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

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AMERICAN
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SOME NOTES ON DRAMATIC ILLUSION IN ARISTOPHANES

Recent discussions of the relationship between author, actor and audience in Greek drama do not seem to have taken sufficient account of one important difference between comic and tragic performances.[1] Spectators of comedy laugh, cheer, applaud, jeer, gasp, groan, and, in short, make a great deal of noise, whereas tragedy is performed before a relatively silent audience. It is true that reverent silence may be a modern phenomenon, and that ancient Athenian and Elizabethan audiences may have been less apathetic towards tragedy than their modern counterparts, but there is no reason to believe that they intruded upon the performance to the same extent as an audience, ancient or modern, responding to comedy.[2] On the contrary, for actors in tragedy the audience is largely irrelevant, while comic actors *need* their audience and are consequently aware of its presence, through its various reactions, all the time. In modern terms Old Attic Comedy is closer to pantomime or circus clowning than to 'farce' or 'situation comedy,' in that the audience is frequently addressed directly and sometimes invited to participate.[3] This is in direct contrast to ancient tragedy, in which, as has

[1] G. M. Sifakis, *Parabasis and Animal Choruses, A Contribution to the History of Attic Comedy* (Athlone Press, University of London 1971), David Bain, 'Audience Address in Greek Tragedy,' *CQ* 25 (i) (1975), 13 ff., and *Actors and Audience, A Study of Asides and Related Conventions in Greek Drama* (Oxford 1977), Frances Muecke, 'Playing with the Play: Theatrical Self-Consciousness in Aristophanes,' *Antichthon* 11 (1977) 52 ff.

[2] Cf. P. Walcot, 'Aristophanic and Other Audiences,' *G & R* 18 (i) (1971) 49. Hdt. 6.21.2, quoted by Walcot, does not help much, since the lamentations in the theatre provoked by Phrynichos' *Capture of Miletos* were proof of the *exceptional* sensitivity of the Athenians about the fate of Miletos. This is not to deny the possibility that national temperament made ancient Athenian audiences more emotional than, let us say, a modern English-speaking audience, but it may be worth noting that a modern Greek audience at Epidavros, which, to the temporary amazement of foreigners present, stands and applauds the reunion of Elektra and Orestes, or Kreousa and Ion, watches the rest of the performance in relative silence.

[3] Cf. Walcot, op. cit. p. 36.

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been recently reaffirmed, there is no audience awareness at all.[4] Therefore, it may still be helpful to think of Greek tragedy as played *in front of* an audience, and Old Comedy as played explicitly *to* an audience,[5] which, in turn, might explain why generalisations about 'dramatic illusion' in Greek drama are unsatisfactory when they try to embrace both tragedy and comedy.[6]

While examination of comedy might suggest that dramatic illusion does not exist at all in Greek drama,[7] observers of tragedy tend to minimise its rupture in comedy.[8] Once it is admitted that writers of tragedy and comedy must necessarily treat their audiences differently, and that theatrical self-consciousness is an integral part of the comic performance despite its absence from tragedy, we are freed from the necessity of making our observations about dramatic illusion fit both types of play.

In a comic performance there must have been many opportunities for the actors to rupture the dramatic illusion by communicating with the audience through movement, gesture, and even words, which were not explicitly called for by the text.[9] But to deny the existence of the dramatic illusion altogether, even though it may only be maintained

[4] Bain's conclusion in both works cited above (n. 1) is supported by Oliver Taplin, *Greek Tragedy in Action* (Methuen, London 1978) pp. 165–66.

[5] Cf. Muecke op. cit. p. 55, pace Sifakis, op. cit. p. 11.

[6] 'Dramatic illusion,' or the 'illusion of reality' has been defined by K. J. Dover, *Aristophanic Comedy* (Batsford, London 1972) p. 56, as 'the uninterrupted concentration of the fictitious personages of the play on their fictitious situation,' cf. Bain, *Actors and Audience,* pp. 6–7, 'Actors pretend to be the people they play and the audience accepts that pretence.'

[7] Sifakis, op. cit. p. 7, 'My contention is that illusion as a psychological phenomenon was entirely alien to Greek theatrical audiences and that the use of the term with reference to Greek drama is an anachronism.'

[8] Bain, *Actors and Audience,* p. 4, 'Greek drama portrays actions and its actors play at being people involved in real situations. They identify themselves with the characters they are playing and speak in the person of those characters' and p. 5, '(in Old Comedy) there are extended passages where no overt account is taken of the audience and where the actors are clearly maintaining the pretence of being people involved in an action.'

[9] We can only guess at the extent of unscripted 'playing up' to the spectators which could have been elicited by their response to the jokes, or more especially, the visual humour of slapstick and comic costume. I find it impossible to believe that there was a rigid performance which conformed to the rehearsed version in every single detail, even if there was only one public performance. Moreover we do not know the exact relationship between our text and the actual performance, and in the absence of the original stage directions, we can never hope to recapture the original performance since, unlike tragedy, comedy has so many variables of movement, gesture, timing, costume, pronunciation

for short periods at a time, is to ignore the comic possibilities of *pretending* to create the illusion, and then rupturing it to parody the 'seriousness' of tragedy.[10] Besides, the dramatic illusion was always potentially there in the traditional dramatic setting created by the theatre, scenery, costumes, masks, chorus, music and a basic 'plot,'[11] even if, as seems quite likely, Aristophanes and his actors made fun of it as often as possible.

I suggest, therefore, that rupture of the dramatic illusion in Aristophanes is the rule rather than the exception.[12] Direct audience address is not confined to the parabasis or the chorus,[13] explicit and implicit reference to the audience is frequent,[14] and allusions to the situation,

---

and so on, which could affect the humour of the presentation. Under these circumstances, whether the transmitted text is the author's original draft, rehearsal script, or polished version for publication, it is the scenario rather than the whole play.

[10] Cf. Muecke, op. cit. pp. 57–58, 'The result is incongruity. Without the shock effect there would be no humour . . . ,' and 59, 'Here again I invoke tragedy, for it seems to me that breaking of the illusion in comedy could well have been funny by virtue of breaking the rules of tragedy.' Perhaps more attention should be paid to the general question of the dependence of comedy on tragedy for its humour, and whether comedy did not, after all, begin as burlesque of tragedy. The value of comparative anthropology in such matters as the evolution of drama is difficult to assess, but I quote what might be an interesting parallel from a shamanic ritual 'performance,' 'Whenever a depressing atmosphere develops as a result of the violence of possessions, then Guede (one of the *loa*) appears, puckish and obscene. He sits on the girls' knees and pretends to be about to rape them. The congregation revels in this sort of fun and laughs heartily,' Alfred Metraux, *A Selection from Vodoo in Haiti* (New York, Vintage 1960) p. 415.

[11] It might also be relevant to mention an audience conditioned by a long day watching the uninterrupted illusion of tragedy, cf. Sir Arthur Pickard-Cambridge, *The Dramatic Festivals of Athens*[2] (Oxford 1968) p. 64 ff.

[12] Dover, op. cit. p. 55 ff., notes some of the more obvious cases and implies that it occurs fairly frequently, 'the chorus or characters in a comedy may at any moment step half out of the dramatic roles which they are sustaining. . . .'

[13] Muecke, op. cit. p. 57, mentions the case of Dikaiopolis (*Ach.* 377 ff., 496 ff.) and several 'prologues' (*Eq.* 35 ff., *Vesp.* 54 ff., *Pax* 43 ff., *Av.* 30, *Ra.* 1 ff.). She could have added Strepsiades (*Nub.* 1201 ff.), Trygaios (*Pax* 819 ff.) and the servant-girl (*Ekkl.* 1141), who all address the audience directly, albeit briefly. Moreover I am sure that Bdelykleon's argument (*Vesp.* 650 ff.), although addressed ostensibly to his father, is intended for the audience as a whole, as is the speech of Hermes (*Pax* 603 ff.), which is nominally directed at the 'panhellenic' chorus, but is full of parochial Athenian terminology (cf. τὴν πόλιν (608), ἐνθάδε (611), αἱ πόλεις ὧν ἤρχετε (619), ἐνθένδ' (626), ἡ πόλις (642)).

[14] Explicit at *Eq.* 163 ff., 228 ff., 1210, 1318, *Nub.* 889 ff., 1096 ff., *Pax* 543 ff., 962 ff., *Ra.* 1475, *Ekkl.* 580 ff., 888 ff., *Plut.* 796 ff., and implicit (e.g. 'these people here') at *Nub.* 897 ff., *Vesp.* 521, *Ra.* 274 ff., 783, 954, *Ekkl.* 167 ff., not to mention the ambiguous use of the pronoun ὑμεῖς.

plots, conventions and characters of comedy are very common.[15] Moreover a good case can be made for regarding some, if not all, 'paratragic' scenes as breaking the illusion by reflecting upon the nature of the theatre itself.[16] I should like to add to the well-known passages some obvious, but not always noticed, examples of theatrical self-consciousness in Aristophanes, which draw attention to the fact that the fictitious situation illustrated by the play is, in fact, a theatrical performance.

A. *Theatrical movements, Machinery, Buildings and Properties*

1. Movement

Ach. 344–46. The chorus refers to its twirling dance (ἅμα τῇ στροφῇ), in which it has just 'shaken out' the stones with which it was threatening Dikaiopolis.

Vesp. 1536–37. 'No-one has led off a comic chorus dancing before' (ὀρχούμενον. . . . ἀπήλλαξεν χορὸν τρυγῳδῶν).

Pax 323–34. Trygaios tries to calm down the chorus which cannot contain its dance of joy, and refers to its movements by using several apparently technical terms (σχήματα, σχηματίζειν, χορεύτον, ὀρχούμενος, ἑλκύσαι, σκέλος ῥίψαντες).

On occasions actors describe their own or others' movements in terms which seem to allude to the theatrical conditions rather than the fictitious situation of the play:

Vesp. 1342–44.[17] Philokleon invites a flute-girl to follow him 'up' (on to the stage?) (ἀνάβαινε δεῦρο), and if this cannot be explained away—and

[15] Pace Bain, *Actors and Audience*, pp. 210, 213, who defines 'play with the dramatic illusion' far too narrowly. Even so there seem to be at least two places in Aristophanes which satisfy his criterion (a comic character being referred to as a comic character):
Nub. 296, where after Strepsiades has said that the noise of the clouds has scared the shit out of him, Sokrates says, 'Don't you dare make fun (οὐ μὴ σκώψει) . . . like those wretched comics (τρυγοδαίμονες) do!'
and *Ekkl.* 371, where Blepyros says that unless he can find some cure for his constipation, he will turn into 'a comic shit-pot' (σκωραμὶς κωμῳδική), which is more or less what he is at that moment in the play (cf. also *Ekkl.* 889?).

In addition κωμῳδία, τρυγῳδία, σκώπτειν and their compounds occur frequently outside the parabasis, and are just three of the many words which can remind an audience that it is watching a comic performance.

[16] Muecke, op. cit. p. 67. David Sider in his review of Bain's *Actors and Audience* (*AJP* 99 (1978) 399–401) has already taken him to task for denying the relevance of allusions to tragedy in his discussion of dramatic illusion in comedy.

[17] For this point in general see Dover, op. cit. p. 17ff., and pp. 18–19 where he discusses this particular passage.

I do not think it can—then *Ach.* 732, *Eq.* 149,[18] *Vesp.* 1514, and *Ekkl.* 1152 probably fall into this category.[19]

Similarly movement in and out of the door(s) of the *skene* was probably described as the audience actually saw it, even when the scene was imagined to be taking place indoors;[20] and on the few occasions when the location shifts from Athens characters 'forget' where they are supposed to be:

Av. 301. When Euelpides sees an owl in the kingdom of the birds, to which he has journeyed, he asks, 'who has brought an owl to Athens?' 1455 ff. An informer who has arrived in Cloudcuckooland in search of wings describes how useful they would be for his business of laying charges 'here' (i.e. in Athens) and flying back 'there' (foreign lands) to seize the defendant's goods before they have even arrived 'here' (Athens again) to defend their case.[21]

2. Machinery

The use of the *ekkyklema,* whatever its exact nature,[22] may be another instance of comic parody of tragedy;[23] it is referred to three times specifically:

[18] But not *Eq.* 169, which is sometimes mentioned in this context, since I believe that the Sausage-seller, having mounted the stage, is now being invited to climb up onto his own table for an even better view.

[19] R. G. Ussher, *Aristophanes Ecclesiazusae* (Oxford 1973) pp. 232–33, admits that there possibly was a low stage, but still prefers to explain away *Eq.* 149, *Vesp.* 1514 and *Ekkl.* 1152. He is least convincing with *Eq.* 149, where he suggests that the Sausage-seller is being called 'up' from the market, since 146 ff. tells us that he has been intercepted on his way *to* market. As for the stage, the picture on the oinochoe from Anavysos ought to be conclusive, see J. D. Beazley, *Attic Red-Figure Vase-Painters*[2] (Oxford 1963) p. 1215, cf. P. D. Arnott, *Greek Scenic Conventions in 5th. c. B.C.* (Oxford 1962) p. 16.

[20] There are many references to 'going in' and 'coming out,' which, it could be argued, draw unnecessary attention to the *skene,* but since so many domestic scenes could actually have taken place out of doors, it is not easy to be sure when the action is supposed to be happening indoors. Dover, *Aristophanes Clouds* (Oxford 1968) p. lxxiii ff. argues that the opening scene of that play is probably to be imagined as taking place inside the house, in which case *Nub.* 19 'bring out my ledger,' and 125 'I am going inside' rupture the illusion.

[21] Hermes at *Pax* 603 ff. (see note 13 above), and Aischylos at *Ra.* 1083 ff. 'forget' that they are in heaven and Hades respectively, and not in Athens.

[22] C. W. Dearden, *The Stage of Aristophanes* (Athlone Press, University of London 1976) p. 50 ff., discusses the evidence for its nature and use, and offers suggestions of other occasions on which it *may have* (my italics) been used.

[23] Cf. n. 10 above. I wonder whether it is merely coincidence that Euripides is on stage as a comic character on all three occasions when the *ekkyklema* is mentioned specifically.

Ach. 408–9. Dikaiopolis instructs Euripides to 'wheel yourself out' (ἐκκυκλήθητ'), and he agrees to come out of his house to see Dikaiopolis (ἐκκυκλήσομαι).[24]

Thesm. 96. Euripides points out Agathon coming out on the *ekkyklema* (οὗτος οὐκκυκλούμενος).

265. Agathon issues instructions that he is to be 'wheeled in' (εἴσω τις. . . . μ' ἐσκυκλησάτω).

The same, or a similar, device may have been used in at least one other case:

Nub. 181–83. Strepsiades calls for the academy of Sokrates to be opened up (ἄνοιγ' ἄνοιγ' . . . τὸ φροντιστήριον . . . ἄνοιγε τὴν θύραν) to reveal the students inside.[25]

The *mechane,* or crane, appears to have been used for flying gods and heroes in tragedy, and doubtless offered great scope for fun and games in comedy.[26] We do not know how often it was used, but its operator is addressed twice in the text by an actor drawing attention to the technique of operating the device—the context of the first passage is obscure, and the text uncertain:

frg. 188 (Daidalos)

ὁ μηχανοποιός, ὁπότε βούλει τὸν τροχὸν
[ἐᾶν] ἀνεκάς, λέγε 'χαῖρε φέγγος ἡλίου.'

but the second is well known:

Pax 174. Trygaios has mounted his dung-beetle for the flight to heaven, and is apparently airborne from 1.82, and in fear of falling off; just before he lands he calls out to the operator to be careful,

ὦ μηχανοποιὲ πρόσεχε τὸν νοῦν ὡς ἐμέ·

There is only one other occasion on which the device is certainly referred to in the text:

[24] The references to 'upstairs' and 'downstairs' in these lines, although the exact meaning is disputed, almost certainly draw attention to the machinery which has brought Euripides into view—409–11, Euripides says, καταβαίνειν δ' οὐ σχολή, and Dikaiopolis replies, ἀναβάδην ποιεῖς, ἐξὸν καταβάδην.

[25] Dover posits a moveable screen in the opening scene, which is rolled away at this stage, *Clouds* p. lxxiv ff.

[26] See Dearden, op. cit. p. 75 ff.

Nub. 226. Sokrates is suspended in midair, and in addition to references to the fact that he is 'hanging' (217, 229) he is said to be looking down on the gods ἀπὸ ταρροῦ.[27]

In two further passages the actors could be drawing the audience's attention to the use of the *mechane* as part of paratragic farce:

Av. 1198. Where the chorus anticipates the arrival of the winged Iris, 'Methinks I hear the winged sound of some whirling aerial god.'

Thesm. 1015. Euripides has appeared briefly, disguised as Perseus, and signalled to his relative that rescue is at hand, 'or he would not have flown past like that.'[28]

3. Theatre

There are three references by actors to the entrances to the orchestra of the theatre:[29]

Nub. 326. When Strepsiades cannot see the chorus of clouds, and Sokrates points them out, παρὰ τὴν εἴσοδον.

Av. 296 As the chorus of birds enters, Euelpides says there are so many 'you cannot see the entrance for wings!'

frg. 388 (Nesoi) in what seems to be a similar context to the two previous passages,

A. τί σὺ λέγεις; εἰσὶν δὲ ποῦ;
B. αἷδὶ κατ' αὐτὴν ἣν βλέπεις τὴν εἴσοδον.

There are several references to what might be the permanent altar (βωμός),[30] in the context of a sacrificial ceremony, but only one passage which mentions it outside such a context:

Thesm. 885–88. The captured relative, pretending to be Helen, is sitting on it, and claims that it is the tomb of Proteus; the woman who is guarding him protests, 'how dare you call the altar a tomb!'

[27] Dover, *Clouds* p. 126, discusses possible meanings of ταρρός, but whether it is a perch, bar, sling or basket, it must be part of the *mechane*, and attention is being drawn to it by Strepsiades.

[28] Dearden, op. cit. p. 83, is worried by ἐκδραμών at l.1011, but this need not mean that Euripides/Perseus had literally *run* on, for δρόμος = flight. Cf. *Av.* 1200 (probably), Aisch. *Pers.* 207 (certainly), and *Av.* 1409, πτερωθεὶς διαδράμω τὸν ἀέρα.

[29] For probable reference to the stage-buildings (*Pax* 731) see p. 10 below.

[30] Cf. Dearden, op. cit. p. 46ff.

Two other statements by actors could be regarded as drawing the audience's attention to the fact that they are in the theatre:

Eq. 704. The Sausage-seller refers to Kleon's right of proedria by saying that he would like to see him 'removed from the front row and watching from the back'—in this instance a simple wave of the arm towards the audience would rupture the illusion.[31]

Thesm. 1060. Euripides, disguised as Echo, gives a clue to the audience and his relative by announcing himself as 'Echo, who was Euripides' ally last year (in the Andromeda) *in this very place* (the theatre).'

4. Judges and Officials

Direct appeals to the judges to award the play the first prize tend to be made by the chorus, in a formal address, in which, like the parabasis, the dramatic illusion is ruptured for more than just a fleeting moment.[32] However three other passages refer briefly to the judges just in passing, as it were:

Ach. 1224. Dikaiopolis says, 'carry me to the judges, where is the 'king' archon (basileus)? Hand over the wine-skin.'[33]

Av. 445–47. The chorus of birds swears to observe a truce, 'as sure as they will win the unanimous verdict of judges and audience,' but if they break their oath 'may we win by only a single judge.'

[31] It could be argued that if Kleon was actually sitting in the front row, as he probably was, the implied reference to him had ruptured the dramatic illusion anyway. This passage would then fall into the same category as *Vesp.* 76ff., *Ekkl.* 167–68, *Plut.* 800 (and perhaps *Nub.* 394ff., *Pax* 472, *Ekkl.* 104), where members of the audience are referred to by name by characters other than the chorus. Such references clearly *do* rupture the illusion, cf. Muecke, op. cit. p. 56, and are not part of any special relationship which might be said to exist between the chorus and audience in the parabases and elsewhere, when it addresses the audience more or less formally.

[32] Cf. previous note; as in the case of the parabases, such passages are obvious and well known (*Nub.* 1115ff., *Av.* 1101ff., *Ekkl.* 1152ff.)—they are between ten and twenty lines long.

[33] I am sure that this passage does refer to the judges of the dramatic contest, although some scholars have explained it in terms of the drinking contest which he has just won (1.1203). The ambiguity is probably deliberate; the *archon basileus* presided over the dramatic contest and supervised the judging (Pickard-Cambridge, op. cit. pp. 95–99), whereas the wine-skin was announced as the prize for the drinking-contest at 1.1002—the ambiguity would, no doubt, be accentuated if, as is more than likely, Dikaiopolis was by now quite drunk.

Ekkl. 1141. A servant girl invites to the banquet any of the audience who is well disposed, 'and any of the judges who has not been looking in the wrong direction.'

In another passage the scholiasts are probably right to see a reference to one of the dignitaries in the audience, the priest of Dionysos:

Ra. 297. The comic Dionysos, terrified by the monster (Empousa) in Hades, appeals, 'O priest, protect me, so that I can share a drink with you.'[34]

Two passages refer to the contributions expected from the choregos:

Ach. 1150–55. The chorus curses Antimachos, 'who when he was choregos at the Lenaia sent me home without my supper.'

Pax 1021–22. Trygaios orders that the sheep be taken inside for sacrifice, which will 'save the choregos a sheep.'[35]

Another similar passage mentions a chorus-trainer (χοροδιδάσκαλος):

Ekkl. 809–10. A man, doubtful that others will obey new regulations about depositing private property with the state, asks, 'will Kallimachos, the chorus-trainer, make any contribution?'[36]

5. Stage Properties

Dover has pointed out that under the ancient theatrical conditions, all movement of properties, which could not be integrated into the action of the play, did in some way rupture the dramatic illusion, and such comings and goings of silent stagehands may have been common, but one passage seems to rupture the illusion further by drawing attention to them:[37]

[34] A scholiast explains that the priest of Dionysos would be sitting in the front row. Dionysos' comment about sharing a drink together suggests, moreover, that he is addressing his 'own' priest.

[35] The meanness of the choregos is probably the point of two passages in the *Av.* 890–901, where the sacrificial goat is described as small enough to be carried off by a single kite, and as all skin and bone (literally 'beard and horns'), and 1056–57 where it is again taken inside at the last moment. The scholiast on *Ra.* 404 explains the chorus' remarks about its costume as a reference to the economy practised by the choregos—see p. 11 below.

[36] There is nothing to prove that Kallimachos was the chorus-trainer for the *Ekklesiazousai*, but the passage has more point if he was, and if, as in the case of the choregos, his meanness could affect the cast of the play in some way or other.

[37] *Aristophanic Comedy* p. 20. Since the lines in question are the introduction to the parabasis, they might be felt to be part of a formal address to the audience—see n. 31 above.

Pax 729–33. The chorus of panhellenic farmers has brought on ropes and tackle (307, 458), and perhaps other implements (cf. 564ff.), which they now need to get rid of before the parabasis, 'meanwhile, let us hand over this equipment (τάδε τὰ σκεύη) to the attendants (τοῖς ἀκολούθοις) to look after, because there are always plenty of thieves loitering with intent around the stage-buildings (περὶ τὰς σκηνὰς).[38] Guard it well, while we tell the audience. . . .' It is true that the attendants could be slaves who have attended the farmers from the beginning,[39] but the joke depends upon a rupture of the illusion in the mention of thieves back-stage and a reference to stagehands would be entirely appropriate.

In a similar category is the flute player who is well attested in vase-paintings and the scholia, and who is specifically addressed on two occasions (for *Av.* 859ff. see p. 13 below):

Ekkl. 890–92. The old woman, who is about to sing her love song says, 'and you, my sweet little flute player, take your pipes and play a tune worthy of us both.'

B. *Masks and Costumes*

In all the extant plays there are jokes which depend upon drawing the audience's attention to the comic dress of the characters, and while it may be argued that the very existence of grotesque masks, padded costumes and the phallos destroys the illusion,[40] reference to comic costume, *as* comic costume, goes a step further.

1. Chorus

It may be felt that the chorus, especially in the parabases, has a special licence to rupture the illusion.[41] The chorus of the Wasps draws specific attention to its costume, as a costume,[42] and the chorus of the Knights, Clouds, and Birds may have done so by movement or gesture

[38] The reference to σκηνάς at *Thesm.* 658 is ambiguous, and this could well have been exploited by the chorus' search for 'other men seated in this place' (1.663, 688), that is at their meeting or in the theatre.

[39] Cf. Dover, op. cit. p. 21.

[40] The opposite could be said, of course—that this *creates* the theatrical illusion—see p. 3, n. 11 above and p. 20, n. 82 below.

[41] Cf. nn. 31, 38 above. It sometimes announces that it is 'stripping' for the parabasis—*Ach.* 627, cf. *Pax* 729ff., *Lys.* 615, 637, 662, 686, *Thesm.* 656. Naturally all such costume-changes need not be announced in the text.

[42] *Vesp.* 1071ff., cf. 403ff. where they first throw off their cloaks.

while discussing their character.[43] There are, however, one or two less formal occasions on which the chorus' costume is noticed:

> *Nub.* 341–44. After the arrival of the chorus of clouds, Strepsiades asks, 'Why, if they really are clouds, do they look like ordinary women? That's not what those up there look like . . . they look more like scattered woolly fleeces, and not at all like women—but *these* have noses!' Whatever the exact point of the joke,[44] it is clear that Strepsiades is inspecting the chorus' costume closely, and drawing attention to the fact that it consists of actors dressed up as clouds.
>
> *Ra.* 404. The chorus of initiates during its entrance song sings, 'It is you, Iacchos, who have torn our tattered clothes and sandals for fun and economy, and have found a way to dance and play for little cost.'[45]

2. Dramatic Entrances

As far as we can gather from artistic representations comic costume was generally grotesque, and although this was the rule new arrivals, even stock characters, seem to have raised a laugh on their first appearance. It is worth noting the number of jokes in the text which are at expense of the costume of a newcomer, and they suggest that the audience was always alert for innovations as well as the old favourites.[46]

> *Ach.* 63–64. The ambassadors returning from the king of Persia are called 'peacock pretenders' by Dikaiopolis before they arrive, but when he sees them he says, 'Bless my soul, O Ekbatana, look at that get-up!'
>
> 156–58. And when the Odomantian army is announced, 'What the hell is this . . . what is it? Who unwrapped the Odomantians' prick?'[47]
>
> 575–86. Lamachos' appearance is ridiculed by Dikaiopolis, 'Oh Lamachos, hero of crests and companies . . . I am dizzy from fear of your armour, please take away that terrifying sight (τὴν μορμόνα) . . . turn your shield up the other way . . . give me a feather from your crest . . . and now hold my head while I throw up—your plumes make me sick!'[48]

[43] *Eq.* 595 ff., *Nub.* 1115 ff., *Av.* 785 ff. (cf. 364–65).

[44] The scholiast suggests that they are wearing ridiculous masks with huge noses; presumably they are female in appearance because they are supposed to be goddesses, and not just for the sake of making a joke about Kleisthenes' well known effeminacy at 1.355.

[45] Cf. n. 35 above.

[46] I have singled out some special costume set-pieces in section 3 below.

[47] For the phallos in general see section 5 below.

[48] Fear is a frequent comic reaction to a new arrival, and it is reasonable to suggest that its expression on these occasions is an indication of the outlandish appearance of the character concerned, even when it is not accompanied by an explicit description.

1024. Dikaiopolis addresses the newly arrived farmer, 'Oh wretched, wretched man! And yet you are dressed in white.'

Nub. 184–86. Strepsiades sees for the first time the students of Sokrates' academy, 'Good lord, what sort of creatures are these? . . . they look like the Spartans captured at Pylos.'[49]

Vesp. 900–1. Philokleon sees the defendant dog, Labes, 'You foul creature, you! He looks like a thief—see him grinning at me—he can't fool me.'

1412–14. Philokleon makes obscure fun of a silent character, Chairephon, brought on to witness the laying of a charge by a baking-woman; it seems to be the corpse-like appearance of Chairephon,[50] and perhaps the old woman herself, which is alluded to (θαψίνῃ).

1507–13. In another obscure passage Philokleon takes on the sons of Karkinos in a dancing match, and they are variously described as crabs (καρκίνους), and either a shrimp (?) or a spider (?) (ὀξίς ἢ φάλαγξ) in what may well be allusions to their costume as well as their manner of dancing.

Pax 239. Trygaios comments to the audience on the terrible appearance of War (τοῦ βλέμματος).

523–25. Trygaios welcomes Peace and Opora and Theoria, 'what a lovely face (πρόσωπον) you have, Theoria, and how sweetly you smell of perfume. . . .'

1044–45. Hierokles is greeted, 'here comes someone with his head crowned with laurels . . . what an imposter!'

Av. 61. The Hoopoe's servant-bird is seen by Pisthetairos who says, 'lord Apollo preserve us—look at that gaping beak (χασμήματος)!'[51]

93–107. The Hoopoe's costume is discussed at length; his feathers, crest, beak, and moulting appearance are ridiculed.

667–74. Pisthetairos greets the arrival of Prokne with enthusiasm, 'how pretty, how soft (ἁπαλόν), how fair (λευκόν)!' and Euelpides says, 'she has got as much gold on her as a young girl'[52] and then her mask is

[49] It seems reasonable to follow the scholiast in attributing this remark to their inhuman appearance—presumably pallor and emaciation.

[50] Cf. *Nub.* 503–4.

[51] The panic of Pisthetairos and Euelpides is jokingly referred to at ll. 65, 68 and 85, cf. n. 48 above.

[52] The reference may be to a girl (παρθένος) in a procession (cf. *Ach.* 258), or involve a sexual double entendre, cf. Jeffrey Henderson, *The Maculate Muse* (Yale University Press 1975) p. 131.

examined in much closer detail because Euelpides says he would like to give her a kiss:

Pisth. 'You fool, her beak is like a pair of skewers (ὀβελίσκοιν ἔχει)

Eu. 'Well then it is like shelling an egg, you have to take off the top—and, then give her a kiss!' (ὥσπερ ᾠὸν..ἀπολέψαντα χρὴ ἀπὸ τῆς κεφαλῆς τὸ λέμμα)—clearly he lifts off her mask.

801–8. Pisthetairos and Euelpides return to the stage with their wings and make fun of each other's appearance:

Eu. 'That's the funniest sight I've ever seen.'

Pisth. 'What are you laughing at?' Eu. 'Your flying feathers! Do you know what you look like dressed in those wings?'

Pisth. 'Well you look like a portrait of a goose by an artist who couldn't afford the paint!'

Eu. 'And you look like a blackbird with a crew-cut!'[53]

859–61. Pisthetairos apparently addresses the flute-player, 'You can stop blowing. Good lord, what was that? I've seen many strange sights in my time, but I never saw a crow wearing a mouthpiece before (ἐμπεφορβειωμένον).'[54]

911, 915. Pisthetairos remarks about the newly arrived poet that he has long hair and 'servile' shirt (ὀτρηρὸν καὶ τὸ ληδάριον).

994. Meton's stage boots look incongruous on him, τίς ὁ κόθορνος;

1021. The inspector (ἐπίσκοπος) wears some extravagant and exotic costume, τίς ὁ Σαρδανάπαλλος οὑτοσί;

1203. Iris' appearance is apparently the subject of the remark, 'are you a boat or a bonnet?' (πλοῖον ἢ κυνῆ);

1567–73. The Triballian god is wearing his cloak over the wrong shoulder and Poseidon rearranges it for him, 'Hey, what are you doing, are you trying to wear it on the left? Change your cloak over to the right side like this. You fool . . . hold still, damn you. . . .'

1709–24. A messenger announces the entrance of Pisthetairos and his bride—he is more radiant than stars or sun, and she is unspeakably beautiful—and the chorus describes the scene, ὦ φεῦ φεῦ τῆς ὥρας, τοῦ κάλλους.

[53] It is true that the audience knows that they have 'dressed up,' but the passage invites comparison with the costumes of the 'real' birds.

[54] The flute-player was doubtless dressed as a bird.

Lys. 7–8. Kleonike draws attention to Lysistrate's scowling appearance, μὴ σκυθρώπαζ' . . . οὐ γὰρ πρέπει σοι τοξοποιεῖν τὰς ὀφρῦς.

79–92. Lysistrate greets the Spartan Lampito by remarking upon her beauty, her complexion, her build (ὡς δὲ σφριγᾷ τὸ σῶμα) and that she looks strong enough to strangle an ox; Kleonike prods her and comments on her fine breasts; next they turn their attention to her companions, a Boiotian whose pubic 'plain' (πεδίον) is lovely, and who is neatly trimmed (παρατετιλμένη), and a Korinthian who is well-endowed (?) (χάϊα).[55]

1148, 57–58. Remarks are made about the appearance of Reconciliation—she has a lovely arse (πρωκτὸς) and cunt (κύσθον) and is also well endowed (see n. 55), and then her body is used as a relief map,

1162–72 for illustrating the 'ring' of Pylos and Echinous (cunt), the Melian gulf (anus), and the 'legs' of Megara.

Thesm. 136–43. Euripides' relative greets Agathon's song and costume with derision, 'what raiment is this, what confusion of nature, what has a lute got to do with a frock, an animal skin with a hair net, an oil flask with a girdle? They don't go together. What has a hand mirror got in common with a sword[56] . . . if you are a man, where's your prick, where's your cloak and shoes, and if you are a woman, where are your tits?'[57]

582–83. The chorus points to Kleisthenes' beardless cheeks to justify referring to him as a 'boy.'

910. The relative looks for a laugh in an unexpected reference to Euripides' disguise as the shipwrecked Menelaos, 'I recognise you by the seaweed.'[58]

1181–87. Euripides has brought along a dancing-girl to seduce the Scythian policeman, and he assists her in a striptease, taking off her

[55] In the context the word clearly has some sexual connotation, as the scholiast notes; it is used again of Reconciliation at 1.1157.

[56] The point about these items, which Agathon was probably wearing or carrying, is that they are a mixture of 'male' and 'female' accessories.

[57] It is true that Agathon's dramatic character is effeminate (cf. 1.98 above), but the closeness of the inspection of his costume must draw the audience's attention to the fact that he is a male actor dressed as a man-who-wears-women's-clothes. Similar fun is made of Dionysos by Herakles at *Ra.* 45–47 'a lion-skin over a frock . . . how does an actor's boot (κόθορνος) go with a club (ῥόπαλον)?', (he is called 'fatty' (γάστρων) by Charon (1.200), and his boots are mocked again by the landlady (1.557)). The condition of Blepyros at *Ekkl.* 329–46, 374 is slightly different, since, although he is mocked for wearing women's clothes, he is faced by an emergency which is an integral part of the plot—his wife has stolen his clothes.

[58] The joke is at the expense of Euripides and the alleged involvement of his family in selling vegetables and greenery, cf. *Ach.* 478.

gown and sandals; she sits on the policeman's lap and he remarks on the firmness and roundness of her breasts and her lovely bottom.

Plut. 422–24. Poverty makes a dramatic and sinister entrance and threatens Blepsydemos and Chremylos who question her, Ch. 'Who are you? You seem very pale (ὠχρὰ) to me.' Bl. 'Perhaps she is one of the avenging Furies from tragedy—she certainly looks wild and tragic (μανικόν τι καὶ τραγῳδικόν).'

861–62. There may have been something conspicuous about the sykophant's appearance which leads the Just Man to describe him as a man 'of evil stamp' (τοῦ πονηροῦ κόμματος).

1018 ff. The appearance of an old woman who has lost her young lover is the subject of a great deal of ridicule; she laments how he used to praise her lovely hands, sweet perfume, her soft and pretty look (βλέμμα), she is likened to a withered corpse, wasted through grief (1033–35) and things get worse when her lover arrives:

1042–86. '. . . my ancient friend, how quickly you have gone grey . . . good lord, look at all those wrinkles on her face (ἐν τῷ προσώπῳ τῶν ῥυτίδων ὅσας ἔχει).' Chremylos warns against bringing a flame close to her in case she catches fire like an old olive wreath (εἰρεσιώνην); they guess at the number of teeth she has—Chremylos says three or four, the lover claims she only has one! The lover says she needs a good wash, but Chremylos warns that to wash off her make-up (ψιμύθιον) would expose the tatters (ῥάκη) of her face, and finally she is likened to old and bitter dregs of wine.[59]

My contention is that these passages listed above tend to remind the audience that they are looking at actors in comic costume and thus rupture the dramatic illusion, but there are in addition several scenes in which Aristophanes seems to go even further and parody the grotesqueness and extravagance of comic costume by producing characters of exceptionally absurd appearance.

3. Costume Set-Pieces

Occasionally the action is interrupted when the characters on stage stop to share the audience's amazement and amusement at the arrival of some spectacular 'apparition':

[59] Comparison with the ugly old women in *Ekkl.* 1051 ff. and 1068 ff. (see p. 17 below) might suggest that these details were actually visible, at least to the majority of spectators. For a summary of the evidence on mask detail, see Dearden, op. cit. p. 122 ff.

Ach. 94–97. Dikaiopolis greets Pseudartabas, The Great King's Eye, 'Saints preserve us! In the name of heaven, man, you look like a warship rounding the headland on the way to the dockyard! Anyway that looks like an oar-pad you've got under your eye.'[60] The outlandishness of Pseudartabas' appearance is, of course, complemented by his gibberish Greek.[61]

Eq. 230–33. A slave prepares the audience for the entrance of the Paphlagonian, whom they already know is supposed to represent Kleon,[62] when he tells the Sausage-seller, 'don't be afraid, he is not represented by a true portrait (ἐξῃκασμένος), since all the technicians were afraid to make a likeness (οὐδεὶς ἤθελεν τῶν σκευοποιῶν εἰκάσαι), but he will be recognisable, the audience is not stupid.' Whether or not the passage is evidence for some portrait-masks, the point here, surely, is that the Paphlagonian is going to be a hideous 'apparition' which, even so, cannot capture the true repulsiveness of Kleon's actual appearance.[63] At all events the audience has been invited to inspect his mask as a mask.[64]

Av. 268–93. The strange birds which enter just before the main chorus of birds,[65] are probably comic caricatures;[66] Pisthetairos, Euelpides and the Hoopoe discuss the appearance and identity of four exotic 'birds,' a Flame-bird, a Median, a second Hoopoe, and a Guzzler:

P. 'Look here comes a bird. Eu. Yes, by heaven, it *is* a bird! What sort of bird is that? It wouldn't be a peacock,[67] would it? . . .

[60] The scholiasts speculate on the nature of the costume and mask of the King's Eye, and make some reasonable inferences from the text—he seems to be wearing a single eye, which is probably in size and appearance like an oar-hole, and his headdress may be so cumbersome that he has to move ponderously giving the impression of a ship (rounding the corner of the stage-building?).

[61] The question of whether he is an impostor is raised, but not settled, by the exposure of his attendants as Greeks, when Dikaiopolis scrutinises *their* costume closely and recognises, or pretends to, two Athenians in disguise: 120–21 'you, you monkey, do you dare to come here wearing this false beard and dressed up as a eunuch?'

[62] He is a tanner (1.44), stole a Lakonian cake from Pylos (55–56), and has one foot in Pylos, one in the assembly (76).

[63] Cf. Dover, op. cit. p. 29.

[64] The fact that his entrance is blustering and threatening adds to the impact—he is greeted with dismay (1.234) and flight (240), cf. the terrifying effect of Aiakos' entry at *Ra.* 465 ff.—Dionysos' stomach turns to water (ἐγκέχοδα)!—and it is likely that he too was frightening to look at, although he is not described in the text.

[65] It has been noted that there are exactly twenty-four birds named later when the chorus begins to flock in (1.295 ff.), and so these four are not to be regarded as part of the chorus, cf. Dover, op. cit. p. 145.

[66] It is possible that they are not intended to represent real birds at all, and that some visual joke, dance, spectacle or even double entendre is in point.

[67] It may be significant that the peacock is synonymous with ostentatious deceit at *Ach.* 63 τοῖς ταῶσι τοῖς τ' ἀλαζονεύμασι, and perhaps also at *Av.* 102 πότερον ὄρνις ἢ ταῶς;.

H. That is not one your ordinary birds which you can see every day—it comes from the marshes. Eu. Wow! It's beautiful—flaming red!

H. Of course, it's called a Flame-bird. Eu. Hey, here, look!

P. What are you shouting about? Eu. There's another bird! P. So there is—that one's from foreign parts too, I bet. What on earth is this strange, prophetic, mountain bird? H. It is a Median.

Eu. A Median? Saints preserve us! And how did this Median fly in without a camel? P. And here's another one—it's got a crest for itself. Eu. And what on earth is *this* monstrosity? I thought you were the only Hoopoe, but is this another one?[68] . . . look how its feathers are falling out . . . Ye gods, look at the colour of that other one! What is that one called? H. That's a Guzzler . . .

Eu. Well tell me, what is all this crest business about—are they going to run in the soldier's race?' Despite the difficulty of deciding exactly what is going on in this passage,[69] it is clear that the costumes are being closely inspected by actors and audience, in contrast to the way that the chorus of twenty-four 'ordinary' birds is merely announced by name a few lines later (297 ff.).

In the *Ekklesiazousai,* the first old woman is probably a stock figure, who despite her attempts at beautification has only made herself more grotesque,[70] but the second old woman is certainly an 'apparition':

Ekkl. 1051–57. Her entry is greeted by the young man, who has just escaped the clutches of the first old woman, 'AAaaagh, where did *you* crawl out from, you disgusting creature? This one is even worse looking than the other one! . . . it's a monster (Empousa) disguised as a blood blister (ἐξ αἵματος φλύκταιναν ἠμφιεσμένη)', and the third old woman is even uglier:

1068–73: '*Oh my god* (ὦ Ἡράκλεις, ὦ Πᾶνες, ὦ Κορύβαντες, ὦ Διοσκόρω) this monster is even uglier than *this* one! What on earth *is* it? Is it a gorilla in make-up (πίθηκος ἀνάπλεως ψιμυθίου) or an old corpse risen from the dead?'

1101. One of them is called 'Phryne (a toad?) with a funeral vase next to her face (πρὸς ταῖς γνάθοις)' which might be another reference to her mask and make up.

[68] This does not necessarily mean that this bird is supposed to be a hoopoe; its scruffy appearance *reminds* Euelpides of the Hoopoe.

[69] I have omitted from the translation one or two jokes in which the 'birds' are compared to some contemporary figures.

[70] She is καταπεπλασμένη ψιμυθίῳ (1.878), wears ἔγχουσα (1.929) as well (cf. *Plut.* 1018 ff. and n. 59 above), and is likened to a sieve (?) (κρησέραν, 1.991) and a hook for drawing buckets from a well (1.1002 ff.).

4. Dressing and Undressing Scenes

Characters dressed in elaborate comic costume could hardly have dressed and undressed on stage, as they have to do on several occasions, without calling attention to the fact that they *are* comic actors dressed up for a play:

> *Ach.* 412–44. Dikaiopolis asks Euripides to lend him some tragic rags, 'since I have to deliver a long monologue to the chorus,' and he puts on the tattered costume of Telephos, 'since I must be who I am but appear to be otherwise; the audience must know who I am but the chorus must stand by like fools so that I can stuff my subtle arguments up their arse.'[71]

Several scenes require actors playing women to be 'stage-naked' even though they do not necessarily undress on stage, and remarks are made about their sexual attributes:

> *Vesp.* 1373 ff. Philokleon tries to pass off his flute-girl as a torch, Ph. 'Don't you see how it is split? Bd. 'What is this black bit in the middle of it, then? Ph. Oh, that's the pitch which comes out when she's burning. Bd. Isn't this an arse here at the back? Ph. No, it's just a knot-hole sticking out of the torch.'
>
> *Pax* 886–93. Trygaios says of Theoria,[72] 'look at this 'oven,' and the servant replies, 'Wow, it's lovely, and I know why it's sooty (κεκάπνικεν) there—that's where the council used to put their 'pots' in.'[73]
>
> *Lys.* 920–50. The actor who plays Myrrhine presumably sheds some clothes while teasing Kinesias—'κδύομαι (925), τὸ στρόφιον ἤδη λύομαι (931), ὑπολύομαι γοῦν (950).[74]

Elsewhere men dress up as women, men swap clothes, or women disguise themselves as men:

[71] The dramatic illusion is, of course, broken by Dikaiopolis' reference to the chorus and audience, but Aristophanes seems to be 'playing with the play' by making him assume the role and costume of an actor himself.

[72] Commentators tend to interpret κατάθου . . . τὰ σκεύη (886) as an instruction to undress, whereas the scholiasts assume her to be carrying something.

[73] Both here and in the previous passage the reference is clearly to some visible depiction of pubic hair, although it need not always be visible to the audience when it is mentioned elsewhere (*Lys.* 89, 824, *Ekkl.* 97).

[74] The actor was probably, as in the case of the flute-girl and Theoria above, wearing flesh coloured tights and padding.

Thesm. 213–63. Euripides' relative dresses up as a woman—he takes off his cloak (214), is shaved (221–32),[75] singed (236–46),[76] and puts on various items of female apparel (253–63), a dress (κροκωτὸν), girdle (στρόφιον), a wig (κεφαλή), shawl (ἔγκυκλον), and sandals . . .

636–50 . . . later, when he is suspected by the women and stripped, it is discovered that 'he does not have any breasts like us,'[77] and then follows the struggle to uncover his penis.[78]

Ra. 495–603. Dionysos and Xanthias change clothes on three occasions, as Dionysos tries to avoid the unpleasant consequences of being mistaken for the real Herakles (495–502, 521–32, 579–603), which seems to involve the exchange of club and lionskin for the servant's baggage; there is no indication that any other items of costume were exchanged, but if Xanthias was wearing an obvious slave-mask he would presumably have handed this over to Dionysos.[79]

In the *Ekklesiazousai* the first half of the play centres around the theory and practice of women disguising themselves as men:

Ekkl. 24–27. Praxagora wonders whether the women will bring the false beards (ἐρραμμένους . . . τοὺς πώγωνας) and whether they have had difficulty in stealing their men's cloaks (θαἰμάτια τἀνδρεῖα).

46–47. Melistiche arrives in her husband's shoes (ταῖς ἐμβάσιν).

60–64. One woman proudly displays her hairy armpits (τὰς μασχάλας λόχμης δασυτέρας) and sun tan.

65–66. Another has thrown away her razor to become hairy all over,

68–75 and they have all brought with them false beards, men's shoes, sticks and cloaks (πώγωνας . . . Λακωνικὰς . . . βακτηρίας . . . θαἰμάτια τἀνδρεῖα).

[75] The shaving scene employs realistic language which suggests that some visible assault was made on his (false?) beard to leave him half shaved (227, τὴν ἡμίκραιραν τὴν ἑτέραν ψιλὴν ἔχων), and then clean shaven (232, ψιλός; 235, Κλεισθένη). We can only guess at how his mask was accommodated for this scene.

[76] This too is described in colourful terms, and must have involved some comic by-play with the phallos (239, τὴν κέρκον φυλάττου νυν ἄκραν), which is somehow hidden until its exposure by the women later (644, διέκυψε καὶ μαλ' εὔχρων).

[77] Obviously his disguise had not gone so far as to include false breasts like the other 'women' had.

[78] Cf. *Thesm.* 643–48 in section 5 (the phallos) below.

[79] We do not know whether Dionysos' disguise included a false beard over his own (probably clean-shaven) mask, but 11.45–48 suggest that his appearance was a comic mixture of Dionysos and Herakles.

118–27. Praxagora instructs any would-be speaker to put her beard on, and she puts her own on, the result is ludicrous and one woman calls to Praxagora, 'look how funny it all seems, as if someone were putting beards on grilled cuttlefish (σηπίαις . . . ἑσταθευμέναις)!'—it may be the contrast between the pale complexions of the women and the dark beards which is the point.[80]

266–79. They all put on their disguises as Praxagora instructs them, 'hitch up your dresses, put on your shoes . . . fix on the beards . . . draw your cloaks up around you . . .'[81]

494–509. The women take off their disguises.

There are some other minor dressing-up scenes which could be regarded as infringements of the dramatic illusion, depending upon how much posturing and slapstick the actors put into them:

Ach. 1103 ff. General Lamachos gets dressed for war.

Vesp. 1131 ff. Philokleon is dressed up as a 'gentleman.'

Plut. 926 ff. The informer is forced to change clothes with the Just Man, and Karion says of the latter's shoes, 'I shall fix these to his (the informer's) forehead like an offering on an olive tree.'

5. The Phallos

With an item of costume as obviously 'unreal' as the phallos, it could be argued that it was hallowed by convention and thus did not impinge upon the dramatic logic of the performance,[82] but we do not know how far convention extended to making fun of its appearance during the play. Hence it is difficult to decide whether reference to the phallos can be regarded as rupture of the dramatic illusion. The following passages seem to include clear reference to the phallos and draw attention to its comic appearance:

[80] A scholiast comments on the whiteness of cuttlefish; perhaps the women's masks were light in colour, even whitened with make up (cf. 386–87), despite the attempts of some of them to acquire a tan (cf. 60–64).

[81] It is hard to say what impression the audience will have formed from the spectacle of male actors, dressed as comic women, putting on men's clothes over their costumes. At all events it can hardly have looked much like real women disguising themselves as real men.

[82] Cf. Dearden, op. cit. p. 41.

Ach. 158–61. Dikaiopolis asks of the Odomantian army, 'who has peeled the leaves off their prick (τὸ πέος ἀποτεθρίακεν)?', and later he says they have got their foreskins drawn back (ἀπεψωλημένοις).[83]

1216–17. Dikaiopolis invites two girlfriends to take hold of his prick by the middle (τοῦ πέους . . . μέσου προσλάβεσθ').

Vesp. 68. The slave's introduction of Bdelykleon as 'the big fellow' (ὁ μέγας) is probably a reference to his phallos.[84]

1342–44. Philokleon tells his flute-girl 'take hold of this rope (τοῦ σχοινίου) . . . be careful it's a rotten rope, but it won't mind a bit of friction', and he refers to it again shortly (1347, τῷ πέει τῳδὶ)

Pax 879–80. Trygaios asks his servant what he is doing drawing circles with his 'thing' (τὸ δεῖν'),[85] and receives the reply, 'I am reserving tent-space for my prick for the Isthmian Games.'[86]

The comic possibilities of the erect phallos are fully exploited in the Lysistrate:

Lys. 845–46. Kinesias describes his as a spasm (σπασμός), the tension (τέτανος) of a man stretched on the torture-wheel.[87]

982 ff. A Spartan herald is called 'priapic,'[88] he is asked about the 'spear' under his cloak, his 'swollen gland,' and produces a 'Spartan baton.'[89]

1071 ff. The chorus remarks on the appearance of the Spartan envoys, who seem to have a 'pig-pen' (?) (χοιροκομεῖον)[90] around their loins, and

[83] Cf. *Ach.* 592, τί μ' οὐκ ἀπεψώλησας; εὔοπλος γὰρ εἶ, where Dikaiopolis seems to be comparing Lamachos' phallos with his own. There were probably different types of phallos, limp or erect, rolled or unrolled, circumcised or uncircumcised. At *Nub.* 538–39 one of the claims made about the special qualities of the play is that she does not come on 'fitted with an artificial leather phallos, thick and dangling with a red tip'; this, of course, is one of the many 'crude gimmicks' which the chorus, in the parabasis, pretends that their author would not stoop to, but which he does employ when it suits him. The point is that this 'dangling' phallos (cf. *Vesp.* 1342 ff.) is not what the Spartans are wearing at *Lys.* 982 ff., 1071 ff.

[84] Cf. Henderson, op. cit. p. 115 f. for exploitation of this double entendre elsewhere.

[85] For τὸ δεῖνα of the penis cf. *Ach.* 1149.

[86] No doubt the point is made more explicit by a gesture towards Theoria's 'isthmus,' cf. Henderson, op. cit. p. 137.

[87] He apparently shows it to Lysistrate at 862–63, and the chorus may indicate it at 964–65 (ὄρρος κατατεινόμενος).

[88] This is how the scholiast explains the reference to 'Konisalos.'

[89] The Prytanis is in the same condition (1012, 1136).

[90] Given the sexual connotations of χοῖρος there is, no doubt, a double entendre, of which the exact meaning is obscure, cf. Henderson, op. cit. p. 132.

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the crisis is obviously a strain (βαβαί· νενεύρωται . . . ἥδε συμφορὰ). Their Athenian counterparts look like wrestlers the way they are holding their cloaks (ὥσπερ παλαιστὰς ἄνδρας ἀπὸ τῶν γαστέρων θαἰμάτι' ἀποστέλλοντας),[91] and they are warned to cover up in case they fall victim to the hermokopidai.

1119–21. Lysistrate tells Reconciliation to take hold of the Spartan's cock (τῆς σάθης) if he will not give his hand, and to lead the Athenians by whatever they offer.

Thesm. 62. Euripides' relative threatens to bugger Agathon's servant with τουτὶ τὸ πέος . . .[92]

643–48. . . . later he tries to hide his phallos from Kleisthenes and the women, Kl. 'where are you pushing your prick to down there?' Woman 'Here it is peeping through here—it's a lovely colour!' They play hide-and-seek with it for a few moments, which, Kleisthenes says, is like traffic going backwards and forwards on the slipway across the isthmus at Korinth.[93]

1187–88. The Scythian archer addresses his own phallos, instructing it to 'stay inside,' and apparently remarking on its appearance, καλὴ τὸ σκῆμα περὶ τὸ πόστιον.

Conclusion

I have tried to illustrate the frequency with which the dramatic illusion is ruptured, outside the more or less formal addresses to the audience by the chorus, by remarks of the actors which remind the spectators that they are in a theatre watching a comic play. There seem to me to be rather more than one hundred passages which reveal the most obvious form of theatrical self-consciousness by drawing attention to the physical aspects of the theatre and the performance. I have not considered the hundreds of other occasions on which the actors seem to talk to the audience in much the same way as modern stand-up comedians do, let alone the places where a gesture or movement towards the audience *might have* ruptured the illusion. Thus it may well be

[91] Exactly why this is so (cf. 1085 ἀσκητικὸν τὸ χρῆμα τοῦ νοσήματος) is not clear.

[92] Cf. 1.157–58.

[93] Cf. n. 86 above. The archer may be making a reference to his prisoner's phallos at 1.1114, when he is trying to demonstrate that Euripides' relative is not really a woman, σκέψαι τὸ κύστο· μή τι μικκὸν παίνεται.

that comedy parodies the dramatic seriousness of tragedy by creating a dramatic illusion only to destroy it as frequently as possible. This means that the spectators at a comedy are virtually a part of the cast, they are noisy extras, whose role is essential but difficult to evaluate because it is unscripted and not always predictable. Thus the relationship between actor and audience in comedy is totally different from that which exists between them during a tragic performance.

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AEGOSPOTAMI REEXAMINED

The battle of Aegospotami in 405 B.C. decided the outcome of the Peloponnesian War. As Grote puts it, "Never was a victory more complete in itself, more overwhelming in its consequences. . . ."[1] Yet, despite the importance of Aegospotami, ancient accounts raise as many questions as they answer, and modern scholarly scrutiny has not been adequate. Recent studies have shed new light on Aegospotami, but many questions remain. This paper will examine three of them: (1) why did Athenian commanders refuse to move their fleet from a dangerous, exposed, and unprovisioned base? (2) how many Athenian prisoners did Lysander execute after his victory? (3) what effect did the manner and magnitude of the defeat have on subsequent Athenian policy?

It is necessary to begin with the tangled tradition of the sources: the main ones are Xenophon and Diodorus.[2] They agree about the bare bones of the story: the Athenian fleet of c. 180 ships hurried to Aegospotami in summer 405 in pursuit of the Spartans 5–7 kilometers across the Hellespont at Lampsacus. Lysander had just taken the town, and the Athenians were anxious to draw him into battle. For several days they sailed across to challenge him, but on each occasion he refused to put to sea. Finally, Lysander surprised the Athenians with their ships largely unmanned, and won both battle and war.[3]

The specific details of the two accounts, however, differ radically. For example, in Xenophon, Sparta's triumph is the result of Lysander's judicious use of scout ships and the strict discipline imposed on his fleet. In Diodorus, Lysander merely relies on deserters for information about the enemy.[4]

[1] G. Grote, *History of Greece,* vol. 6 (London 1898) 441.

[2] The main ancient sources are Xenophon *Hellenica* 2.1.22–30 and Diodorus Siculus 13.105–6. (Unless otherwise stated, all following references to Xenophon are to *Hellenica,* Book 2; to Diodorus, to Book 13.) Plut. *Lys.* 10–11, Frontinus 2.1.18, Polyaenus 1.45.2, Pausanias 9.32.9 all follow Xenophon. Plut. *Alc.* 36–37 and Nepos *Alc.* 8 follow Xenophon in the main but contain traces of Diodorus' version.

[3] Xen. 2.1.22–28; Diod. 13.105–6. Xenophon places Aegospotami at 15 stades or 3 kilometers from Lampsacus. A more accurate measurement is 7 kilometers, or 5 if measuring from the left wing of the Athenian fleet. G. Busolt, *Griechische Geschichte,* vol. 3.2 (Gotha 1904) 1618 n. 3.

[4] Xen. 1.24; Diod. 106.1–2.

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Xenophon's Spartans surprise the Athenians with their ships beached and many of their men off in search of food; overconfidence had bred indiscipline. In Diodorus, the Spartans take the Athenians in the midst of a clumsily-executed maneuver led by the general Philocles—Diodorus leaves its purpose unclear; modern reconstructions make it either a ruse to draw Lysander into battle or the beginning of an Athenian retreat to Sestos, c. 20 kilometers away.[5]

In Xenophon, Lysander takes with hardly a fight 170 ships and many prisoners, of whom he later executes all the Athenians; 3–4,000 men, if later accounts are credible. In Diodorus there is somewhat more fighting, though still hardly a battle. If Lysander takes prisoners, the reader is left to infer it. As for executions, mention is made of precisely one, that of the Athenian general Philocles.[6]

The details of the two accounts differ in many other ways, too many for Xenophon and Diodorus to be reconciled. Which account is one to prefer? Before the discovery of the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* and the recognition that it was the source of Ephorus, Diodorus' source in turn, scholars chose Xenophon and rejected Diodorus.[7] Now, many writers would do just the opposite. A generation of research has demonstrated Xenophon's general inferiority—and particularly in naval affairs—to the Oxyrhynchus historian and therefore to Diodorus, insofar as his account derives from the former. Recent studies of the Ionian War prefer Diodorus to Xenophon on the battles of Notium, Cyzicus, and Mytilene.[8] C. Ehrhardt does the same for Aegospotami: he rejects

[5] Xen. 1.27–28; Diod. 106.1–2. On the distance to Sestos see D. Lotze, *Lysander und der Peloponnesische Krieg* (Berlin 1964) 32. Lotze (34) suggests the retreat to Sestos. C. Ehrhardt, "Xenophon and Diodorus on Aegospotami," *Phoenix* 24 (1970) 227, argues that the Athenians hoped to tempt Lysander into attacking a smaller fleet—just as they had done, unsuccessfully, at Notium in 407. If Ehrhardt is right, the Athenian plan was foolish, since Lysander already had seen the real number of Athenian ships at Aegospotami.

[6] Xen. 1.28–32; Plut. *Lys.* 11.6, 13.1–2, *Alc.* 37.3; Paus. 9.32.9; Diod. 106.6–7.

[7] For example, Grote, *History of Greece*, vol. 6, 438–39; K. J. Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte*[2] vol. 2.1 (Strasbourg 1914) 425 n. 1; Busolt, *Griechische Geschichte*, vol. 3.2 1618–21.

[8] S. Accame, *Ricerche intorno alla guerra corinzia* (Naples 1951) 1–20; G. DeSanctis, *Studi di storia della storiografia greca* (Florence 1951) 163–71; I. A. F. Bruce, *A Historical Commentary on the "Hellenica Oxyrhynchia"* [*HCHO*] (Cambridge 1967) 20–21, 35–39; R. J. Littman, "The Strategy of the Battle of Cyzicus," *TAPA* 99 (1968) 265–72; P. Pédech, "Battailes navales dans les historiens grecs," *REG* 82 (1969) 43–55.

Xenophon and accepts the account of the Oxyrhynchus historian as preserved in Diodorus. E. Will has reached similar conclusions.[9]

It is tempting to accept Ehrhardt and the revisionist view; there are good reasons not to, however. First, Xenophon may be incomplete (e.g., the omission of Philocles' maneuver) and at times suspect (the shield signal to Lysander at 2.1.27 sounds fanciful) but he is generally "clear and intelligible," as Grote writes.[10] Diodorus, on the other hand, is over-condensed: he has the Athenians maintain a base without food supplies, but he does not explain why; he has the general Philocles begin a maneuver before the bulk of the fleet is ready to follow his ships, but again Diodorus supplies no explanation. Diodorus leaves out important details, such as four of the six Athenian generals present at Aegospotami. His characterization of Alcibiades, who shows up at the Athenian camp on the eve of the battle, is as hostile as Xenophon's is naive: one portrays Alcibiades as a stage villain, the other as an ideal patriot.[11]

Secondly, however reliable the Oxyrhynchus historian is on the battles of the Ionian War, Diodorus is not the Oxyrhynchus historian or even his condenser, but merely the condenser of the unreliable Ephorus. Where the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* has survived alongside Diodorus, it demonstrates Diodorus' or Ephorus' tendency to condense a complicated story into a simple and unsatisfactory one or, worse, to omit the story altogether.[12]

[9] C. Ehrhardt, "Aegospotami," 225–28; E. Will, C. Mossé, and P. Goukowsky, *Le monde grec et l'orient*, vol. 1 (Paris 1972) 384 n. 1, 389.

[10] Grote, *History of Greece*, vol. 6, 438 n. 1. Will calls Xenophon's account "plus ou moins romancé: *Le monde grec*, vol. 1, 389, n. 1.

[11] On the Athenian generals at Aegospotami, see infra 29 and n. 19. Diodorus has Alcibiades promise the Athenians the help of his Thracian allies to force the Spartans into a land fight. For this he names a price, a share in the command, to restore his popularity in Athens (105.3–4). Xenophon portrays a selfless and patriotic Alcibiades who merely warns the Athenians to move to a safer base at Sestos (1.25–26). Perhaps the truth is some combination of these two accounts, as Lotze suggests (*Lysander*, 35). In Plutarch, Alcibiades offers Xenophon's advice to the generals and advice similar to Diodorus' to his confidants (*Alc.* 36–37). In Nepos, Alcibiades gives advice similar to Diodorus' to an assembly of the Athenians; he gives Xenophon's advice later as a parting shot to the general Philocles (*Alc.* 8).

[12] Diodorus does not seem to have read the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* itself, but rather, only Ephorus' account, which was based on the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*. G. L. Barber, *The Historian Ephorus* (Cambridge 1935) 49–67.

Diodorus' omissions: For instance, Diod. 14.80.1–5 derives his account of the battle of Sardis from *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* 6–7, but he omits any mention of the

Thirdly, the Oxyrhynchus historian is not a writer without faults, although he was a good historian. He had his biases: for instance, in favor of Sparta and of oligarchy. He was excellently informed about Athens, but is unlikely to have enjoyed Xenophon's access to Spartan sources.[13]

Finally, because of the nature of the subject, any account of Aegospotami is open to question. The greater the defeat, the greater the legends that grow up around it, the more eager the public is for scapegoats, the less fussy about evidence. One has only to think of the "stab in the back" legend that grew up in Germany after World War I. Extending the analogy, post-war Athens, like post-war Germany, had a politician whose fortunes demanded an account of defeat in which he was blameless: Conon or Ludendorff.

The prudent course, therefore, as D. Lotze has argued, is to reserve judgment. Neither Xenophon nor Diodorus gives an adequate account of all the details of Aegospotami.[14] Nevertheless, one can reexamine certain details, both because Xenophon and Diodorus do agree about some points, and because some of Diodorus' lacunae can be filled with credible details from Xenophon or other sources.

(1) *The Athenian Commanders*

The first subject to consider is Aegospotami itself, that is, the base Athenian commanders chose for their fleet. Aegospotami was not a harbor, but simply a beach. An empty spot, it lacked provisions for the 30,000 men of the Athenian fleet, as both Xenophon and Diodorus

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substantial damage Agesilaus did to the countryside after the battle. In his discussion of the battle of Notium, Diod. 13.71.2–4 fails to mention Athens' inability to get all its ships out of the harbor in time to join battle with the Spartans; a detail provided by the Oxyrhynchus historian, see Bruce, *HCHO* 37. The historian's long description of the causes of the Boeoto-Phocian War of 396 (*H. Oxy.* 11) becomes a war "because of certain grievances" (ἔκ τινων ἐγκλημάτων) in Diod. 14.81.1. At times, Diod. leaves out whole parts of the Oxyrhynchus historian's narrative altogether (e.g., the Demaenetus affair at Athens of 396/395, *H. Oxy.* 1–3).

[13] On the Oxyrhynchus historian's pro-Spartan bias, see *infra*, n. 29; on his oligarchic bias, see Bruce, *HCHO* 9–10; on his admiration for Conon, ibid. 9–10, 17; for Theramenes, Littman, "Cyzicus," 272. Despite its biases, the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* impresses Bruce, *HCHO* 10, with its general fairness. On the Oxyrhynchus historian's sources, see Bruce, *HCHO* 5–8. On Xenophon's sources for the Ionian War, see H. R. Breitenbach, *Xenophon von Athen* (Stuttgart 1966) 1674–78; J. K. Anderson, *Xenophon* (London 1974) 62–72.

[14] Lotze, *Lysander*, 31–37.

point out. Xenophon has the Athenians scatter up and down the Chersonese to buy food. Hence, by choosing Aegospotami as a base, the Athenian generals ensured a periodic and dangerous division of their forces.[15]

What Aegospotami did offer was access. The Spartan fleet was only 5–7 kilometers away at Lampsacus; the Athenians were eager to draw this fleet into battle. Had they withdrawn to Sestos, c. 20 kilometers away, they would have obtained a harbor and provisions, as Alcibiades advised them (according to Xenophon). At the same time, however, they would have lost the best position for drawing Lysander into battle. Their treasury empty, their allies abandoning them, their enemy growing in strength, the Athenians were desperate for a quick victory—and desperate men need to take risks. Despite the disadvantages of Aegospotami as a base, therefore, a reasonable commander might have rejected Alcibiades' advice.[16]

That is, at first. Once it became clear that Lysander would not accept the challenge to battle, good tactics dictated an Athenian retreat to a safer base at Sestos. On certain previous occasions in the Ionian War, the Athenians had done just that: retreated when the enemy refused battle. Yet they remained at Aegospotami for several days—five, according to Xenophon.[17]

Why? If military tactics do not explain the behavior of Athens' generals, politics may. Aegospotami came hard on the heels of Arginusae and the subsequent trial of the generals. In the best of times, Athenian generals in the field mistrusted the ecclesia. No commander wanted to come home defeated; even Pericles had been cashiered for failure. Now, after the execution of six generals in 406, what Athenian general wanted to take responsibility for losing Lampsacus to the Spartans? Fear of their own countrymen may have made the Athenians stay at Aegospotami longer than prudence demanded.[18]

If in 405 relations between the generals and the ecclesia were strained, what of relations between the generals themselves? In the

[15] Xen. 1.27; Diod. 105.2, 106.1; cf. Nepos *Lys.* 1.2; Plut. *Alc.* 36.4–5; Polyaenus 1.45.2; 30,000 men; see infra n. 35.

[16] Unlike the Spartans, the Athenians had no Persian gold to rely on. Xen. 2.1.14; Diod. 104.3–4; cf. Busolt, *Griechische Geschichte*, vol. 3.2, 1616.

[17] Xen. 1.27. Athenian retreats after challenging the enemy: Miletus, 411 (Thuc. 8.79.6); Ephesus, 408 (Xen. 1.5.15); cf. W. K. Pritchett, *The Greek State at War*, vol. 2 (Berkeley 1974) 150–52.

[18] Pericles: Thuc. 2.65.3–4; Arginusae executions: Xen. 1.7.34; Diod. 101.7–102.

aftermath of Arginusae, collegiality is likely to have given way to distrust, and staff conferences to have heard echoes from the law courts.

Six Athenian generals shared the command at Aegospotami: Adeimantus, Conon, Menander, Philocles, Tydeus, and Cephisodotus.[19] It is not hard to find reasons making them suspicious of each other. Adeimantus, for instance, had already thrown down the gauntlet to Philocles in the ecclesia. When the demos voted to cut off the right hand of every captive, Adeimantus alone opposed the motion. By contrast, Philocles had gone one better by throwing overboard to a man the crews of two captured enemy triremes.[20]

A second point of division was Athens' most controversial leader, Alcibiades. What a hornet's nest his appearance in the Athenian camp before the battle is likely to have stirred up! The generals rejected his offer, whether it was merely advice to move to a safer base at Sestos (Xenophon) or a promise of Thracian aid in return for a share in the command (Diodorus). Tydeus and Menander were especially vehement: they reminded Alcibiades bluntly that they were in command, not he, and told him to leave. If correctly identified, both generals were veterans of Sicily; Tydeus may even be the son of the famous Lamachus. Perhaps it was in Sicily that they formed their opinion of Alcibiades.[21]

Conon was no friend of Alcibiades either. In 407, when Alcibiades' comrades were serving with him in the Hellespont, Conon stayed in Athens, whence he was elected general. After Notium, when the ecclesia cashiered Alcibiades, it sent Conon out as his replacement. Athens was

[19] Menander, Tydeus, Adeimantus (Xen. 1.16, 26, 30, 32) Conon (Xen. 1.28–29; Diod. 106.6), Philocles (Xen. 1.30, 32; Diod. 106) and Cephisodotus (Xen. 2.1.16). The command at Aegospotami rotated, apparently daily (Diod. 106.1). Diodorus makes Philocles and Conon joint commanders, with the other generals presumably subordinate (104.1). Such special competencies for select Athenian commanders were common in the Ionian War; see C. Fornara, *The Athenian Board of Generals from 501 to 404* (Wiesbaden 1971) 79–80. Diodorus' account is, nevertheless, suspect, because he omits any mention of the other Athenian generals. It may be that each of the six generals commanded the fleet in turn; if not, even the four subordinates would have some say in planning tactics.

[20] Xen. 1.31–32; Plut. *Lys.* 13.1.

[21] Xen. 1.26; Plut. *Alc.* 36–37, *Lys.* 10. Menander (*PA* 9857) temporarily served as general in Sicily in 414/413 (Thuc. 7.16.1; Plut *Nic.* 20). His presence in two naval engagements there is recorded (Thuc. 7.69.4; Diod. 13.13.2; Plut. *Nic.* 20). One Menander commanded a detachment of 120 hoplites at Lampsacus in 409 and he reported in turn to Alcibiades (Xen. 1.2.16). Tydeus (*PA* 13884) is perhaps the Athenian commander at Catana in 413 (*Lys.* 20.26). Kirchner suggests—based on one Tydeus, son of Lamachus, of Oe in the late fourth century *IG* II 1567 B—that the famous general Lamachus was father of our Tydeus. Of Cephisodotus (*PA* 8312) nothing is known.

in no mood to have given the command to a friend of Alcibiades, and Conon should be judged accordingly.[22]

Adeimantus, on the other hand, had a very different relationship with Alcibiades. One wonders if Alcibiades would have received a better reception at Aegospotami if Adeimantus had been the sole commander: for the two were old friends and comrades. A fellow demesman of Scambonidae, Adeimantus, like Alcibiades, was a child of wealth, a frequenter of the Sophists. He was with Alcibiades at the profanation of the Mysteries in Charmides' house in 415 and he suffered the same fate—exile. In 407, when Alcibiades sailed out to Andros, he chose Adeimantus and Thraysbulus as his colleagues. After Notium, they were deposed from command along with Alcibiades. In 395, even after Alcibiades' death, Adeimantus was still associated with his family: the man who prosecuted Alcibiades' son for military misconduct also turned his fire on Adeimantus. Both in and out of politics, therefore, Adeimantus was a friend of Alcibiades. After Alcibiades' visit to the Athenian camp at Aegospotami, Adeimantus' relationship with Tydeus and Menander cannot have improved.[23]

Reactions after Aegospotami give further indication of divisions among the commanders. Adeimantus was accused of having surrendered the ships to Lysander, a charge which Lysander's mercy to Adeimantus after his capture no doubt inspired. Tydeus was charged with having taken Spartan bribes. Conon did not dare to return home after the battle until twelve years later, when he had cleared his name at Cnidus. Plutarch remembers Philocles, commander on the day of the disaster according to Diodorus, as "a demagogue, 'inglorious foe whose only

[22] Conon in 407: Xen. 1.4.11, 5.16–18; cf. Beloch, *Die Attische Politik Seit Perikles* (Leipzig 1884) 118–19. On the division between the city and the Hellespont see A. Andrewes, "The Generals in the Hellespont, 411–407 B.C.," *JHS* 73 (1953) 2–9.

[23] For Adeimantus' friendship with Alcibiades see And. 1.16, Xen. 1.4.21. Generalship of 407: Xen. 1.4.11. Scambonidae: Kirchner, *PA*, 202, 600. Prosecution of 395: *Lys.* 14.38, 22; 15.1–2; 16.15; Plut. *Lys.* 29; Paus. 3.5.4. See also J. Hatzfeld, *Alcibiade* (Paris 1940) 112, 174, 293, 305, 311, 316, 325.

Could Adeimantus have secured election as general in 405 in the Athens of Cleophon without foreswearing his friendship with Alcibiades? Yes, for unpopular as Alcibiades was after Notium, Athens in 405 had still not rejected him completely. "She longs for him (Alcibiades), she hates him, she wants to have him," Aristophanes writes in the very year (*Frogs* 1423). Even Theramenes, who stood far from Cleophon's leftwing politics, managed to be elected as general in 405, although he failed at his *dokimasia* (Lys. 21.10).

weapon is a sharpened tongue,' . . . a man whom Mithridates would not deign to compare with his groom, nor Marius with his lictor."[24]

The variety of charges and counter-charges after the battle is not surprising, nor does it prove that the generals were enemies before the battle. It is, however, good evidence of the political climate in Athens obtaining even before Aegospotami: suspicion and distrust.

There is of course no record of the staff conferences of the Athenian generals at Aegospotami, but informed speculation has its uses. Which general would take the responsibility for a retreat to Sestos and its implicit admission of the loss of Lampsacus? No one who was concerned about the report one of his colleagues might make back at Athens. The issue was made more complicated by Alcibiades' appearance, especially if, as Xenophon reports, he urged a retreat. Who but Adeimantus would move to adopt "Alcibiades' plan"? Who would want to make tacit admission that without the mercenaries Alcibiades offered—or was rumored to have offered—victory was impossible? Diodorus, perhaps, describes the mind of the generals; they feared "that in case of defeat the blame would attach to them and that in case of success all men would attribute it to Alcibiades."[25]

This scene is only an imagined one, but it does fit the conditions of 405. Political considerations, not military ones, may have kept the Athenian fleet at Aegospotami too long—and this delay invited Lysander to exploit Athenian indiscipline. If the evidence does not show just how far collegiality had broken down among Athens' generals, it is sufficient to call to mind Thucydides' dictum: Athens' worst enemy was not Sparta but itself.[26]

[24] Plut. *Comp. Lys. et Sull.* 4; Diod. 106.1, 6; Xen. 1.32; Lys. 14.38; Paus. 4.17.3, 10.9.11. When Conon finally returned home in 393, he prosecuted Adeimantus for his behavior at Aegospotami (Dem. 19.161). The guilty verdict Conon obtained cleared his own name—or did it? A half century later, Isocrates still had to emphasize that not Conon but his co-commanders were responsible for Aegospotami (Isoc. 5.62, written in 346).

These charges, the common currency of defeat, hardly prove that any general did commit treason. See G. Gilbert, *Beiträge zur Innern Geschichte Athens im Zeitalter des Peloponnesischen Krieges* (Leipzig 1877) 393; Busolt, *Griechische Geschichte,* vol. 3.2, 1623; *contra,* Grote, *History of Greece,* vol. 6, 441.

[25] Diod. 105.4.

[26] Thuc. 2.65.12, 8.96.5.

(2) *The Execution of Athenian Prisoners*

After his victory, Lysander gathered his prisoners at Lampsacus. They were a large group: for only about 10 of approximately 180 Athenian ships escaped from Aegospotami, and only some of the remaining Athenians were able to flee overland. Both Xenophon and Diodorus recount the execution of Philocles, but only Xenophon records a mass slaughter of Athenians. Ehrhardt and Will, who prefer Diodorus and his sources in general, reject Xenophon's account and later reports of 3,000 (Plutarch) or 4,000 (Pausanias) Athenian victims—figures which probably "grew with the telling."[27]

Xenophon and his tradition deserve a defense, however. He is likely to have been well informed about these executions. Xenophon was in Athens soon after the battle and may even have heard the year's funeral speech. He would eventually have seen the inscribed casualty list. Just as important, he knew as much about Sparta as any man of his generation, and it was Sparta that carried out the executions. Xenophon could have spoken to men with Lysander at Lampsacus or perhaps to Lysander himself.[28]

In contrast, Diodorus (or Ephorus) is quite capable of omitting significant details of a narrative derived from the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia.* Besides, one may wonder just how significant Lysander's executions were in the Oxyrhynchus historian's account. Bruce argues convincingly that he had a pro-Spartan bias which blinded him to "the overbearing nature of Spartan imperialism."[29] So moved, he may have discounted official records of the number of victims killed by Lysander (and not by disease, pirates, etc.). If so, it is easier to understand how Diodorus (or Ephorus) might omit mention of Lysander's executions.

[27] Escaping ships: Xen. 1.28–29; Diod. 106.6; Lys. 21.9–11; Lotze, *Lysander,* 35. Escape on land: infra, n. 32. Executions: Xen. 1.28–32; Diod. 106.6–7; Plut. *Lys.* 13.1; Paus. 9.32.9; Ehrhardt, "Aegospotami," 225–26; Will, *Le monde grec,* vol. 1, 389.

[28] Xenophon did not leave Athens to join the Ten Thousand until spring 401 (D.L. 2.55; Xen. *Anab.* 3.1.4). The vividness of Xenophon's account of Athens 405–3 suggests to me that he was an eyewitness; cf. Breitenbach, *Xenophon* 1573–74. On the annual Athenian funeral orations see Thuc. 2.34; "Ἐπιτάφιος," *RE* 6 (1909) 218–19. On the casualty lists, D. W. Bradeen, "The Athenian Casualty Lists," *CQ* n.s. 19 (1969) 145–59.

[29] Diodorus' omissions: supra n. 12. Pro-Spartan bias: Bruce, *HCHO* 116–17. For example, the Oxyrhynchus historian has Athens' war hawks moved less by hostility to Sparta than by hope of peculating in wartime. The Argive, Boeotian, and Corinthian enemies of Sparta care not about Spartan imperialism but only Spartan support for their political rivals. *H. Oxy.* 2.2, 13.1.

Problems with Xenophon's account nevertheless remain. In Xenophon's version, Lysander captures most of the enemy at Aegospotami; the others flee. Lysander takes the prisoners to Lampsacus, where he convokes an allied tribunal. After hearing reports of Athenian atrocities, the allies vote to execute all the prisoners who were Athenians except for Adeimantus, the sole opponent of the ecclesia's decision to maim captured enemy seamen.[30]

Ehrhardt criticizes this account by pointing to three references in early fourth century oratory to survivors of Aegospotami. One is particularly telling, for in it the speaker assumes that the jury, selected at random, contains a large number of survivors of Aegospotami. How could Lysander have captured and executed most of the enemy, Ehrhardt wonders. He therefore accepts Diodorus' assertion that most of the men on the Athenian side escaped Aegospotami for Sestos.[31]

Yet Xenophon never denies that many Athenians survived the battle and made their way home. It is not even clear that he says that most Athenians were taken prisoner. His language is ambiguous. He states that Lysander "collected most of the men on the land."[32] But does this mean most of the men who had been with the fleet originally or only most of those present when Lysander attacked? After all, in Xenophon, many Athenians were away looking for food at the critical moment.

Even if Xenophon does mean that Lysander captured the majority of the men of 170 ships, his account can still stand. The minority, the escapees, may have been a large number (in theory up to 49 percent) of the whole. Perhaps Athenian citizens made up an unusually large percentage of the escapees—and not necessarily by chance; citizen rowers did not run faster than foreign ones, but they had greater reason to fear Spartan vengeance.[33] Hence, however construed, Xenophon's account

[30] Xen. 1.28–32.

[31] Lys. 21.10; Lys. *For Eryximachus* 100–4 (*Rylands Papyri* 3, 489); Isoc. 19.59–60; Ehrhardt, "Aegospotami," 225–26; cf. Will, *le monde grec,* vol. 1, 389.

[32] Xen. 1.28:

διασκεδασμένων δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, αἱ μὲν τῶν νεῶν δίκροτοι ἦσαν, αἱ δὲ μονόκροτοι, αἱ δὲ παντελῶς κεναί· ἡ δὲ Κόνωνος καὶ ἄλλαι περὶ αὐτὸν ἑπτά πλήρεις ἀνήχθησαν ἀθρόαι καὶ ἡ Πάραλος, τὰς δ' ἄλλας πάσας Λύσανδρος ἔλαβε πρὸς τῇ γῇ. τοὺς δὲ πλείστους ἄνδρας ἐν τῇ γῇ συνέλεζεν. δὲ καὶ ἔφυγον εἰς τὰ τειχύδρια.

A noun may have a partitive sense without standing in the genitive; here, τοὺς πλείστους ἄνδρας means "most of the men." Cf. Thuc. 1.60.2, 2.84.

[33] Citizens, metics, and foreigners all served as rowers in the Athenian fleet, but in what proportions, no one can say. One can conclude only that a large number of rowers was Athenian, but that the other groups were well represented too. See A. W. Gomme,

does not preclude the survival of many Athenians from the Aegospotami fleet.[34]

The figures of Plutarch and Pausanias, like all ancient statistics, invite skepticism. As rough estimates, however, they are plausible. The Athenians brought more than 30,000 men to Aegospotami. Even if Lysander executed 4,000 Athenians among them, there would still have been plenty of survivors left to return to Athens.[35]

Plutarch read at least three accounts of Aegospotami and its aftermath: Xenophon, Ephorus and Theophrastus (or, following the amendation of Treves, Theopompus).[36] He might have taken his figure from the third source or even from a passage in Ephorus which Diodorus has failed to transmit. Plutarch or his source may have had access to an Athenian casualty list or funeral speech. The difference between Plutarch's three thousand and Pausanias' "about four thousand," may be the result of a copyist's error, or simply a disagreement over how to round off a figure such as 3,500.

In short, while one cannot be sure that the figures of Plutarch and Pausanias come from a contemporary estimate—and an accurate one—it is reasonable to think they did. The statistics are plausible. Xenophon's account of the executions at Lampsacus, supplemented by the numbers in Plutarch and Pausanias, stands scrutiny. It supplies an important detail omitted by Diodorus or his source.

(3) *Consequences*

As every student of antiquity knows, the main consequence of Aegospotami was to render inevitable Athens' surrender to Sparta. The

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The Population of Athens in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries B.C. (Chicago 1967) 12 n. 2; M. Amit, *Athens and the Sea* (Brussels 1958) 29–48; B. Jordan, *The Athenian Navy in the Classical Period* (Berkeley 1975) 225. E. Ruschenbusch, "Zur Besatzung der Athenischer Trieren," *Historia* 28 (1979) 106–10, argues for a fixed number of Athenian rowers on every trireme: the 62 *thranitai*. He does not substantiate this, however. For a different view, see Jordan, *Athenian Navy*, 217.

[34] *Contra* Ehrhardt, "Aegospotami," 225, Xenophon does not say that Lysander captured all Athenians at Aegospotami save those on the nine ships that escaped.

[35] The normal complement of a trireme was 200 men, and Athens had 180 ships at Aegospotami. L. Casson, *Ships and Seamanship in the Ancient World* (Princeton 1971) 304–5.

[36] Plutarch's account generally follows Xenophon. For his familiarity with Ephorus see Plut. *Lys.* 17.2, 20.6, 25.3, 30.3. Treves makes the plausible suggestion that "Theophrastus" is a copyist's error for "Theopompus;" see "Philokles," *RE* 19 (1937) 2488.

secondary consequences of both the battle and the executions at Lampsacus, however, are not as obvious, and are worth considering.

Defeat in a proper battle, with every Athenian doing his duty, might have discredited the democracy, just as the failure at Sicily had. The debacle at Aegospotami was even more damaging. It may have convinced more than a few waverers that the time had come for an oligarchy.

Then too, the executions at Lampsacus may have eased the way for a change in regime. Many if not most of the Athenian prisoners were thetes, members of the lowest property class which furnished rowers to the fleet. Their execution deprived democracy of many potential supporters against oligarchy. It is worth wondering, as Lotze has, if Lysander and his allies had this idea in mind when they voted to execute Athenian prisoners.[37]

The circumstances of Athens' defeat are likely to have embittered domestic politics for years to come. As has been seen, there was no shortage of charges of treason, nor of candidates. Aegospotami nourished an unhealthy trait of the Athenian character: the tendency to blame failure on treason or conspiracy.[38]

Likewise, Lampsacus may have left its mark on Athenian foreign policy. Between Aegospotami and final surrender, Athens held out against Sparta for about half a year.[39] Did fear of another Lampsacus stiffen Athenian resistance? The democracy, when finally restored in 403, could never have been more than an unwilling ally of Sparta. Yet, had Lysander not treated his prisoners so brutally, perhaps Athens would have been less willing to sabotage Sparta's crusade in Asia in 395 for the sake of revenge or out of fear.

Tradition says that long before 405 a meteor had fallen at Aegospotami, a portent of disaster.[40] A portent, indeed, but a Delphic one—it did not say who would suffer the more, the vanquished of Aegospotami or the victor.

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[37] Lotze, *Lysander*, 36.

[38] Supra, n. 24.

[39] The battle of Aegospotami took place in summer 405; see Lotze, *Lysander* 31. Athens did not surrender until April 404; see Gomme, A. Andrewes, and K. J. Dover, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, vol. 4 (Oxford 1970) 12; Andrewes, "Two Notes on Lysander," *Phoenix* 25 (1971) 214, 218.

[40] Plut. *Lys.* 12.

RHETORIC AND REASON IN LUCRETIUS

It is widely held that Lucretius was bad at logic. This view has the authority of Cyril Bailey, who maintained that Lucretius' "mind is visual, not logical," so that "we must not demand logic, but try to catch the picture."[1] Bailey was influenced strongly by Karl Büchner, who argued that Lucretius has so powerful a visual imagination that he often views what is yet to be explained as already present (by "anticipation") and what has already been explained as still present (by a "suspension of thought," as Bailey puts it). According to Büchner, Lucretius lacks control of a logical, methodical presentation of his doctrines.[2] More recently, some critics have evaluated Lucretius' logic more favorably. C. J. Classen, for example, has argued very convincingly that Lucretius consistently subordinates his use of poetry and rhetoric to his philosophical purpose, and does not allow himself to be carried away by his poetry. However, Classen too considers that Lucretius' logic is slipshod and faulty, and the general belief remains that Lucretius is neglectful of logical sequence.[3]

I have used the following abbreviations:
Halm = Karl Halm, ed., *Rhetores Latini Minores* (Leipzig 1863).
PVR = Siegfried Sudhaus, ed., *Philodemi Volumina Rhetorica*, 2 vols. and suppl. (Leipzig 1892–1895).
Spengel = Leonard Spengel, ed., *Rhetores Graeci*, 3 vols. (Leipzig 1853–1856).
SVF = Joannes von Arnim, ed., *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta*, 4 vols. (Leipzig 1905–1924).
U = Hermann Usener, ed., *Epicurea* (Leipzig 1887).

[1] Cyril Bailey, *Titi Lucreti Cari De Rerum Natura Libri Sex*, 3 vols. (Oxford 1947) vol. 1, pp. 17–18; cf. "The Mind of Lucretius," *AJP* 61 (1940) 278–91.

[2] Karl Büchner, *Beobachtungen über Vers und Gedankengang bei Lukrez* (Gräfenhainichen 1936), esp. pp. 6–7, 13, 21–22, and 33–34. For Büchner's influence on Bailey, especially in regard to "suspension of thought," see Bailey's commentary on Lucretius, vol. 1, p. 18 and pp. 165–68.

[3] C. J. Classen, "Poetry and Rhetoric in Lucretius," *TAPA* 99 (1968) 77–118, esp. p. 100 and p. 117. Classen analyses the form of Lucretius' arguments on pp. 81–85. In his book, *Horror ac Divina Voluptas* (Amsterdam 1970), P. H. Schrijvers also defends the arrangement of Lucretius' arguments. Schrijvers relates Lucretius' use of anticipation and suspension of thought respectively to the Epicurean notions of πρόληψις (understood as the initial announcement of a doctrine) and πύκνωμα (understood as the "condensation" of arguments into a single image) (p. 147, and the following discussion at pp. 148–74). While there is much that is extremely perceptive in Schrijvers' account, the Epicurean notions of πρόληψις and πύκνωμα seem to me irrelevant to the order of Lucretius' arguments, since Epicurean πρόληψις (as I understand it) is an ordinary concept, as

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In this paper, I wish to argue that Lucretius is always in control of the logical sequence of his arguments, but that he has chosen to present his doctrines in an order which is not always strictly logically correct. There are two orders of arguments in Lucretius' presentation: one is the underlying logical sequence, of which Lucretius himself is always aware; the other is the order of presentation itself, which may be called "rhetorical" and which is intended to make the doctrines clear and attractive to the student. This latter order is "rhetorical" in the wide sense in which both philosophers and rhetoricians use linguistic artistry to plead their case. Lucretius' use of a "rhetorical" mode of presentation, I shall argue, belongs to a historical context in which philosophers increasingly viewed their doctrines as cases to be defended and their opponents' doctrines as cases to be refuted, and in which rhetoricians correspondingly appropriated philosophical topics as issues to be argued for and against. It is not surprising, therefore, that Lucretius should use the resources of rhetoric in order to make his philosophical doctrines more acceptable to the layman.

I shall attempt to demonstrate Lucretius' fusion of philosophy and rhetoric by first giving a brief review of the relationship of philosophy to rhetoric in the time from Epicurus to Lucretius, and then analysing the first three books of Lucretius' poem against this background, beginning with a brief review of Book 3 and continuing with a more detailed analysis of Books 1 and 2. I think that most readers will agree that Book 3 represents as nearly perfect a union of philosophy and rhetoric as there can be. Books 1 and 2, I shall argue, illustrate the same rare combination of philosophical and rhetorical skill, though in a more complex fashion. Books 1 and 2, moreover, afford an especially good test of Lucretius' logic by allowing a close check of the basic structure of the argument against Epicurus' own presentation of his doctrines in the *Letter to Herodotus*. I shall use Epicurus' presentation as a standard of logical coherence by which to measure Lucretius' logic. Although Epicurus' logic might itself be attacked as faulty (and

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opposed to a scientific doctrine, and Epicurean πύκνωμα seems to me unrelated to a sequence of arguments. Most recently, Wolfgang Kullmann has argued that the logical form of Lucretius' arguments is in agreement with that of Epicurus and the later Epicureans, although Kullmann also notes briefly that there are many imprecisions in Lucretius' presentation ("Zu den historischen Voraussetzungen der Beweismethoden des Lukrez," *Rheinisches Museum* 123 [1980] 97–125, esp. p. 123). I discuss the method of inference used by Epicurus and his followers, including Lucretius, in detail in my forthcoming book, *Epicurus' Scientific Method* (Cornell University Press).

was indeed attacked vigorously by the ancients themselves), what is at issue is not whether Lucretius' logic can pass any test at all, but whether it can pass the test established by Epicurus and his other followers. There is no space in the compass of this paper to analyse also the remaining three books of Lucretius' poem; but I believe that the general results gained from an analysis of the first three books apply also to these.

To consider, then, the historical context of Lucretius' use of rhetoric, it is, first of all, well known that Epicurus had little use for rhetoricians. Epicurus wrote a book, *On Rhetoric,* which is lost, and which Diogenes Laertius sums up by saying that in it Epicurus demanded nothing but clarity.[4] Quintilian says only that Epicurus wrote "against" rhetoric, with the comment that this is not surprising, since Epicurus rejected all of learning.[5] For more details about Epicurus' book, we rely on Philodemus, an Epicurean contemporary of Lucretius. In his own treatise *On Rhetoric,* which is preserved in a fragmentary condition, Philodemus argues against certain other Epicureans that "sophistic," or "epideictic," rhetoric is an art (*techne*), and claims that Epicurus, as well as the Epicureans Metrodorus and Hermarchus, previously held this view. Adopting the Aristotelian division of rhetoric into three types, epideictic, forensic, and deliberative, Philodemus agrees with the rest of the Epicureans that neither of the other two branches of rhetoric, forensic or deliberative, is an art.[6]

In defending epideictic rhetoric as an art (*techne*), Philodemus understands the term *techne* in a loose sense as a "stochastic," or "conjectural," discipline, which, while lacking knowledge, relies on methods which are likely to succeed. This sense of *techne* is to be distinguished from the strict sense, according to which a *techne* is a fixed system of

[4] U 54.

[5] U 45. Epicurus' hostility towards the rhetoricians receives some additional confirmation from a fragment (NF 24) in Diogenes of Oenoanda's inscription. Here Epicurus (it appears) gives the advice: "you will turn away from the speeches of the rhetoricians in order to hear something of our tenets" (see Martin F. Smith, "Diogenes of Oenoanda, New Fragment 24," *AJP* 99 [1978] 329–31). I thank Diskin Clay for drawing my attention to this fragment.

[6] U 49; esp. the first two fragments cited, = *PVR* vol. 1, p. 50 (cf. pp. 68–69) and p. 12. See also U 10. Harry M. Hubbell discusses Philodemus' position in "The Rhetorica of Philodemus," *Transactions of the Connecticut Academy of Arts and Sciences* 23 (1920) 243–382, pp. 251–58. On the identity of "sophistic" with "epideictic" oratory, see also Cicero *Orator* 42.

truths.[7] Accordingly, Philodemus distinguishes all of rhetoric, including epideictic rhetoric, from philosophy on the ground that rhetoric deals with what is plausible, while philosophy offers certainty.[8] In one place, Philodemus contrasts "philosophical persuasion" with "rhetorical persuasion."[9] Philodemus insists that only the truth which is ascertained by the philosophical investigation of nature, φυσιολογία, can make one happy.[10] He also considers it "great folly" (μανία . . . πολλή) for the rhetorician to presume to argue about physics;[11] and conversely, he rejects the view that the physicist is the best rhetorician.[12]

It appears from this that both Epicurus and his followers drew a strict distinction between philosophy and rhetoric. At the same time, Philodemus shows a somewhat conciliatory attitude towards rhetoric by recognizing epideictic rhetoric as an art. Since there was some disagreement among the Epicureans about Epicurus' view, and since Philodemus is not able to cite a plain assertion by Epicurus stating that epideictic rhetoric is an art, it seems that while Philodemus' position may well be compatible with that of Epicurus, there was a tendency among the later Epicureans to take a more favorable view of rhetoric than Epicurus himself did. As for Epicurus' own practice, his extant writings, especially the *Letter to Menoeceus* and the Κύριαι Δόξαι, which were intended for a wide audience, exhibit some rhetorical skill, though in general Cicero seems justified in claiming that Epicurus, along with most of his followers, composed in a plain, unadorned style.[13] Interestingly, Cicero makes an exception for the Epicurean Zeno, who exercised a strong influence on Philodemus and the entire Epicurean movement from the end of the second century through the first

[7] *PVR* vol. 1, p. 53 and following (esp. pp. 69–76); this distinction is blurred by Hubbell (op. cit. in note 6, p. 254). The application of the distinction to "sophistic" rhetoric is made at *PVR* vol. 1, p. 123 (col. 22.37–38), where interestingly "sophistic" rhetoric is grouped with poetry as having some (though little) method.

[8] *PVR* vol. 1, pp. 247–48 and following (to p. 270).

[9] *PVR* vol. 1, p. 269 (col. 32.8–10).

[10] See esp. *PVR* vol. 1, pp. 286–89.

[11] *PVR* vol. 1, p. 208 (col. 27a.7–10).

[12] *PVR* vol. 2, pp. 19–50, also p. 193 and p. 231. Philodemus names Nausiphanes as the proponent of this view; in his attack, Philodemus is following Metrodorus. The Stoics adapted Nausiphanes' position, as they maintained that the wise man alone is a rhetorician (see below, note 46).

[13] For Cicero's verdict, see *De finibus* 1.14–15, and *Tusculan Disputations* 2.7–8; cf. *Academica* 1.5. By contrast, Theon accuses Epicurus of making an Asiatic use of rhythm (U 105 and 133, also U p. 88); cf. Eduard Norden, *Die Antike Kunstprosa* (Leipzig 1898) 123–25.

century B.C. Cicero praises Zeno for speaking "*distincte graviter ornate*"; and he has his own Epicurean speaker Velleius emulate this style, by having him speak "*dilucide,*" "*copiose,*" and "*ornatius*" than the Epicureans are accustomed to speak.[14]

The Epicureans were not alone in segregating rhetoric, as practised by professional rhetoricians, from philosophy. Indeed, it was the common belief of all Hellenistic philosophers that the professional rhetoricians lack philosophical insight. Cicero attests this general prejudice when he notes that towards the end of the second century B.C. the leading Academics Charmadas, Clitomachus, Aeschines, and Metrodorus, as well as the Peripatetic Diodorus and the Stoic Mnesarchus, along with numerous other famous philosophers, all "shut out" the orator "from all learning and the knowledge of greater things," and confined him in "law courts and petty assemblies as though in some grain mill."[15] At the same time, we know that the Academics, Peripatetics, and Stoics all insisted that the philosopher is *not* shut out from rhetoric, although each philosophical group had a very different idea of what this philosophers' type of rhetoric should be. While the philosophers thus repulsed the rhetoricians' attempt to combine philosophy with rhetoric, there was also an attempt by the philosophers to find a rhetoric which was suitable to their own needs.

Of the philosophical schools, the Peripatetics were the most favorably inclined towards using traditional rhetoric in the presentation of their doctrines. In his *Art of Rhetoric,* Aristotle defends rhetoric as an art and argues vigorously for its usefulness. In addition, Cicero and others report that Aristotle assigned philosophical problems, called "theses," to his students to be argued for and against in a rhetorical, instead of a philosophical, manner.[16] Aristotle himself defines a "thesis" (θέσις) in the *Topics* as a "paradoxical" opinion held by a well-known philosopher or otherwise supported by argument; and he cites, among other examples, Melissus' contention that "everything is one" and

[14] Cicero, *De natura deorum* 1.58–59.

[15] Cicero, *De oratore* 1.45–46, including (the speaker is Crassus): . . . *a quibus omnibus una paene voce repelli oratorem a gubernaculis civitatum, excludi ab omni doctrina rerumque maiorum scientia, ac tantum in iudicia et conciunculas, tamquam in aliquod pistrinum, detrudi et compingi videbam.* Cf. 1.83–93. See also Sextus Empiricus, *Adversus mathematicos* 2.20ff. (cf. 2.12). These philosophers seem to be reacting with special vehemence to the recent claim of some rhetoricians (as we shall see shortly) that philosophical topics fall within the province of the rhetorician.

[16] Cicero, *Orator* 46 and Diogenes Laertius 5.3; cf. Cicero, *De finibus* 5.10 and *De oratore* 3.80, and Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria* 12.2.25.

Heraclitus' claim that "everything moves."[17] What makes the opinion "paradoxical" is that it is contrary to the generally accepted beliefs of either the wise or the many. Aristotle also includes "theses" in the general category of "dialectical problems." He notes that in his own time the term "thesis" was used to denote just about any dialectical problem at all; he himself proposes to restrict it to paradoxical dialectical problems, although he adds that the use of the term makes no difference.[18] Aristotle explains that a "dialectical problem" is an investigation that concerns either (a) choice and avoidance, or (b) truth and knowledge, and about which we either have no opinion or else there is a difference of opinion between the many and the wise, or among either of these groups.[19] Aristotle also divides dialectical problems into (i) ethical, (ii) physical, and (iii) logical problems, and exemplifies (i) by "should one obey one's parents rather than the laws?," (ii) by "is the world everlasting or not?," and (iii) by "is the knowledge of contraries one and the same or not?"[20]

Aristotle and Theophrastus are reported to have written numerous "theses" themselves which the student of rhetoric might use as examples; but these are lost.[21] Their successors are said to have continued the rhetorical practice of "theses"; but we have no further information about these.[22] There is, however, good evidence that the rhetorical practice of "theses" continued to flourish also outside the Peripatetic school. The Cynical writers Bion (ca. 325–255) and Teles (a little later) clearly made an important contribution to this genre. While these writers are generally regarded as authors of "diatribes," a "diatribe," as Hermann Throm has shown, is a type that falls within the general category of rhetorical "thesis."[23] Bion appears to have been particularly imaginative in the rhetorical embellishment of "theses." His practice of mixing every type of style earned him Eratosthenes' judgment that he was the

[17] Aristotle, *Topics* 104b19–104b28. Aristotle uses the term θέσις in a quite different sense in the *Posterior Analytics* (72a14–16) to designate the type of primary scientific premise which "it is not possible to prove and which it is not necessary for the person who is to learn anything to have." Hermann Throm has a detailed discussion of Aristotle's notion of "thesis" in his very useful book, *Die Thesis* (Paderborn 1932) 30–37.

[18] Aristotle, *Topics* 104b29–105a2.

[19] Ibid., 104b1–17.

[20] Ibid., 105b19–25.

[21] Theon (Προγυμνάσματα 165) Spengel vol. 2, p. 69.3; and see the references in Throm (*Die Thesis*) 171–75.

[22] Strabo C 609; see Throm (*Die Thesis*) 175–79.

[23] See esp. pp. 8–10 and 190–92 (*Die Thesis*).

first to "dress philosophy in flowery garb."[24] Among the fragments of Teles, two exemplify clearly the structure of a rhetorical "thesis." One begins with the opinion, which is put to Teles as a "thesis," that "poverty prevents one from philosophizing, and wealth is useful for this"; this "thesis" is then refuted in detail by Teles. The other fragment is similarly devoted to the "thesis" that "the acquisition of wealth puts an end to scarcity and want."[25]

Meanwhile, the philosophical treatment of dialectical problems, or "theses" in the wide sense, enjoyed an important resurgence under Arcesilaos (b. ca. 315). According to Cicero, Arcesilaos reintroduced the Socratic habit of having any opinion at all put to him, and arguing against it. Arcesilaos did this, Cicero notes, in the true dialectical style, by engaging the person who proposed the opinion in an argument, for as long as the interlocutor could hold his own. Cicero adds that the Academics continued the practice of refuting any opinion at all that was put to them, but that by his own time the Academics had abandoned the question and answer method in favor of continuous speech, the method used also by all the other philosophers. Among Arcesilaos' successors, Cicero singles out Carneades (b. ca. 214 B.C.) as having been a particularly fluent speaker.[26] Diogenes Laertius confirms Cicero's judgment by reporting that even the rhetoricians went to hear Carneades.[27]

It hardly seems a coincidence that about the time of Carneades the rhetorician Hermagoras reasserted the prerogative of rhetoricians to debate philosophical problems. Cicero reports in his youthful work *De inventione* that Hermagoras divided the subject matter of rhetoric into two types of investigation, (a) "thesis" (*quaestio,* a translation of θέσις), and (b) "hypothesis" (*causa,* a translation of ὑπόθεσις).[28] As Cicero

[24] Diogenes Laertius 4.52: πρῶτος Βίων φιλοσοφίαν ἀνθινὰ ἐνέδυσεν. See also E. J. Kenney, *Lucretius De Rerum Natura Book 3* (Cambridge 1971) 17–20.

[25] Teles Fragments IVb and IVa (Otto Hense, ed., *Teletis Reliquiae,* 2nd ed., Tübingen 1909). Throm points out these examples of a "thesis" at p. 185 (*Die Thesis*).

[26] Cicero, *De finibus* 2.2 and *De oratore* 3.67–68 (including 3.68 on Carneades); cf. *De finibus* 5.10. On the importance of "theses" in the Academy, see also Throm (*Die Thesis*) 179–83.

[27] Diogenes Laertius 4.62.

[28] Cicero, *De inventione* 1.8. For Cicero's distinction between the two types of investigation, see also *De partitione oratoria* 4, 61, 68; *Topica* 79–80; *De oratore* 2.65, 2.133–41, and 3.109; and *Epist. ad Att.* 9.4, cf. 9.9. In his later works, Cicero translates θέσις by *propositum, consultatio,* and *proposita consultatio,* and he uses *quaestio* as a covering term for both θέσις and ὑπόθεσις. At *De oratore* 3.109, Cicero uses *controversia*

goes on to explain in his *De inventione,* Hermagoras defined "theses" as controversial issues considered abstractly, without the introduction of any individuals, for example "is there any good besides moral good?," "are the senses true?," "what is the shape of the world?," "what is the size of the sun?"; and he defined "hypotheses" as controversial issues concerning individuals. Thereupon Cicero berates Hermagoras in his *De inventione* for including "theses" among rhetorical topics, on the ground that it is "great folly" (*magna amentia*) to assign to the rhetorician matters on which the greatest philosophical minds have labored.[29] The young Cicero was just as vehement in "shutting out" the rhetorician from the higher realms of learning as Philodemus and the other philosophers of the time.

Later, Cicero was to change his mind. Adopting the general distinction of "theses" into (1) "theoretical" theses, which concern knowledge, and (2) "practical" theses, which concern action, he included both types among the subject matter of rhetoric.[30] Quintilian subse-

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as an alternative translation for *causa.* For the distinction between "thesis" and "hypothesis," see also Spengel vol. 2, p. 49 (Aphthonius), vol. 3, p. 493 (Nicolaos), etc., as well as Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria* 3.5.5–18. Quintilian (3.5.11) and Sulpitius Victor (Halm, p. 314) show that there was some difference of opinion about whether individuals might be introduced into "theses."

[29] Cicero, *De inventione* 1.8. According to Plutarch, Hermagoras was attacked by the Stoic Posidonius "concerning general inquiry" (περὶ τῆς καθόλου ζητήσεως) (*Pompey* 42); it is likely that this was also an attack on Hermagoras' appropriation of "theses." There has been a large scholarly controversy as to whether Hermagoras did in fact recognize "theses" as belonging to rhetoric, and if so, whether he admitted not only "practical" or "political" but also "theoretical" theses to the realm of rhetoric. The controversy is already mentioned by Quintilian at *Institutio oratoria* 3.5.14; Quintilian himself cites Cicero's *De inventione* as his authority for believing that Hermagoras did include all "theses" within the domain of rhetoric. It has been argued by modern scholars that in spite of the examples cited by Cicero at *De inventione* 1.8 Hermagoras admitted only "political" theses (so Throm, *Die Thesis,* 89–104). The main piece of evidence cited for this view is Sextus Empiricus' assertion at *Adversus mathematicos* 2.62 that Hermagoras defined the subject matter of the orator as πολιτικὸν ζήτημα. In addition, it has been argued by Hans von Arnim that Hermagoras probably included also non-political theses, so long as they did not demand specialized knowledge (*Leben und Werke des Dio von Prusa* [Berlin 1898] 94–96). I see no conflict between a "political inquiry" and the inclusion of purely theoretical theses, specialized or not, among the subject matter of rhetoric; for any type of thesis may be a component in an inquiry which is political as a whole.

[30] Cicero, *De partitione oratoria* 62–67 and *Topica* 81–86; cf. Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria* 3.5.6. Cicero also includes "theses" among the subject matter of the rhetorician at *Orator* 45–46; cf. Crassus' position in *De oratore* 3.122–43. There was some difference

quently endorsed the mature view of Cicero.[31] Other rhetoricians took the view that while "practical" theses (also called "political" theses), for example "should one marry?," were within the province of the rhetorician, purely "theoretical" theses (or as they were also classified, "physical" theses), for example "is the world spherical?," "are there many worlds?," "is the world governed by divine providence?," should be left to the philosopher.[32]

In appropriating "theses" for the rhetorician, Hermagoras clearly understood the term "thesis" in the wide sense, which seems to have been current from the time of Aristotle on, in which it designates virtually any philosophical topic of debate; and this is also how the later rhetoricians understood the term. The division of "theses" into (1) "theoretical" and (2) "practical" seems to be based directly on Aristotle's division of dialectical problems into these two types. The only restriction in the range of philosophical problems treated by the rhetoricians seems to have been the exclusion of problems of formal logic. No example of this type is cited by the rhetoricians; and the identification of theoretical theses as "physical" theses by some rhetoricians suggests that "theses" were viewed in general as consisting of ethical and physical problems. The epistemological problem "are the senses true?" might be categorized either as a logical problem (in the wide sense, recognized by the Stoics, in which logic as a branch of philosophy includes not only formal logic but also epistemology) or as a physical problem (in accordance with Epicurean classification).

The rhetoricians developed precise rules concerning the composition of "theses." In the first place, they offered detailed classifications

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on just how the distinction between "theoretical" and "practical" questions should be drawn; Victorinus, for example, classifies "is there any good besides moral good?" as a practical question (Halm, p. 176), whereas Cicero treats questions of this sort as theoretical questions.

[31] Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria* 3.5.12–16.

[32] Ps-Hermogenes, for example, making a distinction between (i) "political" and (ii) non-political or "theoretical" theses, held that the former belong to the field of the rhetorician, while the latter, which have to do with specialized knowledge, belong to the philosopher (Προγυμνάσματα, Spengel, vol. 2, p. 17). Similarly, Theon claims that theoretical theses are more suitable for philosophers (Spengel, vol. 2, p. 121). Nicolaos distinguished between "physical" and "political" theses, and said that those who occupy themselves with philosophy deal with the former (Spengel, vol. 3, p. 497). Victorinus glosses Cicero's distinction between (a) "theoretical" and (b) "practical" theses as a division between (a) "divine" affairs and (b) human and political affairs (Halm, p. 176), and also as a division between (a) "physical" and (b) "political or ethical" matters (Halm, p. 270).

of "thesis" topics. As Cicero reports, they divided "theoretical" theses into three main types, (1) whether a thing exists, or is the case (*sit necne*), (2) what it is (*quid sit*), and (3) what sort it is (*quale sit*).[33] They in turn subdivided each of these categories; to take just (1), they divided this into (a) whether a thing can be produced, and (b) how it comes into being, or alternatively into (a) what exists, (b) its origin, (c) its cause, and (d) its immutability.[34] "Practical" theses were divided into two main types, (1) those concerning one's duty, and (2) those concerning the emotions; and the latter category was divided into (a) calming and "healing" the emotions, whether by consolation, removing fear, placating anger, and so on, and (b) arousing the emotions, whether by complaint, a tearful appeal to pity, and so on.[35]

The rhetoricians also laid down rules for the arrangement of "theses." In general, the same parts of discourse were held to apply to a "thesis" as to a "hypothesis." However, there was some difference of opinion on just how these parts were to be adapted to a "thesis." Cicero notes only that a "thesis" and "hypothesis" alike should have four main parts, a proem, narration, proof, and epilogue; the proof was to be divided in turn into confirmation and refutation.[36] Further information is provided by later sources, which may be assumed to preserve much material from an earlier period. The Greek rhetorician Theon (of Quintilian's time, or a little earlier) explicitly excludes narration, as he claims that the proem is followed immediately by the commonplaces which make up the argument.[37] Theon offers two detailed examples of a "thesis," one practical, "should the wise man take part in politics?," the other theoretical, "is the world governed by divine providence?" In both examples, Theon offers numerous commonplaces (including necessity, advantage, pleasure, and so on) which are to be used in sequence to argue for the case; and he adds the brief remark that the

[33] Cicero, *De partitione oratoria* 62, *Topica* 82–85, *De oratore* 3.113–17, and *Orator* 45. The same three divisions apply to "hypotheses," except that Hermagoras added a fourth, "translative," to "hypotheses" (Cicero, *De inventione* 1.16).

[34] For the first division, see Cicero, *De partitione oratoria* 64; for the second, see Cicero, *De oratore* 3.114, and *Topica* 82.

[35] Cicero, *De partitione oratoria* 67, *De oratore* 3.118, and *Topica* 86. In addition, at *De partitione oratoria* 63 Cicero offers what appears to be an alternative division of practical "theses" into (a) those having to do with what ought to be sought and what ought to be avoided, and (b) those having to do with utility.

[36] Cicero, *De partitione oratoria* 68, and 27–60.

[37] Spengel, vol. 2, pp. 120–21.

opposite arguments are to be used to argue against the case.[38] Theon also notes that "theses" admit of amplification and digressions, and that the speaker will resort to emotions, character, protreptic, and "just about all figures of speech."[39] In the fifth century, the sophist Nicolaos lists the parts of a "thesis" as proem, narration (which he understands as one's own supporting arguments, or confirmation), objection (ἀντίθεσις), refutation (λύσις), and epilogue.[40] Finally, the late rhetorician Aphthonius recommends that instead of a proem one should use an ἔφοδος, or indirect approach, followed by the commonplaces of the argument. Aphthonius then develops the thesis "should one marry?" as an example. Taking the affirmative position, he supports this view with a sequence of commonplaces, then continues with an objection and a refutation, followed by two more objections, each refuted in turn. The whole is concluded by an epilogue, which consists in a summary of the original section of supporting arguments.[41]

To return to the second century B.C., we find that philosophers and rhetoricians are debating, each group in their own way, a common set of philosophical problems. Under the impetus of the Academics and other skeptical philosophers, who were all intent on refuting all philosophical dogmas, the "dogmatic" philosophers in turn defend their various beliefs and refute objections. The rhetoricians learn from both sides, and bring their own skills to the debate. Both philosophers and rhetoricians alike gather material for the debate from the doxographical handbooks of the time. As illustrated by the collection of "physical" opinions by Aetius in the first century B.C., philosophy was parcelled out in these handbooks into topics of controversy. Aetius' list of topics includes such problems favored by the rhetoricians as "is the universe one?," "on the shape of the world," "is the world animate and governed by providence?," and "are the perceptions and presentations true?"[42]

Given this convergence of interests by the rhetoricians and the philosophers, we might expect that the Peripatetics and Cynics would be joined increasingly by other philosophers in the use of traditional rhetorical devices. There is some evidence that this happened; but it is

[38] Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 123–28.

[39] Ibid., vol. 2, p. 128.

[40] Ibid., vol. 3, p. 496.

[41] Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 50–53.

[42] Hermann Diels, *Doxographi Graeci* (Berlin 1879) 267–444; a quick overview is provided by the table of contents at pp. 268–69.

slim. We have already considered the Epicureans. As for the Academics and Stoics, both aspired to a "philosophers' rhetoric" which they viewed as very different from traditional rhetoric. Among the Academics, the same Charmadas who denounced the rhetoricians also argued that a genuine art of rhetoric is possible only for a person who had studied philosophy.[43] He is clearly following Plato, whose explicit instructions for a philosophical rhetoric in the *Phaedrus* have nothing in common with the rules of the rhetoricians. In Cicero's work *De finibus,* the Academic Cotta proposes to offer an example of the "philosophers' rhetoric," as he calls it; and he contrasts this with his own manner of forensic rhetoric, which, he admits, "is necessarily at times somewhat dull, since it uses a popular manner of expression."[44] In his exposition, Cotta clearly heeds Plato's prescriptions as set out in the *Phaedrus,* most conspicuously the demand for definition and division. But, just as interestingly, Cotta also gives a marvelous display of techniques used precisely in the forum. While Cotta is of course Cicero's own mouthpiece, it is reasonable to suppose that from the time of the articulate Carneades at least the continuous speeches practised so widely by the Academics showed considerable skill of the type taught traditionally by the rhetoricians. Some further indication that the later Academics took an increasingly conciliatory view of traditional rhetoric is that the Academic Philo, in Cicero's time, taught traditional rhetoric as well as philosophy.[45]

The Stoics also followed Plato, as they maintained that the wise man, and only the wise man, is a true rhetorician.[46] They understood "rhetoric" as continuous, and correspondingly expansive, speech, as opposed to "dialectic," the method of using brief, compressed arguments.[47] Unfortunately, the Stoics' notion of a philosophical "rhetoric" seems to have been rather bleak. Cicero sums up the Stoic contribution to rhetoric by saying that the Stoic writings on rhetoric were enough to make one mute, and that in practice the Stoics shunned rhetorical embellishment.[48] Cicero makes an exception only for Cato, a Roman

[43] Cicero, *De oratore* 1.84–93; see also Plato, *Phaedrus,* esp. 261a and 269d ff.

[44] Cicero, *De finibus* 2.17.

[45] Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations* 2.9; cf. *De oratore* 3.110.

[46] *SVF* 2.294 and Cicero, *De oratore* 1.83; cf. *SVF* 2.291 and 292.

[47] Cicero, *De finibus* 2.17; see also *SVF* 1.75 and 2.294.

[48] Cicero, *De finibus* 4.7; see also Cicero's criticism of Stoic style at *De oratore* 3.66 and *Paradoxa Stoicorum* 2. The sources on Stoic rhetoric have been gathered and discussed by F. Striller, *De Stoicorum Studiis Rhetoricis, Breslauer Philologische Abhandlungen,*

politician of Stoic persuasions, whom Cicero compliments for speaking with adornment on certain lofty ethical topics.[49] We know that some of the Stoics wrote works entitled "theses"; but we know almost nothing about the contents of these works.[50] In a general attack on the Stoics, Plutarch remarks that Chrysippus would go out of his way to include the case for the opposition in his arguments; and he cites Chrysippus' recommendation that one should always put the opponent's case in such a way as to indicate its falsehood. Plutarch's wry comment is that Chrysippus achieved the opposite.[51]

While there are tendencies, then, which seem to conspire towards the union of philosophy with the rhetoricians' art, the evidence does not fully prepare us for the remarkable fruition of the notion of a philosophy joined with rhetoric about the middle of the first century in Rome. Cicero proclaimed this ideal in his *De Oratore,* finished in 55 B.C., in which the speaker Crassus claims that neither philosophy nor rhetoric is complete without the other and calls rhetoric the "crown" of philosophy.[52] Cicero came to reiterate and exemplify this ideal in a wide variety of philosophical writings, most of them composed in the last two years of Cicero's life as part of an ambitious project to write out "whole issues" (*totae questiones*) comprehending all of philosophy; this complete treatment was to demonstrate the coherence of all philosophical topics with one another.[53] Cicero's philosophical writings include two works which deal explicitly with "theses." One is the *Paradoxa Stoicorum,* in which Cicero undertakes to defend a number of Stoic "theses" in the manner of the rhetoricians. The other is *Tusculan Disputations,* in which Cicero proposes to refute five "theses" in the manner of the Academics. In the remaining philosophical works, Cicero defends or refutes a variety of positions, each of which may be viewed as a "thesis"; these writings present the views of various philosophers, but all are infused with Cicero's own rhetorical skill.

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vol. 1, 1886. To judge by the few testimonies that we have, the Stoics accepted certain broad distinctions which may be traced to Plato and Aristotle (for example, *SVF* 2.295–96 and 1.83).

[49] Cicero, *Paradoxa Stoicorum* 3; cf. *De finibus* 3.19 and 26.

[50] *SVF* 1.409 (Herillus); 2.13, 2.16, and 3.68 (Chrysippus). See Throm, *Die Thesis,* 183–85.

[51] Plutarch, *De Stoicorum Repugnantiis* 1036d–e.

[52] See esp. Cicero, *De oratore* 3.23–24, and 3.142–143 (where Crassus maintains that rhetoric, though despised by the philosophers, "*tamen aliquem cumulum illorum artibus afferre videatur,*" 3.143).

[53] Cicero states his project at *De natura deorum* 1.9.

As indicated by the variety of Cicero's philosophical works, Cicero's notion of the fusion of philosophy and rhetoric takes various forms. In the *Paradoxa Stoicorum,* Cicero gives a sample of his practice of "transferring to our rhetorical manner of speaking," as he says, issues which are spoken "θετικῶς" in the philosophical schools. In particular, he undertakes to bring "into the light, that is into the forum" certain paradoxical ethical opinions of the Stoics, beginning with the "thesis" that "only what is morally good (καλόν) is good."[54] In defending the Stoic "theses," Cicero uses standard rhetorical commonplaces, followed by objections and vigorous refutations. In all the rest of his philosophical works, Cicero has a more complex aim: he wishes to fashion his own philosophical rhetoric, distinct from forensic rhetoric, yet embellished with all the ornaments that forensic rhetoric can provide. Cicero states his goal in the *Tusculan Disputations:* he has always judged that type of philosophy "perfect" (*perfectam*), he asserts, "which can speak copiously and ornately on the greatest issues."[55] At the same time, Cicero laments the fact that philosophy has not until his own day had any "light of Latin letters" shed upon it, and he proposes it as his task to "illuminate and awaken" philosophy, and in particular to "arrange," "illuminate," and "attract the reader by some charm." Cicero then presents himself as an Academic philosopher; he presumes, with ironic self-deprecation, to refute any opinion put to him—that is, any "thesis"—just like a Socrates.[56] His first "thesis" is "death seems to me an evil." Towards its end, there is an interesting interlude in which Cicero reaffirms his vision of a philosophy united with rhetoric. The Academic philosopher recedes for a moment as Cicero self-consciously asks his interlocutor whether he may add a "rhetoricians' epilogue"; thereupon the interlocutor encourages Cicero not to abandon rhetoric, "*quam semper ornasti.*"[57]

In his book *De finibus,* Cicero sums up the contribution of his rhetorical skill to philosophy in these words: "if we preserve what has been asserted by those whom we approve, and add to them our own judgment (*iudicium*) and our own order of writing (*scribendi ordinem*), why should they prefer Greek words to those which are expressed with

[54] Cicero, *Paradoxa Stoicorum* 4–5. While we have no other extant samples of "theses" composed by Cicero in the rhetoricians' style, Cicero mentions at *Epist. ad Att.* 9.4 that he is practising "political" theses (cf. *Epist. ad Att.* 9.9).

[55] Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations* 1.7.

[56] Ibid., 1.5–8.

[57] Ibid., 1.112.

splendour (*splendide dicta*) and are not translations from the Greek?"[58] Cicero's three contributions, judgment, order, and *splendide dicta,* correspond roughly to the three categories of rhetorical art which apply to written composition—invention, arrangement, and style. Cicero proposes to use all three to make philosophy "perfect."

Lucretius, I suggest, anticipated Cicero's ideal of a "philosophical rhetoric." While Lucretius used poetry rather than prose to present his philosophy, the influence of rhetoric in Lucretius' poetry is just as pervasive as in Cicero's prose. Like Cicero, Lucretius wished to invest philosophical subject matter with a style that was luminous and attractive. Lucretius' pride in composing songs that are "*lucida*" is echoed by Cicero's descriptions of the contribution of his rhetoric to philosophy.[59] And more than Cicero, Lucretius wanted to make his philosophy absolutely persuasive to the ordinary person; he not only wanted to attract, but to hold the listener with his message, and to do so with a doctrine that he considered distasteful and repellent to the ordinary person.[60] Lucretius views himself as smearing the bitter cup of philosophy with the honey of poetry. But his poetry throughout serves the rhetorical aim of persuasion: poetic music and diction are joined with rhetorical arrangement and style to create a "philosophical rhetoric" that is intended to compel as it teaches.

Lucretius' use of rhetoric is perhaps most obvious in his use of prologues, as well as digressions, and in his section of arguments against the fear of death at the end of Book 3. The use of prologues and digressions, along with other rhetorical devices, has been the subject of an excellent study by C. J. Classen; and Barbara Wallach has recently shown in very perceptive detail the influence of rhetoric, including the

[58] Cicero, *De finibus* 1.6. This is not incompatible with the offhand manner in which Cicero describes his philosophical compositions in a letter to Atticus (12.52): ἀπογράφα *sunt, minore labore fiunt; verba tantum adfero quibus abundo.* While Cicero's philosophical writings are, to some extent, translations, there is little doubt that Cicero brought his own judgment and artistry to bear on them.

[59] There has been a vigorous debate on the antecedents of Cicero's notion of a fusion of philosophy and rhetoric. Hans von Arnim argued that Cicero derived this notion from the Academic Philo (*Leben und Werke des Dio von Prusa,* pp. 97–114). This view has been opposed, among others, by J. Perret, who argues that this is Cicero's own contribution, in "A propos du second discours de Crassus (*De Orat.* I, 45–73),"*REL* 24 (1946) 169–89, p. 181, notes 2 and 3, and pp. 183–89. My own suggestion is that Cicero responded with unique insight and talent to a convergence of influences, including that of the Academy, Greek rhetorical theory, and Lucretius.

[60] Lucretius describes his poetic purpose at 1.921–50; see esp. 1.933–34 and 1.943–50.

rhetoric of Bion and Teles, in the arguments at the end of Book 3.[61] I do not propose to duplicate this work. What I wish to do is to indicate that Lucretius has structured his philosophical presentation as a whole along rhetorical guidelines. Lucretius, I suggest, has fashioned the philosophical doctrines of Epicurus into unified essays which are heavily influenced by contemporary rhetorical theory, and which are designed at the same time to display the logical coherence of Epicurus' philosophical system as a whole. In reorganizing Epicurus' doctrines as rhetorical compositions, Lucretius continually anticipates doctrines which are proved later on in the sequence of arguments. While these would be viewed as logical disturbances in a purely logical tract, in the context of Lucretius' own rhetorical style of composition they are components of a whole, into which they fit perfectly logically. More precisely, Lucretius often lifts conclusions from a later context of argument in order to clarify and strengthen an earlier sequence of argument, without, however, illogically using these conclusions to prove them later; and what accounts for this procedure is that Lucretius takes the logical coherence of his doctrines as worked out in advance and makes it his goal to defend his doctrines in well rounded essays that persuade.

Let us first consider Book 3. After a prologue (3.1–93), Lucretius develops a sequence of argument in which he shows (a) that there is a soul, divided into a mind and the rest (3.94–135), (b) how the mind is related to the rest of the soul (3.136–60), (c) that the soul is corporeal (3.161–76), (d) what sort of corporeality the soul has (3.177–322), (e) what is the relationship of the soul to the body (3.323–416), and finally in a long accumulation of proofs, (f) that the soul is mortal (3.417–829). Lucretius then concludes, with some further argument, that "death is nothing to us" (3.830–69). From this point on to the end of the book (3.870–1094), Lucretius takes on one person after another who would still object that death is an evil, and refutes each in turn. Lucretius begins his refutation by answering three types of objection—the objection of the person contemplating his own dead body (3.870–93), the objections of the mourners (3.894–911), and the objection of banqueters lamenting the shortness of their pleasure (3.912–30). Following these refutations, Lucretius brings Nature herself on stage, by the device of

[61] C. J. Classen, op. cit. (note 3), see esp. pp. 105–9 (on the proem to the first book); and Barbara Price Wallach, *Lucretius and the Diatribe against the Fear of Death, Mnemosyne* Suppl. 40 (Leiden 1976). On the use of rhetoric in the last part of Book 3, see also Kenney, op. cit. in note 24, pp. 16–20.

prosopopoiia, to reinforce his answers by her successive refutations of successive objectors (3.931–77). Subsequently, Lucretius reassures the listener that the stories about the underworld are not literally true (3.978–1023); and he ends the entire refutation with a detailed, compassionate section of consolation mixed with sharp rebuke (3.1024–94).

The ending of Book 3 (from 3.830 or 3.870 on) has been called a "diatribe."[62] Our earlier analysis of the rhetorical "thesis" helps to show more precisely, it seems to me, just how the term "diatribe," which denotes a certain type of rhetorical "thesis," applies to the end of Book 3. The end of Book 3, beginning with the objection stated at 3.870–72, conforms to that part of a rhetorical "thesis" which consists in the refutation of objections, after the "confirmation." Lucretius has just finished proving at 3.830–69 that "death is nothing to us." Immediately afterward, Lucretius embarks on a rhetorical "refutation" of the objection that death *does* affect us, that is, that "death is an evil." In his successive refutations, Lucretius states some of the objections explicitly, and implies the rest; and he depicts some of his objectors in vivid personal detail, while he assigns a common humanity to the others. Throughout, he uses a thoroughly rhetorical manner of argument, as he arouses and assuages emotions in quick succession, all with the purpose of eradicating the emotion which poisons all the rest, the fear of death.

The whole of Book 3 thus consists of three main parts, a prologue (3.1–93), a sequence of supporting arguments ending in the conclusion that "death is nothing to us" (3.94–869), and a section of "refutation" (3.870–1094) addressed against the objection that death is an evil. While the "refutation" is composed in a predominantly "forensic" manner according to the rules of a rhetorical "thesis," the section of supporting arguments consists in a very carefully organized, detailed progression

[62] Wallach considers all of 3.830–1094 to be a "diatribe" (op. cit., see especially the introductory remarks at pp. 6–10); Wallach also notes with approval (p. 6) Throm's definition of "diatribes" as "paraenetische Theseis," but does not discuss "theses" as such. Kenney takes all of 3.830–1094 as the "conclusion" of Book 3, with 3.94–829 as the "argument," and he considers that 3.870 forms the beginning of the "diatribe" (p. 30 and p. 199, op. cit.). Kenney also suggests that 3.94–829 is written in the "expository" style, while 3.830–1094 is written in a "pathetic" style (p. 31, also pp. 15–20). A very different attempt to show rhetorical influence in Book 3 is that of E. K. Rand in "La composition rhétorique du IIIème livre de Lucrèce," *Revue de Philologie* 60 (1934) 243–66. Rand argued that Book 3 conforms strictly to the rhetorical rules for the arrangement of a speech as follows: 3.1–40 form the *exordium,* 3.41–414 the *narratio,* 3.417–829 the *argumentatio,* and 3.830–1094 the *peroratio.*

of arguments which is very different from the sequence of commonplaces used by rhetoricians in the development of their "theses." In his "confirmation," Lucretius is clearly drawing inferences in accordance with Epicurean standards of reasoning; and the concatenation of arguments, not to speak of their sheer quantity, is obviously in violation of the rhetorical precept that arguments should be brief. At the same time, Lucretius' "confirmation" is clearly embellished with rhetorical art; and his presentation as a whole conforms to the overall structure of a rhetorical "thesis," according to which a "thesis" is defended in a section of "confirmation" followed by a section of "refutation." Lucretius has constructed all his arguments on the soul with a view to the final conclusion "death is nothing to us"; and after proving this claim, he refutes objections to it. While the style of Lucretius' "confirmation" may be said to be predominantly "philosophical" by contrast with the predominantly "rhetorical" style of the "refutation," both styles blend into a single style of "philosophical rhetoric" which is unique to Lucretius.

A brief look at the prologue to Book 3 confirms, I suggest, that Lucretius has constructed Book 3 as a "thesis" of his own type in defense of the claim that "death is nothing to us." The prologue begins with a vision of heaven that excludes the existence of any Hades. Lucretius then announces the topic of Book 3; after a quick review of what he has already explained in his first two Books, Lucretius states (3.35–40):

hasce secundum res animi natura videtur
atque animae claranda meis iam versibus esse
et metus ille foras praeceps Acheruntis agendus,
funditus humanam qui vitam turbat ab imo
omnia suffundens mortis nigrore neque ullam
esse voluptatem liquidam puramque relinquit.

From here to the end of the prologue, Lucretius outlines in vivid detail the misery and horror with which the fear of death afflicts mankind. Clearly, Lucretius will explain the "nature of the mind and the soul" (3.35–36) as a means of showing that death is not to be feared. As in his initial vision of a heaven without hell, Lucretius shows throughout the remainder of his prologue that the theme, or "thesis," of the ensuing explanation is that "death is nothing to us."

To return to our initial question, is Lucretius' presentation of his arguments logically deficient? In particular, does Lucretius construct the arguments of Book 3 in a logically coherent fashion, or is he so dominated by a poetic vision that he "anticipates" and "suspends"

thoughts with little or no regard for logical order? In the case of Book 3, a comparison with Epicurus' order of presentation reveals little about Lucretius' logic, since Epicurus' extant discussion of the soul in the *Letter to Herodotus* is not only much briefer, but also consists not so much in a sequence of argument as in a summary followed by two supplementary explanations.[63] On the whole, one is impressed by Lucretius' ability to partition a complex argument and to fit the parts into a meaningful whole, and puzzled by Epicurus' principles of organization.

If we analyse Lucretius' order of reasoning in Book 3, we find clear examples of "anticipation." There is also an example of "suspension of thought," though it hardly qualifies as the type of "leap" of thought that is normally understood by that expression. I shall mention it briefly, because I think that it is quite typical of Lucretius' "suspensions of thought." Lucretius proves at 3.323–49 that the soul and body are dependent on each other for life; but he then defers any further discussion of the mortality of the soul until the long section of arguments on the mortality of the soul at 3.417–829. This postponement is clearly due to Lucretius' desire to offer a complete discussion of the relationship of the soul and body to each other before summoning all his resources to embark on a highly controversial topic, the mortality of the soul, which was much discussed for its own sake and recognized as a distinct topic of debate by Aetius. There is nothing illogical about this postponement: Lucretius has organized his material in two sections, (i) the relationship of the soul and body to each other (3.323–416), and (ii) the mortality of the soul (3.417–829), and this order has priority over the logical consequence of (ii) upon the first part (3.323–49) of (i).

As for "anticipation," one clear example is Lucretius' claim at 3.138–44 that the mind is the dominant part of the soul. All that Lucretius is entitled to claim at this point is that the soul and mind are joined in union with one another. That the mind is the dominant part in this union must be supported by argument, and Lucretius does not begin to prove this until 3.396–416, where he demonstrates that the mind is more important to the preservation of life than the rest of the soul. It is not difficult to see why Lucretius has made this anticipation.

[63] Epicurus sums up all the conclusions reached by Lucretius in 3.94–322 in a single introductory sentence (*Letter to Herodotus* 63), and then argues in detail, first, that the soul and body together are responsible for sense perception (63–66), and, secondly, that the soul is corporeal (67). Lucretius places the argument for the soul's corporeality where it logically belongs in his sequence (at 3.161–76).

In showing that the soul and the mind are united with each other, he does not want to give the false impression that the mind and the rest of the soul are equal partners in this union; and he also takes it as a common belief that the mind is the governing part of the soul. Lucretius' anticipation, therefore, is an aid to clarity. While Lucretius is, strictly speaking, infringing the logical order of exposition, there is no confusion in Lucretius' mind, and there is also no infringement of the rules of logic, since Lucretius will prove his claim later.

Similarly, Lucretius anticipates at 3.145 and 3.240 that the mind is the organ of thought; Lucretius cannot justify this claim until he has shown at 4.722 ff. that the mind has images.[64] Again, the anticipation is in agreement with common opinion; Lucretius makes it because he can give a clearer account in this way, and he will prove the point later.

The other main anticipation in Book 3 is the claim that reason can dominate the physical constitution of the soul in such a way that the latter has only a very slight influence on one's behavior—so slight, indeed, that anyone can live a "life worthy of the gods" (3.307–22). Lucretius here excuses his anticipation by saying that he can only make the assertion now, without being able to give a detailed explanation of the physical make-up of the soul. Lucretius is clearly well aware how his anticipation fits into the logical structure of his exposition. In this case, Lucretius points ahead in order to give encouragement to the student.

In the preceding short survey of Book 3, I have tried to show that Lucretius has arranged the doctrines of Book 3 with a view to a single goal, the demonstration that "death is nothing to us." Within this general rhetorical framework, Lucretius makes "anticipations" of doctrines that are yet to be proved; and this, I suggest, is a deliberate feature of Lucretius' rhetorical method of exposition, which no more implies logical carelessness than Lucretius' method of organization as a whole. Much additional insight into Lucretius' method of exposition can be obtained by a study of Books 1 and 2. Most of the doctrines set out in these books are also found in Epicurus' *Letter to Herodotus,* although in much briefer compass; and while Lucretius undoubtedly used also some of Epicurus' more detailed writings as a source, Lucretius' sequence of arguments is clearly modeled on the sequence found in the *Letter to Herodotus.* At the same time, Lucretius' very striking departures

[64] A related example of "anticipation" (which is noted by Kenney, op. cit., p. 135) is Lucretius' explicit mention of "eidols" at 3.430–33.

from this order illustrate very clearly the contribution of Lucretius' rhetoric to Epicurus' philosophy.

Book 1 begins with a prologue in which Lucretius announces the contents of his poem as follows (1.54–61):

> *nam tibi de summa caeli ratione deumque*
> *disserere incipiam et rerum primordia pandam,*
> *unde omnis natura creet res auctet alatque*
> *quove eadem rursum natura perempta resolvat,*
> *quae nos materiem et genitalia corpora rebus*
> *reddunda in ratione vocare et semina rerum*
> *appellare suemus et haec eadem usurpare*
> *corpora prima, quod ex illis sunt omnia primis.*

In this table of contents, the "supreme doctrine of the heavens and the gods" embraces all of physics, φυσιολογία, and the explanation of the "principles" (*primordia*), out of which all things are created and into which all are destroyed, is the foundation of this "supreme doctrine." For Lucretius and the Epicureans, as for Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, and indeed all natural philosophers, natural philosophy culminates in theology; that is why Lucretius calls the explanation of the heavens and the gods "*summa,*" "supreme."[65] Lucretius will devote all of his poem to theology, and he will begin his exposition by explaining the *primordia* in Books 1 and 2. A little later in the prologue (1.127–35), Lucretius adds detail to his initial table of contents. He explains that in order to eradicate utterly the fear of the gods he must also give an account of the nature of the soul; this is the subject of Books 3 and 4. At the same time, Lucretius fills out what he will discuss in Books 5 and 6: he will explain, he states, the "things above," including the journeys of the sun and the moon, as well as what happens on earth. In addition to

[65] Against Bailey, who takes *summa caeli ratione* to refer to Book 5 (vol. 2, p. 604 of his commentary on Lucretius) and who considers that Lucretius never fulfils his promise of giving an account of the gods, I agree with Pierre Boyancé that the entire phrase *summa caeli ratione deumque* applies to the poem as a whole (*Lucrèce et l'épicurisme* [Paris 1963] 71). I also differ from Bailey in the sense that I assign to *summa.* Bailey suggests that *summa* is "almost a transferred epithet" taken with *caeli* to signify "the working of the heavens on high" (vol. 2, p. 606 of his commentary on Lucretius). In my view, Lucretius' use of *summa* corresponds to the Stoics' description of theology as the "ultimate" (ἔσχατος) study in the investigation of nature (*SVF* 2.42). I refer the reader also to Giovanni Barra, who argues in detail that the phrase *summa caeli ratione deumque* together with the succeeding mention of the *primordia* announces the topic of Books 1 and 2 alone (*Struttura e composizione del "De rerum natura" di Lucrezio* [Naples 1952] 55–59).

these tables of contents, Lucretius confirms throughout his prologue to Book 1 (beginning with the invocation of Venus) that the theme of his entire poem is God, and that his "thesis" in particular is that the gods are not to be feared.

Lucretius ends his prologue and turns specifically to the topic of Books 1 and 2 with these words (1.146–58):

Hunc igitur terrorem animi tenebrasque necessest
non radii solis neque lucida tela diei
discutiant, sed naturae species ratioque.
principium cuius hinc nobis exordia sumet,
nullam rem e nilo gigni divinitus umquam.
quippe ita formido mortalis continet omnis,
quod multa in terris fieri caeloque tuentur
quorum operum causas nulla ratione videre
possunt ac fieri divino numine rentur.
quas ob res ubi viderimus nil posse creari
de nilo, tum quod sequimur iam rectius inde
perspiciemus, et unde queat res quaeque creari
et quo quaeque modo fiant opera sine divum.

In these verses, Lucretius announces the very first doctrine of his physics—that nothing comes to be from nothing—and at the same time places this within the context of his entire poem, and of his first two Books in particular. Lucretius will attempt to free mankind from the fear of the gods by showing, as his first doctrine, that nothing comes to be from nothing, and using this as a first step towards demonstrating "both from what all things are created and how all things come to be without the agency of the gods" (1.157–58). "From what" all things are created is demonstrated in Book 1; "how" all things are created is demonstrated in Book 2; and the goal of both Books together is to show that all things are created by the *primordia,* and not by the gods. The use of the word *divinitus* at 1.150 looks ahead to this final conclusion. Strictly speaking, Lucretius does not go on to prove that "nothing comes to be from nothing divinely"; what he does prove, as his first doctrine, is that "nothing comes to be from nothing," and what he will prove later is that the *primordia* alone are responsible for creation, to the exclusion of the gods. Lucretius explains all of this himself immediately after using the word *divinitus. Divinitus* is an "anticipation" of what it is to come; and from a logical point of view, it is faulty. However, Lucretius is not himself confused; nor does he wish to confuse his readers.

Lucretius subsequently develops the topic of the *primordia* by proving in succession the following claims: (1) there are invisible principles, *primordia,* from which all things are created and into which all things are destroyed (1.159–328); (2) there is void (1.329–417); (3) there is no third self-subsistent entity apart from bodies and void (1.418–82); (4) the *primordia* are everlasting and atomic (1.483–920); (5) the *primordia* are infinite in an infinite universe (1.921--1113, end of Book 1); then after a prologue to Book 2, (6) the *primordia* are in continuous motion, which results in the creation of ever the same things (2.80–332); (7) the *primordia* have different shapes, which are innumerable and which are each represented by infinite *primordia* (2.333–729); (8) the *primordia* have neither perceptible qualities nor sense perception (2.730–990), and are responsible for the everlasting cycle of creation and generation in the world (2.991–1022); and lastly, (9) the *primordia* create and dissolve infinite worlds (2.1023–1174, end of Book 2). All of these conclusions are centered on the topic of the *primordia;* and Lucretius has developed this topic through a sequence of arguments culminating in the demonstration that the *primordia* are responsible for an infinite cycle of generation and destruction extending to infinite worlds, without the gods being responsible for any of this.

Epicurus begins his *Letter to Herodotus* with an introduction which consists in (a) a section of protreptic (36–37) and (b) a section of "canonic," that is, rules of scientific procedure (37–38). Epicurus then sets out a series of deductions as follows (38–44): (1) nothing is generated from non-being; (2) nothing is destroyed into non-being; (3) the universe is unchanging in what there is; (4) there are bodies; (5) there is void in addition to bodies; (6) there is no third self-subsistent entity in addition to bodies and void; (7) the bodies are either combinations or atomic and unchanging bodies; (8) the universe is infinite, and its two constituents, bodies and void, are infinite; (9) the atoms are innumerable in the variety of their shapes, and infinite with respect to each shape; and (10) the atoms are in continuous motion, which results in diverse combinations. This concludes Epicurus' "outline," as he calls it, of his fundamental doctrines. Subsequently, Epicurus develops a variety of topics in detail, beginning with the claim that there are infinite worlds.

Unlike Lucretius, Epicurus does not give a table of contents in his introduction, or state or allude to any of his conclusions. Instead, he ends his introduction to his physical doctrines with a statement of the two rules by which all scientific conclusions are to be obtained. Lucretius, by contrast, omits any explanation of "canonic" from his

introduction to his physics. This difference in the two introductions reflects a basic difference in Epicurus' and Lucretius' methods of exposition as a whole. While Epicurus presents his doctrine as though he, and the student, were themselves developing it as they went along by relying on the two initial rules of investigation, without knowing in advance what conclusions they would reach, Lucretius takes the complete doctrine as given and presents this to the student as a completely worked out whole. Accordingly, Lucretius fashions his poem in its entirety, and individual parts within it, as unified compositions or "theses," each viewed as a case that is to be confirmed by arguments of one's own and defended by a refutation of opposing arguments; and to this end Lucretius uses anticipations freely.

This difference in method of presentation may be illustrated in detail by an analysis of Lucretius' first section of argument in Book 1, consisting in the demonstration that there *are* invisible *primordia* (1.159–328). Lucretius' argument is clearly divided into (1) two complementary sections of proof, showing that (i) nothing comes to be from nothing (1.159–214), and (ii) nothing is destroyed into nothing (1.215–64), followed by (2) a section of refutation (1.265–328). Unlike Epicurus, Lucretius does not follow up his first two conclusions, that nothing comes to be from nothing and that nothing is destroyed into nothing, by the logical consequence that the universe is unchanging (step (3) in Epicurus' sequence). What Lucretius has done is to replace this consequence with a section of refutation in which he answers the objection that it is *not* the case that "there are invisible bodies." Lucretius has rearranged Epicurus' doctrines to fashion the "thesis" that "there are invisible bodies," divided into a section of confirmation and a section of refutation.

Along with this rearrangement, Lucretius makes numerous "anticipations." The most important of these is the assumption throughout the argument that *what* a thing is created from and into *what* it is destroyed is "bodies" (*corpora* 1.196, 215; *genitalia corpora* 1.167; *corpora prima* 1.171; *materies* 1.171, 191, 203; etc.). All that the argument allows him to conclude at this point is that what a thing is created from and into what it is dissolved is *something* (or strictly, not non-being). That this "something" is corporeal is not justified until 1.422, where Lucretius claims (following Epicurus) that the existence of bodies is shown directly by sense perception.

Lucretius' other anticipations in his first section of argument may be divided roughly into (a) "explicit" anticipations, like the antici-

pation concerning "bodies," and (b) "allusive" anticipations, with an intermediate range between these two types. Among the first type is Lucretius' suggestion that there are "many bodies common to many things, just as we see letters in words" (1.196–97). This conclusion will be developed in detail by Lucretius in Book 2 (333–699, especially 2.688–699). Another example is Lucretius' claim (at 1.302–3) that all sense perception is due to the impact of bodies, a doctrine that is to be developed in detail in Book 4 (46 ff.).

Intermediate between "explicit" and "allusive" anticipations, we may group Lucretius' assumption of "empty spaces" in his claim that a thing is destroyed either by being broken apart by a blow from outside or by being dissolved by a force that enters into it "*per inania*" (1.223). In addition, Lucretius describes the matter into which a thing is dissolved as "everlasting" (1.221, 239, 242, 245). That there are "empty spaces" that are wholly devoid of body is not proved until 1.329 ff., and that there are ultimate bodies which are "everlasting" in the full sense of not being changeable in any way is not proved until 1.483 ff. These two examples differ from the others in that Lucretius might well expect the student to understand the two expressions in a wider sense than the technical sense which will be developed later. At the same time, by the use of these terms Lucretius points ahead to the doctrine that will be set out later on.

A good example of an "allusive" anticipation is Lucretius' description of the *aether* as "father" (*pater,* 1.250) and of the earth as "mother" (*matris,* 1.251). Lucretius will elaborate his view of the earth as "mother" later on at 2.589–660, when he sets out his doctrine of the shapes of atoms, and he will subsequently use the same descriptive pair "*pater*" and "*mater*" at 2.992–93 to sum up his detailed explanation of how the sky and earth together produce all living things by means of combinations of variously shaped, infinite atoms.

There are more examples of "anticipation," especially of "allusive" anticipations, in Lucretius' essay on the existence of invisible *primordia.* But the examples that I have chosen illustrate, it seems to me, the range of "anticipations" of philosophical doctrines found in Lucretius' poem as a whole. The anticipations illustrate in part Quintilian's description of the rhetorical practice of "preparing" the audience for revelations that are yet to come. Quintilian notes that a speech must be read through to the end and then re-read in order that one may appreciate the full force of each statement: for the orator "*praeparat, dissimulat, insidiatur*" as he makes assertions in the first part of a speech which will have an

effect later.[66] Lucretius' own use of "anticipations" is a philosophical counterpart to this rhetorical practice. Lucretius anticipates doctrines that he will prove later in order to make the present exposition clearer as well as to prepare the student for doctrines that will be developed later. This procedure is not intended as a camouflage for weaknesses in one's own position, nor is it logically unsound. Lucretius is prepared to justify the assumptions that he makes; and he never relies (according to Epicurus' standards of logical coherence) on an anticipation of a doctrine in order to prove that very doctrine later.

Lucretius' second section of argument in Book 1 consists in showing that there is void (1.329–417). It has a short prologue of its own (1.329–34), and consists, like the first section of argument, in a "confirmation" (1.335–69) followed by a "refutation" (1.370–97); the whole i closed by an epilogue (1.398–417). The entire argument forms another "thesis." As before, Lucretius relies on the assumption that there are bodies, as he undertakes to demonstrate that there is void in addition to bodies.

It is not until he has completed his essay on the void that Lucretius returns to Epicurus' order of exposition. Well aware that he has departed from the order used by Epicurus in the *Letter to Herodotus,* Lucretius now announces that he will retrace his steps (*sed nunc ut repetam coeptum pertexere dictis,* 1.418).[67] Lucretius now reverts to step (4) of Epicurus' sequence (and to Epicurus' very own wording), as he claims that there are bodies and explains again in brief that there is void. He subsequently develops the doctrine that there is no third self-subsistent entity, with a response to an objection at 1.464–83.

[66] Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria* 10.1.20–21; at 9.2.22–23 Quintilian describes what appears to be one type of this preparation, *sustentatio* (as called by Celsus) or παράδοξον (*inopinatum*). I am indebted to Diskin Clay for these references. Gordon Williams discusses these passages and their relevance to poetic composition in general at p. 97 (and following) of his book, *Figures of Thought in Roman Poetry* (New Haven 1980). My own treatment of "anticipation" in Lucretius' poetry is restricted to anticipations of philosophical doctrines, that is, to those claims which might appear to lay Lucretius open to the charge of violating the rules of logic.

[67] Bailey comments on Lucretius' order here that "we must not expect to find in Lucretius the regular logical sequence of a modern scientific treatise" (vol. 2, p. 666, of his commentary on Lucretius). Bailey rejects at the same time Giussani's suggestion that Lucretius is here deserting Epicurus' Μεγάλη Ἐπιτομή for the *Letter to Herodotus.* In my view, Lucretius' painstaking effort to make clear precisely what order he is following (at 1.418 and 1.429) shows that he is not guilty of patchwork.

In the remainder of Book 1 Lucretius argues that there are ultimate everlasting (and, accordingly, atomic) bodies (1.483–920), and finally that these *primordia* are infinite in an infinite universe (1.921–1113); the whole book is rounded off by a short epilogue (1.1114–17). Both of these sections of argument are constructed as "theses." The argument on atomicity is divided into a prologue (1.483–502), a long series of arguments confirming Lucretius' position (1.503–634), and an even longer series of arguments refuting in turn a number of pre-Socratic thinkers (1.635–920). This section of refutation serves both to round off the argument on atomicity and to conclude the entire preceding sequence of argument on the *primordia* and the void. The essay on infinity then marks a fresh start, signalled by an elaborate new prologue, in which Lucretius describes his poetic mission (1.921–57). The argument on infinity is divided into a section of confirmation (1.958–1051) and a section of refutation (1.1052–1113).[68]

While Lucretius preserves Epicurus' general sequence of argument in following his proof of atomicity with a proof of infinity, there is an important difference in perspective here as throughout Books 1 and 2. Whereas Epicurus focuses on the universe as his topic of investigation, Lucretius focuses on the *primordia;* and while Epicurus accumulates one logical consequence after another with complete emotional detachment, Lucretius views the *primordia* from the beginning as forces that will usurp the power of the gods. That is why Lucretius launches on a new, exultant prologue at 1.921–57: what fills Lucretius with such unrestrained enthusiasm is that the *primordia* turn out to be infinite—having the infinite power traditionally assigned to the gods.

There are frequent examples of "anticipation" in the remainder of Book 1. I shall mention only the most conspicuous example. This is the assertion, often repeated, that the *primordia,* which themselves lack perceptible qualities, create all perceptible properties and changes through various arrangements of themselves (1.675–89, 798–802, 817–29, 907–14). Lucretius joins to this the claim (which he has already made) that many principles, like letters in words, are common to many things (1.814–29). He also follows up these anticipations by explaining briefly in his section on infinity how the atoms are able to form by their

[68] J. Mussehl divides the argument of Book 1 into three main parts, (1) proof that there are atoms and void (1.149–399), (2) a section on the exclusion of a third principle (1.418–82), and (3) a section on the "qualities" of the atoms (1.483–1113) followed by an epilogue (1.1114–17) (*De Lucretiani libri primi condicione ac retractatione* [Diss. Berlin, 1912] esp. pp. 91–92). Mussehl suggests at the same time that the prologue at 1.921–57 was composed as a later addition; this seems to me very unlikely.

arrangements all the things contained in the world (1.1021–41). All of this looks ahead to Lucretius' detailed explanation in Book 2 of how the *primordia* are able to create all things including, ultimately, infinite worlds.[69]

Related to the problem of "anticipation," there is one major problem of logical sequence in Book 1, which has been much discussed. Lucretius claims at 1.531 that he showed "a little earlier" that solid bodies cannot be dissolved by external blows or by penetration or in any way at all. The problem is: where did Lucretius give this demonstration? Some editors have pointed to Lucretius' introductory claim at 1.485–86 that solid bodies are invincible. However, Lucretius only asserts the doctrine here, without proving it; and this has led Adolf Brieger, for example, to suggest that Lucretius just thinks that he has proved the point, and Karl Büchner to propose that the point is so vividly before Lucretius that he claims it as proved without really having proved it.[70] However, I suggest, Lucretius did prove the point earlier on in his arguments for the existence of void. As Lucretius shows by his examples at 1.532–35, there are just two ways in which a body may be dissolved, (a) by being shattered by an external blow, and (b) by being penetrated within. That (a) requires internal void is proved by Lucretius at 1.384–97; here Lucretius argues that for two bodies to come apart there must already be void between them. That (b) requires internal void is proved by Lucretius at 1.346–57. Just in case the student has forgotten these proofs, Lucretius refreshes the student's memory by the examples which he adds at 1.532–35.

Book 2 begins with a general prologue (2.1–79) which ends with an announcement of the contents of the book. In the list of contents (2.62–79), Lucretius gives special prominence to the motion of the *primordia,* the subject of his first section of argument (2.80–332), but at the same time indicates the subject of the book as a whole by claiming that the *primordia* have the power to increase and diminish all things in a continuous cycle of creation and destruction. Lucretius' discussion

[69] Gerhard Müller has previously drawn attention to the anticipation consisting in the letter simile at 1.823–29; he calls this a "pädagogisch einführende und zugleich dichterische Darstellungsweise" (*Die Darstellung der Kinetik bei Lukrez, Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, Institut für griechisch-römische Altertumskunde,* nr. 7, 1959, p. 50). Müller also suggests, unnecessarily it seems to me, that 2.688–99, where the letter simile recurs, should be excised. I agree with Müller that in the argument on infinity in Book 1 Lucretius anticipates his arguments on the growth and decline of worlds at the end of Book 2 (ibid., p. 87).

[70] Adolf Brieger, ed., *T. Lucreti Cari De Rerum Natura libri sex* (Leipzig 1894) pp. xxxvii–xxxviii; and Karl Büchner, op. cit. in note 2, pp. 29–33.

of motion at 2.80–332 is carefully divided into several sub-divisions, including a refutation of the view that the gods take care of mankind (2.167–83), a refutation of the claim that some things move upward by their own nature (2.184–215), and a final refutation, intended as a sequel to all the preceding arguments on motion, of the objection that continuous subperceptible motion is incompatible with perceived stillness (2.308–32).

Lucretius next undertakes to show "of what sort" (*qualia,* 2.334) the *primordia* are by showing what shapes they have (2.333–729). This essay is divided into a number of sub-sections, each of which follows logically upon what has preceded: (a) the *primordia* have a variety of shapes (2.333–477); (b) these shapes are limited in number (2.478–521); (c) each shape has an infinite number of *primordia* (2.522–80); (d) each perceptible thing contains more than one shape (2.581–699); and (e) not every combination of shapes is possible (2.700–29). There are no sections of refutation in this essay, although there are two elaborate and much admired rhetorical "digressions" (on the mother seeking her slain calf, 2.352–66, and on Cybele, 2.600–60), both entirely suitable to the argument. The latter digression contains the important anticipatory claim that the gods enjoy supreme peace far away from human beings (2.646–51).

The order which Lucretius follows in presenting, first, an account of motion and, secondly, an account of the qualities of the atoms is an important departure from Epicurus' order. Epicurus places the first three conclusions on shape—(a), (b), and (c) of Lucretius' account—immediately after his arguments on the infinity of the universe and of its two constituents, and before his arguments on motion; and he also concludes his entire introductory exposition of his physics with his account of motion (*Letter to Herodotus* 42–44). The reason for which Lucretius has postponed his discussion of "what sort" the *primordia* are until after his discussion of motion is that he has chosen to compose a single, comprehensive essay on the "qualities" of the *primordia* (2.333–729) which is followed by a complementary essay showing what qualities the *primordia* do *not* have (2.730–990). In this latter essay, Lucretius shows that while the *primordia* themselves have neither perceptible qualities nor sense perception, they are nonetheless able to create these by combinations of themselves. This conclusion then leads to Lucretius' final essay, which crowns the entire sequence of arguments in Books 1 and 2, showing that the *primordia* have the power to create infinite worlds (2.1023–1174). However orderly this regrouping, Lucretius has not only swept past Epicurus' own sharp break in the argument,

but he has also departed from the logical sequence of Epicurus' argument. For Lucretius needs to "anticipate" in his essay on motion that the *primordia* vary in shape, in order to conclude, as he does at 2.95–110 and assumes through the remainder of his essay on motion, that the atoms are able to combine in such a way as to create all things. Lucretius has abandoned Epicurus' strict, logical sequence of argument in order to present his own sequence of ever more astounding revelations on the power of the *primordia.*

Lucretius' section of argument showing that the atoms have neither perceptible properties (2.730–864) nor sense perception (2.865–990) lacks a separate section of refutation, like the preceding section of argument on shape; but all of it may be considered a refutation appended to the preceding essay on shape, disproving the objection that a variety of shapes alone is not sufficient to account for the perceived world. The conclusion stated at 2.991–1022 elaborates the claim made earlier in Book 1 (250–64) that the sky and earth together create all living things in an everlasting cycle of creation and destruction. Lucretius is now able to add detail to the earlier conclusion by asserting that this cycle of creation and destruction is due to the arrangements of ever moving, variously shaped atoms. This conclusion serves as a recapitulation of all of the argument that has preceded in Books 1 and 2. It also serves as a preliminary to the final conclusion of Book 2, which Lucretius now prepares with a new, resounding prologue.

This new prologue (2.1023–47) balances the prologue to the discussion of infinity in Book 1 (921–57). Lucretius now shows the full extent of the creative powers of the *primordia* by proving that they create, and in turn dissolve, infinite worlds. After the prologue, Lucretius develops three arguments showing that there are infinite worlds (2.1048–89). Astonishingly, it turns out, the creative power of the *primordia* extends to an infinite number of worlds. The conclusion is clear and compelling: the creative power of the *primordia* takes the place of the creative power of the gods. Lucretius does not delay the conclusion; he proclaims immediately after his proofs for infinite worlds, at 2.1090–93:

> *Quae bene cognita si teneas, natura videtur*
> *libera continuo dominis privata superbis*
> *ipsa sua per se sponte omnia dis agere expers.*

The *primordia* rule in place of the gods, and the universe is free from the tyranny of divine masters. And just in case someone might object that the gods might yet busy themselves in the affairs of the universe,

Lucretius confirms with an oath—in which he appeals to the peace and happiness of the gods—that the gods can hardly busy themselves everywhere at once, and surely they wouldn't toss their thunderbolts as randomly as these obviously occur (2.1094–1104). A rhetorical refutation gives force to a conclusion which has been reached by a deliberate, rhetorical rearrangement of philosophical argument.

Book 2 ends with a detailed explanation of how the *primordia* have the power to create and destroy the worlds of this universe (2.1131–74). This explanation is attached loosely to the preceding denial of divine governance by the connective particle *-que* (2.1105); and this has puzzled some scholars. According to Bailey, there has been a "suspension of thought" from 2.1089 to 2.1105, with an intervening digression directed against the traditional view of the gods.[71] Lucretius also clearly anticipates in this final part of Book 2 two major topics of Book 5, the explanation of how worlds grow (5.416ff.) and the explanation that worlds are not everlasting (5.91 ff.). Lucretius' order is, however, entirely appropriate. Lucretius has carefully designed his sequence of argument with one aim: to show that the *primordia*, and not the gods, govern the course of events in the world. Lucretius' explanation of the growth and decline of worlds, with a final narrowing of focus on this world, and this human being, completes the project that Lucretius set out to accomplish in his first two Books. This is to free his fellow humans from the fear of the gods by proving, by a skilful rhetorical adaptation of the logical sequence of argument, that the world is not governed by the gods.*

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[71] Bailey, p. 971 and p. 975 of vol. 2 of his commentary on Lucretius. Müller rightly objects that the so-called digression is really a logical consequence of what has preceded (note 69 above, p. 85). Müller divides Book 2 similarly to myself into a prologue, followed by four main topics (1) 2.62–332, (2) 2.333–729, (3) 2.730–1022, and (4) 2.1023–1174. Friedrich Klingner agrees with Bailey that 2.1105 is ill connected with what has preceded; and Klingner also suggests that Lucretius' explanation from 2.1105 to the end of the book marks an abrupt shift from the topic of infinite worlds to our own world, and as such should be located in Book 5 ("Philosophie und Dichtkunst am Ende des zweiten Buches des Lucrez," *Hermes* 80 (1952) 3–31, esp. p. 21 and pp. 7ff.). Klingner concludes that there are two types of arrangement in Lucretius, a philosophical-systematic order and a poetic order. While I agree that there are two orders, I suggest that Lucretius has blended them into a single, harmonious sequence without detriment to either.

* I am very much indebted to Diskin Clay for reading an earlier draft of this paper and making numerous, very helpful suggestions, many of which I have incorporated in this paper.

INTERPRETATIONS

NINE NOTES ON PLATO'S *LYSIS*

(i) 204d3–7

καὶ ἃ μὲν καταλογάδην διηγεῖται, δεινὰ ὄντα, οὐ πάνυ τι δεινά ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὰν τὰ ποιήματα ἡμῶν ἐπι-
5 χειρήσῃ καταντλεῖν καὶ συγγράμματα. καὶ ὃ ἐστιν τούτων δεινότερον, ὅτι καὶ ᾄδει εἰς τὰ παιδικὰ φωνῇ θαυμασίᾳ, ἣν ἡμᾶς δεῖ ἀκούοντας ἀνέχεσθαι. νῦν δὲ ἐρωτώμενος ὑπὸ σοῦ ἐρυθριᾷ.

d5 καὶ συγγράμματα secl. ci. A. Masaracchia[1]

Masaracchia argues that it is odd for Ctesippus to say: "and what he [Hippothales] expounds in prose (καταλογάδην) is bad enough, but not quite as bad as when he undertakes to deluge us with works of poetry *and prose*." That καὶ συγγράμματα is a gloss, he thinks, is further indicated by the fact that it seems to spoil what ought to be a progression in Hippothales' increasingly δεινότερα activities of 1) prose, 2) poetry, 3) worst of all, singing.

That the text is sound, however, is strongly suggested by what Hippothales says a few lines later, when asked whether he denies being in love with Lysis: οὐκ ἔγωγε . . . ἀλλὰ μὴ ποιεῖν εἰς τὰ παιδικὰ μηδὲ συγγράφειν (205a5–6). The wording of this denial must look back to τὰ ποιήματα . . . καὶ συγγράμματα in 204d5.

What then of the alleged redundancy? It is undeniable that συγγράμματα here are 'prose writings.' What is less certain is that καταλογάδην (fr. λογάς, λογάδην: 'picked out' or perhaps 'taken as is') must mean 'in (sc. written) prose.'[2] With an eye on διηγεῖται ('describes,' 'narrates') Liddell-Scott s.v. I.1 renders καταλογάδην in our text as 'by way of conversation.' If this is justifiable, the problem of course disappears. Is it? What may appear to stand in the way is evidence pointing to a typical association of the term with prose composition: *Sym.* 177b3 καταλογάδην συγγράφειν, *Laws* 811e3 γεγραμμένα καταλογάδην, Isoc. *To Nicocl.* 7 τῶν καταλογάδην συγγραμμάτων. Further, it is unclear that διηγεῖσθαι must signify *oral* description. *Laws* 957d1, however, furnishes confirmation that the term does not necessarily designate

[1] 'Platone *Lys.* 204d5,' *Maia* 12 (1960) 218f.

[2] Cf. P. Vicaire, *Platon: Lachès et Lysis* (Paris 1963) ad loc.

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written prose, but may just as well describe the spoken language of ordinary conversation: καὶ ὅσοι [sc. τῶν λόγων] καταλογάδην εἴτ' ἐν γράμμασιν εἴτε καθ' ἡμέραν ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πάσαις συνουσίαις. . . . Thus there is no redundancy in Ctesippus' complaint, which does involve an orderly progression after all. He says that what Hippothales says in 'ordinary language' is bad enough, but worse are the poems and prose treatises he deluges us with, and worst of all is his obnoxious singing to Lysis.

(ii) 205c2–d2

ἃ δὲ ἡ πόλις ὅλη ᾄδει περὶ Δημοκράτους καὶ Λύσιδος τοῦ πάππου τοῦ παιδὸς καὶ πάντων πέρι τῶν προγόνων, πλούτους τε καὶ ἱπποτροφίας καὶ νίκας Πυθοῖ καὶ
5 Ἰσθμοῖ καὶ Νεμέᾳ τεθρίπποις τε καὶ κέλησι, ταῦτα ποιεῖ τε καὶ λέγει, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἔτι τούτων κρονικώτερα. τὸν γὰρ τοῦ Ἡρακλέους ξενισμὸν πρῴην ἡμῖν ἐν ποιήματί τινι διῄει, ὡς διὰ τὴν τοῦ Ἡρακλέους συγγένειαν ὁ πρόγονος αὐτῶν
d ὑποδέξαιτο τὸν Ἡρακλέα, γεγονὼς αὐτὸς ἐκ Διός τε καὶ τῆς τοῦ δήμου ἀρχηγέτου θυγατρός, ἅπερ αἱ γραῖαι ᾄδουσι. . . .

c8 αὐτῶν] αὐτόν ci. M. Schuster[3] secl. mox τὸν Ἡρακλέα

Schuster argues that the threefold repetition of 'Heracles' in c7–d1 is much too awkward. It is indeed at least conceivable that the copying of αὐτῶν for αὐτόν would lead naturally to the insertion of τὸν Ἡρακλέα as object for the verb. However, it seems unlikely that ὁ πρόγονος would stand without a qualifier and αὐτῶν makes perfect sense, its antecedent being Democrates and his father in c2–3. The repetition of the name does not necessarily offend and is perhaps even appropriate in the context. What amuses Ctesippus about the song in question seems not simply that it is so old fashioned. It tells how Lysis' direct ancestor entertained Heracles on account of his kinship to the hero (mutual filiation from Zeus). Its performers—Hippothales and the "old ladies"—are evidently impressed by the fact that Lysis' family has Heracles as an ancestor (even if merely collateral). Does Ctesippus find this sort of thing ridiculous in itself? At any rate Plato does: cf. *Theaet.* 175a5–7. Perhaps the somewhat mocking iteration of 'Heracles' is an expression of this.

[3] 'Zu Platon's *Lysis* 205cd,' *Wien. Stud.* 30 (1908) 340.

(iii) 207c7–d2

Οὐ μὴν ὁπότερός γε, ἔφην, πλουσιώτερος ὑμῶν, οὐκ ἐρήσομαι· φίλω γάρ ἐστον. ἦ γάρ;

Πάνυ γ', ἐφάτην.

10 Οὐκοῦν κοινὰ τά γε φίλων λέγεται, ὥστε τούτῳ γε οὐδὲν διοίσετον, εἴπερ ἀληθῆ περὶ τῆς φιλίας λέγετον.

Συνεφάτην.

d Ἐπεχείρουν δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐρωτᾶν ὁπότερος δικαιότερος καὶ σοφώτερος αὐτῶν εἴη.

What can the conditional clause in 207c11 refer to? It is strange for Socrates to say to Lysis and Menexenus that they are equally wealthy "if you speak truly about friendship," for they have said nothing about friendship, not even their own. They have merely affirmed Socrates' statement that they are friends. Thus Jowett gives: "if you say truly that you are friends." Yet although English idiom allows one to say "you are telling the truth about your friendship" and mean simply that the statement *that* you *are* friends is true, this possibility is perhaps not as clearly present in Greek. At any rate, does it make sense for Socrates to express any hesitation at all (even ironically) about the veracity of their affirmation?

Wright tries: "if only you give me a true account of your friendship." But this is remote from the text and moreover suggests a falsehood. It is *not* the case that Socrates intends to examine their claim to be friends by seeing whether they can provide an account of their friendship (say, by asking for a definition of friendship, as he does for σωφροσύνη at *Charm.* 158e6–159a10, when testing Charmides' claim to be temperate). For he tells us in 207d1–2 that he was about to do something else: ask which of the two was juster and wiser. Neither in 211d ff., which begins the main investigation, nor anywhere else in the dialogue, does Socrates ask either interlocutor to provide such an account. (Undeniably, the *Lysis* seeks an account of friendship; and Socrates ironically evinces a wish to profit from Menexenus' expertise in the winning of friends [cf. 212a3–7]. However, it is a peculiar thing about the *Lysis,* at least when it is compared to the other 'Socratic' dialogues, that the various accounts which it examines are all provided by Socrates himself, who asks of his interlocutors little more than to affirm or deny his leading questions.)

Read λέγεται for λέγετον in 207c11. The clause now makes perfect sense; moreover, given διοίσετον in the same line, the orthographic error -τον/-ται is especially intelligible. The account whose truth is in

question is obviously κοινὰ τὰ φίλων. Socrates means that if the proverb is true, then—since the two boys are friends—he should have no need to ask which is wealthier. His attitude towards the proverb is clearly ironic, for the entailed suggestion that neither is wealthier is of course something of a joke. As mere παῖδες, neither Lysis nor Menexenus is much of a candidate for the predicate πλούσιος in the first place. (If, on the other hand, we were to construe 'wealthy' in this case to apply to the boys' families, it is clear that Lysis' family is well known to be much the richer of the two [cf. 205c4–5].) At any rate it is evident that the truth περὶ φιλίας has yet to be found, this being the theme of the dialogue.

Thus the following translation by J. S. Mill,[4] whether due to a happy mistake or to silent emendation, is the best. Lysis and Menexenus are friends ". . . and friends have all things in common, if what *they say* of friendship is true, so that there can be no difference between you in this respect."

(iv) 209a4–b1

Οὐ γάρ πω, ἔφη, ἡλικίαν ἔχω, ὦ Σώκρατες.—Μὴ οὐ
5 τοῦτό σε, ὦ παῖ Δημοκράτους, κωλύῃ, ἐπεὶ τό γε τοσόνδε,
ὡς ἐγῷμαι, καὶ ὁ πατὴρ καὶ ἡ μήτηρ σοι ἐπιτρέπουσιν καὶ
οὐκ ἀναμένουσιν ἕως ἂν ἡλικίαν ἔχῃς. ὅταν γὰρ βούλωνται
αὑτοῖς τινα ἀναγνωσθῆναι ἢ γραφῆναι, σέ, ὡς ἐγῷμαι,
b πρῶτον τῶν ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ ἐπὶ τοῦτο τάττουσιν.

a6 σοι <οὐκ> ἐπιτρέπουσιν καὶ [οὐκ] ἀναμένουσιν ci. U. Paoli[5]

Paoli avers that τό γε τοσόνδε in a5 possibly refers to the matters discussed previously by Socrates and Lysis, as opposed to the material about to be introduced. That is, it might refer to the many things Lysis' parents forbid his doing, such as driving his father's chariots (cf. 207e9–208e3). If so, it would mean: "[non omnia sed] id tantum [id videlicet quod ob imperitiam recte administrare nullo modo posses]." But such things they do *not* now entrust to him; they *do* delay doing so until he is older. Hence οὐκ should be relocated.

The conjecture is absurd. Not only is there no problem demonstrated in the text as it now stands. Even worse: Socrates' very point is obliterated. For what he wants Lysis to see is that the criterion his

[4] *Essays on Philosophy and the Classics*, Vol. XI of *The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill* (Toronto 1978) 211.

[5] 'In Platonis Lysidem 209a,' *Stud. ital. di filol. class.* 3 (1923) 159–61.

parents use in restricting his freedom is *not* his age, but rather his degree of intelligence and skill. Thus τό γε τοσόνδε clearly refers to what Socrates is about to draw attention to: Lysis' activities reading and writing, which his parents let him perform as he wishes regardless of his age, since he knows how each is to be done.

(v) 212b5–c8

5 Τί δέ; οὐκ ἔστιν φιλοῦντα μὴ ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τούτου ὃν ἂν φιλῇ;—Ἔστιν.—Τί δέ; ἆρα ἔστιν καὶ μισεῖσθαι φιλοῦντα; οἷόν που ἐνίοτε δοκοῦσι καὶ οἱ ἐρασταὶ πάσχειν πρὸς τὰ παιδικά· φιλοῦντες γὰρ
c ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα οἱ μὲν οἴονται οὐκ ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι, οἱ δὲ καὶ μισεῖσθαι. ἢ οὐκ ἀληθὲς δοκεῖ σοι τοῦτο;—Σφόδρα γε, ἔφη, ἀληθές.—Οὐκοῦν ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὁ μὲν φιλεῖ, ὁ δὲ φιλεῖται;—Ναί.—Πότερος οὖν αὐ-
5 τῶν ποτέρου φίλος ἐστίν; ὁ φιλῶν τοῦ φιλουμένου, ἐάντε καὶ ἀντιφιλῆται ἐάντε καὶ μισῆται, ἢ ὁ φιλούμενος τοῦ φιλοῦντος; ἢ οὐδέτερος αὖ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ οὐδετέρου φίλος ἐστίν, ἂν μὴ ἀμφότεροι ἀλλήλους φιλῶσιν;

c6 καὶ ἀντιφιλῆται] μὴ ἀντιφιλῆται ci. H. Müller[6]: καί secl. ci. Bonitz[7]

212e6–213a3 6 Τὸ φιλούμενον ἄρα τῷ φιλοῦντι φίλον ἐστίν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὦ Μενέξενε, ἐάντε φιλῇ ἐάντε καὶ μισῇ· οἷον καὶ τὰ νεωστὶ γεγονότα παιδία, τὰ μὲν οὐδέπω φιλοῦντα, τὰ
a δὲ καὶ μισοῦντα, ὅταν κολάζηται ὑπὸ τῆς μητρὸς ἢ ὑπὸ τοῦ πατρός, ὅμως καὶ μισοῦντα ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ χρόνῳ πάντων μάλιστά ἐστι τοῖς γονεῦσι φίλτατα.

e7 ἐάντε <μὴ> φιλῇ Schanz

To Müller it was completely obvious that μὴ is required before ἀντιφιλῆται, which then leaves the mss.' καὶ under a cloud of suspicion. (To Bonitz—apparently unaware of Müller's note—it seemed certain that καὶ makes sense only in the second limb of the ἐάντε . . . ἐάντε construction.) Nevertheless, his suggestion has met with only spotty approval. Adopted by Croiset and Crexells, it is rejected by Stallbaum, Burnet, Vicaire and others. So too Schanz's supplement in the parallel

[6] *Platon's Sämtliche Werke,* tr. H. Müller, introd. K. Steinhart, Vol. I (Leipzig 1850) 271 n. 6.

[7] 'Anmerkung zu dem vorstehende Aufsatze [J. Kvíčala, 'Über Platons *Lysis*],' *Ztschr. f. d. österr. Gymn.* 10 (1859) 285–87.

passage. But Müller is right: it is clear that in c6 the negative particle is missing. The same holds true in e7. Perhaps the case can be strengthened.

It is true that, as Stallbaum notes, ἐάντε καὶ . . . ἐάντε καὶ is *per se* perfectly acceptable: cf. *Rep.* 557a6–7. But then the question remains whether it makes good sense in the present context.

Socrates is wondering whether Menexenus will cling to his intuition that the lover (ὁ φιλῶν) can always be called φίλος; thus he draws attention to two occasions on which that intuition seems to lose some of its force. Doesn't it happen at times that a lover is not loved in return (μὴ ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι) by his beloved (cf. b5–6)? Secondly, doesn't it sometimes also happen that he is not only not loved by his beloved but even hated (καὶ μισεῖσθαι) by him (cf. b6–c3)? Hence the question arises (freely rendered): "well then who is the φίλος of whom? the lover of the beloved . . . or is it possibly the beloved who is the φίλος of the lover?" The omitted portion is where our problem lies. If we read with the mss. we must translate: "no matter whether he [the lover] is indeed loved or hated. . . ." If we adopt Müller's supplement, we must translate: "if he is not loved in return or even if he is hated. . . ." It is plain what Plato wrote. The clause in question recapitulates the two conditions, noted in the immediately preceding lines, which tend to undermine the notion that the lover is always φίλος. Hence Müller's suggestion is correct. The mss. reading makes Socrates' argument appear less precise than it in fact is. It is not only that the lover is sometimes hated; the difficulty with his being φίλος also arises, Socrates suggests, on those occasions when he is simply *not loved* in return.

Exactly the same considerations apply in 212e7. Only here the two conditions are not spelled out in the preceding but rather in the lines following (212e7–213a3), and the point Socrates makes concerns not the status of the lover but of the beloved. Moreover, the two conditions do not in this case undermine the beloved's being φίλος. The idea is that this is still possible *despite* their holding true (notwithstanding what Menexenus may think). The beloved is φίλος: "if he doesn't love and even if he hates." Thus the uncomprehending infant, if when punished by his parents he doesn't yet love them or even hates them, is nevertheless still φίλτατα.

The transformation of μὴ into καὶ is easily intelligible. The loss of precision referred to above is a case of scribal simplification. It is more common for the double-ἐάντε construction to encompass X plus the contrary of X (as, e.g., at *Prot.* 356b7) than the contradictory of X plus the contrary of X. Even with the help of Brandwood, I have not

been able to locate any other instances of the latter in the Platonic corpus.

(vi) 218b6–8

b διὸ δὴ καὶ φιλοσοφοῦσιν οἱ οὔτε ἀγαθοὶ οὔτε κακοί πω ὄντες, ὅσοι δὲ κακοὶ οὐ φιλοσοφοῦσιν, οὐδὲ οἱ ἀγαθοί· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ἐναντίον τοῦ ἐναντίου οὔτε τὸ ὅμοιον τοῦ ὁμοίου φίλον
5 ἡμῖν ἐφάνη ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν λόγοις. ἢ οὐ μέμνησθε;—Πάνυ γε, ἐφάτην.—Νῦν ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Λύσι τε καὶ Μενέξενε, παντὸς μᾶλλον ἐξηυρήκαμεν ὃ ἔστιν τὸ φίλον καὶ οὔ. φαμὲν γὰρ αὐτό, καὶ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ κατὰ τὸ
c σῶμα καὶ πανταχοῦ, τὸ μήτε κακὸν μήτε ἀγαθὸν διὰ κακοῦ παρουσίαν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φίλον εἶναι.—Παντάπασιν ἐφάτην τε καὶ συνεχωρείτην οὕτω τοῦτ' ἔχειν.

In 218b7 καὶ οὔ appears dubious. What Socrates and his interlocutors have now (νῦν) discovered, he says here, is that the neither-good-nor-evil, or intermediate being is friend of the good on account of the presence of evil. That is, they have strengthened the account of ὅ ἔστιν τὸ φίλον introduced earlier (216c1–217a2), according to which the intermediate agent is the subject of friendship, so that it now includes some explanation of why such a subject embraces the good. They have not—not *now*, that is—discovered what a friend 'is not.' The conclusions (1) that friends are not those like each other, (2) that friends are not those opposite each other, were established much earlier ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν λόγοις (i.e., 213d6 ff.) and then utilized as assumptions in the derivation of the basic intermediacy account (cf. 216d7–e7). Nor can καὶ οὔ be explained by the immediately preceding argument that the class of philosophers excludes both the completely ignorant and the completely wise, for that concerns not τὸ φίλον in general, but rather a special class of friends, i.e., φιλόσοφοι.

Should νῦν . . . ἐξηυρήκαμεν be construed as "*by now* . . ." or "*as things stand* . . . we have discovered" (cf. Liddell-Scott s.v. νῦν I.4; *Crat.* 384b6; Riddell §149 on the idiom νῦν δὲ . . . γάρ), so as to anticipate reference to earlier results as well as those obtained *just* now, thus rendering καὶ οὔ intelligible? This seems unlikely. For the combination νῦν ἄρα in Plato (or ἄρα νῦν) seems always to have an adversative force carrying with it the idea of a *just discovered* contrast with or opposition to an *earlier* result: cf. *Lys.* 210c7, 212d1–3: *Cri.* 46d3; *Hipp. Ma.* 295e5; *Gorg.* 502d5; *Rep.* 438d12. The present case fits this pattern. Socrates is contrasting the result which has now emerged with the findings obtained

ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν λόγοις and—as it happened—referred to in 218b3–4 (the end of a digression beginning in 218a2). His point is that whereas the earlier arguments merely indicated what the friend is not, "now then [sc. in the arguments just now concluded] . . . we have discovered above all what the friend is [sc. *is*]." This is after all what Socrates has been seeking throughout—and soon resumes seeking once his professed satisfaction with the *seemingly* positive result has disappeared.[8] Indeed, it soon emerges (see next note) that the friend is *not* (not precisely) what it was just "discovered" to be. Socrates' confidence that the friend has finally been captured (cf. ἔχων ἀγαπητῶς ὃ ἐθηρευόμην: 218c5) quickly gives way to the fear that the result stated in 218b8–c2 is like a "dream" or "deceitful men" (cf. c8, d2). Here then is perhaps a further reason to doubt καὶ οὔ: it dulls the edge of this characteristic reversal. For the present findings have turned out not to present a contrast with the earlier λόγοι at all, but rather to follow in their pattern. What appeared to be an acceptable account of what the friend *is* is in reality unacceptable, at best an account of what the friend is not.

Excise καὶ οὔ. It must be a gloss, or the remnant of one. Perhaps, remembering Socrates' approval (216c6) of the adage that τὸ καλὸν φίλον, some scholiast saw ὃ ἔστιν τὸ φίλον in 218b7 and wrote καλόν, the transformation of which into καὶ οὔ is not unintelligible. Or perhaps—rather more cleverly—he wrote καὶ οὔ, aware of the ensuing argument (220b8–221d2) that *not* all φίλα are φίλα διὰ τὸ κακόν.

(vii) 219a6–b8

—Τὸ οὔτε κακὸν οὔτε
b ἀγαθὸν ἄρα διὰ τὸ κακὸν καὶ τὸ ἐχθρὸν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φίλον ἐστὶν ἕνεκα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ φίλου.—Φαίνεται.—Ἕνεκα ἄρα τοῦ φίλου τὸ φίλον <τοῦ φίλου> φίλον διὰ τὸ ἐχθρόν.—Ἔοικεν.
5 Εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. ἐπειδὴ ἐνταῦθα ἥκομεν, ὦ παῖδες, πρόσσχωμεν τὸν νοῦν μὴ ἐξαπατηθῶμεν. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ φίλον τοῦ φίλου τὸ φίλον γέγονεν, ἐῶ χαίρειν, καὶ τοῦ ὁμοίου γε τὸ ὅμοιον φίλον γίγνεται, ὅ φαμεν ἀδύνατον εἶναι·

[8] Cf. 207c11 περὶ τῆς φιλίας, 212a5–6 ὅντινα τρόπον γίγνεται φίλος ἕτερος ἑτέρου, 214a3 περὶ τῶν φίλων οἳ τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες, 214d8 τίνες εἰσὶν οἱ φίλοι, 218d3–4 περὶ τοῦ φίλου, 222b5 περὶ φίλου ὃ ἔστιν, 222d2 περὶ φιλίας, 222e6–7 εἰ μηδὲν τούτων φίλον ἐστίν, ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκέτι ἔχω τί λέγω, 223b7–8 οὔπω δὲ ὅτι ἔστιν ὁ φίλος οἷοί τε ἐγενόμεθα ἐξευρεῖν. Socrates does not once in the *Lysis* (apart from the disputed text) characterize the definiendum as "the F and the not-F" or "the F and the opposite-of-F." In some dialogues he does this repeatedly, perhaps for dramatic reasons: cf. *Euth.* 5d7, 6d9–e6, 9d4–5, 15d8–e1, 15e6–7; *Rep.* 369a5 *et passim;* in others not at all: cf. *Lach., Charm., Hipp. Ma.*

b3 τὸ φίλον <τοῦ φίλου> Hermann: post τοῦ φίλου add. Burnet

Hermann (Vol. III p. viii) reasons as follows: "Desideramus enim, quod respondeat antecedenti τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φίλον ἔστιν, neque id desiderari Platonem voluisse, docent sequentia, in quibus eadem sententia brevius redigitur: ὅτι μὲν γὰρ φίλον τοῦ φίλου τὸ φίλον." Burnet relocated the supplement in order to explain its loss through haplography, thereby strenthening the case. Although unheeded by Stallbaum, the conjecture has since been accepted by all other editors that I have consulted. Nevertheless it is almost certainly false; the text is fine as it is.

Why must the predicate φίλον in b3 have a genitive object corresponding to τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ in b1? Hermann gives no reason for this. But clearly he presumes it obvious that τὸ φίλον in the same line must be active in sense, as opposed to passive: i.e., the 'befriending' or desiring agent (= φιλοῦν), not the 'befriended' or desired object (= φιλούμενον). (Unlike the English 'friend,' the term φίλος can have either sense, a fact abundantly illustrated in the *Lysis* itself [cf. esp. 212a7–213c8].) If, further, it is here active in sense, then it—or rather its predicate—would seem to require an object of some sort (dative or genitive). At any rate it is certainly the case that Socrates deduces the lemma Ἕνεκα ἄρα τοῦ φίλου <?> τὸ φίλον φίλον διὰ τὸ ἐχθρόν (b2–3) from the thesis stated in the previous sentence (a6–b2), in which the intermediate agent is said to be φίλον (active) of τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. If τὸ φίλον in the lemma represents the agent, Hermann must think, should we not expect a correlate of τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ as well? Nonetheless it is far from obvious that τὸ φίλον in b3 is active; it need not be for the derivation of the lemma.[9] In fact, if we take it to be passive, it will be clear not only that the mss. reading makes good sense, but that the proposed emendation, by forcing τὸ φίλον to be active, spoils what must be the intended effect of b2–3 in the first place.

The view under consideration is the generalized intermediacy thesis: "the neither-good-nor-evil [intermediate] is the friend of [desires] the good on account of what is evil (an enemy) for the sake of what is good (a friend)." Reading with the mss., let us ask: Why should Socrates, before examining this thesis in 219c1 ff., deduce from it the odd-sounding claim that "the friend [i.e., every friend] is friend for the sake of a friend on account of an enemy" (b2–3)? The reason is evident upon observation of the outcome of Socrates' subsequent investigation, *in which* φίλος

[9] That is, it may stand for the desired good rather than for the agent, who would then drop from the picture.

has a passive sense throughout. He eventually finds (1) that the 'true' friend, at least, is *not* a friend *for the sake of a friend* (τὸ γε τῷ ὄντι φίλον οὐ φίλου τινὸς ἕνεκα φίλον ἐστίν: 220b4) or in other words that there is a final desired end that is not desired for the sake of some other; (2) that friends are *not* (necessarily at least) friends *on account of an enemy* = evil (ἔσται ἄρα καὶ τῶν κακῶν ἀπολομένων, ὡς ἔοικεν, φίλ' ἄττα . . . οὐκ ἄν, εἴ γε τὸ κακὸν αἴτιον ἦν τοῦ φίλον τι εἶναι . . . : 221b8–c2) or in other words that evil is *not* necessarily the efficient cause of a thing's being desired. The net result is that both limbs of the lemma have been refuted by counterexample. Thus in 219b2–3 as it stands, wherein τὸ φίλον must have a passive sense, Socrates acts to focus our attention on precisely the question about to be examined: the explanation of something's being φίλον (passive). What he does is raise an initial doubt concerning the cogency of the intermediacy thesis, as so far presented, as an account of this question. The oddity, if not outright incoherence of the lemma foretells its imminent refutation and thus also that of the thesis from which it is derived.

As for Hermann's supporting claim that it is 219b2–3 which is recapitulated in b6–7, it too is baseless. That b6–7 is independent of b2–3 is demonstrated by the fact that the very thought which it expresses was taken for granted by Socrates already at 218d10, where he simply assumes that on the intermediacy thesis φίλος ὁ φίλος τῷ φίλῳ. The dative here makes no difference; that it is passive in sense and functions equivalently to the later genitive is clear from the context.

(viii) 219c1–d2

c ἡ ἰατρική, φαμέν, ἕνεκα τῆς ὑγιείας φίλον.—Ναί.
—Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ ὑγίεια φίλον;—Πάνυ γε.—Εἰ ἄρα φίλον,
ἕνεκά του.—Ναί.—Φίλου γέ τινος δή, εἴπερ ἀκολουθήσει τῇ
πρόσθεν ὁμολογίᾳ.—Πάνυ γε.—Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐκεῖνο φίλον αὖ
5 ἔσται ἕνεκα φίλου;—Ναί.—Ἆρ' οὖν οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἀπειπεῖν
ἡμᾶς οὕτως ἰόντας ἢ ἀφικέσθαι ἐπί τινα ἀρχήν, ἣ οὐκέτ'
ἐπανοίσει ἐπ' ἄλλο φίλον, ἀλλ' ἥξει ἐπ' ἐκεῖνο ὅ ἐστιν
d πρῶτον φίλον, οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα φαμὲν πάντα φίλα
εἶναι;—Ἀνάγκη.

c6 ἢ Schanz: καὶ mss. c7 ἀλλ' ἥξει ἐπ' ἐκεῖνο] ἀλλ' ἔσται ἐν ἐκείνῳ ci. Heindorf: ἀλλ' ἔσται αὐτὸ ἐκεῖνο ci. Stallbaum: ἀλλ' ἥξει secl. Schanz: ἀλλὰ λήξει ci. Apelt[10]

[10] *Platons Dialoge: Charmides, Lysis, Menexenos,* tr. & comm. O. Apelt (Leipzig 1922) 120 n. 49.

Heindorf saw the problem first: if ἀρχήν governs both ἐπανοίσει and ἥξει and is itself identical to that which is πρῶτον φίλον—all of which is surely the case—how could Socrates possibly say of it that it 'will arrive' at the latter? His suggestion of a solution is only half-hearted, however. He insists only that if Plato somehow did use the verb ἥκειν, its subject must have been the same as that of ἀφίκεσθαι: namely 'we' who are pursuing the argument. Stallbaum agreed that the received text is 'ineptum . . . et absurdum." But if his skepticism is confident, his own suggestion is likewise infirm. ". . . [Q]uid a Platone profectum sit, ego non decernam," he says. Schanz takes the easy way out; he is followed by a number of editors, including Croiset and Crexells. Burnet, on the other hand, simply accepts the mss. reading. Is either move justifiable? It is difficult to conceive why Burnet sees no problem, for Heindorf's premises and the inference therefrom seem impregnable. Schanz's bracketing leaves the gloss unexplained; but then not every gloss is explicable. More troubling is the resultant juxtaposition of ἐπί phrases, which appears both inelegant and unlikely.

Apelt's ἀλλὰ λήξει deserves serious consideration. Although his citation of Sext. Emp. *Pyrrhon. Hyp.* 2.106 for a comparable use of λήγειν is perhaps ill conceived, the overall case can be strengthened. It requires, however, that we read ἐπ' ἐκείνῳ in c7 instead of the accusative.

In the passage cited Sextus is criticizing the Stoic theory of the conditional proposition (τὸ συνημμένον). The consequent of such a proposition is called τὸ λῆγον, literally 'the concluder.' (Cf. also *S.V.F.* II 215 = Diog. Laert. 7.73; etc.) The customary subject of λήγειν in this usage is not the person making the inference but rather the entire proposition itself. Now this usage is of course not found in Plato; it seems to have its origin in Chrysippus. However that may be, in our text it could only be the ἀρχή which forms the subject of λήξει, not the proposition (needless to say not a conditional) which establishes the ἀρχή. This is sufficiently disanalogous to the Stoic usage that doubt may be raised as to its particular relevance here.

Nevertheless, λήξει makes good sense in the present context. There are in the Platonic corpus some twenty-three instances of λήγειν listed by Brandwood. Invariably it is used intransitively in one or the other of the following constructions: (1) with an accompanying participle, e.g., *Rep.* 407c5: ὠδίνοντα μήποτε λήγειν, cf. Liddell-Scott s.v. II.3; (2) with an accompanying genitive, e.g., *Phaedr.* 251e5: ὠδίνων ἔληξεν, cf. Liddell-Scott s.v. II.2. I suggest that at *Lys.* 219c7 a participle must be understood from the context: τινα ἀρχὴν ἣ οὐκέτ' ἐπανοίσει ἐπ' ἄλλο φίλον ἀλλὰ λήξει [sc. οὕτως ἐπαναφέρουσα] ἐπ' ἐκείνῳ ὅ ἐστιν πρῶτον

φίλον. . . . Translate: "some beginning, which will no longer refer us to another friend, but which will stop [sc. referring us] at that which is first friend." Socrates' argument is, roughly, that one can't desire *x* for the sake of *y* without being committed (in principle, at least) to desiring some *z* for the sake of which *x* is desired and which is not desired for the sake of anything else. (In neglecting this, the intermediacy thesis in its present formulation yields an infinite regress, since every φίλον was said to be φίλον for the sake of some other [cf. 219b2–3].) We desire many φίλα for the sake of others; the former 'refer' us to the latter. But we must reach a φίλον that is 'first,' at which such reference will cease. Strictly speaking it is the reference which will 'stop,' not the ἀρχή. The ἀρχή, i.e., the πρῶτον φίλον, is of course not what has been referring us along in the first place; no one thing has been the agent of reference, but rather a series of φίλα each of which refers. What then could Socrates mean by "a certain ἀρχή" which ". . . will *stop* [referring]," if not an ἀρχή which *has been* referring until now? The same as what he means by "a certain ἀρχή which *no longer* (οὐκέτι) refers. . . ." He is speaking loosely. Compare: "For years every car I owned kept breaking down; but I am determined to find one that will no longer do that [or: that will stop doing that]." I don't mean that I want one that first breaks down and then stops doing so; I want one that—*unlike the others—doesn't* do so. Socrates means that there must be an ἀρχή, a 'first friend,' which—unlike the friends below it in the chain—does not refer us to anything beyond it.

The conjecture does not face the difficulty of making it impossible for the ἀρχή to be the same as the πρῶτον φίλον, since "at that which is first friend" can (and must) be taken to mean "at the point at which we reach the first friend." The transformation of ἀλλὰ λήξει into ἀλλ' ἥξει is easy, all the more so given ἥκομεν in b5 and ἀφικέσθαι in c6.

It is noteworthy that throughout Greek literature it is standard to couple λήγειν with ἄρχεσθαι: *Il.* 9.97 ἐν σοὶ μὲν λήξω, σέο δ' ἄρξομαι; Hes. fr. 192 Rzach[3] = Eustath. *In Il.* 1163.62 ἀρχόμενοι δὲ Λίνον καὶ λήγοντες καλέουσιν; cf. *Theog.* 47–48; Theognis 1.1–4; Plat. *Alcib.* 1.131e11–132a1; Theocr. *Id.* 17.1; etc. So too the Stoic term for the antecedent of the conditional is τὸ ἀρχόμενον. The parallel to the present text is not exact: here it would be the ἀρχή which λήξει, rather than *we* who 'begin and end . . .' with it. Nevertheless, like those beings addressed in the first four examples cited here—gods or, as in the case of Agamemnon, god-like beings—the πρῶτον φίλον is at once, in its own way, both a beginning and an end for us. It is both the 'beginning'

or first principle of desire and that final good or end towards which we strive.

(ix) 220a6–b5

Οὐκοῦν
καὶ περὶ τοῦ φίλου ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος; ὅσα γάρ φαμεν
b φίλα εἶναι ἡμῖν ἕνεκα φίλου τινός, ἑτέρῳ ῥήματι φαι-
νόμεθα λέγοντες αὐτό· φίλον δὲ τῷ ὄντι κινδυνεύει
ἐκεῖνο αὐτὸ εἶναι, εἰς ὃ πᾶσαι αὗται αἱ λεγόμεναι
φιλίαι τελευτῶσιν. Κινδυνεύει οὕτως, ἔφη, ἔχειν.
Οὐκοῦν τό γε τῷ ὄντι φίλον οὐ φίλου τινὸς ἕνεκα
5 φίλον ἐστίν; Ἀληθῆ.

b1 ἑτέρῳ] ἑτέρου Hermann

Hermann reasons as follows. At 220d8–e2 Socrates remarks: τὸ ἄρα φίλον ἡμῖν ἐκεῖνο εἰς ὃ ἐτελεύτα πάντα τὰ ἄλλα—ἕνεκα ἑτέρου φίλου φίλα ἔφαμεν εἶναι ἐκεῖνα—οὐδὲν [δὲ] τούτοις ἔοικεν. Where did Socrates say about "all the other φίλα" that they are ἕνεκα ἑτέρου φίλου? It must be 220b1; hence read φίλου τινὸς ἑτέρου rather than ἑτέρῳ ῥήματι. That ῥήματι requires no adjective when it is used (as here) "ut improprius vocabuli usus rei veritati opponatur" is shown by *Phaedo* 102b8: οὐχ ὡς τοῖς ῥήμασι λέγεται οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἔχειν. Although rejected by Stallbaum, the conjecture has since been adopted by Schanz and Burnet and all other editors that I have consulted. Nevertheless it is almost certainly false.

What meaning may be given to ῥήματι by itself? Heindorf, citing *Phil.* 13a7–8 as a parallel, had already suggested that the mss.' ἑτέρῳ ῥήματι is equivalent to 'alieno nomine, improprio'; this is later repeated by Stallbaum. On this interpretation Socrates is saying that φίλα desired for the sake of other φίλα are called φίλα only improperly. Hermann evidently believes, on the strength of the passage in the *Phaedo,* that the same could be true for ῥήματι alone, which is then presumably to be translated 'as a mere figure of speech' or 'in name only.' This, however, is highly suspect. Liddell-Scott s.v. ῥῆμα I.1 lists τῷ ῥήματι λέγειν, εἴπειν = 'say *in so many words,*' citing *Gorg.* 450e5, *Rep.* 340d5, and cf. *Theaet.* 166d8. Dodds in his *Gorgias* commentary ad loc. concurs: there τῷ ῥήματι means 'in your verbal formulation' or 'as you actually put it.' Aside from *Lys.* 220b1 Brandwood lists nine other instances of ῥήματι in Plato, of which at least two may be added to Liddell-Scott's list, *Gorg.* 489c1 and *Laws* 906c6. In not one case, however, is the

translation 'improprio' or 'in name only' remotely possible. Thus Hermann's text would have to be translated: "in the case of things we say are friend to us for the sake of some other friend, we appear to be saying it in so many words" or ". . . in our verbal formulation." But this is to make nonsense of the text. Hence Hermann's reading is impossible.

What about *Phaedo* 102b8? Indeed, τοῖς ῥήμασι is without an adjective here and the meaning is that the words used "don't express the truth of the matter." However, this meaning is not contained in the phrase τοῖς ῥήμασι *by itself*, which is at the very least what Hermann would have to show to prove his point; rather it is what the whole clause says. By itself τοῖς ῥήμασι could not possibly convey the thought that the words or phrases referred to are somehow inaccurate, improper, or 'mere' words.

Nor is the rest of Hermann's argument very convincing. What 220e1 looks back to is not the argument ending in 220b5 at all, which is intended to elucidate how it is that the πρῶτον φίλον and the subsidiary φίλα (those desired for its sake) are—for all their being different—in a certain relationship to each other. Rather 220e1 looks back to the argument in 219c1–d2, which revealed the existence of that difference in the first place. To be sure, Socrates did not therein *say* that the subsidiary φίλα are ἕνεκα ἑτέρου φίλου φίλα. This is, however, inconsequential. That the πρῶτον φίλον is a distinct entity from the subsidiary φίλα is obviously the point of the argument: only the former is 'first.' That is strong enough to justify Socrates' description in 220e1 of what 'we said.'

If we read with the mss., as we must, how shall we translate? Heindorf and Stallbaum are probably right to cite *Phil.* 13a7–8: ὅτι προσαγορεύεις αὐτὰ ἀνόμοια ἑτέρῳ, φήσομεν, ὀνόματι. Here προσαγορεύειν is roughly equivalent to λέγειν in our passage, and ὀνόματι to ῥήματι.[11] Nevertheless, it is not at all clear that in either passage the meaning is 'alieno nomine,' as they thought. In the context of the *Phil.* passage Socrates and Protarchus are arguing about pleasure: specifically, whether Protarchus is correct to maintain that all pleasant things are also good. (The line in question was at one time considered highly suspect and thus frequently emended [cf. Stallbaum ad loc.]; but it is

[11] Although often distinguished in various ways (cf. *Crat.* 399b1 with Liddell-Scott s.v. I.2), ὄνομα and ῥῆμα are at times used synonymously in Plato (cf. *Tim.* 49e1, 50a2 with J. C. Riijlaarsdam, *Platon: Über die Sprache: Ein Kommentar zum Kratylos* [Utrecht 1978] 65 f.).

perfectly sound.) Socrates says to Protarchus in effect (I paraphrase down to 13d6): "You are taking these things (i.e., pleasant things) which are very unlike each other and predicating *a different term* of them (i.e., 'good,' which is a different term from 'pleasant'); the problem is not that such a move is necessarily wrong; it might be justified—but only if you can point to some property all pleasant things share—other than being pleasant—by virtue of which you predicate such a different term of them in the first place; but you can't; and you continue to make the puerile mistake of thinking that the generic identity of pleasures (together with the fact that *some* pleasures indeed *are* good) could justify the predication of 'good' of all of them; but of course it can't." Thus the phrase ἑτέρῳ ὀνόματι in and of itself *means* simply 'with a different name.' The point that this particular name happens also to be improper, or improperly applied, emerges independently of the fact that it is 'different.'[12]

At *Lys.* 220a7–b2 we must translate: "In the case of things we say are friends (dear) for the sake of some friend, we appear to be saying it by means of a different term. The 'true' friend happens to be that in which all these so-called friendships have their end." When we predicate φίλος of things that we desire for the sake of something else, we appear to be using a term (φίλος) which is in some way different. Different from what and how different? As the lines following indicate, the contrast is with the case of φίλος predicated of the end, or that which is not desired for the sake of anything else. The latter is the 'true' friend (perhaps better, friend 'in the truest sense'); in the terminology introduced earlier, it is the 'first friend.' Socrates' point is that the term φίλος predicated of the means seems to be different from the same term predicated of the end, not of course in that it is literally a different term, but rather in that the same term is applied in virtue of different properties in the two cases. These are, in the one case, that of being desired for the sake of something; in the other, that of being desired as an end. Thus, unlike Protarchus' predicating 'good' of all pleasures, predicating the 'different term' φίλος of the means is obviously *not* open to challenge (at least not on the grounds of the absence of any property in the designata capable of warranting it). Thus there seems to be no basis for construing ἑτέρῳ ῥήματι to mean that subsidiary φίλα are only 'improperly' so called, as though Socrates thought they just did not

[12] Note also that ἕτερος ≠ ἀλλότριος, which is Greek for 'alienus' = 'other' in the sense of 'foreign, belonging to something else.'

deserve the name at all.[13] The point is that they are called φίλα in, so to speak, a different sense.[14]

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[13] It might be thought that Socrates' assertion that our claims to value (περὶ πολλοῦ ποιούμεθα: 'think much of') gold and silver don't convey the truth of the matter (ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον οὕτω τό γε ἀληθὲς ἔχῃ: 220a2–3) should be extended to the case of φίλος. The suggestion would be that, just as we really value only the end which money is used to obtain, never the money for itself (*pace* J. S. Mill), so too it is not really true in general that the means are 'dear.' However, although Socrates does argue that the αὐτὸς λόγος is to be given for each case, he does *not* hold that it is *false* that we value money. He only argues that our saying we do is misleading, because it obscures the fact that what we value *most* (περὶ παντὸς ποιούμεθα) is the end money is used for.

It might also be thought that αὗται αἱ λεγόμεναι φιλίαι in 220b2–3 must mean that the 'friendships' for subsidiary φίλα are 'only so called,' i.e., don't really deserve the name in all strictness; that this in turn would justify the interpretation of ἑτέρῳ ῥήματι which I have just tried to refute, insofar as what holds for the φιλίαι would seem to hold (in this case at least) for their objects as well. However, λεγόμεναι does not mean '*only* so called'; any doubt cast on the legitimacy of the name would have to be supplied by the context. (The same is true, although to a lesser extent perhaps, for the English use of 'so called.') Cf. *Tim.* 91c1 αἱ μῆτραί τε καὶ ὑστέραι λεγόμεναι: 'as we call them.' Contrast *Rep.* 491c1 τὰ λεγόμενα ἀγαθά where it is clear that the goods referred to have a dubious status as goods.

[14] This passage has been the focus of controversy concerning whether or not it betrays a πρὸς ἕν or 'focal' analysis of the meaning of a predicate. The positive position is argued, e.g., by H. Cherniss, *Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy* (New York 1962) 358 n.267, the negative by, e.g., G. E. L. Owen, 'Logic and Metaphysics in Some Earlier Works of Aristotle' in *Aristotle and Plato in Mid-Fourth Century,* ed. I. Düring (Goteborg 1960) 182–83. It would be inappropriate to join this issue here. However, a defense of the mss. reading lends some support, I believe, to the positive position as long as it does not simply assume that position, as I have tried not to do. In any case the weightier support will derive from a careful analysis of the arguments in 219d–220b; it can be shown that Socrates in effect commits himself to a kind of mitigated ambiguity in φίλος, the different senses of which share a common element and are related to each other in an order of priority and posteriority.

I wish to thank Leonardo Tarán and Paul Oskar Kristeller.

NOTES ON SENECA 'RHETOR'

The following editions are referred to: Elzevir (1672, containing notes of Gronovius, Schulting, and others); Kiessling (1872); H. J. Müller (1887; from this I take manuscript information and pre-1887 conjectures not reported by Elzevir or Kiessling); Bornecque (1902, with French translation); Winterbottom (Loeb edition, 1974).

Thomas = E. Thomas, *Philologus* Suppl.-Bd. 8 (1899–1901) 157–298.

W. = M. Winterbottom, *BICS* 21 (1974) 20–42.

All Seneca references, where no work is stated, are to the *Controversiae.*

SUASORIAE

1.5. non eodem modo in libera civitate dicendam sententiam quo apud reges . . . ; et inter reges ipsos esse discrimen: quosdam minus †aut† magis veritatem pati.

Novák's conjecture *alios* (for *aut*) has been adopted by Müller and later editors; in its support Müller refers to 10.4.8 *quosdam . . . alios.* It may well be right, but palaeographically easier would be *<p>auc<os>*.

2.2. . . . si cadendum est, erratis si metuendam creditis mortem. . . . optamus quoque plerumque mortem; adeo in securam quietem recessus ex vita est. at gloriae nullus finis est, proximique deos sic †ageses agunt†.

The theme is the Spartans at Thermopylae. Many conjectures have been proposed in the corrupt passage, but no certainty is obtainable. My guess would be *proximeque deos sic* ('by death in battle') *<mort>ales ac<ced>unt.* I think this is an improvement on the suggestion of R. Opitz (*Comment. philol. Ribbeck* [Lipsiae, 1888] 43), *proximeque deos hac cadentes accedunt.* Like Opitz, I compare Cicero, *Mil.* 59 *proxime deos accessit Clodius* and *Lig.* 38 *homines enim ad deos nulla re propius accedunt.*

6.8. hic cum dixisset [*sc.* Latro] 'aliquid erit quod Antonium offendat, aut factum tuum aut dictum aut silentium aut vultus,' adiecit sententiam '†aut erit† placiturus es.'

In this passage any restoration can be little more than a guess. Mine would be *tantum morte.*

CONTROVERSIAE

1.1.5. *timeo* mutationem: et ille nihil prius ex bonis quam filium perdidit.

Kiessling's *time* has been adopted by all subsequent editors, and there is little doubt that an imperative is required. But *time<t>o* is palaeographically preferable.

1.1.23. audimus fratrum fabulosa certamina et incredibilia nisi nos fuissemus: impias epulas, detestabili parricidio †futurum† diem.

'The reference is of course to the banquet of Thyestes. As none of the various conjectures (*furvum, fuscatum, funestum*) seems very satisfactory, I suggest *fugitivum.* The loss of 'g' between vowels is common in these MSS: *agit* and *ait* are constantly confused, and in 1.7.15 all MSS have *fuisse* for *fugisse,*' Summers, *CQ* 5 (1911) 18. Winterbottom's *fugatum* can be regarded as an improvement on *fugitivum,* but perhaps the simplest solution is *fugiturum,* 'ready to flee.' Similarly at Seneca, *Epp.* 49.4, *cuius brevitatem aliquando †futuram† cogitemus,* I think that *futuram* conceals *fugituram* rather than, as is usually assumed, *defecturam.*

1.2.3. vultis auctionis exitum audire? vendit pirata, emit leno, *excipitur nihil.* eo deducta es ubi tu aliud nihil honestius facere potuisti quam mori.

I think that *excipitur nihil* is sound. In selling the girl the pirate could have imposed the condition that she should not be forced into prostitution, and that if she were she should gain her freedom, but no such condition was imposed; cf. Ulpian, *Dig.* 2.4.10.1 'prostituta contra legem venditionis venditorem habebit patronum si hac lege venierat ut, si prostituta esset, fieret libera'; so too Pomponius ib. 21.2.34 and Modestinus ib. 37.14.7. The first of these passages was adduced by Gronovius in his refutation of Lipsius's emendation, now renewed and adopted by Winterbottom (cf. W., p. 34), *excipit fornix;* similarly Opitz proposed *excipit lupanar,* comparing §8, *sed lupanar excepit,* but that

sense is here expressed by *eo deducta es* etc., which is probably part of the same *sententia* and not (as Winterbottom) a different one.

2.1.34. itaque memini optime illum dicere pro †hac re ne† adulteri reo, in quem Syriacus Vallius, homo disertus, calumniam iuraverat. erat genus iudici tale: speciosum iuvenem dominus suus deprehendisse cum uxore in cubiculo testatus est *etc.*

Winterbottom rightly returns to the view of some older editors, that the person accused of adultery is the slave and not his mistress; these editors accordingly emended *in quam* to *in quem.* Hence, if *hac re ne* conceals a noun, it must be a masculine noun and not a feminine one like *matrona* or *uxore.* W. (p. 36) would prefer to delete *hac re ne,* but its presence in the text seems inexplicable; he also suggests *verna.* Why not *iuvene,* the word used in the next sentence? This is the reading of the Elzevir edition and no doubt of other early editions, but is not reported in any modern one.

2.4.1. cetera quemadmodum narrem nescio: steterim an sederim, quid locutus sim, quid audierim, nescio; hoc unum scio, *iacuisse* me inter duos filios.

If *iacuisse* is right, it must mean 'lay helpless,' 'restai sans force' (Bornecque), not a very convincing meaning in the context. The only emendation usually reported is Schulting's *tacuisse,* which is scarcely an improvement; but Schulting also suggested *iac<tat>um esse,* comparing 1.1.6 *iactatus inter duos patres . . . quid faciam?* This may well be right. The sons in question will then be the man's own two sons, not (as Winterbottom) 'his natural son and his (future) adopted son.'

2.4.8. non habet, inquit, fiduciam si mavult videri recepisse puerum quam adduxisse; †et qua ratione† est adoptatum esse non quia debuerit sed quia secutus sit.

The conjectures reported by Müller include *et sine ratione* (adopted by Winterbottom), *aequa ratione, ex qua ratione, neque rationis, et contra rationem;* none of these is quite convincing both palaeographically and in point of sense. Perhaps *et <n>oua ratio[ne]*, 'it is a strange procedure'; for the corruption, cf. Cicero, *De orat.* 2.230 *quam* L: *nouam* M.

2.5.7. imputat tibi [*sc.* marito] quod †publica† est, imputat tibi quod torta est, imputat tibi quod sterilis est.

Unlike some silly suggestions (*pudica, mutila, repudiata*), Gronovius's *alligata* at least gives the right sort of sense: something which happened to the woman before she was tortured. I suggest that *ducta* ('arrested') would be palaeographically more convincing; that this should have been mistaken for *publica* will not be found incredible by anyone who has studied this very corrupt tradition. The arrest is described in §3: *iactatur misera inter satellitum manus et toto itinere non ducitur sed trahitur.*

7.1.10. inponitur miser in naufragium, navigio per se pessum ituro pondus †insui(t)†.

The favourite remedy has been Bursian's *insuper,* followed by a verb like *infert, addit,* or *additur.* It is more probable, I think, that the corrupt word is itself the remnant of a verb; suggestions include *inditur, inicitur, insilit.* The last is very good palaeographically, but one can hardly imagine the condemned man 'leaping into' the wreck of a boat which was to take him to his death. Preferable, I suggest, would be either *insidet* or *insidit;* both give good clausulae.

7.2.12. hic color displicebat Passieno, quia †ad testem ducit†.

'No convincing emendation of these words has been suggested,' Winterbottom. The *color* of which Passienus disapproved was that of Arellius Fuscus; immediately before this *color* Seneca reports that of Cestius, which was on the same lines as that of Fuscus but did not go so far in improbability. Perhaps *testem* conceals *Cest<ian>um,* sc. *colorem;* cf. 1.7.17 *ad illum colorem redi<i>t Cestianum.* Indeed, that passage suggests that in ours we might well write *qui ad Cest<ian>um <re>diit.*

7.6.13. de facto servi primum disputavit [*sc.* Latro], deinde de animo. factum quale †num† est? dominam non stupravit. auge beneficia: nec dominum occidit nec adulter domino venenum dedit. non est beneficium scelere abstinere.

qualem num est *AB:* quale non *VD*

In the corrupt passage suggested emendations are *quale enim est, qualenam est, quale tandem;* but later editors have followed Müller in

just deleting the awkward *num* or *non*. I think it possible that this word belongs to the following sentence, and that we should read *factum quale? num est <quod> dominam non stupravit?*

10.3.10. perit . . . propter desiderium viri; . . . mulier praeceps, temeraria, insano flagrans amore et attonita, quem virum patre relicto secuta fuerat, †res viso† consecuta est.

Most attempts at emendation change *res* into some form of *pater* in order to get a phrase which balances *patre relicto;* e.g. *patre viso, patre invito, patris (in)iussu.* None of these is at all convincing, nor is a second mention of *pater* necessarily required. I suggest *rursus ultro;* the daughter committed suicide not because of her father's hostility but because she missed her dead husband and of her own accord followed him to death, just as previously she had followed him to war. The same point is made again in §15, *iterum illam nobis vir abduxit.*

10.5.9. inter ista Parrhasius dubium est studiosius pingat an *ille* saeviat.

The superfluous *ille* is deleted (e.g.) in the Elzevir edition, and again by Müller and later editors, presumably as a gloss. 'Glossematum fere nulla in Seneca vestigia reperta sunt,' says Thomas (p. 249); contrast W. (p. 26), 'glosses undoubtedly disfigure the text of Seneca.' No doubt Thomas's 'fere nulla' is an exaggeration, but it is a salutary exaggeration because it makes one hesitate before excising words as 'glosses.' Perhaps *an ille* is a corruption of *anne.*

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REVIEWS

Lexicon Iconographicum Mythologiae Classicae, I (Aara-Aphlad), 2 vol. Zürich et Münich, Artemis Verlag, 1981. I,1: lvii et 881 pp. avec 193 ill. I,2: 699 pl. et 53 pp. d'index. No price stated.

Près de 400 entrées, dont plus de 200 comportent un article (les autres renvoient à des articles du même tome ou des tomes à paraître). Chaque article se compose de cinq parties: introduction, sources littéraires, bibliographie, catalogue, commentaire. Les articles rédigés en français, allemand, anglais et italien paraissent dans la langue originale; les autres ont été traduits dans une de ces quatre langues. L'apport le plus original de ce nouveau *Lexicon* réside dans les articles mineurs, consacrés aux allégories, aux personnifications, aux divinités locales ou fluviales. Monnaies, mosaïques, monuments de l'Antiquité tardive en sont souvent les uniques témoignages, les vases restant, pour les périodes antérieures, le principal matériel de référence. Le domaine gréco-romain se taille la part du lion, même si les éditeurs ont jugé à propos d'incorporer les mythologies "périphériques": l'*Allath* de Palmyre, adorée sous les traits de la *Parthénos* de Phidias (no. 28), n'est pas moins proche des Olympiens que leurs avatars étrusques.

Le *LIMC* dresse le bilan de l'information imagée dont on dispose à propos de tel ou tel personnage—principe éminemment *nominal,* en vertu duquel une entrée ne se justifie que si la figure a un nom reconnu, autrement dit une réalité philologique (ex: *Agyrtes, Aidos, Aither, Aktaios* I et II, *Albunea, Aletheia, Alkimos, Alkyone* II, *Aloadai, Amarynkeus, Amata,* etc.). La sélection repose souvent sur des critères épigraphiques, comme si une inscription pouvait seule garantir l'existence iconographique d'une figure (ex: *Ainippe* II, *Aischines, Alastor:* aurigel, *Alkinoos* II, *Alkmeon, Alpan, Altria-Alsir, Amatutunia, Aminth, Aniochidas* I et II, *Antenor* II, *Anthylla, Antias, Anties, Antimachidas, Antimachos* III et IV, *Antiphata, Antiphatas,* etc. Noms corrigés ou complétés: *Akademos, Amphialos* II, *Antiphonos,* etc. Cf. *Achvizr:* figure ailée ou aptère, masculine ou féminine). N'est-ce pas plutôt dans le *CIE* ou les *IG* qu'un tel matériel devrait trouver place? Il s'agit d'onomastique beaucoup plus que d'iconographie, même si la figure désignée par l'inscription tient un rôle dans une scène mythologique. Plusieurs catalogues se font par agglutination, les documents anépigraphes venant se rattacher, par la méthode analogique, à l'image inscrite, qui est tête de série (ex: *Aliunea, Alkandre,* etc.). Cela implique que le nom donne droit de suite aussi sur les figures ou les scènes anonymes. Dans un ou deux cas, la primauté reconnue aux noms propres légitime la projection dans l'image de rapports de parenté dont la littérature fournit le modèle (ex: *Amphithea* I et II). Les lois de la généalogie et les lois de l'iconographie seraient-elles interchangeables? Ce totalitarisme du *verbal* met en évidence, paradoxalement, l'écart qui sépare textes et images, quant à la conception, quant à l'action représentée, quant aux intentions, quant à l'importance relative des figures, en proportion souvent inverse. Prenons l'exemple des silences de

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l'iconographie: comment expliquer que des figures ou des épisodes qui, dans le mythe, sont décisifs, n'aient pas d'existence iconographique? De nombreux articles illustrent—à l'insu de leurs auteurs—cette non-correspondance entre la réalité des images et celle des textes.

Les rares entrées qui ne concernent pas une figure, mais un thème, répondent également à des critères philologiques (ex: *amyetoi*). C'est qu'on ne peut pas donner une définition iconographique des ἀμύητοι, et, à l'exception de la fresque de Polygnote (no. 4), les autres attestations figurées sont des plus incertaines. Or, le système lexical obligeait à "faire entrer" tous les documents sous un en-tête ou sous un autre, ce qui confine à l'absurde quand, de l'aveu même des auteurs, les images ne représentent pas nécessairement la figure sous le nom de laquelle elles sont pourtant cataloguéées (ex: *Acheron, Agamedes, Agenor* I, *Amata, Anas, Angerona, Antinoe,* etc. De même *Aletes, Ambrax, Amythaon,* etc., bien que les auteurs soient indécis). Si, loin d'être exceptionnel, un tel cas se présente encore et encore, n'est-ce pas l'indice que quelque chose ne joue pas dans la conception même du répertoire? Autre déficience de la méthode: les documents d'interprétation délicate, qui sont souvent les plus intéressants, figurent en fin de listes; toujours cités—dans autant de catalogues qu'il y a de personnages représentés—ils seront toujours sacrifiés. Pourquoi, en revanche, le thème des *anodoi* ne fait-il pas l'objet d'un article? Est-ce par manque d'une définition philologique appropriée (déjà dans l'Antiquité)? N'est-ce pas plutôt qu'en l'occurrence le primat du motif sur le nom eût obligé à des révisions méthodologiques déchirantes et eût peut-être conduit au constat de faillite du système lexical?

Angelo Brelich, dont l'équipe a commencé, il y a longtemps, la mise sur fiches de la mythologie classique, a posée les fondements théoriques d'une telle entreprise (cf. "La metodologia della scuola di Roma," in: *Il Mito Greco* [1977] 3–29). Travail gigantesque, car, dans pareil domaine, tous les éléments sont interdépendants et, par conséquent, relevants: non pas seulement les héros et les divinités, mais les animaux et les plantes, les montagnes et les fleuves, les villes et les territoires où se dééroulent les mille et une aventures dont ces dieux et ces héros sont les acteurs. En bref, "une figure mythologique n'est rien d'autre que ses aventures et ses *rapports*—avec les autres personnages, les objets et les lieux qui entrent dans sa sphère—hors desquels elle n'existe pas" (ibid. p. 25). De même W. Burkert, *Structure and History in Greek Mythology and Ritual* (1979) 23–24: "Proper names need not have a «meaning», but they have a reference. . . . In this way Greek myths are connected with families, tribes, cities, places, rituals, festivals. . . ."

Et sur le plan figuratif? Les figures mythologiques ne sont pas des unités sémantiques dont l'assemblage donnerait naissance aux scènes. L'imagier part d'une situation, c'est-à-dire d'un "moment" du mythe, qu'il conçoit *visuellement* en fonction d'une tradition figurée (schèmes pré-donnés, formules iconographiques, "trucs" d'atelier). Dans la genèse de l'image, c'est la figure en tant que type iconographique (σχῆμα) qui est déterminante. C'est pourquoi les mêmes schèmes peuvent s'appliquer tantôt à une entité du mythe (Ulysse par ex.), tantôt à une autre (Diomède ou Ajax), sans qu'il en résulte la moindre gêne. L'adéquation parfaite de la mythologie et de l'iconographie, en Grèce, s'explique par cette caractéristique fondamentale: la personnalité d'un héros

résulte de la combinaison particulière d'éléments qui sont communs à tous, le type personnel n'étant que l'actualisation, c'est-à-dire l'adaptation à un individu, d'une typologie plus générale (cf. A. Brelich, *Gli Eroi Greci,*[2] [1978] pp. 307 sqq.). D'où un jeu de réciprocité: le schème ou le motif a telle valeur, parce qu'on le voit appliqué à tel personnage; inversement, le personnage reçoit du schème au moins une orientation de sens. Tant que les interprètes des images n'iront pas à l'essentiel, celles-ci resteront un instrument auxiliaire dans l'étude de la mythologie, permettant tout au plus de connaître "des détails qui ne figurent pas dans les textes" (Brelich, "Metodologia," op. cit., p. 6). Les exégètes du mythe ne rechignent pas à l'étude du grec et du latin pour aborder les textes de plain-pied: pourquoi les exégètes de l'image refuseraient-ils de se mettre à l'étude de l'iconographie? Pour comprendre une scène du mythe, il faut connaître toutes les autres scènes mythologiques, représentées à la même époque et dans le même domaine iconographique. Autrement dit, pour interpréter une scène du mythe, il faut connaître le *langage iconographique,* langage qui n'est pas une nomenclature, mais qui implique une syntaxe—qu'un dictionnaire ne peut contenir. On rêve de cette grammaire des motifs et des schèmes dont le livre de Jane Henle constitue une intéressante ébauche. . . . Et l'on s'attriste à la pensée que Ch. Clermont-Ganneau avait indiqué la voie, il y a juste un siècle, dans son mémoire sur la *Mythologie iconologique chez les Grecs* (1880): "Il ne s'agit plus de rechercher dans l'image la traduction du mythe, mais dans le mythe la traduction de l'image. Le problème est renversé . . . car la génération des images par les mythes et des mythes par les images est alternante et réciproque" (pp. xvii–xviii. Cf. aussi *Journal asiatique,* 7ème série, 11 [1878] 244, sur l'opposition entre "mots" et "syntaxe").

L'article *Achilleus* (le plus long: 164 pages, 922 pièces de catalogue) donne une excellente idée de ce que le *Lexicon* se propose et nous propose. Articulé en une trentaine d'épisodes, avec un certain nombre de subdivisions internes, il développe une biographie héroïque vue au travers des images. Les documents sont présentés pêle-mêle pour ce qui est de la chronologie (quelle idée bizarre que d'avoir choisi l'ordre alphabétique des lieux de conservation pour les catalogues!) et le commentaire vise essentiellement à identifier, pour chaque illustration, le texte référentiel. Ce sera peut-être utile pour l'historien de la littérature, à qui cette colonne figurée offrira un point de comparaison. Mais qu'en penseront les vrais interrogateurs d'images, ceux pour qui l'iconographie n'est pas la simple illustration d'un texte, mais "l'adaptation d'une formule—la plus adéquate visuellement parmi celles qu'offre la tradition figuréée—eu égard à la fonction qu'on lui assigne et au contenu psychologique dont elle est porteuse" (J. Bialostocki, "Rahmenthemen," in: *Stil und Ikonographie* [1981] 146). A aucun moment, le point de vue des imagiers—ne disons rien des spectateurs de l'image—n'est pris en considération: les sources littéraires sont l'unique pierre de touche et l'optique théâtrale est si contraignante qu'elle laisse hors du champ de vision tout ce qui n'est pas conforme à cet axiome. Pourquoi citer à chaque page ses propres publications, et ne pas renvoyer aux opinions adverses, si du moins l'on admet que la vérité (ou, plus modestement, la découverte) naît de la confrontation des points de vue? (ex: no. 372. L'article de Chamay, cité bibl. p. 73, illustre et commente ce vase. Il était donc indispensable d'y renvoyer, et l'interprétation qu'il propose, acceptée ou rejetée, eût

mieux valu que le constat négatif de la p. 95). L'insertion, dans le catalogue, d'oeuvres connues seulement par voie littéraire (ex: nos. 95, 105, 106, 900. Cf. aussi nos. 50, 205), se justifie, vu l'influence que certaines grandes peintures ont exercée sur les imagiers contemporains et postérieurs. Mais Philostrate (ex: no. 107)? Ses tableaux constituent, bien sûr, d'utiles pièces à conviction par l'intérêt exclusif que le narrateur porte aux contenus mythologiques. Discuter du degré de réalité des *Eikones* eût peut-être permis d'aborder avec un regard neuf la relation texte-image, et de montrer l'autonomie—parfois irréductible—de l'iconographie réelle. Le lecteur est rassuré de voir abondamment cité ici l'un des ouvrages les plus marquants qu'on ait écrits sur l'art grec, celui de Martin Robertson (qui ne figure pas dans la *Liste des Abréviations*, p. L. Précisons que l'article "The Food of Achilles," cité bibl. p. 42, n'est pas de M., mais de D. S. Robertson. Pour en finir avec les problèmes de présentation: Ptol. Heph. est un auteur, contrairement à ce qu'on pourrait croire p. 41 et p. XXXVIII, où on cherche en vain son nom. Enfin, p. 92, l.19, lire *Linkslaüfigkeit* pour *Rechtslaüfigkeit*).

L'admirable étude de Devambez sur les *Amazones* (le deuxième article par ordre d'importance: 68 pages, 819 pièèces répertoriées) met crûment en lumière les limites et les déficiences du système lexical. En un article clair, au style élégant et racé, tout est mis devant nos yeux, les thèmes, leur date d'apparition, leur développement, leur succession, l'arrière-fond historique, politique, social, religieux, la valeur symbolique. . . . Synthèse magistrale, mais qui, dans sa perfection, n'apporte pas de réponse aux vrais problèmes. Devambez a joué le jeu, en toute loyauté, et il a expliqué les images d'Amazones sans sortir du thème des Amazones: pari courageux, mais désespéré. Les Amazones vivent ici d'une vie factice, arrachées au contexte d'images dont elles sont partie intégrante et hors duquel elles ne signifient plus rien. La mythologie figurée des Grecs constitue, κατ' ἐξοχήν, un ensemble iconographique cohérent. Les images y sont liées les unes aux autres—sur le plan diachronique *et* sur le plan synchronique—par une "chaîne d'emprunts, de traditions, d'influences." Elles reflètent, simultanément, "des situations-types de l'âme humaine, pour lesquelles on trouve, dans les épisodes du mythe, des contenus correspondants" (Bialostocki, op. cit. pp. 149–50). Faute d'avoir repéré les fils invisibles qui relient les motifs les uns aux autres et qui forment la trame des scènes mythologiques, Devambez est resté en-deçà d'une interrogation, et d'une réponse, iconographiques. (Pourquoi écrire *Darios* au lieu de *Darius?* Cf. p. 641, 647, 648, etc. La forme grecque est *Dareios*).

Les doutes émis par l'auteur de cette recension quant à la méthode défendue (implicitement) par le *LIMC* et quant à la valeur intrinsèque des articles, procèdent d'une vision personnelle de l'imagerie mythologique. L'utilité du dictionnaire, en tant que magasin de documents et en tant que répertoire iconographique, repose essentiellement sur la crédibilité scientifique des catalogues. Qu'en est-il? Le sondage effectué sur une liste, choisie au hasard (*Amazones*, pp. 587–636: vases attiques et italiotes exclusivement) appelle les remarques suivantes. Vases attiques d'abord. La mention de von Bothmer, *Amazons*, eût été souhaitable aussi pour les pièces qui comportent une référence bibliographique plus récente. Non moins indispensable eût été la citation de *ABV*, même si von Bothmer y renvoie systématiquement. L'omission de *ARV*^{2}

(ex: nos. 66, 88, 235, 236, 237, 238, 244, 305, 581, 650a, 651, 658, 659, 762, 765 pour ne mentionner que les vases où il n'y a pas de référence plus récente pouvant contenir cette indication) est une lacune plus regrettable, car dans *Amazons* (1957), on a les attributions de *ARV*.[1] Pour un grand nombre de pièces, *Para* apporte des corrections ou, en tout cas, des compléments d'information: là encore, l'omission est irrémédiable, quand il n'y a pas de renvoi à un ouvrage plus récent susceptible (mais l'a-t-on vérifié de cas en cas?) d'y renvoyer (ainsi: nos. 12, 23, 30, 61, 64, 85, 257, 275, 303, 313, 332, 653, 713, 724, 732, 741, 749, 750, 753, 756, 758).

Les attributions fausses ou incomplètes—et pourtant il suffisait de transcrire correctement Beazley—sont multiples (28: "not very like Group E, and should be omitted" d'après *Para* 57. 32: lire *apparenté* au P. de Lysippidès. 39: ajouter manière du P. de Lysippidès. 50: ajouter P. de New York 07. 58: lire *à comparer avec* le gr. de Münich 1501. 65: lire *manière* d'Euphronios, 78: lire *manière* du P. d'Haimon. 180: ajouter Polygnotos. 239: Beazley dit *gr.*, bien qu'il s'agisse probablement d'une même main. Alexandré: cf. 323. 274: lire proche du P. de Rycroft et de Psiax. 300: ni Beazley, ni von Bothmer n'attribuent ce vase au P. des Niobides. 316a: lire *manière* du P. de Cléophon. 319: lire P. d'Amphitrite, non d'Amymone. Cf. *ARV*[2] 830 et, ici même, *Amymone*, no. 97 = *Amphitrite* no. 41. 320: "Dwarf" = Nain. 322: *potier* Sotadès, non P. de Sotadès. 327: lire gr. d'Alexandré: cf. 239. 331: ajouter P. de Naples. 337: ajouter gr. G et *ARV*[2] 1464 no. 48. 354: ajouter P. de l'Amazone et *ARV*[2] 1478 no. 3. 651: lire P. de New York 21.131. 661: ajouter P. de Klügmann. 732: lire gr. de Capodimonte et *Para* 214 no. 1. 740: lire Hypsis, non P. de Hypsis. 742: lire cl. d'Altenburg. 745: lire *cl.* d'Athènes 581, *II*. 750: lire gr. P, cl. d'Athènes 581. 762: lire *apparenté* au P. de Charmidès. 765: lire P. de Münich 2363. 768: P. d'Erétrie d'après *ARV*[2] 1251 no. 40). D'autres erreurs sont à signaler (24: lire no. 6, non no. 33. 53: lire B 618, non B 618,37. 332: non pas de Mélos, mais probablement d'Italie, comme l'a montré Devambez. Cf. *Para* 482 no. 1. 644: lire no. 40, non no. 41. 714: lire amphore *à col.* 716: lire 101, non 105 et amphore *à col.* 758: "not Amazons" d'après *Para* 292 no. 4. 760: même vase que 87, ce qu'il eût fallu préciser. 761: Léningrad 642, St. 1357, non Léningrad 641, St. 1712).

Pour les vases apuliens, le renvoi à *RVAp* I manque fréquemment (92: 403 no. 41. 361: 26 no. 117. 370: 25 no. 109. 372: 169 no. 29. 374: 424 no. 55. 379: 431 no. 82). L'absence d'index dans *RVAp* I n'est pas une excuse: la Rédaction du *LIMC* aurait dû s'imposer l'effort qu'a fait l'auteur de cette recension. Faute d'avoir assumé ses responsabilités (cf. *Préface*, p. VII, *sub* 5), la Rédaction rejette cette tâche sur les lecteurs. A l'avenir, chaque nouvel utilisateur de ce premier tome devra faire la recherche et repérer dans le *corpus* de Trendall—en s'aidant des index de *RVAp* III, quand celui-ci aura paru—l'attribution désirée. Il y a d'autres erreurs et inexactitudes (183: lire proche du P. de l'Ilioupersis et du P. d'Atheènes 1714. 361: pourquoi avoir placé ce vase à part? Il figure dans *RVAp* I: cf. supra, et déjà dans *ESI*. 366: lire *proche* du P. de Sisyphe. 375: lire gr. de Goleta, non P. de Vérone, dont la liste de vases commence à la page suivante. 613 et 614: le P. de Cassandre est un peintre campanien, non lucanien. 613: P. de la Niké assise. 614: gr. d'Egisthe. 616: lire *P.* d'Ixion. 667: lire amphore *à anneau*. 671: lire P. de Dolon. 778a: lire cercle du P. de Grasmere,

comme l'indique l'article cité de Trendall, et non cercle du P. de Berkeley, dont les oeuvres sont rassemblées *RVAp* I 268 sqq.).

Les vases italiotes sont tantôt présentés en masse indivise (ex: p. 598, p. 628, p. 634, p. 636), tantôt répartis en ateliers (ex. pp. 592–93, pp. 610–12, p. 626: ici fautivement), tantôt groupés avec les vases attiques comme "vases grecs" (ex: p. 624): pourquoi? Et pourquoi ne pas avoir classé de manière cohérente les vases dans chaque liste, selon leurs formes ou selon leur chronologie? La logique, ou le bon sens, aurait dû empêcher d'intercaler entre deux ou plusieurs vases du même peintre des pièces d'une autre école (ex: 363–65, 371–73, 616–18). Remarquons que les listes de vases attiques ne sont pas moins confuses. Ces négligences sont navrantes, car il eût été facile d'y remédier. Elles sont d'autant plus navrantes que les inconvénients s'en feront sentir aussi longtemps que le *LIMC* sera en usage. Il ne s'agit pas de pédanterie, hélas! Les fautes enregistrées ci-dessus ne portent que sur les renvois à Beazley, à von Bothmer et à Trendall. Un pourcentage aussi élevé d'erreurs est inadmissible pour un catalogue qui ne contient que les références bibliographiques de base. C'est grave, car, à l'exception de quelques céramologues (mais les listes relatives aux statues, aux reliefs et aux monnaies sont-elles moins fautives?), les utilisateurs du *LIMC* ne pourront pas procéder aux corrections qui s'imposent. Plus grave: ils ne soupçonneront pas même ces défauts, et il y a fort à craindre que les publications des années à venir ne fourmillent de ces inexactitudes, dont nous essayons à grand peine de prévenir nos étudiants. Forts d'un instrument de travail dont ils croiront qu'il a été composé avec toute la rigueur scientifique et tout le sérieux requis, ceux-ci se contenteront le plus souvent du matériel mis ainsi (commodément) à leur disposition, sans pousser plus loin les recherches.

Malgré les sommes démesurées qui ont été consacrées à ce premier tome, la lettre A a dû être divisée—pour ne pas retarder indéfiniment la parution. Les grandes divinités (Aphrodite, Apollon, Arès, Artémis et Athéna) figureront dans le second tome, qui est annoncé pour 1983.

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HUNTER R. RAWLINGS III. The Structure of Thucydides' History. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1981. Pp. xiv + 278. $20.00.

In this important and stimulating book Hunter Rawlings argues that Thucydides describes two 'ten-year wars,' with events and speeches in each war shedding light on those in the other. Rawlings begins with a fresh treatment of 5.25–26 that dates the 'beginning' of each war, resolves a long dispute about chronology, and correctly relegates the problem of composition to a secondary position. He then traces the workings of Thucydides' 'double vision' over four chapters, the last of which considers the years 410–404 B.C. With a sharp eye for detail, he contrasts Pericles' dominance and Athenian vigor in I–II with Nicias' passivity and Athenian discord in VI–VII, then moves on to balance three sequences of action in VIII with analogues in III. The discussion of VIII, often the despair of Thucydidean scholars, is particularly enlightening.

How might Thucydides have treated the last years of the war? Probably, Rawlings suggests, by playing them off against events in IV and V: Cyzicus against Pylos, Lysander against Brasidas, the debate on how to treat defeated Athens against the Melian Dialogue. Rawlings' concluding chapter draws reasonable but not novel conclusions about the problem of composition and the interpretation of 1.22.4, and contrasts his approach to Thucydides to those of other recent scholars. (Here reference should have been made to Christophe Schneider's *Information und Absicht bei Thukydides* [Göttingen 1974] with its strong case that Thucydides 'created' much of his data.)

Kenneth Clark won fame as a gallery director for hanging paintings so that they 'had conversations with each other.' Similarly, Thucydidean scholars, especially since Jacqueline de Romilly's *Histoire et raison chez Thucydide* (Paris 1956) have paired passages to bring out previously unnoticed features. In Rawlings' hands, the approach yields new and convincing analyses of several key passages, and a sustained survey of the complete narrative—a rare achievement. Future critics may find it difficult not to adjust their readings to Rawlings' template.

Yet this very template, with its emphasis on thorough-going structural oppositions, raises problems. Rawlings avoids some of the pitfalls of structural analysis—he always works his oppositions into meaningful networks, and acknowledges the importance of change and process in history—but not others. Although he can play Nicias and Alcibiades off against each other at particular moments, his insights do not bring comprehensive understanding of these men. Citing Stahl, he says that Nicias is correct in predicting opposing the Sicilian expedition (p. 49).[1] Later, he calls Alcibiades 'Athens' best and most effective public leader' (p. 115). Can the 'best leader' propose such a disastrous undertaking? Rawlings' structural approach permits him, and us, to avoid answering this question and developing an overall assessment.

An evaluation of Nicias and Alcibiades would, of course, be difficult. It might even necessitate abandoning a strictly binary approach. Thucydides' is, after all, as famous for shattering as for creating antitheses, and this is as true of his narrative as of his sentences. Both can subvert or reverse themselves as they proceed.

Consider, for example, the Sicilian expedition, which Rawlings subordinates to the overarching pattern of the 'two wars,' presenting it only as the mirror of the latter half of Book II. His evidence is sound, but partial: the Sicilian disaster recapitulates themes from other parts of the text, including the plague, Pylos, the Melian Dialogue, even the Trojan War and the Egyptian expedition. It is composed, as Rawlings notes, with the epic symmetry that characterizes a complete work, and we might easily conclude that Books VI and VII invert not only I–II but I–V, the entire 'first war.'

Rawlings' neat dyadic version of the text, then, while informative and correct, is not exhaustive. Nicias furnishes another example of unexhausted possibilities. Clearly a 'warning figure' with models in earlier literature, he is also an agent, making crucial decisions that lead directly to disaster, and a victim, the major victim, of his own destructive leadership. VII.86 shows that

[1] He does not, like Stahl, ignore Nicias' later failures (pp. 74, 90, 137).

Nicias' 'virtues' are shared with the Melians. Ironically, in both cases failure comes not despite but because of these very virtues.

Rawlings rightly stresses the importance of irony in Thucydides, but it may be more pervasive and subversive than he allows. Only rarely betrayed by semantic markers, it lurks Escher-like in the text, invisible until the reader performs the requisite cognitive shift. Through irony, Nicias is given a richer if more ambiguous position. So too, Brasidas, threatening to starve out those he would free, introducing not autonomy but oppressive Spartan governors, perhaps violating his own constitution (note 4.86.4: 'your' or 'our' *patrion?*), is more ironically presented by Thucydides than Rawlings' selective translation of his speech reveals (pp. 237–38, parenthetically amended pp. 242–43).

Irony functions so as to unfold an action, to reveal it in a new light. Thus Thucydides *seems* to praise the Chian revolt (8.24.4, Rawlings pp. 184–85), but this praise appears ironic if we adopt Rawlings' principle of viewing events in the light of 403 B.C. Chian *sōphrosunē* led to an Athenian siege, a harsh Spartan governor, ravaging of land that was unharmed for over six decades (8.24.3).

Neglect of irony can lead to inaccurate causal judgments. On Samos, the *dēmos* ('populace' or 'lower class,' depending on the context) seizes power, constitutes itself as the government, and turns on its former fellow-commoners on the ground that they are—of all things—the *dēmos* (8.73.2). These would-be oligarchs, seeking Alcibiades' favor, kill his foe Hyperbolus. Rawlings detects a causal line to this assassination from the mutilation of the Herms in 415 B.C. (pp. 113–15), noting that Thucydides like Alcibiades speaks of the *ponēria*, 'baseness,' of the latter's enemies, and concluding that the demagogues Androcles and Hyperbolus, each mentioned only once by Thucydides, were 'more than anyone else, . . . responsible for Athens' defeat.' The pattern that emerges is one of worthy aristocrats—Alcibiades in 415, the Pisistratids in 514—exiled or killed by worthless commoners, at great cost to the city.

Thucydides' text is too complex for this billiard-ball approach to causation. An ironic interpretation would avoid laying such causal weight on virtual nonentities, or confusing Thucydides' judgments with Alcibiades' allegations. Note that Hyperbolus is killed by oligarchs who have just been *dēmos*, to please an oligarch who had shortly before been *ponēros* himself, indeed the ideologue of radical democracy (5.45.4, 6.15.3, 6.18.6), and that the commons at Athens had changed its attitude as fast as Alcibiades (6.15.3–4), partly because of Alcibiades' *paranomia*, a weighty word in Thucydides, as Rawlings elsewhere admits (p. 241). Attention to context would show that all parties, not just the 'lower class,' are subject to private motivation, and that the cause of Athens' defeat is a multiplicity of factors.

Rawlings' binary structure depends on 'paradigms'—incidents that resemble other incidents. He treats these as he does causation and parallelism, with a quasi-mathematical approach that assumes point-to-point correspondences. De Romilly had spoken of the 'rigorous' and 'mathematical' elements in Thucydides' language (*Histoire et raison*, pp. 230–31), and it is partly her influence that has led Stahl, Hunter, and Rawlings to perceive a nearly mathematical perspicuity in Thucydides' narrative as well as his language. But no language, and certainly no narrative, is ultimately 'mathematical' in the sense of being a self-enclosed system with fixed correspondences, and in invoking

'paradigms' Rawlings opens Pandora's box: Thucydides' paradigms, like their predecessors—the Meleager-story, the lion in the house—are memorable and important precisely because of their inexactness, their multivalence.[2] That, not the obtuseness of all readers before us, is why we still discuss them.

It is a mistake, then, to conclude that Rawlings' binary pattern is the only fruitful or meaningful one in Thucydides. Attention to context, tone, irony, and ambiguity will reveal a Thucydides more in line with Collingwood's criteria for a historian than the discussion of Collingwood (pp. 262–63) admits.

Some passages require brief comment. The emendation proposed on pp. 35–36 deserves more detail. Complex narrative structure in Herodotus and Homer is too casually dismissed (pp. 55–57). Mistranslations occur: of 1.68.1 (p. 81), and 4.81.3 (pp. 236–37), where *elpida* means 'supposition' not 'hope.' Here and on pp. 153 and 238–39 Rawlings unnecessarily takes passages out of context, and on p. 241 he ignores forms of *paranom-* that weaken his case. Occasional stylistic slips include 'mouthpiece' (p. 83), Runyonesque and bizarre as applied to Archidamus. Contemporary Thucydidean scholars will feel misrepresented by p. 127 n. 2. On pp. 230–31 Gomme's analysis of 4.17–20 deserves more serious consideration.

My criticisms should not obscure Rawlings' achievement or deter scholars from reading his work with care. He has succeeded in a difficult task, that of showing how, as a narrative historian, Thucydides finds meaning in events, and his original explications cover the whole stretch of the narrative. This makes his book a serious contribution not only to Thucydidean scholarship but to the ongoing justification of narrative history, currently under attack on so many fronts.

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MARY R. LEFKOWITZ. The Lives of the Greek Poets. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981. Pp. xi + 187.

Despite its modest size and modest subject, this is a major book which aims at demolishing the underpinnings of much that has passed for Greek literary criticism. Its subject is a minor, postclassical, subliterary genre: the lives of the Greek poets. Analyses of the lives are presented in chronological order from Hesiod to Apollonius of Rhodes. Good English translations of seven of the principal lives are supplied in appendices.

Prof. Lefkowitz's purpose throughout is to show that "virtually all the material in all the lives is fiction (viii)." This is accomplished by demonstrating that the source of most of the detail in the *vitae* is the poets' own words, or those of contemporary comic poets. We are shown, e.g., how the wonderful

[2] Rawlings cites Schadewaldt's discussion of paradigms, pp. 260–61. But as Ruth Scodel observes, in 'The Autobiography of Phoenix: *Iliad* 9.444–95,' *AJP* 103 (1982) 129 n. 4, for Schadewaldt 'Ungenauigkeit' was one feature of paradigms in Homer.

story in the *vita* of Aeschylus about the chorus of Eumenides frightening the audience so that "children fainted and unborn infants were aborted" was derived from the words of the chorus itself (*Eu.* 187–88, 328ff., 354, 785–87), which were taken as literal expressions of the poet's intentions (pp. 71–72). Similarly, the comic exaggerations of Aristophanes' parabases supplied most of the "facts" in his own *vita*, while his *Frogs* and *Thesmophoriazousae* determined many aspects of the life of Euripides.

In the transformation from literary reference to biography, humor is taken seriously and metaphor becomes fact. Among these "facts" Prof. Lefkowitz finds typical incidents that make the lives similar to one another and to the lives of Greek heroes. These include early recognition of talent (Hesiod's and Archilochus' encounters with the Muses, the oracle received by Euripides' father); contests with rival poets (Homer and Hesiod, Pindar and Corinna, Aeschylus and Simonides); exile (Solon in Egypt, Aeschylus in Sicily, Apollonius in Rhodes); violent or degrading death (Homer slipping in the mud, Aeschylus struck on the head by a tortoise, Euripides torn apart by dogs); death as the result of a misunderstood oracle (Homer, Hesiod, Aeschylus); and elevation to heroic status after death (Delphi's ordering Hesiod's bones moved to Orchomenos, the establishment of the Archilocheion on Paros, Sophocles' heroization as Dexion).

While the nature of the evidence precludes proving that every incident in every life is fiction, it must be said that Prof. Lefkowitz's skepticism seems more than justified. The upshot of her argument is a definition of the genre of Greek literary biography that forbids us from using any material contained within it as a source for literary or historical facts. In some areas of scholarship a trend to discount the *vitae* is already underway, as in the case of Callimachus and Apollonius of Rhodes, whose alleged quarrel once informed all criticism of their poetry, but is now often and rightly dismissed. In other areas Prof. Lefkowitz's book will inspire some important reappraisals. Historians, e.g., will want to consider the implications of her demonstration that Aristotle's principal source for Solon's political accomplishments was Solon's own poetry, and that after 200 years, the poetical conventions of the sixth century were easily misunderstood. This argument, like others in the book, has a rather negative tone, but its proper application to classical studies will have a very positive effect.

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JOHN WARDEN. Fallax Opus: Poet and Reader in the Elegies of Propertius. Toronto, Buffalo, University of Toronto Press, 1980. Pp. viii + 148. $15.00. (*Phoenix*, Suppl. 14).

W. argues that in Propertius' elegies the interplay between poet and reader, convention and innovation, induces a sense of ambiguity that prevents the reader from discovering a "firm footing" (p. 111) of interpretation. He proposes to describe one poem in great detail, in order that we may "stand back

and view it as a static entity" (p. 3). In the contradiction of conclusion and purpose lies the weakness of W.'s treatment: he does not ask how a single interpretation (his), no matter how determinedly undogmatic (p. 3), can emerge from a corpus of poetry so thoroughly informed by ambiguity.

W. is to be commended for his refusal to dress up his argument in the jargon of one or another school of contemporary criticism; on the other hand, if he claims to tell us about "poet and reader in the elegies of Propertius," he needs to explore more thoroughly the problems that such criticism addresses. Of the numerous books that have, from a specific or a theoretical approach, dealt with the relationship of poet and reader in classical as well as other literature, W. mentions only Northrup Frye's *Anatomy of Criticism*. This book, published in 1957, while perhaps seminal, can hardly be considered representative or inclusive of contemporary treatments of the role of the reader; furthermore, it does not even appear in the bibliography, but once in a note (p. 135, n. 2). The critic who proposes to explore the role of the reader might profit from a consideration of various methodologies. *Arethusa* 10 (1977), for example, offers a collection of approaches to "Classical Literature and Contemporary Literary Theory" that helps define the problems of adapting innovative interpretive tools to the study of classical poetry.

W. concentrates for 78 of the book's 111 pages on Propertius 4.7, in order to describe his responses to it in detail. W.'s pleasant translation, and his often sensitive reading of the poem, are in the end overwhelmed by his failure to make his own response to a particular poem convincing as a means of understanding the relationship of reader and poet. Thus, W. has chosen an unfortunately apt title: the book suggests but does not accomplish the application of modern literary critical concepts to an analysis of classical poetry.

The first section of W.'s study scrutinizes one of Propertius' most provocative and problematic poems, the lover's account of a dream in which Cynthia, newly dead, returns to berate him, to defend her reputation, and to remind her lover of his own mortality. The poem offers fertile ground for scholarly argument. It has three audiences: the lover addressed by Cynthia, the listener addressed by the lover, and the reader addressed by the poet. It mingles the conventions of funerary epigram (cf. pp. 62, 103), mythological exempla, and literary allusion, with the personal tone of Roman elegy (cf. p. 110), and a peculiarly Propertian fondness for dissonance and emotional *variatio*. W. knows that these factors "colour the reader's response to the emotions at the very moment they are being expressed" (p. 22), and that the persistent questions of sincerity and biographical veracity with which scholars have traditionally approached the poem might indeed be fruitfully superseded by an attempt to understand the poem's narrative complexity. The resultant unravelling of Propertius' technique might then tell us much about his poetic method and even his intent.

W. imagines a "sensitive reader" who "knows quite well how he is supposed to respond" (p. 57; see p. 23, and often). W. does not confront the fact that every element in the entity dubbed the 'response of the sensitive reader' has been the subject of extensive critical discussion. Stanley Fish, for example, (*Self-Consuming Artifacts* [Berkeley 1972]) suggests that the critic must imagine a community of opinion shared by every "informed reader." This desirable

entity, which we all imagine ourselves to epitomize, has been the subject of much subsequent controversy (see Fish on himself and others, in *"Is There a Text in This Class?"* [Harvard 1980]).

Further, the process of reading is inevitably incremental (a phenomenon seized upon by Harold Bloom especially): we respond differently from Propertius' original audience because we have also read Pound, or because we are sensitive to Homeric allusion, or because we understand more about psycholinguistics. The modern critic of classical poetry ought to be wary lest his information and response rely on interpretive tools or expectations not shared by the poet's intended audience, yet W. fails to distinguish among himself, Propertius' reader, and the general reader, or to explain why he thinks this distinction unnecessary. (W. does not even mention a further complication, a favorite of contemporary critics, which can be especially confusing in classical poetry, but nonetheless should be considered—that is, the distinction between the audience of the poem addressed by the poet [the fictional audience] and the actual audience, those who heard or read the work.)

W. is well aware that 4.7 is informed by various allusions to Homer, to the conventions of epigram and elegy, and to the shared experience of a Roman audience. He notes, for example, the use of allusive detail in Propertius' description of the tableaux that represent in shorthand the experience of Cynthia and her lover: these "feed the emotional progress of the poem" (p. 21). Yet W. goes no further: the poem conjures "a world with its own dimensions of time and space, akin to the world of the reader's experience, and yet different" (p. 23). W.'s analysis is weakened by such generalizations, such recourse to paradoxes and antitheses, especially lamentable when the worlds of W. and of Propertius' Roman readers are so vastly different. W. might consider, as background to his analysis, a book such as Wolfgang Iser's *The Act of Reading* (Baltimore 1978), before identifying the mechanisms that determine "the way in which a reader responds to a particular reference" (p. 55). (Further references representative of other approaches may be found in the extensive bibliographies to: *The Reader in the Text*, S. Suleiman and I. Crosman, eds. [Princeton 1980]; and *Reader-Response Criticism*, J. P. Tompkins, ed. [Baltimore 1980].) A study of the reader's response ought, too, to take into account the meaning, at least for the Roman reader, of a statement like the following: "Elegy is poetry in a parainetic mode . . ." (p. 85). Again, W.'s bibliography leaves out basic references, such as Pichon, Day, and Lück, who raise points that ought to be considered before drawing the parameters that define the community of opinion upon which W. relies.

This flattening out of distinctions among the various possible addressees and their assumptions leads to other confusions, most serious of which is the failure to analyze the relation of the poet Propertius to the narrator of the poem. W. shows that he is aware of this distinction: he points out the difference between the lover whose "inner world" the poem describes and the "creating poet" who controls the presentation (p. 94, see also p. 11, and p. 99: "The role of the poetic 'I' remains close to [but not identical with] that of the creating poet"). In his discussion of 4.7, W. has developed no consistent terminology to maintain such a distinction; thus for example W. uses "poet" and "narrator" interchangeably in the passage on p. 70 in which he distinguishes between the

poet and the narrator. The first paragraph begins: "The poet creates two characters to populate his dramatic world." The second begins: "The poet's role in the poem is an inglorious one." The distinction between poet and narrator, while important in itself, is essential both to the analysis of 4.7 and to the particular technical problems W.'s argument raises. The interplay between poet and narrator, and the audience's awareness of the tensions it may produce, is fundamental to its response. Thus for example our reading of Horace's satires has been altered by our increasing understanding of the gap between Horace the poet and Horace the narrator. Similarly, Ovid's love poetry demands that we discern the difference between the wry and learned poet and his often sentimental narrator.

4.7 has two narrators: the lover and Cynthia. Each, for his/her own reasons, is unreliable. The reader's awareness of this unreliability must, as W. sees (e.g., p. 22), shape the reader's response to the versions of the affair that they present. The narrative frame of the dream not only sets the scene, but helps remind us at the end that Cynthia's monologue is a fiction within a fiction; we then wonder whose story is true, or truest. This process is interpretation. Although W. notices these complexities in Propertius' narrative, his detailed analysis of his response to a single poem obscures rather than elucidates his object.

In the most provocative section of the book, W. argues that Propertius' elegies reveal the poet's involvement, almost amounting to a fascination, with the possibilities of address: "address becomes a literary tool" (p. 85). This observation, relevant both to other elegists, and to Roman poetry in general, may help explain the ascendancy of genres, such as satire and love poetry, that offer rich possibilities for experimentation with address and narration, and may also explain the relative neglect of dramatic forms in which the narrator has no role and the tension between poet and persona cannot be exploited. But the development of this interest has a long history.

Propertius, as W. notes, owes a debt to his predecessors' experiments with address and its conventions, notably Catullus. W. mentions the similarity of Propertius 2.5 to Catullus 8, where "the poet is seen looking at himself" (p. 91), but does not pursue this point. A brief consideration of Catullus' poetry reminds us that he, too, was concerned with various forms of address; that is, with the range of stances and audiences that the love poet can adopt. Furthermore, variety of address is intrinsic to several aspects or fictions of elegy: for example, the propempticon, the topos of the *praeceptor amoris*, the *exclusus amator*, not to mention the pleas and paeans to the loved one herself. Propertius, far from being unique in his interest in address, instead follows precedents that must have colored the responses of his audience; but W. does not explore the effect of these conventions and the ways the innovative poet may play off them.

Book 1, W. finds, "indicates two main ways in which the system of address can be developed," internal dialogues "pursued in the mind of the poetic 'I'" and external dialogue, in which "the poetic 'I' becomes one of the characters" (p. 90). W. briefly analyzes each book to show the range of Propertius' experimentation with various forms of address, including the conventional hortatory address of elegy, "switching address," poems in which "the lack of a

center of address has itself a literary function" (2.8, p. 92), "poems in which an initial address introduces a "poème à thèse" (p. 97).

While the first section of the book suffers from an excessively microscopic approach, the second is weakened by its range: W. covers all four books of elegies in less than thirty pages. As a result, we find constricted analyses such as the following, excerpted from the single paragraph on 4.11 (p. 103): ". . . the poet borrows the convention of the funerary epigram in which the dead person speaks . . . the address has a double function. . . . This double fiction . . . gives a tremendous breadth to the address. . . . Each message gives a greater depth to the other. . . . And in the end they flow together. . . . The reader's relationship is close, but oblique."

The generality of W.'s approach is betrayed by the need to resort to phrases such as: "a kind of objectivity" (p. 90); "a certain autonomy" (p. 101); "the descriptions become more consciously poetic" (p. 104). The vagueness of his style is not mitigated by W.'s failure to make clear which poem he is discussing at any time: he deals with "poem 11," "poem 2," and "three poems (2, 3, 11)," all on page 103; that we are in the fourth book was last explicitly mentioned on page 101. This obscurity, coupled with the condensed treatment of the entire corpus, the minimal use of quotation, and the tendency toward errors of grammatical reference (a stylistic infelicity that appears several times on almost every page—e.g., p. 88), undermines W.'s perception that Propertius' use of address has something to do with the effect of his poetry on a reader. But this weakening of the argument would perhaps not interfere with W.'s purpose if he had more carefully explicated the primary question he poses in this section: "what role does this [the relationship of poet and reader] leave for the reader?" (p. 85).

W. argues that Propertius uses change of address to keep the response of the reader in flux: "The reader is drawn deep into the mind of the soliloquizing lover in his desire to follow the poem's progress. He becomes witness to the process as it takes place within the lover's mind. The jerkiness of movement reflects his agitation as he turns from one address to another, the patterns of association and response as they form" (p. 93). And again: "The system of address exposes the reader to cross-currents, and leaves him uncertain as to the upshot. . . . We are left perplexed, and this is as it should be" (p. 102). But ambiguity is just another label for the realization that the interpretation of every reader differs, and yet that poetic intention is in the end less recoverable than the effect of a poem on an audience. Interpretation may be in flux, but this insight constitutes the starting point, not the conclusion, of reader-response criticism. Reader-response criticism seeks to identify the components of "the reader," to explain how he interacts with the material of the poem (its conventional, allusive aspects, its subject and emotional ranges), with the narrator of the poem (the fictional voice that interprets the material), and with the poet himself (and the degree to which he mingles his own voice with that of the narrative persona he has chosen).

In identifying these elements, W. suggests how objective analyses of historical and cultural aspects of a poem can and should be integrated with an awareness of the role of the reader who converts these "facts" into poetic

meaning. But this conversion cannot be explained by assuming that a close reading describes the process of reading.

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RONALD MARTIN. Tacitus. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1981. Pp. 288. $30.00.

Ronald Martin, the author of numerous articles on Tacitus, has now prodced a comprehensive survey of the historian's life and works the aim of which is to prove that Tacitus is the greatest of the Roman historians and to induce thereby more students to read him in Latin. His book will be most useful to such readers, as well as to more advanced students of historiography.

In Tacitean fashion, M. sets out the major themes of his work in the preface: that all Tacitus' works save the *Germania* deal with the problem of what constitutes *virtus* in public life under the principate; that Tacitus' perception of the gap between the ideal of *virtus* and actuality caused his pessimism; that his attempts to explain the reasons for this gap in his analyses of the relationship of senate and *princeps* give his work its profundity and, finally, that Tacitus has carefully molded his style to express the political tensions in the periods he described. In eleven chapters, M. sets out the themes and major scholarly controversies of each of the works, then discusses sources for *Histories* and *Annals*, the style of Tacitus and, in a brief postscript, his *Nachleben*. There is an excellent bibliography.

Before proceeding to the works, M. places Tacitus both in the tradition of Greco-Roman historiography and in Roman society of the first century A.D. It is to the great Republican, senatorial historians Cato and Sallust that Tacitus looks in his emphasis on *virtus* and in his focus on the relations of Senate and *princeps*. (M. has covered the same ground more fully in "Tacitus and his Predecessors," in T. A. Dorey, ed., *Tacitus*, London 1969.) Moreover, M. believes that Tacitus tries to reconcile the dichotomy between pragmatic and literary history. For the most part, Tacitus subordinates the rhetorical to the historical and uses rhetoric as a tool "to drive home his interpretation of events or persons" (24).

In reviewing Tacitus' career, M. points to the paradox that the historian advanced without hindrance in public life while he produced works which starkly portrayed the way in which the principate brought out the worst both in senators and *princeps*. (M. rejects Syme's contention that the *Annals* were written largely under Hadrian and agrees with Goodyear that *rubrum mare* at 2.61.2 refers to the Red Sea and thus dates that passage to A.D. 108–114.) M. attributes Tacitus' ambivalent attitudes to many persons and events in his works to his awareness of this paradox within himself.

Nearly half the book consists of a detailed exposition of themes and structure of the *Histories* and *Annals*. Inevitably, this has its *longueurs*, but it will prove very useful to those students who can read only portions of the original. In the *Histories* M. focuses on Tacitus' factual accuracy, superior

chronology and grasp of causation and his precise handling of such complex events as the revolt of Civilis. In the *Annals,* M. makes this mass of detail intelligible by pointing out the smaller thematic units within each reign, by discussing annalistic technique and by comparing Tacitus' evaluation of each emperor with those of Suetonius and Dio. The themes of *virtus, libertas* and the relationship between Senate and emperor are traced throughout.

Any such survey of so large and complex a subject will find its detractors. To my mind, M. lets Tacitus off too easily from his tendentious treatment of *maiestas* cases under Tiberius. Although M. points out the historian's bias, he does not offer any explanation for it. Moreover, M. never admits the possibility that Tacitus' views on the principate may have changed over time. He says only that the historian viewed this form of government as a necessity.

Those acquainted with M.'s papers on Tacitus will not be surprised that he is at his best when dealing with speeches and style. He is very sensitive to the polyvalent functions of literary reminiscences in the speeches and to the contrast between words and political realities which appears when speeches are studied in their contexts. Thus, when Mucianus opposes Curtius Montanus, who had urged that delators be prosecuted, Montanus' speech stands revealed as "a brief interlude of high flown Ciceronian eloquence on themes that befitted the free Republic of Cicero's day, but dropped like a hot brick, the moment the reality of power politics under an emperor (here displayed by his vice-gerent) was asserted" (100). Similarly, M. notices that Tacitus uses *oratio recta* for both sides of an argument just once in the *Annals,* in the exchange between Seneca and Nero (14.53–56) and there only to underline the artificiality of the exchange and the manifest insincerity of both speakers.

M. explicates the chief glories of Tacitus' style in a lucid and concise way which makes them comprehensible even to the Latinless reader. He reiterates that the distinctive elements, especially *variatio,* serve Tacitus' basic concerns as an historian, the exploration of men's motives and the revelation of the frequent disparity between those motives and men's public professions.

In all, M. should be commended for admirably fulfilling the goals he set for himself. He has produced a thorough and intelligent introduction to our author which presents the major issues of his works with a minimum of simplification.

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Aufstieg und Niedergang der romischen Welt. Geschichte und Kultur Roms im Spiegel der neueren Forschung II Principat. Vol. 9, part 2, edited by Hildegard Temporini. Berlin/New York, DeGruyter, 1978. 360 DM.

This addition to the gigantic *ANRW,* like its predecessors and successors, nominally consists of interrelated articles; these three focus on Roman trade with the East. It shares with its companions an unevenness in both scholarship and editing which may be graphically illustrated merely by the relative volume of the contributions: A. Dihle's "Die entdeckungsgeschichtlichen Voraussetzung

des Indienhandels der romischen Kaiserzeit" (pp. 546–80) and John Ferguson's "China and Rome" (pp. 581–603) are dwarfed by M. G. Raschke's "New Studies in Roman Commerce with the East" (pp. 604–1378).

It is upon the last of these that this review will focus; for quite apart from its sheer size and in spite of all its imperfections, historians and economists, archaeologists and numismatists—indeed all students of antiquity, whatever their orientation—will use it as a point of departure in studying the often obscure links between west and east. The list of abbreviations alone (many of them unfamiliar to the classicist) runs to 20 pages, and the bibliography (unfortunately not analytical) to 146; the latter includes works in virtually every major language, and will be particularly useful to scholars unaccustomed to dealing with secondary literature published in the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, or in India. Some 1800 footnotes occupy 395 pages; the seventeen indices cover not only persons, subjects, geography, and Greek and Roman authors, but papyrological, epigraphical, and literary evidence as well.

Raschke's study is divided into four major essays, a summary conclusion, and a brief appendix which dismisses (as "a work of fiction of moderate interest") Dubs's peculiar hypothesis of the establishment of a Roman "colony" in China, which Ferguson (pp. 599–601) seems to consider at least possible.

Raschke has clearly been influenced, as he admits, by the views of Max Weber, summarized by Raschke as follows: "social attitudes and institutions are the most important factors in determining the type, quality, and quantity of commercial activity in a given society." Four themes are then explored in detail:

1) "Neither farsighted governmental planning nor aggressive mercantile capitalism was responsible for the development of the silk trade. It was the evolution of steppe nomadism and the resulting social and political consequences which created a demand for Chinese goods in Siberia and which eventually brought Chinese garrisons to Eastern Turkestan, astride the roads to the West."

2) "Hollow moralizing about a gold drain from Rome is replaced by a more complex, but less romantic approximation of reality."

3) "An assault is launched upon that economic dogma, by no means confined to Marxists, which condemns middlemen as unworthy parasites . . . many of those whom we may describe by this term were not geographically remote and instinctively acquisitive foreigners, but rather subjects of Rome's empire."

4) An attempt is made to outline some of the main problem areas relating to the spice trade and to correct some currently accepted hypotheses.

I. *The Rise of the Silk Trade* (pp. 606–22)

The first of these analyses strikes me as entirely plausible. Raschke argues that the rise of true nomadism in the ninth and eighth centuries B.C. led to increased interaction with other peoples, first in the form of warfare and later in the form of intermarriage, exchange of gifts, and barter. The need to defend oneself and one's property (largely herds and pasture) produced the mounted

warrior and, eventually, a military aristocracy that increasingly demanded luxury goods (e.g. silks, lacquers, and mirrors). A watershed was reached with the advent of the Hsiung-nu, an empire of sufficient might and administrative organization to challenge the Han empire itself and, thus, to extract what was in effect a tribute from it. The flow of goods was entirely one-directional in return for the Hsiung-nu refraining from raids on the Chinese frontier. Raschke quite rightly observes that this is hardly commerce in any meaningful sense of the term, and infers that neither the Former nor the Later Han rulers had any interest in the export of silk for profit—the purpose was merely to maintain stable frontiers. Whatever the intent, however, the effect was to fill the frontier territories with silk. He concludes, anticipating a thesis propounded more broadly later on, that no organized structure of "middlemen" need be posited to explain the presence of Chinese luxury goods in the West until the political expansion of the Arabs and Mongols brought some kind of unified control to the "Silk Route."

II. *Silk and the Imbalance of Trade* (pp. 622–37)

Here a somewhat less successful attempt is made to gauge the relationship between Roman silk imports and the infamous "gold drain" from the empire. Several approaches are taken: the first involves dismissal of the combined evidence of a sixth-century tale of a Chinese princess smuggling silk worms, eggs and mulberry seeds to Khotan, and a wall-painting from Dan-Dan-Uilik which may portray a scene from the story. It is further noted that the Chin court made a gift of silkworms to a Hsien-Pi prince, and that Chinese immigrants brought silk culture to Korea as early as the second century B.C. Nor does Han law, which defines certain materials whose export was illicit, ever mention silk (although the items specified are mainly of military application). Thus, it is concluded, the Han never had, much less attempted to establish or maintain, a monopoly on silk production. Raschke adds, quite unnecessarily, a reference to the preceding chapter, asserting that much exported silk even left China *gratis;* this is not strictly true, since even if exports consisted principally of tribute to the Hsiung-nu, the transaction constitutes a form of exchange even if not commerce in the conventional sense.

Raschke goes on to dispose of the statement of the *SHA Vita Aureliani* (45.5) that "libra enim auri tunc libra serici fuit;" even if this were not repugnant to common sense it would raise the eyebrows of anyone familiar with the *SHA*'s treatment of coins, money, and precious metals, which K. Menadier showed long ago to be wholly untrustworthy. Pliny, too, is given short shrift (p. 624) and a detailed if somewhat circumstantial dismissal as a source of "unimpeachable statistical evidence" (!) (p. 637). But even if Pliny's figures are wrong—as, no doubt, they are—Raschke's own arguments neither disprove the existence of the gold drain nor demonstrate that none of this gold found its way to China in exchange for silk. The question is one of scale, which is as difficult for modern historians to estimate as it must have been for Pliny, given the broad range and eccentricity of the evidence.

Raschke (p. 625) regards it as "necessary to consider the numismatic evidence for the relationship between silk and the drain of wealth from the Roman Empire." In fact the evidence is slim almost to the point of non-existence; but why should this not be the case? Han (and later) China possessed no indigenous gold or silver coinage, so one might suppose that "Roman" precious metals, if they did find their way East, were reduced to bullion or jewelry, as has in fact been argued. The absence of Roman coins from burials proves nothing; nor are finds of Byzantine coins and barbarized imitations of them evidence for their "circulation" or for a change in the pattern of currency flow in the sixth through eighth centuries, as is suggested on p. 626. A possible explanation for this change of pattern (such as it is) is hinted at but not fully explicated by Raschke. From the second through the fourth centuries, Roman precious-metal coinage becomes scarcer and scarcer; it is only with Constantius II and his successors that it begins to be at all abundant, at least in gold, and if the legal codes are any guide there were attempts to control its export. The eventual encroachment of Arabs and Sasanians on Byzantine territories placed masses of gold coins outside imperial control of any sort, precisely when finds of such coins in China begin to increase. The "ironic" connection of these finds with the development of sericulture in the West is, then, purely adventitious. A discussion of alternative means of exchange is more convincing, even though the results are largely negative: it is good to see certain classes of objects—glass, for example—removed from the canon of Roman exports to China.

Some quarrel might be had with Raschke's methodology in analyzing Roman finds from Northern and Southern India. It has long been observed that the finds are abundant in the South and almost unheard-of in the North, and Raschke concludes that this difference merely reflects the extensive importation of coins in the South but not in the North—a position that gains vague support from the *Periplus*. Little account has been taken of the possibility of widespread melting, and none of the phenomenon of regional preference for certain denominations, which can be demonstrated in the late Roman and Byzantine worlds. Certainly if the C. L. CAESARES issue of Augustus and the PONTIF MAXIM of Tiberius could be "preferred" in the South, on no rational ground, bullion or jewelry could be preferred to coin at another time and/or place—and it should be borne in mind, as Raschke acknowledges, that although they remained monetiform, Roman coins were certainly treated as bullion once they reached India. The archaeological evidence for circulation of precious-metal coins is always scanty and finds—mostly clandestine—are notoriously susceptible to adulteration in modern times; for the moment, Raschke's analysis is as good as any other.

III. *The Middlemen* (pp. 637–50)

"A most delicate subject this, and one which calls forth liberal and Marxist scholars' deepest economic prejudices. It is accepted doctrine that the middlemen were the villains in Rome's Eastern trade." So begins a discussion of who the middlemen were that concludes with their identification as (at least assimilated) Romans.

Whatever one's prejudices, the middlemen have been with us since the beginnings of exchange, and "hollow moralizing" about them nearly as long. It is always easy to condemn the individual who contributes nothing to a product other than his ability to broker it, and the ancient mind readily made both moral and social distinctions between producers and distributors (or, perhaps better, providers of services) that would simply not occur to us today. But critical examination of the evidence shows that in fact the distinction may have been more rhetorical than real—as D'Arms has recently put it, from late Republican times onwards "the privileged classes . . . , senators and *equites*, were in fact involved in economic activities of a kind and to an extent which we should never imagine, were we to rely primarily on the impressions conveyed by [the literary tradition]" (*MAAR* 36 [1980] 77). In short, Raschke is right to summarize what evidence there is for the middlemen and for their *Romanitas;* but wrong to be surprised at this and, as he seems, to expect others to share his astonishment.

IV. *The Spice Trade* (pp. 650–71)

As the introductory summary indicates, this is a wide-ranging, rather free-form discussion of areas for future exploration. The difficulties in translating ancient Greek terms for spices into modern equivalents are treated, and despite the problems it emerges that Rome's spice trade with the East was, at times, very extensive; the *Periplus* (a commentary on which is to follow these *prolegomena*) is dated to the Julio-Claudian period on the basis of the mention of Malichus and his dates of A.D. 40–70. There follows a discussion of the coin finds based on a somewhat fuller sample of evidence than that available to previous students of the problem. The fact that finds of Roman coins (almost all imperial) come overwhelmingly from the south of India has long been noted; some 99.9 per cent of 5,400 denarii come from hoards from Mysore, Kerala, Madras (Tamil Nadu) and the southern part of Andhra Pradesh, and some 98 per cent of the aurei have been found south of the Kistna. Even areas which have not produced large numbers of coins have yielded *bullae,* mostly in clay but also in silver and gold, and barbarized imitations of imperial portraits which presuppose a knowledge of Roman coins; sometimes these, as well as the coins themselves, are pierced for suspension in jewelry.

A further peculiarity of the finds is that the silver hoards terminate with coins struck by Nero prior to his reform of the coinage in A.D. 64; indeed, the lightening and slight debasement of the coinage that took place in that year has been used to account for the absence of later coins. Raschke points out that in fact most hoards deposited and lost later than the Tiberian period have at best a very few coins of Claudius and/or Nero (pre-reform); and that anyhow they show a strong bias toward two types: Augustus' C. L. CAESARES and Tiberius' PONTIF MAXIM. He observes that these were lighter than the early issues of the Augustan moneyers in Rome, no greater in fineness, and concludes that the preference for these two types must have been "psychological." This psychology, the argument runs, could operate even if what were coins to the Romans functioned as bullion in India. Thus, Raschke suggests, when these two par-

ticular coinages ceased to be available within the (Roman) empire, the Indians refused to accept Roman denarii at all.

The reasoning is flawed and the facts are wrong, partly because Raschke's metrology is based on specific gravity analyses—which, as he acknowledges, have large margins of error particularly when one is dealing with silver coins. Since he wrote, D. R. Walker (*The Metrology of the Roman Silver Coinage I–III, BAR Supplementary Series* 5, 22, and 40, Oxford, 1976–1978) has published a gigantic series of X-ray fluorescence analyses which show that there is no substantive difference, either in weight or silver content, between the coins of Augustus and Tiberius and those of their immediate successors through 64; and that the post-64 debasement was neither great nor long-lasting (Domitian, for example, returns to what Walker calls the "Neronian" standard). Moreover, while it is true that we have no great number of Julio-Claudian hoards on record, it is also clear that the C. L. CAESARES and PONTIF MAXIM issues were far larger than any other issue of either ruler (it is ridiculous to compare them to those of the Augustan moneyers), and individually the largest issues from ca. 2 B.C. (the presumed date of C. L. CAESARES) for another century. Tiberius issued hardly any type other than PONTIF MAXIM, and until the reform of Nero there was no issue even remotely comparable in size. Therefore it may be the unavailability of *later* Julio-Claudian types, not of the two "preferred" ones, which governs their absence from Indian hoards.

It is also true, as Raschke argues earlier, that moneychangers were aware of the relative gold or silver content of a coin presented to them; in this case it would have been simple enough to trade ten post-reform denarii for nine earlier ones, or vice versa. This would only introduce an inconvenience if lightening were also accompanied by debasement, as indeed it was in 64. On balance, I think the numismatic events of that year have to be given more weight than the inscrutable preferences of Indian hoarders.

* * *

This review has only scratched the surface of a work that displays broad familiarity with the subjects essayed and, generally, sound methodology. It could have benefitted from careful editing and reorganization, but it remains, nonetheless, an original, stimulating, and provocative study. Page for page, it is among the most valuable of the contributions to *ANRW*, and deserves to be read with care.

WILLIAM E. METCALF

THE AMERICAN NUMISMATIC SOCIETY

U. VON WILAMOWITZ-MOELLENDORFF. History of Classical Scholarship. Translated from the German by Alan Harris. Edited with Introduction and Notes by Hugh Lloyd-Jones. Baltimore, Md., The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982. Pp. xxxii + 189. $20.00.

In March 1921, at the urging and with the help of Eduard Norden, who vetted sections as composed, Wilamowitz set *Pindaros* aside and in some three

weeks wrote the history of classical studies from the Sophists to his own time. "No praise of a man's scholarship is worth anything unless it comes from a scholar who is at least his equal," wrote Lloyd-Jones (*Greek Studies,* 3). That leaves only Wilamowitz. His history is *einmalig.* Endowment of the Rhodes Scholarships in 1902 and the overnight abolishment of German in American schools after the Lusitania entailed catastrophic consequences for American philology. Most of us can not read a Wilamowitz book through, as Gildersleeve, Scott, or Shorey easily did. Only *Recollections* and the Oxford Lectures were available in English (Italians fare better). Now the *History of Classical Scholarship* is. We thank from the bottom of our hearts translator, editor and press. I shall not hymn Wilamowitz' achievement. I am not his equal. Rather I turn to translation, introduction and notes.

Wilamowitz declared (*Hippolytos,* 7) true translation to be metempsychosis. Alan Harris gives us just that. One reads English prose, not translated German. The standard of accuracy is high indeed. What follows is not typical, errors of intelligence and occasional ambiguities. References are to page and line of *HCS:* 23.15–16 for "to make him free of it" r. "to make it accessible to him;" 28.25 Wilamowitz' *Kompendien* means *ligatures* not *handbooks* (cf. *OED* s.v. compendium 2d); 39.13 n. 168 belongs to *authority* not *Danzig;* 49.25 for "come off best" r. "come off better;" 51.12–13 for "Luther's *Table Talk* and the *Conversations* of Eckermann" r. "Luther's *Table Talk* and Goethe's *Conversations* with Eckermann;" 54.11 after "excellent style" add "and he also composed notable writings about it;" 69.2–7 rewrite "Anyone . . . Neoplatonists" as "Anyone who neither treated mythology as a plaything for poets, and its deities as symbolical or allegorical figures—as they themselves did in their own Latin poems—nor took the line of the Stoics as described in Cicero's *De natura deorum,* stood under the spell of the Fathers and the Neoplatonists;" 86.10 after "It is true that . . ." add "in 1744;" 97.19 for *regulars* better *monks;* 111.8 for "King Otho" r. "King Otto;" 147.18 for "When he accepted a chair in St Petersburg" r. "When he accepted a post at St Petersburg" (Nauck was schoolmaster and proofreader not professor at a university there); 147.19 after "as a scholar" add "which he had attained at Berlin;" 148.1 for "Italian languages" r. "Italic languages;" 150.14–15 for "It was almost completely unrepresented at headquarters" r. "It had scarcely any full professors;" 156.14–15 for "though Jahn, in his concern to preserve Kellermann's literary remains, early nourished the ambition of producing it himself" r. "Jahn's concern for Kellermann's literary remains had led Mommsen to the idea;" 160.8–9 for "The science of antiquity is no longer classical, nor even claims to be" r. "The science of antiquity is no longer neo-classical; nor does it even claim to be classical;" 164.34 for "his tragically brief career" r. "his all too brief career" (the debased use of tragic is un-Wilamowitzian); 167.26 for "Roman philologists" r. "Romance philologists;" 175.6–7 for "even when they vouch for 'Plutarch', *De fluviis*" r. "even when they are found in the *De fluviis* attributed to Plutarch;" 175.26 for "various species" r. "various genres."

Lloyd-Jones (L-J) provides an introduction, 669 notes, a brief bibliography, and corrects some five minor errors of Wilamowitz. The introduction evaluates and summarizes Wilamowitz, adding spotty coverage for 1921–1980. Most notes are bare references to Sandys' collection of biographies, now almost

80 years old, often followed by citation of Fraenkel, *Beiträge,* Momigliano, *Contributi,* Pfeiffer, *History* i and ii (*sic*), Reynolds-Wilson *SS*², Rumpf, *Archäologie* i (a tiny paperback), and L-J's own, just published *Kleine Schriften,* called *BG* and alleged (180) to have been published in 1981. There is no systematic attempt whatsoever to integrate *Geschichte* with Wilamowitz' other statements on the subject throughout some 70 volumes and hundreds of published letters. L-J is almost entirely innocent of the vast amount of work done on Wilamowitz and his contemporaries since 1970. Fundamental books and reference works (e.g., *NDB*) are never used. Although apologizing for the need to cite non-English work (vii), L-J seems not to know that *Erinnerungen* exists in English: *My Recollections 1848–1914* (London 1930). A sporadic check reveals misquotations and dozens of minor errors. I try to remedy some below. Major misrepresentations mar the introduction to the degree that any non-specialist could be seriously misled. I glance briefly at L-J's presentation of the Wilamowitz-Nietzsche Struggle; Wilamowitz-Murray; and Werner Jaeger.

1. "The name of Nietzsche is not to be found in Wilamowitz' history" (xi–xii). Why ever would it? What perceptible influence had Nietzsche on classical scholarship by 1921? Even Rohde in *Psyche* only mentions him once (*Psyche*² II. 200 n. 4). Far more reprehensible is the omission of Schliemann, left out from sheerest snobbism: see *Philologus* 124 (1980) 146–51. Or Pattison, or Jowett, or Busolt, whose use by scholars today far exceeds that of Curtius or Grote. Wilamowitz thought him a compiler not worth mention. Gildersleeve (xxvi) is omitted because he was still alive. Nietzsche did not "gain a full professorship at the astonishingly early age of twenty-three." He went to Basel as *extraordinarius* in his twenty-fifth year. He became full professor 9 April 1870. "The antipathy between the two" derives partly from the earlier Jahn-Ritschl feud. Nietzsche bore no antipathy toward Wilamowitz, was bewildered by *Zukunftsphilologie!,* and blamed "Berlin Jews" for corrupting his former schoolmate. His critique of Jahn provided a pretext for Wilamowitz, but schoolboy jealousy and Nietzsche's undeserved breaks (a failure in math raised to pass, no dissertation, no oral defense, an unscrupulous patron) were decisive. There is no evidence (xviii) that Rohde "quarrelled with Nietzsche." Their ways simply parted.

2. We are told (xxiv) for the seventh time since 1962 by L-J: "the Ibsenian Euripides of Wilamowitz inspired the Shavian Euripides of Murray." It is impossible chronologically that Hedda Gabler influenced Wilamowitz' portrayal of Phaedra: see *GRBS* 20 (1979) 233–34. If Murray's Euripides is Shavian, it is because of Murray's good friend Shaw, not Wilamowitz' non-Ibsenian Euripides. Verrall expectedly is "disingenuous and unscholarly." Not a word for his vast influence on rationalist criticism in classics and English: see James E. Ford, *Rationalist Criticism of Greek Tragedy: A Critical History* (Diss. Chicago 1981). For Verrall's praise of Wilamowitz see *CR* 10 (1896).

3. L-J writes (xxvii) of Werner Jaeger:

> National Socialist Germany did not offer the ideal setting for a third humanism; the accident of having a non-Aryan wife compelled its chief proponent to leave for the United States, where he devoted three volumes to a dull history of Greek civilisation seen from the scholastic standpoint before moving on to the Christian Fathers.

Jaeger did not marry a Jewess accidentally. He was not compelled to leave Germany. He declined the alternative of divorce and chose exile in Chicago. He had already published *Paideia* I in Berlin (1934). The books have nothing to do with scholasticism. He did not "move on to the Christian Fathers." He had been working on them since at least 1913 (*SM* 1.107–10).

Correct L-J, who (vi) faults Wilamowitz for trusting his memory, as follows: v.8 for "in 1908" r. "1903–1921"; vi.16 Pfeiffer wrote: "A quite individual and brilliant survey;" x.2 for "University of Berlin" r. "Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität;" x.32 Niebuhr's *History* (1812) was not published "soon after" Boeckh's *Economy* (1817); xiii.21–22 Wilamowitz was not "inspired by . . . the aged Mommsen"; whom he detested but by Mommsen aged 55; xiv. 31–32 the commentary on E. *Herak.* was not "circulated privately . . . as early as 1879," only the text and translation were; xv.5 Wilamowitz never commented on "Hesiod's *Works and Days;*" xxi.30 r. "Cornewall Lewis;" xxii.16 how much "German scholarship" not in Latin did Jebb know?; xxiii n. 39 for *Selected Essays* r. *Selected Prose;* xxv.6 the Oxyrhynchus excavations were not 1899–1902 but 1896–1907; xxviii.14–19 Jaeger's congress was 1931 and Reinhardt's article 1942 (not 1931); xxviii. 32ff. the influence of Catholicism on Pfeiffer is wildly overemphasized (cf. xxx.35ff.). It does not exist for his pagan work; xxix.3 precisely how did Rohde influence Crusius?; 8 n. 37 no warning that Sandys did not know that there were two Tzetzes; 11 n. 47.4 for *49* r. *52;* 27 n. 111 Weiss does not mention Wilamowitz; 51 n. 211 for *d'Oliver* r. *d'Olivet;* 61 n. 251 r. "*HCS* ii 133, 2 after *AKS* 60;" 65 n. 268 Wilamowitz means G. Finsler, "Die 'Conjectures académiques' des Abbé d'Aubignac," *NJb* 15 (1905) 495–509 cf. Cauer, *Grundfragen*[3] 127 n. 19; 76 n. 309 Chapman completed his Homer in 1624 not in 1611; 85 n. 341 for *Copenhagen* r. *Leipzig;* 87 n. 350 I should never call Hermann Fränkel a Wilamowitz pupil nor did he; 101 n. 399 Pattison is entirely fair on Heyne see Justi, *Winckelmann* I[4]. 234–37; 109 n. 423 the authoritative life of Hermann is Jahn, *BiogAuf* 89–132; 134 n. 494 the only satisfactory account of the Jahn-Ritschl struggle is Paul Egon Hübinger, *HistJahrbuch* 83 (1964) 162–216; 151 n. 575 for Wilamowitz on Couat see *ICS* 3 (1977) 325–28; 173 n. 651 for Hdt. papyri see M. H. Chambers *POxy* XLVIII.3376; 178 n. 667 Wilamowitz means Hugo Bretzl, *Botanische Forschungen des Alexanderzuges* (Leipzig 1903), reviewed by him at *DLZ* 24 (1903) 1181–83 cf. *RE* Supp. 7 (1940) 1459.47ff.; 178 n. 669 Wilamowitz' play on Cato is from Leo, *Plautus:* see Fraenkel, *Beiträge* I.10.

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

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THE VALUE OF IGNORANCE IN THE *HIPPOLYTUS**

Ignorance is a common, if not universal, dramatic device. Without it we could have no recognition, no irony, no suspense in tragedy or comedy.[1] But it would be hard to find a play in which so many people display or claim so many levels of ignorance of so many different things as in Euripides' *Hippolytus*. And yet all the characters who tamper with the plot are so sure that they do know that they stake their lives, futures, honor, and happiness on that certainty.

τὴν δὲ σὴν ἁμαρτίαν / τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι μὲν πρῶτον ἐκλύει κάκης, says Artemis to Theseus at lines 1334–35, "*your ignorance* excuses your hamartia of malice." In the following remarks, certain passages in which characters claim ignorance will be examined for the purpose of discovering whether we can accept these divine words at face value, or whether they are ironic, an example (like Nurse's δεύτεραι φροντίδες and the many instances of the argument from *eikos*) of generalization which is inappropriate to the case at hand.

Let us begin then with Hippolytus, whose deep ignorance has been called "an existential crime."[2] In answer to his servant's question (91):

> οἶσθ' οὖν βροτοῖσιν ὃς καθέστηκεν νόμος . . .
>
> "do you know the law which is established for mortals . . ."

before he has heard the end of the old man's query, Hippolytus breaks in with,

> οὐκ οἶδα . . . (92).

* An earlier version of this paper was presented at the eleventh annual meeting of the Classical Association of the Pacific Northwest. I wish to take this opportunity to thank the readers for *AJP* for many useful suggestions.

[1] Cf. George E. Duckworth, *The Nature of Roman Comedy* (Princeton 1952) 140–42.

[2] Lester Crocker, "On Interpreting *Hippolytus*," *Philologus* 101 (1957) 240.

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It is a telling response: Hippolytus is aloof, ignorant of human behavior, unsympathetic to human passions, ignorant too of the ways of the gods and of what is owed to *them,* in spite of his special treatment by Artemis and his justified claim to special knowledge and inimitable virtue. This becomes immediately clear from his rejection of the servant's advice—good advice, as we know from the prologue—that all the gods require honor from all men. He is mistaken too about the nature of his friendship with Artemis, as we learn later: she did not or could not protect him as he believed (60; cf. 1328 vv. on the *nomos* of the gods).

The servant in his turn goes too far. Although he correctly assumes that the gods are our masters (88) and that deference is owed to them, this leads him to the further assumption that the gods are wiser than men (120). In fact the old man himself undermines this line of argument by treating Aphrodite just as he treats Hippolytus: he gives both his masters advice. As it turns out, the gods are not wiser than men: their understanding is partial and their ability to act on the knowledge they have is limited. Hippolytus shrugs off the old man's advice; we know that Aphrodite heeds it no better.

Besides his profound ignorance of the way things are and of the human modality and his lack of direct knowledge of passion and psychic pain, Hippolytus displays the various levels of ignorance present in the play. Of what else is he ignorant? Aphrodite tells us (56) that Hippolytus does not know that the gates of Hades stand open for him. Now on the shallowest level, obviously Hippolytus does not know that he will die today, and as far as the relation of knowledge to action is concerned, it is irrelevant. On the other hand, Hippolytus does reflect the goddess' observation with his prayer to remain forever as he is: what after all is changelessness in the human condition but death?

At line 904 Hippolytus claims ignorance again:

> τὸ μέντοι πρᾶγμ' ἐφ' ᾧτινι στένεις / οὐκ οἶδα.

This is a simple case of want of facts, such as all the characters suffer. Of course he sees at once (905) one cause of his father's loud lamentation. But the rest is still hidden from him as his father laments the state of empiricism as it is. In itself this particular οὐκ οἶδα may seem insignificant. But as part of a pattern of Hippolytus' entrances in ignorance it gains meaning. When we first see him, because we know that he is enjoying his last day, we give him our sympathy. We are aware that he is offensive to Aphrodite, but what this means is still unclear. But when he attacks all women and Phaedra herself, he loses our sympathy,

because we know Phaedra; we know that she is his equal, that she is virtuous, though virtue comes hard to her and is dearly bought. When he makes his penultimate entrance, after so much has happened of which he is unaware, and of which he does not become fully aware until 1057, he regains the sympathy he lost. Once again he has been condemned and sentenced.[3] In all cases it is our knowledge opposed to and aware of his ignorance that is a major factor in our feeling for him.

The next time Hippolytus acknowledges ignorance, it is to deny firsthand knowledge of sexual union:

> οὐκ οἶδα πρᾶξιν τήνδε (1004).

Except for hearsay and artistic representation, he is ignorant of the act. This is his main line of defense against his father's accusation. Obviously, from the outcome, it is not enough. It is also Aphrodite's line of accusation (14). Theseus' picture of his son is false, nor is Aphrodite's version the whole: the divine knowledge to which we have been privy is only partial knowledge. Hippolytus himself puts it in better perspective: "*one* thing I have not experienced" (1002). Of course, far from regretting this inexperience, he is proud of it. When, however, Knox writes, "the . . . pattern [of choice between speech and silence] seems to represent the exhaustion of the possibilities of the human will,"[4] it is not enough: for that choice does not quite exhaust the intellectual capabilities of these characters. There is also the choice *not to know,* most obvious in Hippolytus. It is obvious—from what Aphrodite says, from what happens to Hippolytus, from the emphasis given to his rejection of the old servant's advice, underscored by the servant's asking forgiveness for his young master—that Hippolytus is not excused for his ignorance. It may also be said that Hippolytus' innocence is not as complete as he boasts: he may not relish talk about and pictures of Aphrodite's works, but he does make assumptions about women in general and about Phaedra which are not the product of a mind untouched.

At lines 1032–34, however, we see Hippolytus beginning to

[3] This parallelism is especially effective if, as David Sider suggests in "Two Stage Directions for Euripides," *AJP* 98 (1977) 19, Phaedra is cowering behind the statue of Aphrodite during Hippolytus' tirade. Her presence there would once more give life and personality to the statue which has been an abstraction since the departure of the goddess. In any case, in revealing Hippolytus' "involvement," Phaedra acts remarkably like Aphrodite after she has been treated as Aphrodite was treated by Hippolytus.

[4] Bernard M. W. Knox, "The *Hippolytus* of Euripides," *YCS* 13 (1952) 6.

understand, beginning to recognize in Phaedra one of the qualities (*sōphrosunē*) he admires in himself and, perhaps with this paradoxical, almost nonsensical, statement (1034), beginning to see the possibility of shifting predication. "If she killed herself in fear, I do not know, I can say no more."[5] Of course, his oath prevents him from speaking here and he has just attested his innocence with the strongest oath (1028–31), and perhaps most significantly, he has for the second time predicated the word *kakos* on himself (1031, cf. 654). He will do so three more times in the short time left to him (1071, 1075, 1191). His ignorance is changing from the prideful, aloof claim of a virgin soul, who had divided the world into two classes, the *kakoi* and the *sōphrones* (80–81), to a more humble human sort; so that in his final scene he does reach a more fundamental understanding than he is usually given credit for (1401, 1405). The profound confusion of a man coming to understand that even his life could be tainted by that which he had rejected physically, intellectually, and spiritually, and his coming to realize that, though he is the most virtuous of men, he can be seen by others as evil, is evident in the poignant speech before his last bitter exit (1091):

ὡς οἶδα μὲν ταῦτ', οἶδα δ' οὐχ ὅπως φράσω.

"Ah that I know these things, but know not how to make them known." He had said to Nurse (656), "my *eusebes* saves you." He begins to see the grim irony of the situation in which what saves the woman is the same that destroys himself. The situation is fixed (1090), and here he realizes that he is the one who made it changeless.

Hippolytus learns that he was not as pure and untouchable as he thought: he is forced to see himself through others' eyes. His virtue was based on ignorance and rejection of experience (cf. 14, 1002–6): what he laments here (at 1091) is not the inability to know; he knows more than he ever wanted to know.

At the opposite pole is Phaedra's Nurse, a pure empiricist. To fulfill her function of persuading Phaedra to betray herself, she needs to know. Most of her part before line 350 is a lament over the inability to know (both in general and in particular). She speaks, for example, of *apeirosunē* and *apodeixis,* in a speech which warns us that she values nothing above living and experience, that in fact nothing exists for her

[5] Or with Nauck and Barrett, Euripides, *Hippolytos* (Oxford 1964) 355–56, "fearing *what.*"

until she has experienced it, that her understanding of Phaedra's inner self can, therefore, be only partial. She tells the chorus (271)[6]:

οὐκ οἶδ' ἐλέγχους.

But Nurse will find a way, not by any plan, but she will keep talking until she hits upon the right words. Her most crucial denial of knowledge comes later, after her second thoughts, when she answers Phaedra's desperate question on the kind of charm she intends to use with the words οὐκ οἶδα (517), true words in a way, for Nurse has no plan before she acts. There are in fact no charms, only the sharing of the partial knowledge she holds, coupled with the unacknowledged belief that Phaedra's life and health will be best served in this way and that this positive goal will be enough to persuade "the friends within" (of line 524). In a brutal juxtaposition, Nurse is given a speech following Phaedra's famous statement of the conclusions of her long and honest self-scrutiny. After considering the situation for a matter of minutes, Nurse produces a slovenly and specious rationalization in which she generalizes Phaedra's unique passion, softening the horror of it with old tales of divine amours, reversing the conclusion of the old servant's argument of the prologue, repeating ἴσασι, ἴσασι by way of proof (453, 454).

Phaedra it is who makes the most use of her intellect, who considers the relation between knowledge and action, and plans accordingly. The truth does not set us free, she concludes. There is a kind of knowledge that enslaves a man (425), and it is this which she must prevent at all costs. She is aware of the ambiguities of deceiving appearances. As Hippolytus comes to be, she is aware that the same virtue can both save and destroy. Tragically she acts according to this awareness. Phaedra too uses the words we hear almost as a refrain in the play: responding to the question by the chorus, "what will you do now?," she says, οὐκ οἶδα πλὴν ἕν. She will die. At this point, her plan has not been made; not until her last speech has she made up her mind to destroy Hippolytus. He must be destroyed because he shares the knowledge of her sickness. She will make him share the sickness itself, for the sickness is not the deed, but the false reputation for it (cf. 729–31). Phaedra learns this very quickly, and in spite of her long deliberations, ultimately she acts with as little thought as Nurse before her or Theseus after her. She

[6] On textual difficulties see Barrett (note 5 above) 210–11. What matters here is the denial of knowledge; the admission of a temporary barrier.

acts contrary to the stated conclusions of her long speech; her decision is certainly an error in judgment, as to both the character of Hippolytus and the nature of the evil she is committing and the effect it will have on her reputation.

The chorus too has a share in spreading ignorance: τοσοῦτον ἴσμεν (804) is the equivalent of οὐκ οἶδα: "we know only so much, for we have just arrived," they tell Theseus. The chorus, of course, is sworn to secrecy. It is, nevertheless, disturbing to hear this denial from a chorus that ended the parodos with the words, μαθεῖν ἔραται ψυχή (173). The chorus sums up the tragedy with a cliché (981–82):

οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως εἴποιμ' ἂν εὐτυχεῖν τινα / θνητῶν.

But the tragic events did not happen of their own accord, nor were they imposed. We have seen each step caused by ignorance or deliberate falsification or inept generalization.

One last character must be considered: Theseus enters knowing even less than the chorus which, like him, enters with a series of questions. Like Phaedra in her final action and Nurse in her "plan," like Hippolytus in his oath and denunciation and the chorus in their promise of silence, Theseus acts in haste and ignorance. This is not to say that Theseus acts unnaturally; even Hippolytus comes to understand enough of human passion to see that (1413). But his ignorance and unwillingness to track down the facts is underscored by the contrast to his desire for a sure method of knowing the truth, by his odd wish that men had two voices, including one just voice to refute the other if need be. Nurse and chorus are presented, albeit on a shallower level, doing what both Hippolytus and Theseus fail to do: asking questions, getting at the truth. Like Hippolytus, Theseus assumes he does know, οἶδ' ἐγὼ νέους (967); as so often in this drama, the generalization is inept.

Τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι μὲν πρῶτον ἐκλύει κάκης (1335), says Artemis. What are we to make of this statement, especially coming from Artemis who shows herself in order to taunt Theseus with the truth? Ignorance *is* a condition of Hippolytus' soul, and it is excused neither by Aphrodite nor by Phaedra. Phaedra acts contrary to the knowledge she gained through reason to promote a falsehood in the hope that it will be believed permanently, that it will in effect be the truth. Theseus is so sure that he does know that he will look no further. The desire for clear knowledge or true witness voiced by the chorus, Nurse, Phaedra, Theseus, Hippolytus, leads to naught. Hippolytus from the beginning believes that ignorance is better than knowledge, but others in speech

or action revert to his position. In the end, passion, whether fear, anger, or loathing, overcomes the longing for truth. Each is so certain of the partial evidence he sees or hears that he blinds himself to the truth. And each, believing that part, generalizes it, refusing to understand more deeply, even when it is possible to do so. Nurse, for example, manages to get the truth out of Phaedra but fails to comprehend her deeper anxieties; Phaedra too fails to understand Nurse's motives, so sure is each of the paramount importance of her own concerns.

Τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι is a condition, but not a consistent condition of the human characters in the play, and the gods do no better; for it is the mortals who want to understand and who finally do understand. So shallow in fact is Artemis' understanding that she gives Hippolytus no active part in the tragedy. The striking and tragic contrast between the longing to know and the willingness to accept the easy answers, the wrong answers, is one of the things the play is about.

Ignorance is a small but not insignificant aspect of knowing in the *Hippolytus,* a drama concerned with knowledge, with levels of knowing and ways of knowing. Not only do the characters talk about knowledge and lament its absence in themselves and others, and long for a clear and infallible means of knowing the truth, but they even tell us, at times explicitly, the processes by which they reach their conclusions. The characters, moreover, in their attempt to understand events, impute to each other motives, intentions, knowledge, and thoughts which go wide of the mark. This is most clear in the debate between Theseus and Hippolytus in which each agonist states and refutes what he supposes to be the rationale of the other. The patterns of speech and silence are part of the question of knowledge as are those of rationalism and irrationalism, so well set forth respectively by Knox[7] and Hathorn.[8] Related to this theme too is the pattern of the general and the particular. The situation is paradoxical. The characters try to grasp the particulars, to put them into a coherent pattern, through empirical analogy. But because we know the particulars more fully, we are saved from the ineptitude of the generalizations made by the characters. When Artemis sums up the tragedy by saying "to err is human" (1433–34) in the face of the pain of the two ruined men on the stage, it is the flaccid conclusion of this constant tension between the general and the particular which

[7] Knox (note 4 above) 3–31.

[8] R. Y. Hathorn, "Rationalism and Irrationalism in Euripides' *Hippolytus,*" *CJ* 52 (1957) 211–18.

began with Aphrodite's monologue when she juxtaposed the state of the cosmos to her unique enemy Hippolytus. Generalization is a kind of blindness, and it is one of the ways in which the mortals reflect the goddesses.

Of interest throughout is the relation of the audience's knowledge to that of the characters. Subtly, Euripides draws the audience into participation in the exciting and pathetic search for the truth, by giving us more information than the characters hold, but by letting us know at the last that even that knowledge was partial.[9] It is in the prologue that Euripides lets us know that this is a play about knowledge when Aphrodite, in a bold leap over the first two episodes of the play juxtaposes "no one knows" (40) to "it will come into the light" (42). Our intellectual involvement is further stimulated by the playwright's undermining of all the traditional paths to knowledge, from the homely truth of clichés to reason, experience, argument, revelation from on high.

But does the *Hippolytus* say that ignorance is an inevitable part of the human condition, that men must be always one step behind?[10] Does not the play, even if it suggests this, also offer an alternative? By having in each debate or discussion at least one person who knows the truth and the appropriate action and who advises accordingly, does not the play show that we can know, as Phaedra says, what is right? But, on the other hand, the play also corrects Phaedra's error that though we know what is right we do not carry it out; for it is in each action ignorance which leads to the fatal wrongdoing of each character. It is this ironic contrast of the pathetic isolation in haughty ignorance of each character whose turn it is to act face to face with someone on stage who knows the truth but cannot or will not make it known which makes Artemis' statement (of 1335) so "stale, flat, and unprofitable." In this painfully exciting intellectual game, made possible by the seeming absence of suspense and free will caused by Aphrodite's prologue, the

[9] On the use of prologue prediction to create certain expectations in the audience and to shape audience reactions, see Richard Hamilton, "Prologue Prophecy and Plot in Four Plays of Euripides," *AJP* 99 (1978) 277–302. I cannot agree that the prologue prophecy in the *Hippolytus* robs the play of suspense (p. 277), but believe that it (like those Hamilton treats in detail) enhances the dramatic action "by creating a second level of action in the audience to echo it" (p. 301). One stratum of this second level of action in the *Hippolytus* has to do with ignorance and knowledge.

[10] As H. P. Stahl suggests in "On 'Extra-Dramatic' Communication of Characters in Euripides," *YCS* 25 (1977) 161.

audience is called to participate, for we reach a fuller understanding than any of the characters, human or divine.

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THE STOIC ΙΔΙΟΝ AND PRODICUS' NEAR-SYNONYMS

Anyone who is familiar with the *Cratylus* is well aware that Plato held that names could provide only contradictory interpretations of reality, and that it was better to learn from the things themselves, that is, from the Forms, than from names (439b6–8). In spite of this, the Stoics attached a great deal of importance to etymology. Their position can be more easily appreciated, if, as I shall argue, their *etymos logos* corresponded to the Stoic ἴδιον, an ontological term which may be translated as "essential characteristic." In this paper I shall examine the evidence for the Stoic ἴδιον, and try to decide whether Alexander of Aphrodisias was right in comparing this term to Prodicus' identifying statement.

One of the most important pieces of evidence for the Stoic ἴδιον is a passage in Alexander of Aphrodisias' *Commentary on Aristotle's Topics* (181,2 = 3.434), which reads as follows:

> Πρόδικος δὲ ἐπειρᾶτο ἑκάστῳ τῶν ὀνομάτων τούτων ἴδιόν τι σημαινόμενον ὑποτάσσειν ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς, χαρὰν μὲν λέγοντες εὔλογον ἔπαρσιν, ἡδονὴν δὲ ἄλογον ἔπαρσιν, τέρψιν δὲ τὴν δι' ὤτων ἡδονήν, εὐφροσύνην δὲ τὴν διὰ λόγων.
>
> Prodicus tried to assign to each of these words some essential characteristic indicated, just as the Stoics did, saying that joy is rational elation, pleasure irrational elation, that gladness is the pleasure which has its source in hearing, and enjoyment is the pleasure which has its source in words.

Fragstein emended the last three words of the Greek to read τὴν δι' ὀμμάτων, "which has its source in vision."[1] The use of the word ἔπαρσις (elation) and the reference to the ἴδιον are consistent with Stoic usage.

Hermias' scholion on Plato's *Phaedrus* 267B preserves the quotation from Prodicus and shows no trace of Stoic terminology:

Throughout this paper I have referred to H. von Arnim, *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta* (Berlin 1905) by the number of the book and fragment only, as, for example, 2.403.

[1] A. von Fragstein, *Die Diaeresis bei Aristotelis* (Amsterdam 1967) 81.

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οὗτος [sc. Prodicus] τὴν τῶν ὀνομάτων εὗρεν ἀκρίβειαν· οἷον διαφορὰν τέρψεως, χαρᾶς, εὐφροσύνης, τέρψιν μὲν καλῶν δι' ὤτων ἡδονήν, χαρὰν τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς, εὐφροσύνην τὴν διὰ τῶν ὀμμάτων.

This man [sc. Prodicus] discovered the accurate use of words, as, for example, a differentia of gladness, joy and enjoyment. Gladness is a pleasure which has its source in hearing, joy the pleasure of the soul, and enjoyment the pleasure that is experienced in vision.[2]

In the *Topics,* Aristotle states that Prodicus divided ἡδοναί into χαρά, τέρψις, and εὐφροσύνη, and adds: "For these are all names for the same thing" (112b21-24 = Diels-Kranz 84 A 19). The differentiae which Prodicus uses in Plato's *Protagoras* for these terms are much less precise: "For it is possible to derive enjoyment (εὐφραίνεσθαι) when one is learning something and participating in wisdom solely with the mind, but to experience pleasure (ἥδεσθαι) while one is eating or feeling some other pleasure with the body itself" (337C1-4).

Since Alexander calls Prodicus' identifying statements ἴδια, I shall use the Stoic term and make the following analysis of his statement:

ἔπαρσις	(a)	ἴδιον	τὸ εἶναι εὔλογος	χαρά
elation		essential characteristic, to be rational		joy
	(b)	ἴδιον	τὸ εἶναι ἄλογος	ἡδονή
		essential characteristic, to be irrational		pleasure
ἡδονή	(a)	ἴδιον	τὸ δι' ὤτων εἶναι	τέρψις
pleasure		essential characteristic, to arise through hearing		gladness
	(b)	ἴδιον	τὸ δι' ὀμματων εἶναι	εὐφροσύνη
		essential characteristic, to arise through vision		enjoyment

Were the terms χαρά, ἡδονή, τέρψις, and εὐφροσύνη individual qualities in Stoic philosophy? We know that the individual quality (ἰδία ποιότης) was formed from the "qualified" (ποιόν) and an essential characteristic (ἴδιον). Plutarch quotes Chrysippus as saying that a virtue was formed by its own individual quality according to the qualified, and specifies a virtue by courage, gentleness, and justice (*De Virtute Morali* 441a = 3.255). In these specifications the "qualified" (ποιόν) is surely ἀρετή. Although I have not been able to find any evidence that any of the four terms for pleasure was an individual quality, on the

[2] The *scholion* is quoted by von Fragstein on page 81.

analogy of virtue I would identify χαρά as an individual quality and construct its substrata as follows:



A correspondence between the *etymos logos* and the ἴδιον is suggested by Zeno's etymology of the names of the Titans. A scholiast on Hesiod's *Theogony* writes as follows:

> He [sc. Zeno] says that Coeus is the quality (ποιότης) according to the change from π to κ in Aeolic, that Creius is the exercise of kingly authority, and the ruling, that Hyperion, the movement across, is from "going across." Since everything that is light has such a nature that it falls from above when it is released, he called such a part Iapetus (1.100).

For the Titans I shall construct the ἴδια as follows:

ποιόν	(a)	ἴδιον	τὸ εἶναι ποιός	Κοῖος
		essential characteristic,	to be qualified	Coeus
	(b)	ἴδιον	τὸ βασιλικὸς εἶναι	Κρεῖος
		essential characteristic,	to exercise kingly authority	Creius
	(c)	ἴδιον	τὸ ὑπεράνω ἰέναι	Ὑπερίων
		essential characteristic,	to go across	Hyperion
	(d)	ἴδιον	τὸ πίπτειν ἄνω	Ἰάπετος
		essential characteristic,	to fall from above,	Iapetus

That which was indicated by the proper name was the individual quality (D.L. 7.58 = 3.22, p. 213), not the individually qualified entity. The individual quality indicated by the name Coeus, for instance, is formed from the ποιόν (qualified) and the ἴδιον. The ποιόν is, I believe, the σῶμα (corporeal body).

Other evidence to support my thesis that the *etymos logos* in the Stoic theory of language corresponded to the ἴδιον in Stoic ontology is found in etymologies attributed to Chrysippus. For instance, we read: ἐγκών . . . ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐγκεῖσθαι (elbow, from lying in, 2.159); τὸ διδάσκειν παρὰ τὸ ἀσκεῖν (teach, from practicing, 2.160). Gentinetta pointed out

that many of the etymologies in the Stoic fragments are similar to those in Plato's *Cratylus*.[3] Ryle observed that in the *Cratylus* nearly all of the suggested root words are verbs.[4] This seems to be true of the Stoics also.

Only two accounts of the Stoic definition have survived, Chrysippus' definition and that of Antipater of Tarsus. Diogenes Laertius writes: "A definition is, as Antipater says in the first book of his *Concerning Definitions*, a *logos* expressed adequately by resolution, or, as Chrysippus says in his book *Concerning Definitions*, an assigning of an ἴδιον" (D.L. 7.60 = 2.226). Alexander quotes the definition that Diogenes Laertius attributes to Antipater, and states that it does not differ from "the assigning of the ἴδιον" (Ant. *SVF* 3.24). The phrase can only mean "the assigning of the ἴδιον to the ποιόν."

There is no evidence that an individual quality was formed from more than one ἴδιον. A ποιόν (qualified), however, could have many ἴδια. An analysis of the virtues makes it perfectly clear that the ποιόν of a particular virtue, ἐπιστήμη, had many ἴδια. In Stobaeus, *Ec.* 11, pp. 62–63, we find several references to essential characteristics. For instance, we are told on p. 62, 8–12: "Each of these[5] [sc. virtues] makes it possible for a man to provide it for himself through the ἴδια. For he has a starting point from his own nature with respect to the finding of the appropriate act, the stability of the impulses, endurance and distribution." On p. 63, 15–18, we read: "For the chief ἴδιον of moderation is to provide for oneself impulses that are stable and to observe them,[6] primarily, and secondly, [sc. to observe] these [sc. ἴδια] which belong to the other virtues."

The "good" is an example of a ποιόν which has many ἴδια. When Diogenes Laertius describes the characteristics of the good in the following passage, he is, in fact, stating the ἴδια of the good:

[3] P. M. Gentinetta, *Zur Sprachbetrachtung bei den Sophisten und in der Stoisch-hellenistischen Zeit* (Winterthur 1961) 111–12. For other examples of Stoic etymologies see W. D. Woodhead, *Etymologizing in Greek Literature from Homer to Philo Judaeus* (Toronto 1928) 77.

[4] G. Ryle, "Letters and Syllables in Plato." *Ph.Rev.* 69 (1960) 443.

[5] Wachsmuth writes: τούτων FP: Corr. Heeren.

[6] The verb that I have translated by "observe" is θεωρέω, which seems to mean "to form basic principles from observation." The noun θεώρημα is that which is inferred as the result of observation. It is not, however, a mere inference, but rather "rules," "basic principles," or "basic structure." We know that Chrysippus made use of this word. A title of one of his books, *Concerning Basic Principles in Syllogisms*, is evidence for its use (*SVF* 2, p. 7, 14).

> Every good is . . . expedient, because it produces things of such a kind that we are benefitted by their results; necessary, because it binds together as is necessary; profitable, because it discharges obligations so that it surpasses the profits of commerce by its advantage; useful, because it renders an advantageous service; serviceable, because it makes the service praiseworthy; fair, because it is in accord with its service; advantageous, because it is such as to benefit; choiceworthy, because it is such that it is chosen reasonably; just, because in law it is harmonious, and productive of fellowship (7.98–99 = 3.87).[7]

From the Greek we can reconstruct the ποιόν, the ἴδιον, and that which is formed from the two, as follows:

ποιόν qualified		ἴδιον essential characteristic	
ἀγαθόν	(a)	τὸ φέρειν τοιαῦτα ὧν συμβαινόντων ὠφελούμεθα to produce things of such a kind that we are benefitted by their results	τὸ συμφέρον the expedient
	(b)	τὸ συνέχειν ἐν οἷς χρή to bind together as is necessary	τὸ δέον the necessary
	(c)	τὸ λύειν τὰ τελούμενα εἰς αὐτό to discharge obligations	τὸ λυσιτελές the profitable
	(d)	τὸ παρέχεσθαι χρείαν ὠφελείας to render an advantageous service	τὸ χρήσιμον the useful
	(e)	τὸ ἀπεργάζεσθαι τὴν χρείαν ἐπαινετήν to make the service praiseworthy	τὸ εὔχρηστον the serviceable
	(f)	τὸ συμμέτρως ἔχειν πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ χρείαν to be in accord with one's service	τὸ καλόν the fair
	(g)	τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶναι ὥστε ὠφελεῖν to be such as to benefit	τὸ ὠφέλιμον[7] the advantageous
	(h)	τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶναι ὥστε εὔλογως αὐτὸ αἱρεῖσθαι to be such as to be chosen reasonably	τὸ αἱρετόν the choiceworthy

[7] Diogenes Laertius describes the good as follows: "Generally, the good is some kind of advantage, but individually, it is either the same as or not different from advantage" (7.94 = 3.76). According to my interpretation, the phrase τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἕτερον ὠφελείας (not to be different from advantage) would be an ἴδιον of the good. The term ὠφελεία would be an ἰδία ποιότης formed from the good, a ποιόν, and its ἴδιον. There is, therefore, no contradiction between statements to the effect that virtue ought to be chosen for its own sake and that it is advantageous. For a discussion of this problem see A. A. Long, "The Logical Basis of Stoic Ethics," *Proc. Arist. Society* 71 (1970–71) 96; and A. Graeser, "Zur Funktion des Begriffs 'gut' in der Stoischen Ethik," *Zeitschrift f. Philosophische Forschung* 26 (1972) 417–25.

(i) τὸ νόμῳ εἶναι σύμφωνον καὶ κοινωνίας ποιητικόν τὸ δίκαιον
to be harmonious in law and productive of fellowship the just

By defining the definition as "the assigning of the ἴδιον," Chrysippus was acknowledging that it was not possible to find a single definition of the essence. There were one or more ἴδια for each ποιόν. The ποιόν, moreover, not only had many ἴδια but was a substratum for individual qualities as well, since there was an individual quality corresponding to every ἴδιον. This is important for the Stoic theory of naming. Because the proper name indicated an individual quality (D.L. 7.58 = 3.22, p. 213), each qualified, or the individually qualified entity in which it resided, had many names.

There are significant differences between the Stoic ἴδιον and the Aristotelian ἴδιον.[8] First, there is no doubt that Aristotle included the genus in the ἴδιον. For example, he specified the ἴδιον of man by "a living creature tame by nature" (*Top.* 128b16–17), and "a living creature capable of receiving exact knowledge" (*Top.* 132a19–20). He says in the latter passage that the man who assigns the ἴδιον correctly is the man who sets it in "something." I doubt very much whether the Stoic ἴδιον included more than the predicate. The Stoics certainly would not have accepted Aristotle's statement that the ἴδιον is real for one subject alone (154b23). For instance, the ἴδιον, τὸ εἶναι εὔλογος (to be rational), was not restricted to ἔπαρσις (elation, Alex. Aphr. *In Top.* 181,2). The question of the convertibility of the subject and the ἴδιον did not arise in Stoic philosophy (cf. *Top.* 154b23). For the Stoics the ἴδιον was the ἴδιον of the ποιόν (qualified). The terms ποιόν and ἴδιον were ontological, and prior to the ontological term ἰδία ποιότης (individual quality); they were not convertible with it.

Was Alexander correct in connecting the Stoic ἴδιον, and consequently the Stoic *etymos logos,* with Prodicus' near-synonyms (181,2)? If there is any similarity between the two, it must be found in the Stoic premise that every individual quality was formed from one ἴδιον only, and that consequently there could be only one *etymos logos* for every word. The similarity between the Stoic *etymos logos* and Prodicus' identifying statement would be greater if Prodicus argued that there was only one identifying statement for every word. To find out whether

[8] For a discussion of the ἴδιον in Aristotle's *Topics* see E. de Strycker, "Concepts-clés et terminologie dans les livres ii à vii des Topiques," *Aristotle on Dialectic. The Topics,* ed. G. E. L. Owen (Oxford 1968) 145; and G. Verbeke, "La notion de propriété dans les Topiques," *Aristotle on Dialectic. The Topics,* 257–76.

this was, in fact, the case, I shall consider the evidence for Prodicus' theory of language.

In 1912, Mayer listed examples of *diairesis* in Herodotus, Thucydides, and Euripides, and argued that all of these writers were influenced by Prodicus.[9] His efforts were, I believe, unsuccessful. There is no passage in any of these authors of which we can say with any certainty that it was based on Prodicus, although the method of constructing *diaireses* was in many cases similar. Our evidence for Prodicus' theory of language is found in Plato, a biased source, and one who is in some respects hostile.

From a careful analysis of the relevant passages in Plato, we can recognize three areas in which Prodicus was active: (1) distinguishing between near-synonyms; (2) determining whether a particular word was used correctly in its context, or was according to common usage; and (3) resolving the problem of whether a word had more than one meaning. To discover whether Prodicus did, in fact, argue that a word had only one meaning, I shall discuss the evidence for these three topics.[10]

In several passages in the *Protagoras,* Plato ascribes to Prodicus the method of distinguishing between near-synonyms which he calls *diairesis.* Socrates says: "The correction that we are making on behalf of Simonides needs the art with which you [sc. Prodicus] distinguish (διαιρεῖν) between βούλεσθαι (wish) and ἐπιθυμεῖν (desire)" (340A7–B1); and "I decline Prodicus' *diairesis* of words here" (358A6–7). And again, in the *Charmides* we read: "I have heard Prodicus distinguishing between words ten thousand times" (163D). Socrates in the *Laches* refers to Prodicus as the best of all the sophists in distinguishing between such words (197D4–5).

There are many examples of the use of *diairesis* in the *Protagoras.* Two near-synonyms are given identifying statements which distinguish one from another in the following passages: κοινός and ἴσος (337A),

[9] H. Mayer, *Prodikos von Keos und die Anfänge der Synonymik bei den Griechen* (Paderborn 1913) 42–84. See also A. R. Kleemann, "Platon und Prodikos," *Wiener Eranos* (1909) 42–47.

[10] For a discussion of Prodicus' theory of language see R. Pfeiffer, *History of Classical Scholarship* (Oxford 1968) 39–40; W. K. C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy,* Vol. 3 (Cambridge University Press 1969) 222–25; E. Heitsch, "Die Entdeckung der Homonymie," *Akad. der Wiss. und Lit., Abh. der Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaftlichen Kl.* 11 (1972) 23–29; G. B. Kerferd, *The Sophistic Movement* (Cambridge University Press 1981) 68–77. See also the bibliography for Prodicus in C. J. Classen, *Sophistik* (Darmstadt 1976) 695–98.

ἀμφισβητεῖν and ἐρίζειν (337B), εὐδοκιμεῖν and ἐπαινεῖσθαι (337B), εὐφραίνεσθαι and ἥδεσθαι (337C). No identifying statements are given for γενέσθαι and εἶναι (340B5) and φόβος and δέος (358D–E). The context in which the last specification occurs emphasizes the fact that two near-synonyms cannot have the same meaning in Prodicus' teachings: "'What, then,' I said, 'do you call δέος and φόβος? . . . Shall I say that this is some expectation of evil, whether you call it φόβος or δέος?' Prodicus and Hippias agreed that this was δέος and φόβος. But Prodicus thought that it was δέος but not φόβος. 'It makes no difference, Prodicus,' I said" (358D5–E2).

Similarly, in *Protagoras* 337A, Prodicus argues that those who are present at a discussion should be impartial (κοινοί) to both speakers, but not equal (ἴσοι), since they hear both speakers in common but give unequal praise or blame to each (337A). Mayer compared this passage with Euripides' *Suppliants,* lines 429–32: "Nothing is more dangerous for a city than a tyrant where first there are no common (κοινοί) laws, but one man rules, having taken possession of the law by himself; and there is no fair dealing" (ἴσον).[11] There is a serious difference between the two passages. Prodicus argued that ἴσος has the meaning "distributing equally." The word is used in the *Suppliants* with the meaning "apportioning fairly" or "dealing fairly." The noun (ἰσότης) in Euripides' *Phoenissae* may be translated as "fair dealing" (536). The adjective ἴσος was used by Sophocles in the *Oedipus Rex* (677) and in the *Philoctetes* (684) to mean "fair" or "impartial."[12] Since Prodicus in the *Protagoras* seems to be ignoring the normal meaning of the word, and attaches a single new meaning to it, the passage provides evidence that he allowed only one meaning to a word.

In an analysis of a poem by Simonides, Protagoras asked whether Simonides was contradicting himself when he wrote that it was difficult for a man to be (γενέσθαι) truly good but later blamed Pittacus for saying that it was difficult for a man to be (ἔμμεναι) good. Prodicus states that the words γενέσθαι and ἔμμεναι have different meanings. Socrates, after referring to a distinction which Prodicus made between βούλεσθαι and ἐπιθυμεῖν, argues that Simonides was blaming Pittacus for saying that it was difficult to be (ἔμμεναι) good, when he should have said that it was difficult to become (γενέσθαι) good. Protagoras then objects that it would show great ignorance on the part of Simonides if he said that to possess virtue was a slight matter, although it is the

[11] Mayer (note 9 above) 51.

[12] Compare Thuc. 3.53.1–2 and 6.40.1.

most difficult of all (339–40).[13] Here, the distinction between near-synonyms is used to decide which word was more appropriate in the context and, consequently, to elucidate the meaning of the poem.[14]

Socrates explains in a digression that Prodicus corrected him when he said that Protagoras was wise and δεινός (i.e., clever), because δεινός was (i.e., meant) something bad. For no one used δεινός to describe "peace" or "health," but rather to describe "sickness" and "war" or "poverty" (341A–B). According to this argument, the meaning of a term is determined by its use.[15]

In the *Euthydemus,* we find evidence that Prodicus may have been attempting to correct the current practice of using the same word with two different meanings:

> For first, as Prodicus says, you must learn about the correctness of words. The two visitors are pointing out to you that you did not realize that people use the term "learn" when someone who has no knowledge of a thing in the beginning later acquires knowledge of it, and also when someone who has knowledge already, by the use of this knowledge, examines this same thing whether this is something done or spoken. People call the latter "understanding" (συνιέναι) rather than "learning" (μανθάνειν), but sometimes they call it "learning." You have not observed, as they point out, that they use the same word with contrary meanings of the man who acts with knowledge and the man who does not (277E3–278A7).[16]

Presumably, correct usage required a distinction between "understanding" and "learning" and the use of either term in the appropriate context.

Prodicus seems to have believed that there was only one identifying statement for a word; the Stoics held that there was only one *etymos logos* for a word, because there was only one ἴδιον from which each ἰδία ποιότης (individual quality) was formed. There is a great gulf between the simple, identifying statements of Prodicus and the sophistication of the Stoic system, and it would be incorrect to assume that Prodicus

[13] For a discussion of this passage see L. Woodbury, "Simonides on Arete," *TAPA* 84 (1953) 135–63.

[14] Pfeiffer (note 10 above) 40, compares the criticism of the prologue of the *Antigone* in Aristophanes' *Frogs* 1182 ff. with the criticism of Simonides' poem in the *Protagoras.*

[15] Here too there is a similarity between Prodicus' views and those of the Stoics. Several passages in our sources refer to the Stoic use of the term "common usage" (συνήθεια). See *SVF* 2.109, 2.270, 3.137.

[16] For a discussion of this passage see Heitsch (note 10 above) 26–29.

influenced the Stoics. Rather, we may conclude that the problems of synonymy and homonymy introduced by Prodicus were also faced by the Stoics and that, in attacking these problems, the Stoics were equally concerned about criteria for distinguishing between terms, or establishing the meanings of terms, and about current usage.

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FORESHADOWING AND DRAMATIC IRONY IN THE STORY OF DIDO*

A casual mention of the story of Dido, or the tragedy of Dido, evokes Book 4 of the *Aeneid*. This paper, however, will be equally concerned with Book 1, in line with a recent tendency of Virgilian scholarship to stress the importance of Book 1 for interpretation of the Dido episode as a tragedy.[1] The paper is offered as a supplement to Antonie Wlosok's analysis of Book 4 in the light of Aristotle's *Poetics*,[2] for dramatic irony, not explicitly recognised by Aristotle, is correspondingly absent from her treatment. Yet for modern critics dramatic irony is a characteristic feature of Greek tragedy,[3] and instances of "tragic irony" are often observed by commentators on Virgil.[4] My aim is to add precision to the identification of this type of Virgilian irony as dramatic irony and, using Aristotle's analysis of the elements of the plot of tragedy, to show that this dramatic irony is basic to the structure of Virgil's "tragedy."

The story of Dido is tragic in two senses of the word, tragic in that her life ends in *pathos*, in untimely self-destruction, and tragic because her story is told as a tragedy. This overlap between "tragic" as a formal generic description and as a term for the proper effect of the genre is

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[1] R. G. Austin, *Aeneid* 1 (Oxford 1971) xviii; E. L. Harrison, "Why did Venus wear boots?—Some reflections on Aeneid 1.314 f.," *PVS* 12 (1972–73) 10 ff., esp. 19.

[2] "Virgils Didotragödie. Ein Beitrag zum Problem des Tragischen in der Aeneis" in *Studien zum antiken Epos*, ed. H. Görgemanns and E. A. Schmidt (Meisenheim 1976) 228–50.

[3] It was first defined and illustrated from the tragedies of Sophocles by Bishop Thirlwall (*The Philological Museum* 2 [1833] 483–537). With W. B. Stanford (*Ambiguity in Greek Literature* [Oxford 1939] 66) I prefer the term Dramatic Irony to Tragic or Sophoclean Irony, for dramatic irony is not confined to tragedy. It is not even confined to drama (D. C. Muecke, *Irony*, The Critical Idiom 13 [London 1970] 64–66).

[4] The earliest comment on tragic irony in Virgil I have found is that of Henry Nettleship on *Aen.* 4.57–58 ("Suggestions Introductory to a Study of the Aeneid" [originally published 1875] in *Lectures and Essays* [Oxford 1885] 127). See Austin on *Aen.* 1.35, 299, 597, 732; *Aen.* 4.45 f., 306; Pease on *Aen.* 4.20, 29, 65 (comparing 10.500–2), 308, 384; Gransden on *Aen.* 8.514 ff.

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already assumed in the *Poetics,* where the analysis of the composition of tragedy is intended to account for its effect—the arousal of pity and fear (esp. 11.1452b). Comparisons with tragedy have long seemed appropriate for this episode of the *Aeneid.*[5] Not only is Dido likened to such Euripidean tragic heroines as Medea or Phaedra, but the preponderance of speech in Book 4 led Heinze, in particular, to regard its composition as analogous to that of a drama.[6] A subtle acknowledgment of the "mixing of genres" was detected by E. L. Harrison in his paper "Why did Venus wear boots?—Some reflections on Aeneid 1.314 f." Venus' *cothurnus,* the mention of which is held back to precede immediately her prologue-like account of Dido's life so far (1.337), is to be taken as the tragic buskin, symbolically hinting at the beginning of the drama.[7] The validity of this insight, as well as of the general approach, is supported by the tendency of the scholia to the *Iliad,* in which Homer figures as the "first of the tragedians," to follow Aristotle in interpreting the *Iliad* in terms of drama.[8]

Harrison pointed out that critics often miss the divine prologue in Book 1, and consequently fail to realise that it is here that the tragedy really begins, begins formally with Venus' prologue, and begins in the sense that the elements of the action are laid down. The most recent analysis of the story of Dido as a tragedy, however, concentrates on Book 4. Although Wlosok recognises the introductory nature of the events in Book 1, she does not really take on board their value as dramatic preparation, nor, incidentally, the relation of Books 2 and 3 to Book 4. For her, "Das eigentliche Drama Didos ist auf Buch 4 konzentriert, das eine in sich geschlossene und auffällig stark dramatisierte

[5] For the influence of tragedy on the *Aeneid* as a whole, see Nettleship (note 4 above) 125 and Conington (Introduction to Vol. 2 1865) 5, "The substance of Homeric poetry, the conduct of the action and the conception of the actors, came to Virgil modified by the intermediate agency of Greek drama" (cf. 14–19). On the Dido episode, Nettleship 129–31. For further references, see Pease 8–11 and Wlosok (note 2 above) 228, n. 2, adding (with no attempt to be exhaustive): K. Quinn, *Virgil's Aeneid* (London 1968) 323–39, E. Turolla, "Le origine e le caratteristiche del tragico nell' Eneide," *GIF* 6 (1953) 114–33, W. S. Maguiness, "L'inspiration tragique de l'Enéide," *L'antiquité classique* 32 (1963) 477–90, J. Foster, "Some Devices of Drama used in Aeneid 1–4," *PVS* 13 (1973–74) 28–41 (with some original perceptions of dramatic irony).

[6] *Virgils epische Technik*[5] (Berlin 1915) 127–28, 134, 138.

[7] Harrison (note 1 above) 20–21. See also his "Snakes and Buskins," *Eranos* 77 (1979) 51–56.

[8] N. J. Richardson, "Literary Criticism in the Exegetical Scholia to the *Iliad:* A Sketch," *CQ* 30 (1980) 265–87, esp. 270.

Komposition bildet."[9] Nevertheless, hers is the most rigorous attempt so far to interpret the story of Dido as a tragedy in the generic sense. Book 4 is firmly divided into five acts, without a prologue, and Aristotle's analysis of tragedy used to define the tragic nature of the Dido episode.[10] In it, in fact, Aristotle's ideal requirements are shown to be fulfilled remarkably well. For Aristotle, the tragic hero is "one who is pre-eminent in moral virtue, who passes to bad fortune not through vice and wickedness, but because of some piece of ignorance, and who is of high repute and great good fortune, like Oedipus and Thyestes, and the splendid men of such families"[11] (13.1453a7 ff.). The best plot is the complex one "where the change of fortune is accompanied by *peripeteia* or recognition, or both" (10.1452a16 ff.). "For a recognition accompanied by *peripeteia* will involve either pity or fear, and tragedy is by definition a *mimēsis* of actions that rouse these emotions" (11.1452b32 ff.).

Whatever our assessment of Dido's character, I think we must agree that Virgil wanted to give her the status, at least, of a tragic heroine.[12] It will be less controversial to find a reversal of fortune in the plot, and one which is a necessary result of the preceding action, involving a change from ignorance to knowledge, and culminating in *pathos*. As to the complicated question of Dido's ἁμαρτία, the *culpa*, here I would agree with Rudd that the Aristotelian notion of disproportion between fault and fate is maintained.[13]

I have concentrated on Wlosok's analysis partly because I think the use of Aristotle valid and wish to develop it further below, and also because I wanted to point out an omission which surprises me. It may be due to the aim of analysing Book 4 strictly in the terms of ancient criticism of tragedy, or to the failure to include Book 1 in the tragedy

[9] Wlosok (note 2 above) 233.

[10] See also C. Collard, "Medea and Dido," *Prometheus* 1 (1975) 131–51, esp. 141.

[11] All translations of the *Poetics* are quoted from Miss M. E. Hubbard's translation in *Ancient Literary Criticism in Translation*, ed. D. A. Russell and M. Winterbottom (Oxford 1972) 90–132.

[12] According to N. Horsfall ("Dido in the light of history," *PVS* 13 [1973–74] 1–13) Dido displays "violence, greed, duplicity and hatred" (12). I believe that the character of Dido is to be kept separate from general Punic characteristics, though these are certainly relevant to the episode. Dido has a greatness from which to fall: she is a queen and founder of a city (1.503–8, 4.655), she shows pity and generosity to Aeneas and the Trojans, and feels bound to Sychaeus by love and loyalty (Niall Rudd, *Lines of Enquiry* [Cambridge 1976] 49). See also Heinze (note 6 above) 138 f.; V. Pöschl, *The Art of Vergil*, trans. G. Seligson (Ann Arbor 1962) 67–72, 90–91; Collard (note 10 above) 142, n. 36; Wlosok (note 2 above) 238–39; F. Klingner, *Virgil* (Zürich and Stuttgart 1967) 409.

[13] Rudd (note 12 above) 49.

proper, but, for whatever reason, this "Beitrag zum Problem des Tragischen in der Aeneis" does not mention dramatic or tragic irony at all.

I

We should note, first of all, that the different kinds of irony that are noticed by modern commentators are not clearly distinguished by them, "Tragic Irony" being detected in the words of a speaker who is deliberately using ambiguity to deceive the person addressed (4.478 ff., Dido to Anna),[14] or in the words of a character which unconsciously betray ignorance of his true situation (1.731–35, Dido's prayer at the banquet),[15] or in the words of the author which call attention to a discrepancy between the character's situation and his knowledge of it (1.299, *fati nescia Dido*).[16] It is only the first case, that of Verbal Irony, which was recognised as *ironia* by the ancient commentators.[17] From my description of the last two cases it can be seen that they are very similar in that both depend on a gap in knowledge between the audience and the protagonist as to the meaning of a given situation. It is this kind of irony that I will treat as dramatic irony, taking it primarily as Situational Irony, which arises from the contradictions between two opposing interpretations of a situation.[18]

In epic the technique of foreshadowing is often used to evoke a sense of dramatic irony, most effectively when it hints at a complete reversal of fortune.[19] The foreshadowing of disaster at a moment of

[14] See Pöschl (note 12 above) 83–84 on amphibology as a device of tragedy, Quinn (note 5 above) 333. On this speech see E. Lefèvre, *Dido und Aias: Ein Beitrag zur römischen Tragödie* (Mainz 1978) 16–22, Collard (note 10 above) 149.

[15] This is Quinn's second kind of Tragic Irony (note 5 above) (334) and G. E. Duckworth's first (*Foreshadowing and Suspense in the Epics of Homer, Apollonius and Vergil* [reprinted New York 1966] 75–76).

[16] This is Duckworth's second type (note 15 above) (77–79). Stanford (note 3 above) 66 distinguishes between Sophoclean Irony (intended by the speaker) and Dramatic Ambiguity (where the speaker is unconscious of the double meaning).

[17] E.g., Servius on 4.93, "ironia est cum aliud uerba, aliud continet sensus." Cf. Quint. 8.6.54, Stanford (note 3 above) 61–65. For the history of the concept of irony see Norman D. Knox, "Irony" in *Dictionary of the History of Ideas*, Vol. 2, ed. Philip P. Weiner (New York 1973) 626–34.

[18] D. C. Muecke, "Analyses de l'ironie," *Poétique* 36 (1978) 478–94, esp. 481.

[19] Duckworth (note 15 above) 59, 75–79.

success or happiness which recurs so insistently in the story of Dido is Iliadic in origin. In the *Iliad,* however, the context of the foreshadowing does not always give the contrast necessary for irony, whereas Virgil in our episode consistently uses foreshadowing to underline Situational Irony. In the *Odyssey* dramatic irony is conveyed by a different technique, as has been shown in the major study by A. F. Bekker, who concludes: "it is 'shown' and only by exception is it 'told.' "[20] Similarly, while there are ironic situations and potentially ironic reversals in the *Argonautica* (e.g., 3.598 ff., Aietes' misinterpretation of the prophecy of Helios that he would be destroyed by one of his own stock), Apollonius rarely draws the reader's attention to them by explicit intervention or foreshadowing.[21]

This element of "editorial intrusion" was an aspect of the narrative of the Dido story which Brooks Otis discussed in his comparison of Virgil with Apollonius in the chapter in which he formulated his well-known theory of the subjective style. Prominent in his analysis is the motif of treacherous ignorance or unawareness, as it is developed in contrast with the motif of happiness. For him the effect of this contrast is pathos, above all the pathos evoked by the specifically Virgilian use of *infelix,* "a finger-pointing word that foreshadows future tragedy and at the same time expresses sympathy: it is the word for those who oppose fate and whom fate opposes but are yet worthy of true pity."[22] But in all this, even with the perception that the motifs are integrated into the framework of the plot, he finds no place for the concept of dramatic irony.[23] I would argue, however, that the function of "editorial intrusion" is ambivalent. For the very ability of the narrator to intervene implies a distance between him and the characters, because, on the most simple level, he can see ahead and they cannot. Therefore, as well as highlighting the pathos of the moment, such intervention also leads away from emotional involvement in it to a perception of the total pattern of events.

The most explicit of the comments of the epic narrator in the

[20] A. F. Bekker, *Ironie in de Odyssee* (Leiden 1965) 321.

[21] σχετλίη of Medea, underlining Hera's plans for her (*Argo.* 3.1113–14) is an exception. Cf. D. N. Levin, *Apollonius' Argonautica Re-examined,* Vol. 1 (Leiden 1971) index s.v. Irony.

[22] *Virgil: A Study in Civilized Poetry* (Oxford 1963) 61–96, esp. 70.

[23] But see his later discussion of "three ironically ambiguous episodes" in Book 1 (234–40).

story of Dido underlines the contradictory nature of the "wedding" in the cave (4.169–70):[24]

> ille dies primus leti primusque malorum
> causa fuit.

Here Virgil is imitating the use of foreshadowing in the *Iliad* through which Homer repeatedly foreshadows the deaths of Patroclus and Hector, intertwining them and showing their inevitable connection. Verbally our passage is closest to *Il.* 11.604b, κακοῦ δ'ἄρα οἱ πέλεν ἀρχή, words which signal the beginning of the ineluctable train of events which is to lead to the death of Patroclus. The immediate context, however, Achilles' sending of Patroclus to inquire about Machaon, does not encourage us to see irony, though Griffin has noticed pathos in the contrast between the hero's greatness (ἶσος Ἄρηϊ) and his fragility.[25] The death of Patroclus is foreshadowed again at *Il.* 15.65–67 in a speech of Zeus and finally there is *Il.* 16.46–47, the narrator's comment on Patroclus' wish to enter the fight:

> Ὣς φάτο λισσόμενος μέγα νήπιος· ἦ γὰρ ἔμελλεν
> οἱ αὐτῷ θάνατόν τε κακὸν καὶ κῆρα λιτέσθαι.[26]

Here there is a contrast between Patroclus' expectations of an easy victory and the doom that we are told awaits him.

The most striking moments of this kind, which form the sort of progression noticed by Griffin, "an ascending scale of pathos," are those which relate to Hector. The first is *Il.* 15.613 ff., where the narrator forecasts Hector's death in his great moment of victory near the ships.[27]

[24] Cf. I. M. Le M. Du Quesnay, "Virgil's Fourth Eclogue," *ARCA* 2, Papers of the Liverpool Latin Seminar 1976, ed. F. Cairns (Liverpool 1977) 25–99, "Deaths and funerals are the very antithesis of weddings and birth, and ancient authors never seem to tire of playing on this fact" (73).

[25] J. Griffin, *Homer on Life and Death* (Oxford 1980) 85. G. Nagy (*The Best of the Achaeans* [Baltimore 1979] 33, 294) links ἶσος Ἄρηϊ (*Il.* 11.604) with θοῷ ἀτάλαντος Ἄρηϊ (*Il.* 16.784) and takes the first use of the comparison as foreshadowing its second appearance at Patroclus' death, since it is not used of him elsewhere in the poem.

[26] Schol. B here comments on the heightening of anticipation by the repetition of the foreshadowing. See G. E. Duckworth, "Προαναφώνησις in the Scholia to Homer," *AJP* 52 (1931) 320–38 and Richardson (note 8 above) 269, n. 2.

[27] It does not affect the argument that most of these passages are "late." See Leaf on *Il.* 2.692, "the epic poet foreshadows [future events] in his own words only in suspicious passages." Indications of lateness are also detected in most of them by G. P. Shipp (*Studies in the Language of Homer*[2] [Cambridge 1972]).

The next passage is more powerful, since it links the fate of Hector with his victory over Patroclus (*Il.* 16.793–800), symbolised by the passing of the helmet to Hector.[28] This motif is repeated in a more elaborate passage where Zeus comments on Hector's arming himself with the spoils of Patroclus, Achilles' armour (*Il.* 17.200–9):[29]

> κινήσας ῥα κάρη προτὶ ὃν μυθήσατο θυμόν·
> "ἆ δείλ', οὐδέ τί τοι θάνατος καταθύμιός ἐστιν,
> ὃς δή τοι σχεδὸν εἶσι· σὺ δ' ἄμβροτα τεύχεα δύνεις
> ἀνδρὸς ἀριστῆος, τόν τε τρομέουσι καὶ ἄλλοι·
> τοῦ δὴ ἑταῖρον ἔπεφνες ἐνηέα τε κρατερόν τε,
> τεύχεα δ' οὐ κατὰ κόσμον ἀπὸ κρατός τε καὶ ὤμων
> εἵλευ· ἀτάρ τοι νῦν γε μέγα κράτος ἐγγυαλίξω,
> τῶν ποινὴν ὅ τοι οὔ τι μάχης ἐκ νοστήσαντι
> δέξεται Ἀνδρομάχη κλυτὰ τεύχεα Πηλεΐωνος."
> Ἦ, καὶ κυανέῃσιν ἐπ' ὀφρύσι νεῦσε Κρονίων.

The ancient scholia recognise the contrast between the victory and the doom to which it will inevitably lead (T *Il.* 17.209 = B *Il.* 17.208):

> τραγῳδίαν ἔχει τὸ ἐπὶ κυρώσει μεγάλων παθῶν νεῦμα. ἔνευσε νικῆσαι· τὸ γὰρ ἀποθανεῖν ἐπέπρωτο.

There is not just contrast here, but all the ingredients of dramatic irony.[30] Homer has used the figure of the all-seeing and all-powerful god to draw the listener's attention to the implications of the action at this crucial moment. The hero's ignorance of his fate is explicitly commented upon. But the ironic effect lies not so much in the fact that his death is foretold in a moment of triumph, as in that it is shown to be the necessary result of the way he has reacted to his victory. The description of Hector's arming himself in the spoils is unique in the *Iliad,* and this is highlighted by the phrase οὐ κατὰ κόσμον. When Virgil adapted this passage for Turnus' killing of Pallas, he too made the epic narrator underline what is there seen as Turnus' ignorance of the fatal folly of his actions (10.500–5).[31]

[28] Cf. Griffin (note 25 above) 136–37.

[29] Cf. Griffin (note 25 above) 129.

[30] Duckworth (note 26 above) 336 goes further and claims that the scholiast recognised the tragic irony.

[31] While acknowledging the taking of the baldric as "the fatal slip of tragedy" (326), Quinn (note 5 above) dismisses the authorial comment as "a trick of plot construction" (341). It is interesting that Virgil does not actually tell us that Turnus put on the *balteus.* Are we to supply this detail from the Homeric allusion?

An examination of the Scholia to the *Iliad* shows that the ancient commentators recognised the contrast basic to dramatic irony and its effect of pathos. Very similar are a group of comments on some ironic moments in Sophocles' *Oedipus Tyrannus,* collected by Stanford.[32] These refer to a series of passages in the *O.T.* where Oedipus makes in ignorance an assertion about the future which is to be reversed to his own disaster. For example, at line 141 he says that in helping Laius he will aid himself, whereas what will really happen is that in helping Laius he will destroy himself. The comment in the scholia is καὶ τοῦτο κινητικὸν τοῦ θεάτρου. τὰ γὰρ ἐναντία ἀποβήσεται. Similarly, comments on lines 236, 249, and 264 combine the elements of ignorance of the protagonist, pathos, and moving of the audience, but do not explicitly mention foreshadowing. We might also notice a comment on Soph. *Electra* 1137 which compares the pathos arising from Electra's mourning of her brother just before the recognition scene, not knowing that he is present, to a scene of dramatic irony in the *Odyssey*—Penelope lamenting for Odysseus when he is present in disguise (19.106–385). From these comments I think we can safely assume that ancient audiences were aware of the effects of dramatic irony, even though they did not have a term with which to label it.

II

Though Virgil's technique of explicit foreshadowing derives from Homer, we would not be mistaken, I think, in attributing its predominantly ironic use in the Dido episode to the influence of Attic tragedy. This is because in Virgil, as in Sophocles, the dramatic irony is linked to the climactic moment of the plot, the reversal of fortune. The structural role of ambiguity in Sophocles is stressed by Stanford: "Sophocles' double meanings play a vital part in the development of the plot, foreshadowing the *dénouement* and reminding the spectators of what has gone before."[33] Similarly Vellacott's definition of dramatic irony is useful for the emphasis placed on its importance in the plot. "This contrast [between expectation and fulfillment] exercises its power upon the audience because at critical points in the unfolding of a plot the

[32] Stanford (note 3 above) 167–68.

[33] Stanford (note 3 above) 173. Cf. "With Sophocles suggestive ambiguity becomes a major element in the σύστασις τῶν πραγμάτων" (165).

audience can see the imminent outcome and can see that the hero cannot or will not see it."[34]

For dramatic irony the "discrepant awareness"[35] of the audience and protagonist is *par excellence* of the outcome and involves directly opposed expectations of what is in store. The sort of plot that encourages disclosure of the outcome at critical points in its unfolding, and which therefore seems to us most productive of dramatic irony, is Aristotle's "complex" plot, "where the change of fortune is accompanied by *peripeteia* or recognition or both" (10.1452a16 ff.). I incline to John Jones' interpretation of these crucial concepts,[36] though acceptance of his views is not necessary to my argument. For him the "change of fortune" is not "the change in the hero's fortunes" but a reversed state of affairs, and the recognition is therefore "recognition of, a discovering of the truth about, a state of affairs which was unknown before, or misapprehended." When we add his definition of *peripeteia* as "Reversal—'the shift of the action towards the opposite pole,'" we can see why many modern critics tend to assimilate the change of fortune to the *peripeteia* and to refer to both simply as the *peripeteia*.[37]

Though Aristotle did not discuss dramatic irony as such, it is now generally agreed that "Irony is implicit in the principle of Reversal of Fortune which Aristotle notes as the basis of tragedy; its general and specific forms are both implicit in his doctrine of Recognition or Discovery."[38] We can also say that irony is implicit in Aristotle's basic requirement that the plot display probability or necessity in the succession of the episodes (7.1450b21-9.1451b39).[39] This does not mean that what happens may not be unexpected, and indeed, having explained

[34] P. Vellacott, *Ironic Drama* (Cambridge 1975) 23.

[35] B. Evans, *Shakespeare's Comedies* (Oxford 1960) vii-xi.

[36] John Jones, *On Aristotle and Greek Tragedy* (London 1967) 13, 16, and 48 (where he quotes Else's definition of *peripeteia*).

[37] Cf. the prominence given to the concept of *peripeteia* in Bert O. States, *Irony and Drama: A Poetics* (Ithaca and London 1971).

[38] G. G. Sedgewick, *Of Irony: Especially in Drama*[2] (Toronto 1948) 59. For him general dramatic irony is the irony of the theatre, potential in the spectator's attitude which is a mixture of superior knowledge and detached sympathy (32-33), while specific dramatic irony occurs when this potential is actualized and made manifest (33).

[39] Cf. G. Brereton, *Principles of Tragedy* (London 1968) 14, "Irony is often held to be an essential concept of the tragic . . . it is bound up with the concept of probability and also with the concept of destiny." The example that Aristotle adduces to illustrate events happening "unexpectedly but because of each other," "the statue of Mitys in Argos killing Mitys' murderer by falling on him as he looked at it" (*Poet.* 9, 1452a 7-9) is striking precisely because, as an accident drawn from real life, it shows how we interpret

that traditional stories allow room for manoeuvre and that, in any case, only a few people know them well (9.1451b26), Aristotle states his preference for plots where "things happen unexpectedly because of each other" (9.1452a3). The emphasis on the unexpected is in the interests of Aristotle's explanation of the effect of tragedy, for he connects the arousal of pity and fear with surprise (9.1452a; 18.1456a). Given our view of the ironic nature of Greek tragedy, Aristotle's emphasis on surprise is puzzling, since it is not just, or mainly, the surprise of the protagonists; but it does cohere with the ancient view that the response demanded by tragedy was emotional involvement in the action.[40] Nevertheless none of this excludes dramatic irony, for, as John Moles has argued, irony can work retrospectively. Foreknowledge is not necessary to ironic effects whose true meaning is only made clear by the Recognition itself. "Thus Aristotle's emphasis on the techniques of suspense is in theory by no means incompatible with an awareness of the significance of ironic effects."[41] For, as Moles points out, if the true meaning of the previous ironic effects is only made clear by the Recognition itself, this will enhance the ἔκπληξις of the audience. For later readers of the plays, less concerned with the impact of the original performance, it is only natural that knowledge of the outcome should lead to perception of the ironic effects as foreshadowing.

An essential component of the irony that is potential in the complex plot of tragedy is the ignorance or quasi-ignorance, the blindness or self-delusion of the protagonist. Just as in the *O.T.* the ironic effect is heightened by the paradoxical extent of Oedipus' knowledge—he is in possession of the oracle yet unwilling or unable to believe that it has been fulfilled—so Dido's ignorance develops from innocence to willful imprudence. In contrast to Dido's ignorance, the knowledge of the reader is not constrained by human limitations of time and space. Expectations can be formed not only by what we are explicitly told in the poem, but also by our recognition, through allusion, of typical story-patterns, as well as by our knowledge of history.

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things in terms of aesthetic pattern, finding the coincidence impressive, as Aristotle himself comments, because it looks designed (Muecke [note 18 above] 481–82, 494). To see the same motif incorporated into a plot, and used ironically, we need think no further than the statue of the Commendatore in *Don Giovanni.*

[40] For dramatic irony and surprise, see D. W. Lucas, *Aristotle Poetics* (Oxford 1968) 135, 292; "Pity, Terror and *Peripeteia,*" *CQ* 12 (1962) 52–60.

[41] "Notes on Aristotle, *Poetics* 13 and 14," *CQ* 29 (1979) 90, n. 2.

In Virgil's Dido episode the operation of foreknowledge and expectation is complex. Beside the, so to speak, hard knowledge of the future history of Rome, which casts a dark shadow over any association between Trojans and Carthaginians, there is also the vaguer sense of the way the epic narrative must go—this last contributed to by the historical dimension just mentioned, the authorial foreshadowing, the divine interventions, imagery,[42] and mythical or literary analogues (Dido is Helen,[43] Calypso, Circe,[44] Penelope,[45] Hypsipyle,[46] Medea,[47] Ariadne[48] and all, not to mention Ajax[49] and Hector[50]). The ironic effects depend at different moments on all these different strands of the audience's knowledge, weaving them together and linking them to the inevitable reversal of fortune. But in what sense is Dido's catastrophe "inevitable"? It has been argued that, in itself, the story of Dido is not tragic in the Sophoclean sense, since the reversal is not a logically necessary result of previous events, "car sa 'reconnaissance' de l'erreur commise et de la trahison d'Enée reste essentiellement liée au processus d'une aventure romanesque qui exclut l'idée d'un destin malheureux au départ."[51] While there may be some truth in this point of view, in that Dido's fate, considered in isolation, lacks a degree of ironic necessity, it seems to me that we are not meant to realise this. On the contrary, Virgil has used

[42] E.g., B. Fenik, "Parallelism of Theme and Imagery in *Aeneid* II and IV," *AJP* 80 (1959) 1–24.

[43] See Servius on *Aen.* 1.650; Pöschl (note 12 above) 149; G. N. Knauer, *Die Aeneis und Homer*[2] (Göttingen 1979) 155, n. 3.

[44] Conington (note 5 above) 12.

[45] C. Kopff, "Dido and Penelope," *Philologus* 121 (1977) 244–48.

[46] Conington (note 5 above) 19; G. Highet, *The Speeches in Vergil's Aeneid* (Princeton 1972) 186, 219, 223.

[47] Collard (note 10 above); G. Zanker, "The Love Theme in Apollonius Rhodius' Argonautica," *WS* 13 (1979) 52–75, esp. 67 n. 44, "Medea's tragic fate is arrestingly foreshadowed by Apollonius' use of the Ariadne myth, which is mentioned at two crucial points (3.997–1007, 4.423–34)."

[48] P. Oksala, "Das Aufblühen des römischen Epos: Berührungen zwischen der Ariadne-Episode Catulls und der Dido-Geschichte Vergils," *Arctos* 3 (1962) 167–97.

[49] Most recently Lefèvre (note 14 above).

[50] If the tragedies of Troy and Dido parallel one another, there are at least as many points of contact between the fates of Hector and Dido as between those of Priam and Dido (Fenik [note 42 above] 19 ff.): both Dido and Hector supplicate; both are defenders of the city; Hector's end leads to the sack of Troy, while Dido's end is like a sacked city (see below); both in a way destroy their people (*Aen.* 4.682–83, *Il.* 22.104). I owe these points to Mr. C. W. Macleod.

[51] R. Lesueur, *L'Enéide de Virgile* (Toulouse 1975) 252–55 on Dido and *peripeteia.*

every means possible to make the plot *seem* to be a tragic plot, and treating Dido's ignorance of the future as an ironic ignorance is one of those means.[52]

There are two stages in Dido's ignorance. In the first she is serenely unaware that things are not what she supposes them to be, unaware that, in welcoming and aiding Aeneas as a guest worthy of sympathy she is setting in train her own destruction. In Book 1 there is constant emphasis on Dido's ignorance, but nothing is said to disabuse her. When Ilioneus speaks to Dido on behalf of the Trojan survivors (1.522 ff.), he explains that the Trojans were driven onto the shores of Libya by a storm and stresses that their destination was Italy. If Aeneas proves to be safe they will proceed there with him, but if not they will return to Acestes in Sicily. Dido's reply acknowledges these possible destinations (569–70) but it also contains the at first tentative, but then solemnly expressed suggestion that the leaderless Trojans should settle in Carthage on equal terms (572–74).[53] It is Aeneas himself, suddenly revealed by the parting of the mist, who replies to Dido (595 ff.). His highly emotional speech is distinctly ambiguous. He acknowledges Dido's offer to share her city (600), saying that only the gods could repay such kindness, but her name will always be honoured wherever he may be. In his desire to express his gratitude adequately, Aeneas suppresses the refusal he ought to have made and it appears only as a vague afterthought (610, *quae me cumque uocant terrae*), something that Dido could interpret as a piece of rhetoric.[54] She replies sympathetically and invites the Trojans to enter her palace.

At the beginning of Book 4, however, Dido can no longer be said to be ignorant of Aeneas' destiny, but she acts nevertheless as if the will of the gods need not apply in her case. We should not interpret the change as a simple contrast between knowledge and ignorance, but see the possibility that ignorance may be dispelled by different degrees of knowledge. At the beginning of Book 4 Dido is no longer *nescia* but

[52] Klingner (note 12 above) 438 handily summarises the focus of Heinze's discussion as "die Verwandlung des erotischen Epos in Tragische mit Hilfe der Tragödie." See also Foster (note 5 above) 29 on Virgil's treatment of the family of Belus as a tragic house.

[53] On the elevation of the expression E. Fraenkel, "VRBEM QVAM STATVO VESTRA EST," *Glotta* 33 (1954) 157–59, who points to the echo of the phrase at 4.655 f.

[54] 1.607–10 is echoed by 4.333–36. Cf. G. Highet (note 46 above) 115, who interprets Aeneas' words as an implicit rejection of the offer. Likewise for Henry (Conington, note 5 above) *uocant* implies that Aeneas will have to leave Dido. Cf. H. W. Prescott, *The Development of Virgil's Art* (New York 1927) 269, "Only the Roman reader appreciated the unconscious irony of the hero's final words."

she is not yet *conscia fati*. Her knowledge is not accompanied by an assent of the will.[55] Books 2 and 3 are all about knowledge, Aeneas' growing knowledge of and understanding of his destiny and what it involves.[56] We have to take this information into account when we consider the position of Dido in Book 4, even though she herself does not seem to have grasped the meaning of what she has heard. The narrative of Aeneas' experiences (especially the prophecy of Helenus, 3.374 ff.) should have made clear to her the impossibility of a permanent association with Aeneas, the marriage she is later to think she has obtained,[57] but the nature of her passion is such that she is unable to heed this warning. Indeed, the narrative itself inspires love (4.1-5, 77-79). What worries her at the beginning of Book 4 is not whether Aeneas is free, but whether she herself is. The *peripeteia* caused by Mercury's intervention finally brings the realisation that Aeneas must leave her, and it is this realisation which leads inevitably to her decision to die (4.450). It is because Dido is no longer *fati nescia* in the wider sense that in Book 4 Virgil shifts the emphasis in his use of foreshadowing to focus exclusively on her death.

III

Since we have said that dramatic irony is potentially present in the reversal of fortune in the tragic plot, we need to look more closely at the *peripeteia* in Book 4. But a *peripeteia* in itself is not sufficient to create a tragic effect, nor is it through dramatic irony alone that a *peripeteia* becomes tragic. We can see this if we compare the analogous legends concerning heroines who, out of love, help foreigners or enemies: betraying their friends or country, they are in turn betrayed. But while the punishments of Scylla and Tarpeia and the abandoning of Ariadne could be classed as peripeties, and dramatic or narrative treatment could highlight the ironies potentially present in these unlooked for reversals of fortune, this alone does not give the serious conflict—"those struggles of inward free will with outward necessity"—which we expect of great tragedy.[58]

[55] I owe this point to Miss M. E. Hubbard.

[56] E.g., M. C. Putnam, "The Third Book of the Aeneid: From Homer to Rome," *Ramus* 9 (1980) 1-21.

[57] G. Williams, *Tradition and Originality* (Oxford 1968) 374-87.

[58] S. T. Coleridge, "Greek Drama" in *Lectures and Essays* (Everyman's Library, London 1926) 16. See Austin (note 1 above) on *Aen.* 4.305-30, "When Ariadne upbraids

In the story of Dido this seriousness derives partly from the far-reaching importance of the dramatic conflict and partly from the moral character of the heroine. Both these elements are displayed through the *peripeteia,* which is the dramatic centre of Book 4. While many critics have mentioned this *peripeteia,*[59] it is Wlosok who has provided the most helpful analysis of it. For her the *peripeteia* is divided into two stages, covering two "acts": the third act (296–449), which results in the separation and parting of the lovers, contains what she calls the external *peripeteia,* while the fourth act (450–583) contains the internal *peripeteia,* with Dido making her decision to die.[60] In the first stage, the aftermath of Mercury's first intervention, Aeneas' decision to leave is contested, and the remote but fated necessity of founding Rome pitted against the living claims of Dido's love (though Jupiter and Mercury have made it harder for Aeneas by stressing the involvement of Ascanius, who is all Aeneas has to love, as well as the bearer of the future of the family). It is at this point that there is a fusion of the historical/divine dimension of the poem and the narrative of events on the human plane. We can no longer keep separate the pairs Rome and Carthage and Aeneas and Dido, for the full force of the *peripeteia* depends on our acceptance of the inevitability, and indeed the rightness, of Aeneas' departure, and this in turn is the result of the embedding of the tragedy in the epic.

When the tragedy of Dido is extracted from its epic context it becomes a very different thing, as a comparison with the Renaissance Dido tragedies (all very much dependent on Virgil) makes clear. In all the plays that I have been able to read,[61] except Marlowe's *Tragedy of Dido,* the centre of interest is the sufferings of Dido. The plays open

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Theseus for his desertion . . . she seems ineffectual and tiresome, a silly little thing for all her betrayal."

[59] Pease (note 4 above) 10 n. 69; Heinze (note 6 above) 119, 132, 323 f.; K. Büchner, *P.Vergilius Maro: Der Dichter der Römer* (Stuttgart 1955 = RE VIIIA 1021–1486) 351. Further on *peripeteia* and irony, V. R. Rossman, *Perspectives of Irony in Medieval French Literature* (The Hague/Paris 1975) 26–28, esp. 26, n. 31; G. Brereton (note 39 above) 47, "Our 'ironical change of fortune' is Aristotle's *peripeteia,* on which he insists, considering it as basic and linking it with the notion of probability." Cf. 14–17, 26–27, 34–37.

[60] Wlosok (note 2 above) 237–38.

[61] Alessandro Pazzi de' Medici, *Dido in Cartagine* (1524); Lodovico Dolce, *Didone* (1547); Etienne Jodelle, *Didon se sacrifiant* (1560); Alexandre Hardy, *Didon se sacrifiant* (1624). I have not seen Giovan Battista Giraldi Cinthio, *Didone Tragedia* (1541) or Georges de Scudéry, *Didon* (1637). For further information and bibliography see E. Leube, *Fortuna in Karthago* (Heidelberg 1969).

just before or simultaneously with Mercury's intervention, and therefore the main focus of attention becomes Dido's decision to die (indeed the tragedies of Jodelle and Hardy are entitled *Didon se sacrifiant*). With such a view of events, the role of Aeneas becomes problematic in spite of attempts to portray his internal struggles. If the divine sanction is undermined by the disappearance of the historical reinforcement[62] Aeneas' reasons for leaving are neither compelling nor believable, and therefore these plays are primarily dramas of Dido's tragic discovery, as well as explorations of the fury of a woman scorned. In these treatments the *peripeteia* and discovery lose their potential for dramatic irony for the simple reason that Dido is not shown happy, confident, or under any illusion, or is shown thus so briefly, as in Lodovico Dolce's play, that no sense of foreboding of disaster can be created in the audience. The final misfortune is not enhanced by a reversal of hope and expectation.

Marlowe's play is an exception to this pattern. In his tragedy Book 1 of the *Aeneid* is given its full importance. In Act I we have the storm, the prophecy of Jupiter, and Venus' encounter with Aeneas, and in Act II the meeting of Dido and Aeneas and the banquet. At the banquet Aeneas tells Dido of the fall of Troy. In spite of the omission of the account of his wanderings (Book 3), it is quite clear that Dido is aware that Aeneas' destination and destiny is Italy, though she is not convinced of its inevitability. As a result Marlowe can exploit dramatic irony and he does this, interestingly, through references to Sychaeus. Though his Dido is not stayed from marriage to Iarbas and her gallery of other suitors by thoughts of Sychaeus, nor does remorse for her fidelity to him torment her after Aeneas has left her, yet references to Sychaeus are used ironically to foreshadow what Marlowe clearly sees as her betrayal by Aeneas. These references come at two crucial moments, the first meeting of the pair and the scene in the cave. Firstly, Act II Sc. I 74–80:

Dido. What stranger art thou that does eye me thus?
Aen. Sometime I was a Trojan, mighty Queen;
But Troy is not; what shall I say I am?
Ilio. Renowned Dido, 'tis our general,
Warlike Aeneas.

[62] Cf. V. Pöschl, "Dido und Aeneas" in *Festschrift Karl Vretska*, ed. D. Ableitinger and H. Gugel (Heidelberg 1970) 148 ff., esp. 169, "Vor allem ist es die politische Dimension, die Zeitproblematik und die Geschichtsdeutung, die Vergil vor dem französischen und dem deutscher Dichter [Goethe] voraus hat."

Dido. Warlike Aeneas, and in these base robes?
Go fetch the garment which Sichaeus wore.[63]

A variation on this theme of identity recurs in the second passage (Act III Sc. IV 40–63):

Aen. If that Your Majesty can look so low
As my despised worths, that shun all praise,
With this my hand I give to you my heart,
And vow, by all the Gods of hospitality,
By heaven and earth, and my fair brother's bow,
By Paphos, Capys, and the purple sea
From whence my radiant mother did descend,
And by this sword that sav'd me from the Greeks,
Never to leave these new-upreared walls
Whiles Dido lives and rules in Juno's town—
Never to like or love any but her!

Dido. What more than Delian music do I hear,
That calls my soul from forth his living seat
To move unto the measures of delight?
Kind clouds that sent forth such a courteous storm
As made disdain to fly to fancy's lap!
Stout love, in mine arms make thy Italy,
Whose crown and kingdom rests at thy command;
Sichaeus, not Aeneas, be thou call'd;
The King of Carthage, not Anchises' son.
Hold, take these jewels at thy lover's hand,
These golden bracelets, and this wedding-ring,
Wherewith my husband woo'd me yet a maid,
And be thou King of Libya, by my gift.

In Dido's speech Marlowe admirably recreates the Virgilian irony that results from the fusion of the historical and personal dimensions—in the invitation to exchange Rome for Carthage, to give up his personal and historic identity, and the ominous obligation to fill the place of the dead husband in some kind of marriage. In contrast to the French and Italian playwrights, Marlowe finds more interest in the external than the inner peripety. But even the dramatic conflict of the external peripety is somewhat dissipated by his Dido's original resourcefulness. To foil Aeneas' first attempt to leave, she has the oars and sails removed from his ships and Cupid/Ascanius abducted to a country house as a hostage.

[63] All quotations of Marlowe are from *Dido Queen of Carthage*, ed. H. J. Oliver (London 1968).

When Hermes has brought back the real Ascanius, and when Iarbas has given back the tackle to get his rival in love out of the way, then we do get the passionate confrontation between love and duty. Yet the decision to die is passed over rapidly (Act V Sc. I 269–71):

> What shall I do,
> But die in fury of this oversight?
> I, I must be the murderer of my self;
> No, but I am not; yet I will be, straight.

It is the betrayal that prompts her decision to die, and she dies uttering the curse prophetic of future enmity between the two races (306 ff.):

> And from mine ashes let a conqueror rise
> That may revenge this treason to a queen
> By ploughing up his countries with the sword!
> Betwixt this land and that be never league.

Returning to Virgil we see that it is in the inner peripety, the moment of realisation, in her awakening to the reality of the situation, that the story of Dido achieves its truly tragic depth.[64] The moment of transition comes at 4.450–51:

> tum uero infelix fatis exterrita Dido
> mortem orat; taedet caeli conuexa tueri.

What does *fatis exterrita* mean? Are we to take the phrase as summing up the preceding scenes or as looking forward to the paragraph which follows? Interpretations are various, from Thornton "for now through Aeneas' refusal she realizes the finality of fate's decree concerning Aeneas, and in her terror she prays for death,"[65] following Pease (who is in turn following a hint in Servius) "she begins to recognise that what is ordained for him conflicts with her own desires" to Austin "she sees her doom clearly." A specialised study of the use of *fatum* in the *Aeneid* concludes that *fatis* here designates "Götterspruche,"[66] messages of the

[64] Cf. Rudd (note 12 above) 49.

[65] A. Thornton, *The Living Universe* (Dunedin 1976) 99 and n. 66, "*fatis* must primarily be the destiny which directs Aeneas to Italy, because Dido herself does not die 'by the decree of fate,' as Virgil says explicitly (696)."

[66] W. Pötscher, *Vergil und die göttlichen Mächte* (Hildesheim 1977) 69. For an opposing opinion see Wlosok (note 2 above) 247, "Ihre Schuld sieht sie ganz aus ihrer fatumsfernen Perspektive als Verletzung der Sittlichkeit und der Treue gegenüber ihrem Gemahl Sychaeus. Der Gedanke an eine Kollision mit den *fata* als Ausdruck göttlichen Willens stellt sich in diesem Zusammenhang nicht ein."

gods which justify or account for everything that has happened. In that case we could conclude that Aeneas' appeals to the will of the gods in the preceding scene are now confirmed in the omens Dido herself receives. The phrase therefore looks both backwards and forwards and links the recognition with the decision to die.

It is Dido's decision to die that redeems her from the status of simply a victim of "an act of divine malice interpreted by an 'ironic' poet."[67] Just as the story of Oedipus becomes tragic through the hero's assumption of responsibility for his actions, even though they were commited in ignorance, so Dido's acceptance of fate, her repossession of her own life even in order to end it, allow her to regain her autonomy in the face of her suffering. At the same time this moment is tragically ambiguous. For when she becomes mistress of herself and conscious of her ruin she also becomes baneful, bringing ruin on her city and initiating the curse on Rome and Carthage.[68]

It would please Aristotle that Heinze regarded the *peripeteia* in Book 4 as a surprise.[69] In his view it looks as if Aeneas is going to stay and the sudden intervention of Mercury causes an unexpected change of direction. But this is only half the picture. As a result of the focus on Dido from the last part of Book 1, with the narration consistently from her point of view to the exclusion of that of Aeneas, the reader is led to sympathise with her desires. Yet the predominance given to Dido's view of the situation does not outweigh the foreknowledge of the reader, reinforced by the foreshadowing of the future, both in the narrator's voice and conveyed through the scenes with the gods, so that there is a continuous tension between the audience's expectations of disaster and the restricted awareness of her situation that Dido is shown to have.

In many ways, in Virgil, ignorance of fate amounts to an ignorance of history, since what has happened is what must happen;[70] historical knowledge thus plays a unique role in the understanding of the *Aeneid.* Right from the beginning Carthage is associated with the anger of Juno, the Roman threat to its future greatness being the latest in the series of defeats and humiliations which she has suffered (1.12–33).[71]

[67] The phrase is borrowed from States (note 37 above) 53.

[68] I owe this point to Mr. C. W. Macleod.

[69] Heinze (note 6 above) 317.

[70] Büchner (note 59 above) 321–22; C. H. Wilson, "Jupiter and the Fates in the *Aeneid,*" *CQ* 29 (1979) 361–71, esp. 367; G. Williams, Ninth Todd Memorial Lecture 1976 (University of Sydney 1982) 3–7.

[71] Horsfall (note 12 above) 1–6.

Henceforward, in this episode at least, information about the historical future given explicitly in the poem is to be located on the level of the gods. As in Homer the vital questions about the future are linked to their less than heroic machinations. So in the passage explaining the motives for Juno's anger the reader is reminded not only that Aeneas will arrive in Italy to found Rome, but also that it is fated that the Romans will one day destroy Carthage in war (1.12–22). A pendant to the great prophecy of Jupiter to Venus in Book 1 is the first despatch of Mercury to Carthage (297–304):

> Haec ait et Maia genitum demittit ab alto,
> ut terrae utque nouae pateant Karthaginis arces
> hospitio Teucris, ne fati nescia Dido
> finibus arceret. uolat ille per aera magnum
> remigio alarum ac Libyae citus astitit oris.
> et iam iussa facit, ponuntque ferocia Poeni
> corda uolente deo; in primis regina quietum
> accipit in Teucros animum mentemque benignam.[72]

Here the poet contrasts divine omniscience, of which Jupiter has just given an example, with human ignorance of the future—measures have to be taken precisely because Dido is *fati nescia.* (Appropriately, Jupiter ensures the disposition to *hospitium* which Dido displays so innocently in the scene in the temple.) At the same time the equally omniscient epic narrator takes the opportunity of reminding us of the warlike nature of the Carthaginians and alerting us to the possibility that their *ferocia corda* will prove relevant. In fact, the future hostility of the two states is prefigured in the original encounter of the Trojans and the Carthaginians. Despite Mercury's mission, Ilioneus complains to Dido of having been treated as an enemy (1.522 ff., esp. 530–41). This future hostility is not referred to again on the human level in Book 1, but given that our historical knowledge is relevant, we can see irony in several important episodes in Book 1: Aeneas in the temple of Juno,[73] Dido's speech of welcome to the Trojans and Aeneas' reply, and Dido's prayer at the banquet (to *Iuppiter hospitalis!*). But in none of these cases is the irony thrust upon us, or even overtly signalled. It is for us to

[72] On the problems of this scene, see A. Wlosok, *Die Göttin Venus in Vergils Aeneis* (Heidelberg 1967) 26, n. 2; W. Kühn, *Götterszenen bei Vergil* (Heidelberg 1971) 28, n. 2, 31, n. 9; Büchner (note 59 above) 320.

[73] Cf. Horsfall (note 12 above) 7 f.; W. R. Johnson, *Darkness Visible* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London 1976) 99–105.

supplement the immediate context with what we know to be the contradictory factors.

On the divine level, however, the historic significance of the encounter is kept alive, in Venus' fears of *Iunonia hospitia,* in the dialogue between the two goddesses in Book 4 (Juno with her gibe that Venus fears the city of Carthage, Venus with her rejoinder that Jupiter may not allow the Tyrians and Trojans to unite in one city), and in the instructions of Jupiter to Mercury (particularly 4.235, "inimica in gente"). Dido and Aeneas, on the other hand, remain equal in their ignorance of the historical consequences, for all that they are the bearers of the fates of their cities (the intertwining of the historical and personal destinies is made clear in the dialogue of the two goddesses in Book 4). No less than Dido, Aeneas is left in ignorance of the Punic Wars; it has often been pointed out that Mercury does not repeat to him Jupiter's "aut qua spe inimica in gente moratur" (4.235).[74] So the confident assertions of future friendship and gratitude in Book 1 are ironical not only in the light of the break in Book 4, but even more because of the wars which this break prefigures.

This is, it need not be said, because Dido and her growing city represent a threat to the foundation of Rome, a threat which foreshadows the danger Carthage will later pose to the very existence of Rome, and to underline this the death of Dido, like that of Hector, is linked by imagery to the final destruction of her city (4.669–71, cf. *Il.* 22.410 ff.):

> non aliter quam si immissis ruat hostibus omnis
> Karthago aut antiqua Tyros, flammaeque furentes
> culmina perque hominum uoluantur perque deorum.

In Virgil this simile looks back to the image of the capture of a city used for Venus' initial attack (1.673–74) and is given added point and poignancy by the allusive reference to the fall of Troy.[75] To sum up, Dido and Aeneas are doubly ignorant in this episode, both of their immediate future and of what it prefigures. This ignorance is thrown into relief by the presence in the poem of the gods with their superior knowledge. While the chief human characters are portrayed in their struggle to reconcile personal desires with the fulfillment of their wider responsibilities (and it adds to Dido's pathos that she thinks she has

[74] Rudd (note 12 above) 37, n. 9.

[75] Cf. 4.330, *capta ac deserta* "as if at the sack of a city" (Austin, note 1 above). V. A. Estevez ("Queen and City: Three similes in *Aeneid* IV," *Vergilius* 20 [1974] 25–28) does not mention the parallel with Troy.

found a way to do this),[76] the gods look after the future. In Virgil we may have even more problems than with Homer about the way they do it, but nevertheless one of their functions in the economy of the poem is to mediate between the facts of history and the epic narrative.

Given the increased importance of the historical future for the poem (relative to Homer), the role of the gods in the narrative becomes more complex. To allow the historical outcome (or fate) to control the narrative directly would not work. Therefore the poet frees himself and his human characters from the compulsion of fate by attributing the manipulation of events to the interventions of the gods. But this does not amount to a simple dramatising of the workings of fate with the gods always knowing better. In our episode Venus and Juno do not seem to be able to see any further ahead than the next move.[77] The conflict between order and chaos, pattern and the randomness of events, or as Cartault puts it,[78] necessity and free will, is spread over both dimensions of the poem. Hence, I think, we do not always have to believe the god's eye view of events if it is in opposition to what we know of the human characters. Venus' fears of Tyrian perfidy and *Iunonia hospitia* (1.661 f. and 671 f.), while to be proved justified in the long run, are not applicable to the Dido we have so far been shown.

In this episode the intervention of the gods is very marked, since they bring about the three crucial events in the actual working out of the story: Dido's falling in love, the "wedding" in the cave, and Aeneas' departure. The portrayal of the gods as manipulators of the action opens up possibilities for anticipation, which, according to Sedgewick is "one of the invariable accompaniments of dramatic irony in its tragic form," since "the ironic sense drives the mind forward from the episode which is engaging its immediate attention."[79] As we have seen, the presence of the gods as actors with power over events provides a locus in the poem for information about the immediate and more remote future. At the same time, by freeing the narrator of responsibility for what happens in the poem it allows him to use foreshadowing for

[76] Foster (note 5 above) 35, "There is great irony in the reversal, if one may use that word, whereby Dido changes her life-style completely from chaste widowhood to infatuated 'marriage' with Aeneas, in that, had other things been equal, this marriage was the right solution for her."

[77] On the role of the goddesses, see G. H. Gellie, "Juno and Aeneas in Aeneid IV" in *Cicero and Virgil*, ed. J. R. C. Martyn (Amsterdam 1972) 138–48.

[78] A. Cartault, *L'art de Virgile dans l'Enéide* (Paris 1926) 84–85.

[79] Sedgewick (note 38 above) 50.

pathetic effect, underlining the ignorance of the human characters. The result in both cases is the preparation of the reader for the tragic reversal—the generation of expectation, which to Coleridge was a more powerful emotion than surprise.[80]

In my discussion I have tried to show that Virgil uses foreshadowing to make us aware of the irony in the story of Dido at crucial moments in it: the first mention of her name, the first exchange of words between Dido and Aeneas, Dido's falling in love, and the "wedding" in the cave. The foreshadowing is implicit and explicit, of either the historical outcome of the meeting or of what it has in store for Dido herself. The function of the foreshadowing is partly one of emphasis, but chiefly it is used to create the sense of dramatic irony—"it points the significance of the situation, it brings the conflict of dramatic forces into clearer view, it heightens the sense of pity and terror."[81] The early ironic moments are ironic in the light of the tragic outcome of the story, but they also contribute to the sense of inevitability inherent in the situation in progress; the dramatic irony, once brought into play, underlines the fundamental role of the *peripeteia* in the plot and encourages us to read the episode as a "tragedy."

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[80] "Characteristics of Shakespeare's Dramas," (note 58 above) 53.

[81] Sedgewick (note 38 above) 63.

THE SILENCE OF NORBANUS

A Note on Provincial Quaestors under the Republic

I

C. Norbanus, new man and perhaps new citizen,[1] bursts into the limelight of Roman politics in 103 B.C., the year of Saturninus' turbulent tribunate and the victory of popular causes. He imitates Saturninus' activity and complements it by prosecuting Q. Servilius Caepio (*cos.* 106), whose aristocratic arrogance (it could be said) had lost a battle and an army. The proceedings were violent. Two fellow tribunes trying to intercede were driven off, and the venerable M. Scaurus, *princeps senatus,* was struck by a stone.[2] Some years later (probably in 95), Norbanus was called to account for the events of that year in what was apparently a general settling of political accounts.[3]

Between these two years, we are surprisingly ill informed about his activities. His silence during the agitated years 101 and (above all) 100, a year of well-documented crisis, is particularly puzzling. We know that he served as quaestor to M. Antonius, who undertook his defence on the occasion of the trial, solely because of the link of *fides* that this relationship had created between them—or so he was to claim, in Cicero's piece of historical fiction.[4] This at once shows that his *cursus* was unusual. His tribunate must have preceded his quaestorship, since M. Antonius never had *imperium* before 103.[5] But the actual date of the quaestorship is uncertain: it could be during M. Antonius' praetorship and his proconsular command in Cilicia, or later, during his consulship in 99.[6]

These alternatives used to be listed without comment,[7] since there appeared to be no way of deciding, until Münzer, in an epoch-making

[1] See F. Münzer, *RE,* s.v. "Norbanus" 1 and, at greater length, *Hermes* 67 (1932) 225 ff.

[2] See *MRR* I 563 f. for sources.

[3] See E. Badian, *Studies in Greek and Roman History* (1964) 34 ff.

[4] Cic. *de or.* 2,197 ff. For the fictional nature of this as regards M. Antonius, see note 3 above, 46 f. (with notes) and *Chiron* 14 (1984), in press.

[5] This point was fully established by Münzer (note 1 above).

[6] Sources *MRR* I 568 ff. (Cilician command); II 1 (consulship).

[7] E.g., Drumann-Groebe IV 57 n. 3.

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discussion of Norbanus,[8] tried to argue that the Cilician command was much the more probable of the two. His principal item of evidence was the fact that Norbanus sought refuge at Rhodes from Sulla's victory: the choice of Rhodes could best be explained by connections established during the quaestorship. Henceforth that date, stated by Münzer less circumspectly in *RE*, became standard. In *MRR*, Norbanus appears as Antonius' quaestor in 102, to be succeeded in 101 by an A. Gabinius, for whom we have only chance epigraphic attestation.[9]

In 1966, E. S. Gruen published a short article trying to move the quaestorship of Norbanus from the earlier to the later date.[10] It was the first time that a case for preferring 99 had actually been made. Gruen drew attention to the fact that no source states or implies service in Cilicia (as we saw, it had long been known that the direct evidence cannot help in deciding the question), and he made the point that, since a quaestor was supposed to stay with his commander throughout the latter's service (as we happen to hear in the case of C. Gracchus), and since A. Gabinius is attested as M. Antonius' quaestor in Cilicia, Gabinius should be regarded as the *only* quaestor serving under Antonius in that war. That would put Norbanus' service firmly in 99.

It certainly is possible that 99 is the correct date, but it has come to seem to me unlikely. In particular, the principle said to have been urged in the attack on C. Gracchus—the principle that provides the basis for Gruen's case—needs more careful examination than it has received. What will emerge, I suggest, is that it should not be taken as an assured fact of Roman constitutional practice.

[8] Münzer, *Hermes* (note 1 above).

[9] *MRR* I 569, cf. 572 and 573 n. 3. (No quaestor or proquaestor is assigned to M. Antonius for his continuing command in 100.) For Gabinius see *IGRRP* IV 1116 (Rhodes). At *MRR* I 565 n. 7 (p. 566), 101 is recognised as possible for the quaestorship of Norbanus, with the admission that it would avoid the overlap of five days between a quaestorship in 102 and an immediately preceding tribunate in 103, which seems securely dated. (On this problem, which cannot be convincingly overcome, see Gruen, cit. next note, 105 f. with n. 9.) Nonetheless, Broughton prefers 102 for Norbanus and 101 for Gabinius, as argued in an article *TAPA* 77 (1946) 38 f., which cannot be regarded as overcoming the problem of the overlap or making this order positively plausible.

[10] *CP* 61 (1966) 105 ff. He misrepresents Münzer's *Hermes* article as assigning the quaestorship to the earlier date without considering the later. In fact Münzer says that the two alternatives have always been known ("wie man schon immer gesehen hat") and refers to Drumann-Groebe (note 7 above). Gruen does not cite this, nor any other scholar who had seen 99 as a possible date. Münzer, after setting out the traditional alternative, then proceeded to argue that the earlier date is the more probable. In *RE*, with less space for discussion, and with a reference to his *Hermes* article for the full discussion, he then stated the earlier date as fact. No one before Gruen (as far as I know) had ever positively argued for preferring 99.

II

Gruen admits that "evidence is scanty on quaestors." But he finds two well-known cases at just the right period: Sulla's service under Marius in the Numidian War, which lasted more than two years, and C. Verres' service under Cn. Carbo in Italy, which lasted more than one year.[11] This, in addition to the theory reportedly enunciated against C. Gracchus, seems *prima facie* a strong case, particularly in view of the paucity of evidence on quaestorian service. But the actual instances call for detailed scrutiny.

No one will deny that quaestors (perhaps even much of the time—we cannot tell) stayed with their commanders for more than a year; and that in spite of the fact that the paucity of epigraphic attestation ought to give us some pause. Honours for promagistrates with *imperium* are too common to need listing. Honours for (or at least references to) quaestors in provinces, though by no means common, are found in a few places, as a look at the indexes to standard collections of epigraphic material will show. Honours for proquaestors, however, are very rare indeed, and they are nearly always given to officials who (*de facto*, if not *de jure*) were acting *pro praetore*. Consultation of the principal collections will give a fair sample of such honours and references. The total harvest from *SIG*³, *OGIS*, *IGRRP*, and *ILLRP* is precisely two men not actually termed *pro praetore:* L. Lucullus, who in fact had a long independent command under Sulla,[12] and an obscure C. Vergilius Balbus, honoured by Halaesa.[13] Durrbach's *Choix d'Inscriptions de Délos* adds M' Aemilius Lepidus, the future *cos.* 66.[14] *RDGE* adds no new names and includes only the mysterious proquaestor of the SC on Stratonicea, active in Rome in 81 (?) and not easily explicable.[15]

[11] Sulla: *MRR* I 551, 554, 556; Verres: *MRR* II 61, 64. Gruen also refers to two cases that some might consider to point the other way, but he rightly dismisses them as irrelevant. They need no further discussion.

[12] On Lucullus see Cic. *Acad. pr.* 1–2. Cf. *ILLRP* 362; *IGRRP* IV 701, 1118 (= *SIG*³ 745), 1191; *MRR* II 55, 58, 61, 64, 69, 77, 81.

[13] *IGRRP* I 508; *MRR* II 133; cf. 155 (the same text under two dates).

[14] *Choix* 153; *MRR* II 86.

[15] *RDGE* 18 (=*OGIS* II 441), line 90 (cf. p. 110 n. 3). It is interesting to compare the number of attested quaestors with that of proquaestors (excluding those termed *pro praetore*) in provincial service.
ILLRP: 3 quaestors (nos. 370, 373, 388), probably all post-Sullan; 1 proquaestor (362: L. Lucullus).
IGRRP IV: 3 quaestors (nos. 197, 435, 1116), 2 of them post-Sullan; 1 proquaestor (701, 1118, 1191: L. Lucullus).

It is theoretically possible that, for reasons unknown to us, quaestors were normally honoured in their first year, soon after arrival; but it would be odd, the more so since their commanders (as would be expected) received their principal honours (and especially statues) near the end of their service, or perhaps even after. It is also theoretically possible that proquaestors were not normally designated as such with technical accuracy; but again, there is no good reason to think so. In informal contexts (e.g., Cicero's speeches and writings), the term "quaestor" can indeed stand for a proquaestor; but so can "praetor" for a proconsul, as is now generally recognised. Yet official monuments carefully distinguish, in this latter case. One would expect them to be equally careful in the case of quaestors.

Obviously, the picture presented by the epigraphic evidence does not justify firm conclusions. But it helps to focus attention on the whole problem and to make us wonder about the difference in attestation between quaestors and their commanders.

It must next be pointed out that most of the (very few) attested cases are, in one way or another, demonstrably exceptional. Of the two Gruen found, Sulla's personal relationship with Marius is obvious from the record—so much so that it has even been suggested, in a context quite independent of the present investigation, that Marius may have personally selected him as his quaestor: he certainly showed an exceptional, and indeed surprising, amount of confidence in Sulla right from the start.[16] Verres' service under Cn. Carbo in Italy, on the other hand, was precisely at the time of Sulla's invasion and the collapse of regular government. In fact, one quaestor of 83, M. Pupius Piso, happens to be on record as refusing to take up his allotted *prouincia* with his consul.[17] We may surmise that there were other cases of this: had the Senate wanted to replace Verres, they might not easily have found anyone willing to take his place—or anyone calculating with equal skill (as Cicero alleges in Verres' case) how to turn the situation to his own profit.

In the thin epigraphic record, we must certainly regard L. Lucullus, in the East under Sulla, as quite exceptional; and even M' Lepidus, who apparently cannot be dated after 78 and may have been in Delos as

[16] E. Badian, *Lucius Sulla, the Deadly Reformer* (Todd Memorial Lecture, Sydney 1970) 6 ff., where the evidence for this view is set out.

[17] Cic. 2*Verr.* 1,37.

early as 84,[18] may turn out to have served during the irregular and disturbed period of the late eighties.

We may conclude that, on detailed investigation, the record (both literary and epigraphic) turns out to be even more puzzling than the collection of the bare facts would suggest.

Of course, the prize exhibit in any discussion of this topic is C. Gracchus. We must next turn to his case.[19] When his commander, L. Aurelius Orestes (*cos.* 126), was prorogued in Sardinia for a second time (for 124) and Gaius was expected to go on serving under him, he surprised everyone by simply going home. He was at once accused before the censors, who happened to be in office at the time. So far the facts.

Plutarch, our only source for the full story, adds that it was thought strange (ἀλλόκοτον) for a quaestor to return before his commander. In fact, this account and comment are the sole basis for the theory that quaestors were expected to serve for the whole length of their commanders' turn of duty. It is the only reference given in Mommsen's *Staatsrecht*,[20] and no one (not even Gruen, to whom this point was vital and who carefully attended to it) has ever found confirmation, either in the legal texts or indeed in any actual Roman source, contemporary or later.

As always, it is difficult to separate what Plutarch found in his source from his own comment. In particular, the statement about what precisely was thought strange may be his own inference from Gaius' defence, which he goes on to report. The only alternative is that it is ultimately based on C. Gracchus himself, as the rest of the narrative certainly seems to be, from the implication that the prorogation of Orestes had been voted by the Senate precisely to keep C. Gracchus away from Rome to the snippets from his defence. The statement regarding Orestes' prorogation is patently absurd, even on the basis of the theory that his quaestor would have been expected to stay with him. There was the usual guerrilla war going on in Sardinia, and Orestes himself no doubt wanted to finish it in order to earn his triumph, as he

[18] See discussion in *Choix* (note 14 above).

[19] Sources *ORF*[4] pp. 180 f., where full references to all passages can be found.

[20] Mommsen, *Staatsrecht* II[3] 531 with n. 3—worded with commendable caution, not always found in his successors ("wenigstens factisch Regel"). However, he seems to accept without question the tale that Orestes was prorogued in order to keep C. Gracchus in Sardinia.

finally did, in 122.[21] In other words, after the attributed motive of keeping C. Gracchus away from Rome had disappeared, Orestes was prorogued for two more years in order to finish his war.

In his defence, C. Gracchus claimed that he was kept in Sardinia for over two years, when in fact he was entitled to return after one. This must be interpreted as an attempt to confuse the issue. Whether or not the point was valid as regards the fact alleged, what is carefully suppressed is the much more serious fact that he had returned without the permission of either the Senate or his commander.

That such permission was required is obvious. The service was *militiae* by definition, and the quaestor had major responsibilities, both financial and military. And in this case there was an actual war going on: it was not inconceivable that Orestes might lose his life, and his quaestor would have been required to take over, for he was the second-in-command as well as the man in charge of the war chest. His desertion (to give it its proper designation) was bound to have a serious effect on the whole war, at least until he could be replaced.

Of course, the Senate, which had voted the quaestor's prorogation, had the right to allow him to leave. So, presumably, had his commander, by virtue of his *imperium*. As it happens, we have a famous case attesting this, in the instance of a quaestor (at a rather later period) who wanted to leave before the end of his assigned term. When the young C. Caesar, serving as quaestor in Spain, was inspired by a statue of Alexander the Great in a temple at Gades with the thought that he had been wasting his time on trifles, he decided to leave at once. But he did not simply decamp. He demanded leave from his superior and, clearly after obtaining it, then left *ante tempus*. To the commander who had given him that permission he felt bound in personal loyalty ever after, which is sufficient proof that the leave was in fact given.[22]

There is an equally well-known case of a *legatus* who greatly disliked his commander and who had urgent business in Rome, yet did not try to leave until he had obtained that commander's permission: C. Marius waited (more or less patiently) while Metellus kept putting him off, until Metellus finally recognised that he could not ultimately prevent him from seeking the consulship and allowed him to depart.[23]

[21] *Inscr. It.* XIII 1,82 f.; 560.

[22] Suet. *DJ* 7,1 and 8; Plut. *Caes.* 5,6.

[23] Sall. *b.J.* 64,1 (*petundi gratia missionem rogat* [and is refused]); 73,2 (*Marium fatigantem de profectione . . . domum dimittit*). Cf. *Gnomon* 46 (1974) 422 f., citing Cicero's confirmation, *off.* 3,79.

Had C. Gracchus had such permission—had he been *ab Oreste missus* (to use the phrase that is used in Marius' case)—that would have been a fully sufficient answer to the charge, whatever precisely it was. There can be no doubt that the commander, at this time as half a century later, was entitled to allow him to leave. It is clear that Gaius had not received such permission and that he preferred not to mention the point—indeed, to distract attention from it. His extended comments on the length of his military service and on his right to return after one year may be regarded as no less irrelevant to the real issue than much of what we have in Cicero's speeches is to the issue in *his* cases. And his insistence on the excellence of his character could be compared to that well-known *topos* in Cicero. Against the actual charge (as it would appear to us) he had no defence.

The difference between his case and the cases of Cicero's clients, of course, is that he was not actually being prosecuted. His action must have been against *mos maiorum,* but (like many heinous and, strictly, unthinkable acts) it may not have violated an actual law. It is only in the last generation of the Republic, starting with Sulla (in particular), that much of what had been accepted as *mos maiorum* in the political sphere appears to have been codified. After all, it was only C. Gracchus himself (it seems) who passed the first detailed and effective *lex repetundarum,* and (as far as we know) only Sulla who laid down detailed specifications encompassing the duties of a provincial commander.[24] *Mos maiorum* consisted of remembered precedent, that is, essentially case law. As long as an act of a certain kind had not been attempted, *mos maiorum* gave no guidance on what to do about it, except by inferences that could be disputed. This had come out very clearly in connection with Ti. Gracchus' tribunate: the persistence of M. Octavius in his veto, his deposition by Tiberius, Tiberius' attempt to secure reelection—all these, it seems, presented problems for which *mos maiorum* had no ready answers. It had to be extended by interpretation so as to fit them in.[25] And now Tiberius' brother was posing another puzzle by returning to Rome without permission, either from

[24] On the gradual codification of custom see D.C. Earl, *Historia* 14 (1965) 331.

[25] For this phenomenon, characteristic of the development of *mos maiorum* and similar systems, see *ANRW* I 1 (1972) 668 ff., on the puzzle posed by Octavius' perseverance in his veto. On Cicero's judgment of this, see now J. Linderski, *Athenaeum* n.s. 60 (1982) 244–47, with confused exposition. (P. 246: "Thus *pace* Badian Octavius' *patientia* manifested itself in his persistent opposition to the agrarian law." Cf. p. 247: "Octavius showed his *patientia* when he nobly endured the indignity of his deposition.")

the commander who so largely depended on his services or from the Senate that had prorogued him and that had for generations expected its assignment of *prouinciae* to be obeyed.[26] Gaius' behaviour, almost as much as his brother's had, struck at the heart of the Roman system, at *disciplina maiorum*. Yet it would have been impossible to prosecute him for it, not only (as we have seen is quite likely) because he had broken no law, but because the memory of his brother would have sufficed to secure his acquittal by the Roman People on a charge of *perduellio*.

It was therefore convenient that censors happened to be in office, for a denunciation before the censors was precisely the right process. The censors traditionally took cognizance of issues not provided for by the law, yet contrary to accepted morality and behaviour. But the advantage that this offered to the prosecution—dispensation from the need to prove contravention of any actual law—was compensated by the corresponding advantage that it offered to the defence. Even in cases prosecuted before Roman courts, as we have already noted and as is well known, matters irrelevant to the actual charge were freely introduced: as regards the defence, these ranged from encomia on the defendant's character and service to the Republic to the *topos* of his potentially fatherless children. However, Cicero at least cannot ignore the actual charge: a large part of his speech must be devoted to proving that the charge as such is baseless. In the procedure before the censors this was not strictly necessary: there was no legal *crimen* to refute. The censorial process tried a citizen's character. As far as we can see, C. Gracchus used some of the techniques of the Roman defendant—which, in the case of a trial before a court, were strictly irrelevant—as his sole weapons. He defended himself by reference to his character and services and tried to enlist the sympathy of the People, no doubt to exercise moral suasion. As for the inconvenient fact that he had left the service of his commander and of the Roman People without permission, he seems to have ignored, indeed suppressed, this. And his tactics were so successful that he not only won acquittal, but achieved the disappearance of the actual fact from our record: as we saw, Plutarch does not even mention it. It is perhaps this that may be called truly ἀλλόκοτον. Gaius pleaded his right to be released as justification for releasing himself.

In fact, C. Gracchus insisted that he had done more military service than most young men and that he had a right to come home

[26] See the striking case of the consul C. Cassius Longinus in 171 (Livy 43,1,4 ff.) and, for what the story is worth, cf. Livy 29,19,6 (Scipio's action at Locri).

after one year, let alone two: he had simply helped himself to what was his due and more than his due. The actual point noted by Plutarch—that he had returned before his commander—is not cited as having come up in the defence. If it was mentioned by his opponents, we may take it that it was only as a side issue: a point of rhetoric (perhaps) rather than an actual charge. We are amply familiar with such means of trying to put the defendant in a bad light. Had it been an actual charge, Gaius could not have failed to refer to it; for, as we shall see, he could easily have cited distinguished precedent to refute it. He was a skilful orator and would hardly have missed the opportunity. In fact (we must again stress), the censorial process did not deal with specific charges as such: the censors were concerned with judging a citizen's character. Their *nota* (or whatever penalty they were empowered to inflict) indicated that, in various degrees, his character was not such as befitted his station. His defence was therefore precisely right for its purpose: he could afford to ignore the specific charge. The outcome proves that he had judged correctly. The censors, by acquitting him, concluded that his character as a young Roman *nobilis* had been vindicated. We must not conclude from this that their verdict sanctioned the principle that a quaestor could depart from his *prouincia* without permission: we do not hear of any other attempt to claim this. The issue as such probably had to wait for Sulla to codify it.

III

We have singularly little evidence that would enable us to check on C. Gracchus' claim that he helped himself merely to what was his due: that he had a right to be relieved after a year. As we have seen, in the late Republic the prorogation of a quaestor (even without *imperium pro praetore*) can at times be firmly attested. But unfortunately quaestors hardly ever get into the record at all, and those in the city are more likely to than those *militiae,* in whom we are here interested. In the long commands of the Hannibalic War, in the great Eastern commands of the second century, and in the prolonged campaigning in Spain, hardly a single quaestor is attested; none gets more than a chance mention, except in the few cases where the sources have an interest in the man himself. Let us look at the record.[27]

[27] References can be found in *MRR* and will not normally be needed here. Nothing of interest or relevance to our point is found before 209.

In the Hannibalic War no quaestor appears between 209 and 204. In 209 (probably) C. Flaminius is Scipio's quaestor at New Carthage. We do not know whether he had been with him from the start or whether he stayed with him to the end of his long command in Spain.

In 204 we are better served. M. Cato is Scipio's quaestor in Africa. The evidence on his year of office is conflicting. Nepos makes him quaestor "P. Africano consuli" (i.e., 205). Cicero twice, in different works, puts his quaestorship in 204, and Nepos himself once appears to imply Africa as Cato's actual *prouincia*.[28] The matter has frequently been discussed at length, and Münzer, in a famous article,[29] made it the basis of extensive historiographical speculations. Though Cicero's authority is inherently superior (especially at this time of his life, after extensive literary and historical researches), we cannot be sure of the date of Cato's quaestorship: like much else about him, it soon became enmeshed in legend, which could probably never again be reliably separated from fact. Cicero may no longer have been able to find out. However, whether or not Cato was actually sent out to Scipio when Scipio was already in Africa, it is certain that he left Scipio some time before Scipio's command came to an end. For Scipio himself, of course, stayed on until after the final victory and made peace in 201. By 202 (certainly), C. Laelius was his quaestor. Cato had left some time in 203.[30]

That was a century before our period, 80 years before C. Gracchus. It would certainly be remembered, as it was even much later. But in the intervening generations, not a single case enables us to check whether Cato's record was (at least, as regards the actual facts) typical, or whether it remained the norm in the case of extended commands. When C. Gracchus (in Plutarch's account) implies that he has been put upon and expected to do what others have not, we simply do not know whether he is to that extent telling the truth. The fact that, to make his case appear better, he demonstrably misleads and distorts in other respects has no bearing on this point. Nor, as we saw, does the censors' acquittal, for they were not trying him on the facts of the case.

[28] Nepos, *Cato* 1,3; cf. 2,2; Cic. *Brut.* 60; *sen.* 10. Plutarch's discussion of this incident is shot through with legend.

[29] For discussion of this, with further references, see *RE*, s.v. "Porcius," coll. 109 ff.

[30] See *MRR* I 316. The story of the relationship of Cato and Scipio at this stage seems wholly irrecoverable, and other legendary elements were added: most egregious his supposed return via Sardinia, where he happened to pick up the poet Ennius and transport him to Rome. But the chronological background should be accurate as regards the fact of his departure before Scipio and is certainly so as regards Laelius' office.

In the next 40 years, down to Sulla's reorganization, we again (as Gruen noted) have only a single case—that of Sulla himself—of a quaestor who stayed with his commander for as long as three years. Again, as we saw, we cannot tell whether it was normal or exceptional, but we happen to know that the personal relationship between this quaestor and his commander was indeed exceptional. Later, there is a single case (that of C. Verres) of a quaestor attested as prorogued into a second year, in demonstrably exceptional circumstances; though, of course, at least occasional prorogation into a second year should certainly not in principle be denied. No quaestor would want to leave just before an imminent triumph, letting another share in it. We merely have no idea what, at this time, was the rule and what the exception.

If we look beyond Sulla's reforms, our evidence at last improves—not that there is much, but we can catch an assured glimpse of what was actually happening. Epigraphic attestation, though rare, now shows quaestors serving at least a second year—whether longer, the nature of that evidence does not allow us to recognise. Obviously, we may expect longer service in exceptional circumstances, as before: the *Sertoriani* in Spain were no more able to get regular quaestors sent from Rome than Sulla had been, a decade earlier, so that L. Lucullus' record under Sulla must have had equivalents among them.[31] All this does not help very much. But fortunately, there are the *Verrines*. For the first time and the last, we have a major work entirely devoted to detailed scrutiny of a long record of provincial administration. The results, for our purpose, are rewarding. C. Verres governed Sicily for three years, and Cicero mentions the names of four quaestors, in a *prouincia* where two served each year under the commander. We can therefore be certain that no quaestor stayed with Verres more than two years, and fairly certain that new quaestors were sent out in his second year and then prorogued for his last.[32] But for the fact that we happen to have this real evidence on a typical province, but for the chance survival of the full text of the *Verrines*, there would have been no way of knowing this, since other indications in the record would not have been sufficient. As it is, Verres' Sicily—a very ordinary province, except for the fact that it had two quaestors each year—may be taken as typical of post-Sullan arrange-

[31] See *MRR* II 83, 87, 98 (Hirtuleius); 93 (Marius: unacceptable).

[32] See *MRR* II 110, 117. The precise dates and *prouinciae* of the four have been much discussed and do not matter here. See N. Marinone, *Atti dell' Accad. delle Scienze di Torino*, Ser. B, 100 (1965–66) 219–55, plausible in his suggestion that the two quaestors appointed for 72 were prorogued for Verres' last year, 71.

ments, and it strikingly confirms the slim evidence from epigraphic finds.

We must try to sum up. The results are far from satisfactory, but there are some results. Evidence from the end of the Hannibalic War and from the time after Sulla shows that at these widely separated periods quaestors were not expected to stay with their commanders until the commanders' return. As far as we can tell, from what (at least in this respect) appear to be very ordinary cases within their periods, they were expected to stay only a year or at most two. Between these two periods we have very little evidence. There is none until 124, and after C. Gracchus there is only one case (Sulla's own) that would not fit into this pattern. This shows that longer service was conceivable. We have no evidence on what was normal.

In 124, C. Gracchus claimed that he had had a right to return after one year and was arbitrarily and maliciously prorogued for a third, after staying for two. Plutarch's statement that a quaestor was not expected to return before his commander—whether his own inference or ultimately from a Gracchan source—is irrelevant to Gaius' actual case, unless indeed it was used to befog the issue. Whether Gaius' claim is true on the facts (however misleading as regards the particulars of his case), we cannot tell for certain. If it was, then his picture fits in with what appears to have been the practice 80 years earlier and was certainly to be the practice 50 years later: service for one year, at most extended for a second (and we must remember that Gaius had accepted this without complaining at the time), but not regularly for longer. If we believe Plutarch's formulation instead (i.e., that the rule was for the quaestor to stay until his commander returned), then we must argue that the practice we find in the earlier period had at some time been reversed and that it was later restored by Sulla. In view of the facts we have surveyed, it seems easier to believe that there never had been such a change: that the principle had remained, in essence, the same throughout, and that Sulla, as in many other respects, codified what he found. This, of course, would imply an increase in the number of quaestors to correspond, at least for a time, to the increase in the number of regular *prouinciae*. If, for instance, the total number of quaestors reached 12 with the addition of two new provinces in 146, it may well have stayed there afterwards, when Asia came to be added. This could even be why, just a few years later, a quaestor (C. Gracchus) was asked to serve somewhat longer than had been customary. But this is speculation, on the evidence we at present have, and we certainly cannot go any further.

However, there is no evidence at all for the frequent implication that the number of quaestors jumped all at once from eight (or whatever other low number we like to imagine) to 20 in 81 B.C.[33]

Quaestors, unlike praetors, were essentially unimportant, especially before they came to be *ex officio* enrolled in the Senate. No one transmitted lists of them to posterity, and no one felt politically or socially threatened by them. Like military tribunes, they could safely have their numbers increased whenever an increase would seem useful, without any threat to the fabric of the Republic.[34] We hear of no law mandating such an increase before Sulla (and in his case we hear by

[33] W. V. Harris's useful survey of the Republican quaestorship (*CQ* n.s. 26 [1976] 92 ff.) recognises the total lack of evidence on the immediately pre-Sullan number. He himself, after conceding that "in 197 Livy ignores the quaestors, which favours the view that the number of quaestorships remained unchanged" (a concession that I see no reason to make), rightly decides to ignore Livy's silence and assumes the appointment of two new quaestors at that point to match the new praetors (104 ff.). There, however, he prefers to stop, finding conjectural confirmation for 10 as the number just before Sulla in the suggestion that Sulla's provision of 20 quaestors to enter a Senate of 600 members implies the number of 10 quaestors when the number of senators was 300. This argument is misleading. First, it is unlikely that either Sulla or any Roman based the number of quaestors to be appointed on the need to replenish the Senate, rather than on the *prouinciae* for which they were needed; and even more so that recourse was had to life expectancy tables in arriving at that number: at most, rough experience will have been a guide. It was for the censors to keep the figures approximately in balance: cf. Dio 37,46,4, for one pair of post-Sullan censors unwilling to undertake this invidious task. (Hence the conventional number of senators is always a rough approximation.) Moreover, we have no reason to think that "few ex-quaestors were probably refused admittance in the immediately pre-Sullan period" (Harris, l.c.): our positive evidence in that period is practically limited to the fact that C. Servilius Glaucia is said by Appian (*BC* 1,28,126) to have been a senator in 102, i.e., before his tribunate of 101. If this is correct, he must (as is generally recognised) have been quaestor before 108 and admitted by the censors of that year at the latest. But Appian, here as elsewhere, may not be as accurate as he is too often taken to be. Glaucia's quiescence for at least six years, as a quaestorian senator, is a little hard to believe, and it is worth noting that Cicero, who seems to have been quite familiar with Glaucia's career, does not mention him in a related context (*Sest.* 101).

Even if Appian is right, this does not prove much. We do not know (to take an interesting case) whether P. Furius, whom Q. Metellus Numidicus tried to deprive of his horse and who avenged the insult in his tribunate (App. *BC* 1,33,147; cf. Dio, fr. 95,2), had been quaestor before he was tribune. No general statement for this period should, in fact, be made, as there is practically nothing to base it on.

[34] Hence there is no reason to think that in 146, when the Senate decided to break with precedent and (practically) to remodel the system of provincial administration by not creating new praetorships for the two new provinces annexed (see *Gnomon* 51 [1979] 793 f.), that decision implied a decision not to increase the number of quaestors. Asia, in 133, would pose the technical difficulty that, by long-established tradition, a single post

mere accident), just as we hear of hardly any other noncontroversial legislation: it is debates and seditions that get into our record. For that matter, we hear of no law trying to *reduce* the number of quaestors, as we do in the case of praetors,[35] and of no debate on such an issue. It is difficult to imagine that anyone would have suggested such a law.

IV

This brings us back to Münzer's argument regarding C. Norbanus. An important point stressed by Münzer should now again be given due weight, once we discard the hypothesis that a quaestor found with M. Antonius in one year of his Cilician campaign (A. Gabinius) must be thought of as staying with him to the end of his command. The point of Norbanus' flight to Rhodes when Sulla's victory seemed certain[36] regains its significance for dating Norbanus' quaestorship. Münzer was right to ask, for the first time, why it should be Rhodes. It was not an obvious choice. If Norbanus had despaired of resistance in Africa, he could have gone to Spain, where he obviously knew resistance was continuing and where, traditionally, it had been very hard to suppress, even if it was only that of barbarian tribes. If he abandoned all hope of resistance and merely wanted to save his life, he could have gone to Syria or Egypt, where extradition would have been unlikely and, if it came to the point, escape could almost certainly be arranged. An island where escape could easily be prevented would be chosen only for a special reason. Münzer very plausibly explained the choice by the hope that Rhodes would shelter Norbanus, because of a relationship of *fides* formed during his service in the Cilician campaign; for we know that Rhodes was perhaps the main base for that war.[37] This still seems a valid reason for preferring that date for Norbanus' quaestorship to 99.

Gruen, trying to ridicule the argument, ironically compared Cn. Carbo's sailing to Cossyra (modern Pantelleria) where he was at once

could not be added to a magistracy. Hence it is perhaps unlikely that the number was increased beyond 12 at this point. Since there was never again a time when two provinces at once were created, it is quite possible that the custom of increasing the number of quaestors fell into abeyance between 146 and 81 and that the number therefore stayed at 12. But we cannot firmly exclude a rise to (say) 14 at some stage.

[35] Livy 40,44,2.

[36] App. *BC* 1,91,422; Münzer, *Hermes* (note 1 above) 226.

[37] To the evidence set out by Münzer (note 1 above) we should add *IGRRP* IV 1116 (see note 9 above).

captured by Pompey's men: surely that did not indicate previous service on that island? But the comparison is misleading. Carbo did not think of Cossyra as a place of escape. It is likely that he thought of it as a place for continuing resistance based on Sicily. He did not know that this would quickly collapse, soon followed by Africa. Indeed, Cossyra was the ideal centre for coordinating Africa with Sicily, should one plan to do so. When resistance in Sicily did collapse, Carbo prepared to flee to Egypt—a reasonable choice, as we have seen. But it was too late.[38]

We ought therefore to return, at least as the best hypothesis, to Münzer's view that Norbanus served under Antonius in Cilicia,[39] there making contacts that later led him to believe (mistakenly, as it turned out) that he would be safe from Sulla among his clients. When he saw that he was not, he ended his life in a manner that was a conspicuous reproach to them for their lack of *fides*. He killed himself in the *agora*.

As for the actual year of his service, 101 obviously ought to be preferred to 102. As we have noted in passing, it avoids postulating an overlap between a tribunate in 103 and a quaestorship in 102, starting five days before the tribunate ended. That a man could be both tribune and quaestor at the same time is a proposition that no amount of constitutional speculation, even by Mommsen himself, can make plausible. On the other hand, there are no good reasons for putting Gabinius in 101 rather than 102,[40] and since the inscription mentioning him refers to him as quaestor, it cannot be shown that he served for more than one year. The situation should be regarded as comparable to what we later find in Verres' Sicily.

[38] See (briefly and without discussing the full implications) Gabba *ad* App. *BC* 1,96,449.

[39] It must be firmly stated that this was in M. Antonius' proconsular command, presumably in 102. There is confusion in T. P. Wiseman, *New Men in the Roman Senate* (1971) 245, where C. Norbanus (also afflicted with the cognomen "Pulbus"—queried) is listed as "q. Cilicia 99?"; cf. 157, where he is among those who "started [*sic*] as provincial quaestors," with Cilicia again given as his province.

[40] See note 9 above. (Broughton at least considers the possibility.) One minor consequence of putting Gabinius in 102, i.e., the year of Antonius' actual praetorship, would be to make it certain that Antonius was given *imperium pro consule* while praetor: the inscription refers to Gabinius as quaestor στρατηγοῦ ἀνθυπά[του]. But in view of the nature of his task, and the long precedent of such increase in *imperium* (especially in Spain), this would not be surprising. However, the title of a praetor with increased imperium would have to be noted, with implications for some other men whose *cursus* inscriptions list them as *praetor pro consule*.

We can now return to the puzzle we noted at the start: why do we not hear of C. Norbanus, prominent in Saturninus' first tribunate, during the second? Had he been a candidate for a quaestorship of 99, as the alternative view postulates, it is surely hard to imagine that, precisely at a time when he would be wanting to attract some public attention, he would not appear in our record as taking some sort of stand in the complex and violent events that mark the last few months of 100. If, however, he had joined M. Antonius as quaestor in 101, as is here suggested, then he would no doubt have wanted—and been allowed, or even asked—to stay on, once the actual campaigning was completed, in order to participate in the expected triumph. During the *seditio* that led to the death of Saturninus, when M. Antonius was *ad urbem* and was in fact asked to take part in the defence of the *res publica*,[41] C. Norbanus would have been with him, unable to intervene in the events taking place in the city even had he wanted to. The silence of Norbanus thus finds a natural explanation.[42]

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[41] Cic. *Rab. perd.* 26 (*extra urbem cum praesidio*).

[42] I should like to thank Professor T. R. S. Broughton for helpful advice. He is not, of course, to be blamed for my views and errors.

INTERPRETATIONS

PENELOPE'S LAUGH: *ODYSSEY* 18.163*

Τῇ δ' ἄρ' ἐπὶ φρεσὶ θῆκε θεὰ γλαυκῶπις Ἀθήνη,
κούρῃ Ἰκαρίοιο, περίφρονι Πηνελοπείῃ,
μνηστήρεσσι φανῆναι, ὅπως πετάσειε μάλιστα 160
θυμὸν μνηστήρων ἰδὲ τιμήεσσα γένοιτο
μᾶλλον πρὸς πόσιός τε καὶ υἱέος ἣ πάρος ἦεν.
ἀχρεῖον δ' ἐγέλασσεν ἔπος τ' ἔφατ' ἔκ τ' ὀνόμαζεν·
"Εὐρυνόμη, θυμός μοι ἐέλδεται, οὔ τι πάρος γε,
μνηστήρεσσι φανῆναι, ἀπεχθομένοισί περ ἔμπης· 165
παιδὶ δέ κεν εἴποιμι ἔπος, τό κε κέρδιον εἴη,
μὴ πάντα μνηστῆρσιν ὑπερφιάλοισιν ὁμιλεῖν,
οἵ τ' εὖ μὲν βάζουσι, κακῶς δ' ὄπιθεν φρονέουσι."

(*Odyssey* 18.158–68)

The exact state of Penelope's mind in this scene has long been a subject of controversy. It is necessary to discuss her situation in order to understand the exact nature of her laugh.

The complexity of motivation has made the passage difficult to interpret. The wide variety of conjectures about the meaning of ἀχρεῖον (163) points up the problem. Penelope's laugh has been variously described as pale, idle, inane, useless, helpless, needless, pointless, forced, silly, aimless, improper, artificial, ill-timed, fruitless, feigned, superficial, queer, and foolish. A clearer understanding of her laugh should help us better to understand her motivation, and vice versa. It will be shown here that her laughter is not necessarily an expression of her embarrassment or confusion, but rather a mark of confidence when she sees that she will be able to fool the suitors.

First, ἀχρεῖον, which Van Bennekom calls a "Schlüsselwort zum Verständnis der Szene."[1] The word appears only once elsewhere in

* An abbreviated version of this article was read at the annual meeting of the American Philological Association in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania on December 28, 1982.

[1] R. Van Bennekom *Lexicon des Frühgriechischen Epos* (Gottingen 1978) s.v. ἀχρεῖος.

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Homer: as a description of Thersites' glance as he wipes away a tear after Odysseus' chastisement (*Il.* 2.268):

> ὁ δ' ἄρ' ἕζετο τάρβησέν τε,
> ἀλγήσας δ' ἀχρεῖον ἰδὼν ἀπομόρξατο δάκρυ.

This parallel, however, is of little use in the interpretation of Penelope's laugh. The soldier and the queen are worlds apart. They are both surprised, but their circumstances are otherwise so different that scholars who cite the parallel are forced to explain ἀχρεῖον differently for each scene.[2]

Most of those writing on the subject have stated that the queen's laugh reflects her disturbed state of mind when presented with the sudden thought of showing herself to the suitors. This group sees her dominant emotion as surprise and embarrassment in the presence of Eurynome.[3] All agree that Penelope is upset by the suddenness of the unorthodox thought which enters her mind. Her laugh and strained conversation with her maid reflect this disturbance.

Somehow, the word ἀχρεῖον is meant to point out the troubled state of her soul, but its exact meaning is difficult to determine. Merkelbach acknowledges his inability to understand it: "Sie lacht ἀχρεῖον, aber wir wissen bekanntlich nicht, was das heißt,"[4] and Büchner[5] also confesses aporia: ". . . so empfiehlt es sich doch, das die antiken Grammatiker nicht mehr verstanden und wir nicht oder noch nicht ableiten können." Fortunately, a new interpretation of the word is not crucial to the present argument.

[2] W. Stanford, *The Odyssey of Homer* (London 1973) *ad* 18.163; Apollonios Sophistes s.v. ἀχρεῖος; *Etymologicum Magnum* 182.37; J. Finley, *Homer's Odyssey* (Cambridge, Mass. 1978) 8 f.; K. Ameis and C. Hentze, *Homers Odyssee* (Berlin 1901) *ad* 18.163; J. Faesi, *Homers Odyssee* (Berlin 1885) *ad* 18.163; H. Ebeling, *Lexicon Homericum* (Leipzig 1885) s.v. ἀχρεῖος; W. Schulze, *Quaestiones Epicae* (reprint of 1892 edition: Hildesheim 1967) 362 f.; Van Bennekom (note 1 above); W. Büchner, "Die Penelopeszenen in der Odyssee," *Hermes* 75 (1940) 141; T. Van Nortwick, "Penelope and Nausicaa," *TAPA* 109 (1979) 269–76. Although he does not mention it, her laugh would seem to emphasize the confusion and indecision which Van Nortwick stresses as Penelope's dominant emotion.

[3] Stanford (note 2 above); A. Pierron, *L'Odyssée d'Homére* (Paris 1875) ad loc.; J. Van Leeuwen, *Odyssee* (Leiden 1917) ad loc.; J. Hewitt, "Homeric Laughter," *CJ* 23 (1928) 441; J. Owen, *The Odyssey of Homer* (N.Y. 1880) 518; Ebeling (note 2 above); Faesi (note 2 above); Ameis-Hentze (note 2 above); N. Austin, *Archery at the Dark of the Moon* (Berkeley 1975) 209; U. Wilamowitz, *Die Heimkehr des Odysseus* (Berlin 1927) 19 f.

[4] R. Merkelbach, *Untersuchungen zur Odyssee* (Munich 1951) 12, n. 1.

[5] Büchner (note 2 above) 143.

The explanations of Penelope's disarranged mental state as expressed in this scene would be sufficient explanation for her unusual laugh if it expressed only her confusion and uncertainty. But I shall argue that, besides reflecting her confusion at the sudden notion to show herself to the suitors, her laugh also anticipates her hoodwinking of them. Her laughter expresses more confidence than surprise.

Hewitt[6] speculates briefly that the queen's laugh might show "anticipatory glee at the prospect of luring the suitors into giving her valuable presents," but he does not elaborate. Büchner's analysis is fuller: he sees Penelope's laugh as a counterpart of Odysseus' sardonic smile (20.301): both characters anticipate getting the better of their enemies. He points to Hera's laugh (*Il.* 15.100 f.) when she conceives the plan to embroil Ares with Zeus, as well as Zeus' mischievous laugh when he seizes upon the idea of sending Pandora to delight and corrupt mankind (*Works and Days* 59). He cites a more modern parallel in the Kûdrûn song (1318.4, 1320–23), where, during the preparation for the wedding with the odious Norman King, the heroine laughs aloud because she knows that her liberators will come the next day.[7]

There are other examples of smiling and laughter as appreciation of one's own *dolos* or that of another. Odysseus laughs at the success of the trick he plays on the Cyclops (9.413); Athena and Calypso (13.287, 5.180) show their appreciation of Odysseus' craftiness by smiling; Amphinomos laughs at Telemachos' ingenuity in outsmarting the suitors (16.354); the gods laugh at the cleverness of Hephaistos' trap (8.326); Telemachos uses laughter to cover his true intentions (21.105). In the *Iliad,* Hera smiles (14.222 f.) after fooling Aphrodite into giving up the love charm: she anticipates the successful deception of Zeus. In the *Hymn to Hermes,* the trickery of the infant god elicits appreciative laughs from Apollo (281) and Zeus (389). Laughter and smiling can appreciate as well as anticipate an ἀπάτη. Penelope's laugh does both and is thus an appropriate response to the idea of fooling the suitors.

A further indication that the queen's laugh is associated with her deception is the fact that it introduces a scene which has numerous parallels to the *Dios apate* (*Il.* 14.159 ff.). Both Penelope and Hera use their physical attractiveness to overcome and confuse their male adver-

[6] Hewitt (note 3 above).

[7] Büchner (note 2 above) 142 f. The Kûdrûn has other parallels to the *Odyssey:* constancy of the heroine in the face of attempts to force her into marriage; a faithless servant who enters into a liaison with one of the enemy and is later executed. I thank Professor B. Fenik for pointing out these parallels to me.

saries; both are beautified with an ambrosial skin treatment before they appear to the men (*Il.* 14.170–72, *Od.* 18.191–93); Athena (*Il.* 14.178, *Od.* 18.187) and Aphrodite (*Il.* 14.188, *Od.* 18.193) are involved or mentioned in both preparations; both women wear a κρήδεμνον (*Il.* 14.184, *Od.* 18.210); the whiteness of their appearance is emphasized (*Il.* 14.185, *Od.* 18.196); before their actions, both give another female figure a false excuse for what they are about to do (*Il.* 14.198 ff., *Od.* 18.166 ff.); sleep is an important element in the preparations for their tricks: Hera has an interview with Ὕπνος (*Il.* 14.231 ff.) and Athena pours ὕπνος over Penelope in order to beautify her (*Od.* 18.188); the charms of the Χάριτες are mentioned in both preliminaries (*Il.* 14.267 ff., *Od.* 18.194); gift-giving is emphasized in both scenes (*Il.* 14.238 ff., 268 ff., *Od.* 18.275 ff., 281 ff.); upon first sight of the females, the males are overcome with sexual desire (*Il.* 14.294, *Od.* 18.212); both women begin the interviews with speeches that have nothing to do with the real reason they have come, thus putting the males off their guard (*Il.* 14.301 ff., *Od.* 18.215 ff.); the males compliment the females as being the most desirable of women (*Il.* 14.315 ff., *Od.* 18.297); ἕρματα (earrings) appear only in these two scenes (*Il.* 14.182, *Od.* 18.297) and are described in an identical line which appears nowhere else in Homer (*Il.* 14.183, *Od.* 18.298). The correspondences, both thematic and verbal, are numerous—if not always exact—and point to a similar underlying gestalt.[8] Hera's dupery involves actual sexual intercourse, which would be unthinkable in Penelope's case, but both practice the same sort of deception.

The queen's actions—which her laugh introduces—thus take on a more determined and purposeful aspect when considered as part of a deliberate plan.

Athena's inspiration clouds somewhat the motivation of Penelope. How much does the goddess have to do with the laugh and subsequent actions? The divine management here has led Hoelscher to conclude recently that Penelope herself has no intention to deceive the suitors,[9] but such an interpretation does not stand up to closer inspection. Divine "motivation" often serves to second a mortal's preconceived notion. For example, Athena inspires Penelope to set up the contest of the bow

[8] On the last similarities, cf. M. Nagler, *Spontaneity and Tradition* (Berkeley 1974) 84 n. 22. On the word *gestalt* as a description of what Nagler calls a "preverbal template," cf. 13 ff. He prefers the Sanscrit word *sphoṭa*.

[9] U. Hoelscher, "The Transformation from Folktale to Epic," in *Homer: Tradition and Invention*, ed. B. Fenik (Leiden 1978) 61 ff. Cf. also D. Page, *The Homeric Odyssey* (Oxford 1955) 124 f. for a very literal-minded and rationalistic analysis.

in the same lines as she had motivated her to appear before the suitors (18.158 f. = 21.1 f.), but in the *homilia* Penelope had already announced her intention to do so (19.560–81). Athena twice in identical lines inspires the suitors to abuse Odysseus (18.346–48 = 20.284–86). But this has been a habit of theirs since his first arrival (17.375 ff., 406 ff., 446 ff., 458, etc.) and something which the king himself had already anticipated (16.274 ff.). Athena inspires the suitors with strange laughter which emphasizes their blindness in the face of Theoclymenos' warnings (20.345 ff.), but they have already shown similar behavior without Athena's motivation when they laughed at the Iros scene (18.1 ff.).[10] Odysseus' own ingenuity saves him on the Scherian coast, but his rescue is attributed to Athena (5.426 f., 436 f.); she inspires him to make a trial of the suitors to test their willingness to be reasonable (17.360 ff.), but he had already announced his intention of doing so (16.278 f.). Thus, it is normal Homeric technique to attribute a character's sudden impulse to divine inspiration, and Penelope's responsibility for the idea of meeting the suitors has been generally acknowledged.[11]

Penelope laughs at the notion of fooling the suitors because she knows she can succeed. The context is significant in this respect, for the laugh occurs immediately after Odysseus has warned Amphinomos to leave the palace (18.125 ff.), and thus contrasts that suitor's inability to understand his own situation with the queen's resolve to take the initiative. The extraction of gifts from the suitors is her first direct action in the epic to gain an advantage over them. Her earlier ruse, that of the shroud, had failed.

The present scheme succeeds—much to Odysseus' joy (18.281 ff.)—and looks toward her organization of the trial of the bow—also a project of which Odysseus approves (19.583 ff.). Penelope's knowing laugh introduces her first successful *dolos* against the suitors, while their ignorant laughter (20.346 ff.) serves to preface her second—and more

[10] Cf. D. Levine, "Odyssey 18: Iros as Paradigm for the Suitors," *CJ* 77 (1982) 200–4.

[11] Van Nortwick (note 2 above) 272; E. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational* (Berkeley 1951) 1–18; C. Whitman, *Homer and the Heroic Tradition* (Cambridge, Mass. 1958) 223; Austin (note 3 above); E. Harrison, "Homeric Psychology," *Phoenix* 14 (1960) 78 ff.; A. Amory, "The Reunion of Odysseus and Penelope," in *Essays on the Odyssey*, ed. C. Taylor (Bloomington 1963) 112, 118; P. Harsh, "Penelope and Odysseus in *Odyssey* XIX," *AJP* 71 (1950) 8–9 n. 9; J. Woodhouse, *The Composition of Homer's Odyssey* (Oxford 1930) 201; but cf. Wilamowitz (note 3 above) 19. It is surprising that A. Lesky does not mention this scene in *Göttliche and menschliche Motivation im homerischen Epos* (Heidelberg 1961).

deadly—challenge (21.1 ff.). Her laugh at 18.163 is a reflection of her intention to lead them on. A pleasant visage is part of her disguise, which induces the suitors to regain their hopes of marriage and eagerly to take up the contest of the axes: Pierron writes "un visage triste lui ôterait la moitié de ses charmes."[12] Van Leeuwen sees an explicit connection: "*Hilara mente* procos fieri vult Minera . . . quo libentius mox ineant certamen fatale."[13]

Penelope's laugh and beautification occur in a context which emphasizes her closeness to her disguised husband. She laughs immediately after Athena prompts her to excite the suitors in order to gain good repute in the eyes of her son *and husband:*

> ὅπως πετάσειε μάλιστα
> θυμὸν μνηστήρων ἰδὲ τιμήεσσα γένοιτο
> μᾶλλον πρὸς πόσιός τε καὶ υἱέος ἢ πάρος ἦεν.
>
> (18.160–62)

The king, in his turn, rejoices that she spoke fair words but had other things in her mind (18.281 ff.). He knows Penelope is lying because he never made the speech she ascribes to him (18.257–70). Logically, of course, the queen cannot know that the beggar is her husband; nor can Odysseus know that his wife's promise of imminent marriage is false. The situation demands that each possess more knowledge than they can logically have. Analysts such as Merkelbach and Kirk take such problems as indications of an earlier version of the story in which the king and queen collaborate to destroy the suitors.[14] Fenik has shown that this is not the most probable explanation. Rather, he argues, the poet "loses sight of (or willingly ignores) strict motivation in direct proportion to the extent to which he develops his favorite situations with their special emotions and ironies."[15] A Homeric audience would have no trouble suspending its disbelief; indeed, in all probability they would not even notice the "problem," since the situation demands a conspiratorial tone and a knowing king and queen: exactly what the poet presents. Athena beautifies Penelope as much for Odysseus as for the suitors. This is her first grand appearance before her husband and

[12] Pierron (note 3 above).

[13] Van Leeuwen (note 3 above).

[14] Merkelbach (note 4 above) 11–15; G. Kirk, *The Songs of Homer* (Cambridge 1962) 247 f.

[15] B. Fenik, *Studies in the Odyssey* (*Hermes* Einzelschriften hft. 30, Wiesbaden 1974) 120.

she must look her best.[16] Her laugh thus occurs amidst reminders of her physical and spiritual proximity to Odysseus, thereby emphasizing the knowledge and growing power of the royal family in contrast to the deceived suitors.

In sum, modern scholars have generally interpreted Penelope's laugh at 18.163 in terms of her weaknesses: it expresses her frail feminine reaction to a shocking and embarrassing idea, whence the explanations of ἀχρεῖον as "helpless," "useless," and the like. Such interpretations are not wrong; her laughter indeed suits the character of a chaste and confused matron to whom a surprising thought suddenly comes. Such a reaction matches her modesty and state of mind. But such interpretations, while valid to an extent, are too simple. Besides confusion, the poet has injected another note by associating Penelope's laugh with her scheme: it expresses her cunning as well as her surprise. The "helpless" laughter of the beleaguered queen expresses also her anticipation of tricking the suitors. Penelope's personality is complex: she is on the one hand a confused woman with a divided mind, but, like Hera, she is capable and clever and shows this by her initiation of the μνηστήων ἀπάτη. Her laugh in 18 appropriately conveys both sides of her character: it emphasizes her chastity and introduces her cleverness. It stresses her closeness to Odysseus and looks ahead to their success against the enemy.[17]

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TWO PINDARIC PASSAGES: *PYTH.* 5.55 AND *PYTH.* 10.21–22

I. *Pythian* 5.55

πόνων δ' οὔ τις ἀπόκλαρός ἐστιν οὔτ' ἔσεται·
55 ὁ Βάττου δ' ἕπεται παλαιὸς ὄλβος ἔμπαν τὰ καὶ τὰ νέμων,
πύργος ἄστεος ὄμμα τε φαεννότατον
ξένοισι.

[16] Fenik (note 15 above) 119; Whitman (note 11 above) 303.

[17] The author thanks the editor and anonymous reader for their suggestions for this paper's revision.

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Misunderstanding of verse 55 begins with the scholia, where two key elements are incorrectly glossed. First, the phrase τὰ καὶ τά is taken to mean τὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ κακά (74 a, Dr.), and, second, ἔμπαν is explained as equivalent to ὁμῶς (74 b, Dr.). The meaning of the phrase ἔμπαν τὰ καὶ τά presumably would then be "good and bad alike." Although no editor has, to my knowledge, accepted the scholiast's interpretation of ἔμπαν, most have followed the first gloss and have consequently (like the scholiast) had to distort the meaning of ἔμπαν in one way or another.[1]

First of all, the expression τὰ καὶ τά in Pindar indicates *variety* "this and that,"[2] whose specification must result from the particular context. Although "good and bad" is *prima facie* a possible translation, those interpreters who accept it[3] must adjust other parts of the sentence to fit this meaning. One way, which may go back to Erasmus Schmid, imparts to the participle νέμων an unusual sense and makes it concessive.[4] B. Gildersleeve's gloss "despite its chequered course"[5] has had a number of followers, including Fennell's "albeit chequered fortune,"

[1] LSJ, s.v. ἔμπας I.1, however, follows the scholium. In the Appendix "Die Bedeutung von ἔμπαν" to his *Pindars zweiter und sechster Paian* (Amsterdam 1958) 200–8, S. L. Radt decisively refutes the equation of ἔμπαν with ὁμῶς (ὁμοίως) in Homer and in passing briefly discusses *Pyth.* 5.55, giving an interpretation indebted to Bury (*ad Nem.* 1.30) and very similar to the one proposed here. Unfortunately, Radt's discussion has passed generally unnoticed (I have the anonymous reader to thank for pointing it out to me after I had arrived at my interpretation), and with very few exceptions (Nisetich is one) translators and scholars since 1958 have continued to accept the scholiastic interpretation.

[2] While J. Rumpel, *Lexicon Pindaricum* (Leipzig 1883) s.v. ὁ, simply glosses it as *varia commoda,* W. J. Slater, *Lexicon to Pindar* (Berlin 1969) s.v. ὁ B.4, quotes the scholium and adds "but perhaps *varied blessings* is meant." Cf. the discussions of J. B. Bury, *The Nemean Odes of Pindar* (London 1890) 18 (*ad Nem.* 1.30) and Radt (note 1 above) 178–79 (*ad Pa.* 6.132) and 202.

[3] These include C. G. Heyne, *Pindari Carmina* I (Göttingen 1798) 317: *moderans secunda et adversa* (note the unusual sense given to νέμων), A. S. Way, *The Odes of Pindar* (London 1922) 79: "though happiness and grief may intertwine," and the numerous others listed below. Cf. also H. J. Rose, "Pindar and the Tragedians," *CR* 61 (1947) 44, whose point is invalid if the present discussion is correct.

[4] E. Schmid, Πινδάρου Περίοδος (Wittenberg 1616) 245, well exemplifies the confusion involved in this passage: "τὰ καὶ τά: *haec et illa, bona et mala: est adhuc familiae vestrae Batti illius primi felicitas avita et quasi hereditaria: et nihilominus tamen adversa interdum non nulla admiscentur, quae aequo animo sunt ferenda.*" Once he has accepted the meaning *bona et mala,* he must then shift the force of ἔμπαν (*nihilominus tamen*) to the participle νέμων, which is then given an impossible meaning (*admiscentur*).

[5] B. Gildersleeve, *Pindar: The Olympian and Pythian Odes* (New York 1885) 310. The noun "course" simply skirts the issue of translating νέμων.

Sandys' "in spite of chequered fortune," Lattimore's "its course various," and Conway's "faring or high or low."[6] Similar, but much vaguer, are Bowra's "after one thing and another" and Swanson's "through changes."[7] What underlies all of these translations is the notion that the *olbos* of Battus has had its ups and downs (das wechselvolle Geschick des Battos).[8] But in each of them the participle νέμων is given a very vague meaning, although νέμει appears at verse 64 (as a synonym of πόρεν and δίδωσι, 65) in its usual sense of "give," "provide," "dispense."[9] Furthermore, the very same phrase τά τε καὶ τὰ νέμει occurs at *Isthm.* 5.52, where it clearly means "gives a variety of things."[10] Only Farnell faces the incongruity inherent in these interpretations (although he is unable to resolve the difficulty): "It is characteristic of Pindar that he commits the audacious incongruity of making Prosperity (ὄλβος) dispense sorrow as well as joy."[11] I hope to show that the interpreters—not Pindar—are creating the problem.

The second issue lies in the word ἔμπαν, which *always* means "nevertheless" in Pindar (cf. Slater, s.v.). And unless there is an expressed περ (as at *Pyth.* 4.237), it marks a *contrast* with what precedes.[12] In order to arrive at Gildersleeve's "despite its chequered course," one must suppose a (καί)περ with the participle νέμων.[13] Not only is (καί)περ

[6] C. A. M. Fennell, *Pindar: The Olympian and Pythian Odes* (Cambridge 1893) 217, J. Sandys, *The Odes of Pindar* (London 1919) 239, R. Lattimore, *The Odes of Pindar* (Chicago 1947) 71, and G. S. Conway, *The Odes of Pindar* (London 1972) 129.

[7] C. M. Bowra, *The Odes of Pindar* (Baltimore 1969) 184 and R. A. Swanson, *Pindar's Odes* (Indianapolis 1974) 98.

[8] The phrase is from E. Thummer, *Pindar. Die Isthmischen Gedichte* (Heidelberg 1968) 132. Cf. also his *Die Religiosität Pindars* (Innsbruck 1957) 81.

[9] Cf. Slater and Rumpel (note 2 above) s.v. νέμω.

[10] Although an adequate discussion of the passage is beyond the scope of this note, the expression τά τε καὶ τὰ νέμει at *Isthm.* 5.52 does not mean "good and bad," or "success or failure" as it is usually taken, but sketches the variety of Zeus' *blessings*, of which the victory at Salamis is one example, the present victory at Nemea another. The particular meaning of all such expressions (cf. *Ol.* 2.53, *Pyth.* 7.22, *Pyth.* 12.32, *Nem.* 1.30, *Nem.* 7.55, *Isthm.* 4.33, *Isthm.* 5.52, and *Pa.* 6.132) becomes clear when the context is understood. The mechanical τὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ κακά of the scholia is of no help.

[11] L. R. Farnell, *The Works of Pindar II* (London 1932) 176.

[12] Frequently the adversative force of ἔμπαν is strengthened by ἀλλά, as at *Nem.* 6.4, *Nem.* 10.82, and *Nem.* 11.44. Furthermore, in the first two examples listed ἔμπαν is withheld for several words. Cf. also Radt (note 1 above) and A. M. Miller, "*N.* 4.33–43 and the Defense of Digressive Leisure," *CJ* 78 (1983) 204–5.

not there, but supplying it completely obscures the true force of ἔμπαν, which, along with the δέ (55), actually underlines the fact that the entire sentence is an *exception* to the general rule just enunciated in verse 54.[14]

When viewed in its context, the intended meaning of verse 55 becomes clear. In verses 49–53 Pindar is completing his praise of the charioteer Carrhotus' perilous victory and turning to praise of Cyrene and the Battidae. This transition is paralleled by the very arrival of Carrhotus at his native city (52–53):

> ἦλθες ἤδη Λιβύας πεδίον ἐξ ἀγλαῶν
> ἀέθλων καὶ πατρωίαν πόλιν.

At the beginning of the epode, the poet provides a (transitional) gnome: "No *individual* (τις) is or will be without share of toil." Although the statement is a general observation about the human condition and has no specific reference, it naturally follows the mention of Carrhotus' toil (κάματον, 47).[15] But it is then *contrasted* with the enduring ὄλβος of Battus' line: "But that (ὁ) ancient prosperity of Battus follows (ἕπεται), nonetheless, as it dispenses a variety of things (τὰ καὶ τὰ νέμων), pillar of the city and most brilliant eye for foreign friends." Obviously, among the "varied things" are the continual good works of the house of Battus which have provided stability (πύργος) to the city and made her the cynosure (ὄμμα φαεννότατον) of other Greeks.[16] Far from being the

[13] J. Duchemin, *Pindar. Pythiques* (III, IX, IV, V) (Paris 1967) 176, glosses νέμων as "quoi qu'il arrive," thus giving the participle an impossible meaning and making it impersonal, which it is not.

[14] There is a good parallel at *Pa.* 2.28–31: νεόπολίς εἰμι· ματρὸς / δὲ ματέρ' ἐμᾶς ἔτεκον *ἔμπαν* / πολεμίῳ πυρὶ πλαγεῖ- / σαν.

[15] Here, as frequently in Pindar, a transitional gnome will look back to what has preceded and then serve (by contrast or elaboration) to introduce the next point. As far as I know, no one has pointed out that the contrast is between the *individual* (τις, 54) who is always subject to vicissitude (πόνων, 54), and the ὄλβος of Battus' line which *nevertheless* (i.e., in contrast to—or in spite of—individual setbacks) continues from of old to provide all sorts of benefits. Thus, scholars have been correct in recognizing a background of "ups and downs" in these lines, but they have misplaced its locus, and attempted to force it on the expression τὰ καὶ τὰ νέμων.

[16] In his paraphrase of this passage, Radt (note 1 above) 202 makes the statement apply narrowly to Arcesilas: "kein Sterblicher ist ohne Mühen (auch du nicht), aber *doch* begleitet dich des Battos altes Glück, das dir bald diesen bald jenen Erfolg bringt." But Arcesilas (and *his* success "Erfolg") is not directly at issue here; rather the poet is referring generally to the family's civic (cf. πόλιν, 53 and ἄστεος, 56) benefactions.

"ups and downs" of the house's fortunes, τὰ καὶ τά sketch the broad front of its activities, which are then specified as service to the city (ἄστεος) and generosity to others (ξένοισι), that is, devotion to Pindar's pan-Hellenic ideal (cf. *Nem.* 4.11–13). Thus the handful of interpreters, who like Boeckh gloss τὰ καὶ τά as *haec atque illa prospera,*[17] are correct. The passage is in fact a glowing tribute to the remarkable longevity (cf. παλαιός) of this family's ὄλβος and to the variety of its accomplishments.[18]

II. *Pythian* 10.21–22

τῶν δ' ἐν Ἑλλάδι τερπνῶν
20 λαχόντες οὐκ ὀλίγαν δόσιν, μὴ φθονεραῖς ἐκ θεῶν
μετατροπίαις ἐπικύρσαιεν. θεὸς εἴη
ἀπήμων κέαρ. εὐδαίμων δὲ καὶ ὑμνητὸς οὗτος ἀνὴρ γίνεται σοφοῖς,
ὃς ἂν χερσὶν ἢ ποδῶν ἀρετᾷ κρατήσαις
τὰ μέγιστ' ἀέθλων ἕλῃ τόλμᾳ τε καὶ σθένει,
25 καὶ ζώων ἔτι νεαρόν
κατ' αἶσαν υἱὸν ἤδη τυχόντα στεφάνων Πυθίων.

In contrast to the previous example, misunderstanding of the expression θεὸς εἴη ἀπήμων κέαρ does not begin with the scholia, for it was consistently understood as a prayer-formula equivalent to *deus sit*

[17] A. Boeckh, *Pindari Opera* II.2 (Leipzig 1821) 288. Cf. also L. Dissen, *Pindari Carmina* II (Göttingen 1830) 262: *varia bona afferens,* J. A. Hartung, *Pindar's Werke II* (Leipzig 1855) 260, and F. J. Nisetich, *Pindar's Victory Odes* (Baltimore 1980) 191: "bringing its varied blessings." A. Puech, *Pindare II* (Paris 1955) is only slightly off the mark with his "apportant sans cesse de nouveau succès."

[18] It should be pointed out in passing that one of the dominant themes of the poem is the *olbos* of the house of Battus (ὁ Βάττου . . . ὄλβος, 55; σφὸν ὄλβον, 102), which from of old (παλαιός, 55) has been handed down in succession to its latest representative, Arcesilas, who (as an individual) has had his hard times (10), but whose hearth now blazes in calm (11). Thus the τις in verse 54 includes not only Carrhotus, but also Arcesilas. But as heir to the great *olbos* (πολὺς ὄλβος, 14) which surrounds him in the form of wealth (πλοῦτος, 1), hereditary rule (βασιλεύς, 15), and success in the games (21), Arcesilas himself is exemplary of the tenacity and diversity of his famous line. For at the end of the poem, after praising the variety of Arcesilas' achievements (ὅσαι τ' εἰσὶν ἐπιχωρίων καλῶν ἔσοδοι, / τετόλμακε, 116–17), Pindar prays that an Olympic victory might be added to the successes of the Battidae (Βάττου γένει, 124).

propitius animo,[19] until 1839, at which point G. Hermann insisted that the scholiast had misinterpreted the phrase, which really meant *eum cui aerumnis vacuum sit cor*. Furthermore, he argued, if it is a prayer, it is otiose because it merely repeats what has been said before. Therefore, he proposed emending it to read: θεὸς οἶος ἀπήμων κέαρ, "God alone [is] free from pain in his heart."[20] Although no editor to my knowledge has adopted his emendation,[21] the legacy of his remarks has been continuous.

Beginning with Donaldson,[22] and continuing through the latest editions, editors and translators have attempted to wrest Hermann's meaning from the text without resorting to emendation. For example, Gildersleeve maintained that θεὸς εἴη was equivalent to θεὸς ἔστω and meant "Let him that is free from heartache be a god," "Set him down as a god."[23] C. A. M. Fennell, however, followed Mommsen and Bergk, and interpreted the εἴη as a potential optative without ἄν (citing *Pyth.* 4.118, a very uncertain example), and translated the sentence: "A god would of course be free from care."[24] Although a case can be made in

[19] Cf. E. Schmid (note 4 above) 353, C. G. Heyne (note 3 above) 388, A. Boeckh (note 17 above) 70, and L. Dissen (note 17 above) 330. While—I hope to show—the paraphrase *deus sit propitius animo* is correct in spirit, it does suggest that ἀπήμων κέαρ is active, which it is not. In this respect, the paraphrase causes confusion while the scholium (see below) does not.

[20] G. Hermann, *Opuscula* VII (Leipzig 1839) 165–66.

[21] The following year C. L. Kayser, *Lectiones Pindaricae* (Heidelberg 1840) 63, approved Hermann's suggestion, but F. W. Schneidewin, "Variae Lectiones," *Philologus* 3 (1848) 528–29, found it "zu kühn" and proposed emending εἴη to αἰεί. In 1855, J. A. Hartung (note 17 above) changed εἴη to ἐστιν, but translated his emended version (θεός ἐστιν ἀπήμων κέαρ) with "Götter allein zwar / Sind leibfreien Gemüthes," showing the persistence of Hermann's οἶος, even when it does not appear in the text.

[22] J. W. Donaldson, *Pindar's Epinician or Triumphal Odes* (London 1841) 179, agreed with Hermann's interpretation of the passage, but felt that the alteration was "unnecessary." He understood the optative as potential and referred to *Ol.* 3.45 (as well as *Ol.* 9.80 and *Pyth.* 4.118) for a similar use without ἄν. He then rendered the passage: "*God may* have his heart free from sorrow; but a *man* is blest enough if he obtains glory himself and sees his son also successful."

[23] B. Gildersleeve (note 5 above) 353, was unwilling to take εἴη as equivalent to εἴη ἄν, and this accounts for his very forced translation (with θεός as predicative), effects of which can be seen in the versions of Lattimore and Conway (see below). To add to the confusion, in his paraphrase (just three pages earlier) Gildersleeve seems to treat εἴη as concessive (see note 40 below).

[24] C. A. M. Fennell (note 6 above) 263. He distinguishes his translation from Mommsen's and Bergk's that make θεός predicative and the subject indefinite: "One free

certain instances for a potential optative without ἄν (κε) in Pindar,[25] it is very difficult to get "would of course be" from a mere εἴη.

A sample of recent English translations will show the amount of uncertainty in dealing with this phrase (I have italicized interpretative words): "*He* that is free from pain of heart *may well be divine*" (Sandys); "*Sooth,* a God's heart *only is* painless" (A. S. Way); "*Only* deity *is* immune to pain" (R. A. Swanson); "Whose heart knows naught of sorrow, *let him be named a* god" (G. S. Conway); "*To be* without grief of heart *is to be a* god" (R. Lattimore); "Though God *alone never* tastes woe" (Bowra); and "[*only*] a god *could have* a heart free of sorrow" (Kirkwood). For some of these translations it is difficult to know just what text was being used. But what is most surprising is that such an array of interpretations can result from a simple, straightforward expression, which (if read without preconceived ideas) means basically what the lone scholiast on this passage says (33 a, Dr.): ἀβλαβὴς καὶ ἀνόργητος ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτῶν (v.l. αὐτοῦ) κατορθώμασιν εἴη ὁ θεός, "may divinity not be harmed or angry because of their [his] successes."[26]

An examination of the statement in its context helps confirm the traditional meaning. Beginning at verse 10, Pindar invokes Apollo with the observation that with the help of the gods the beginning and end of human endeavors is sweet. He then praises father and son for their victories at Pytho and Olympia (11–16), culminating in the name of the father Phrikias (16). As in numerous other passages of praise (e.g., *Ol.* 1.115–16, *Ol.* 2.12–15, *Ol.* 4.12–13, *Ol.* 5.17–23, *Ol.* 6.101–5, etc.), the poet prays for the goodwill of the gods and hopes for continued success. Either optatives or imperatives are conventional in such passages and frequently a series of requests results. For example, at *Ol.* 7.87–93 there are three imperatives: τίμα . . . δίδοι . . . μὴ κρύπτε, which show

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from care would surely be a god." This "surely" and Fennell's "of course" are legacies of Hartung's "zwar" (see note 21 above) and represent an attempt to make a gnome of the statement.

[25] Cf. W. W. Goodwin, *Syntax of the Moods and Tenses of the Greek Verb* (New York 1889) 4, 80–81, and the long discussion in *Appendix I.* The case for such optatives in Pindar is well made by L. R. Farnell (note 11 above) 29, 70 (where read *Ol.* iii.45), and 77 (where read *Ol.* iii.45).

[26] L. R. Farnell (note 11 above) 217, says that the scholiast is taking ἀπήμων actively. Although both ἀβλαβής and ἀπήμων have active and passive meanings, it is clear that the scholiast is defining the *state of mind* of the divinity as being *affected by* (ἐπί with the dative regularly defines the provocation of emotions) Phrikias' (and his son's) success.

how the poet can dwell on his prayers by using both positive and negative expressions. Furthermore, the last request (μὴ κρύπτε) is asyndetic. At the end of *Ol.* 6, three optatives are followed by two imperatives: μὴ θράσσοι χρόνος (97) . . . δέξαιτο (98) . . . θεὸς . . . παρέχοι φιλέων (101–2) . . . δίδοι (104) . . . ἄεξ' (105), two of which (μὴ θράσσοι and θεός . . . παρέχοι φιλέων) are asyndetic.[27]

There are three successive optatives in *Pyth.* 10.17–22: ἕποιτο . . . [μὴ] ἐπικύρσαιεν . . . εἴη. It is inconceivable that the third optative in the series could be understood by the audience as entirely different from the preceding ones,[28] especially when the phrase θεὸς εἴη ἀπήμων κέαρ, although unparalleled in specific vocabulary, nevertheless is easily recognisable as a prayer-formula like θεὸς εὔφρων εἴη at *Ol.* 4.12–13 and θεός . . . παρέχοι φιλέων at *Ol.* 6.101–2, both of which occur in the midst of extended praise of success.

What causes the most difficulty is the expression ἀπήμων κέαρ, for κέαρ (an accusative of respect) demands the passive sense of ἀπήμων, "not troubled," as ἀπήμων κραδία "undisturbed heart" at *Nem.* 1.54.[29] Although I can find no exact equivalent for this expression, it is certainly consonant with other formulas that are concerned with the god's state of mind and either solicit his "pleasure" (e.g., εὔφρων at *Ol.* 4.12, ἱανθείς at *Ol.* 2.13, and πρόφρων at *Pyth.* 5.117) or avert his "irritation" (e.g., ἀφθόνητος . . . γένοιο at *Ol.* 13.25–26 and θεῶν δ' ὄπιν ἄφθονον αἰτέω at *Pyth.* 8.71–72). Indeed, there is a good positive equivalent of ἀπήμων κέαρ at the beginning of *Ol.* 5, when the poet requests Camarina to receive the present celebration "with a glad heart": καρδίᾳ γελανεῖ

[27] Cf. also *Ol.* 8.84–88: θέλοι [sc. Ζεύς] (85) . . . ἀπαλάλκοι (85) . . . ἀέξοι (88); *Ol.* 13.24–30; and *Pyth.* 5.117–21.

[28] It may be significant that the phrase θεὸς εἴη / ἀπήμων κέαρ is asyndetic and embedded in the context of the prayer as are the two close parallels at *Ol.* 4.12–13: θεὸς εὔφρων / εἴη λοιπαῖς εὐχαῖς and at *Ol.* 6.101–2: θεός / . . . παρέχοι φιλέων. At any rate, the position of θεὸς εἴη ἀπήμων κέαρ tells strongly against its *differing* radically in sense from the preceding optatives or marking a strong *contrast* with what follows in the same verse. Conversely, for a potential optative (clearly marked by κεν) in a series of requests, cf. *Pyth.* 1.69–70.

[29] It is important to note that in this close parallel ἀπήμων κραδία refers to the *state of mind* of one freed from something upsetting. That ἀπήμων κέαρ could refer to a god in the sense of "with untroubled heart" is not surprising when Greek gods are normally envisioned as experiencing emotions of sorrow, pity, anger, envy, pleasure, etc. in reaction to the deeds of mortals.

. . . δέκευ (2–3).[30] In this light, ἀπήμων κέαρ is a form of litotes for "content."[31]

Thus, in the first of the three successive prayers, the poet prays that μοῖρα (17) may continue to increase their great wealth (πλοῦτον, 18). In the second he prays that they not encounter begrudging (φθονεραῖς, 20)[32] reverses from the gods, that is, that they continue to win their great share of sweet success (τῶν ἐν Ἑλλάδι τερπνῶν, 19). The third prayer (21–22), in asyndeton, is more general in scope, and it puts a solemn seal on Pindar's great praise of the family and prepares for the specific praise of the father, who in the following lines (22–26) is said to have reached the limits of human happiness. All this caution is meant to heighten the hyperbole of his praise which follows for οὗτος ἀνήρ "a man like this one."[33] While the first two prayers ask for continued blessings, the last one is specifically concerned with the god's reaction *to this occasion.* The following δέ (22), which most understand as adversative,[34] would then be equivalent to the frequent γάρ, ἐπεί, τοι, or δέ which links the praise with prayers and explains why the god should be disposed in such and such a way.[35] Divinity, then, having been asked to further the success of the family (17–21), is here requested to receive favorably (literally, "not to be pained at") the good fortune (εὐδαίμων, 22) and its praise (ὑμνητός, 22) which Phrikias has received. The following caveats about the limits of human success in lines 27–30 not

[30] Cf. the expressions εὐμενὲς ἦτορ ἔχων and ἵλαον ἦτορ ἔχουσα at *h. Orph.* 30.9 and 35.6.

[31] Litotes (whether with μή or ἀ-privative) is particularly common in prayers.

[32] As in the above examples from *Ol.* 13.25 and *Pyth.* 8.72, the poet abjures any φθόνος (displeasure, ill-will, reluctance) on the gods' part, a conventional aspect of prayers. Perhaps because he has already mentioned the more frequently employed φθόνος he then (for variation) resorts to the less usual ἀπήμων κέαρ.

[33] Although οὗτος (ἀνήρ) does look forward to the general relative clause which follows, its obvious application is to Phrikias. In order to preserve both the demonstrative and generalizing force of the expression, I have translated it as equivalent to τοιοῦτος "a man like this, who . . ." (cf. Slater, s.v. οὗτος 1.b., although he labels it as prospective). A parallel is κεῖνος ἀνήρ at *Ol.* 6.7 (cf. Slater, s.v. κεῖνος 2.).

[34] Interpreters who see here a stated contrast between the lot of the gods and that of man naturally consider the δέ as adversative. Frequently the passage is rendered as if the δέ emphasized ἀνήρ (= ἀνὴρ δέ): "God may . . . but a man" (Donaldson), "Though God alone . . . yet that man" (Bowra), and "The gods . . . but a man" (Nisetich).

[35] For γάρ, cf. *Ol.* 4.10, *Ol.*11.19, and *Isthm.* 6.10; for ἐπεί, *Ol.* 4.14 and *Ol.* 7.90; for τοι, *Ol.* 7.93, *Ol.* 8.10, and *Nem.* 9.32; for δέ, *Ol.* 9.83, *Pyth.* 1.59, *Nem.* 3.6, *Nem.* 10.2, and *Isthm.* 1.67. Although the content of these passages differs, they all share the same function of explanation and assurance after a request.

only assure the god of Phrikias' proper humility, but also conclude his praise with the familiar "go no further" motif.[36]

Before concluding, I would like to point out some of the difficulties that arise from regarding θεὸς εἴη ἀπήμων κέαρ as *potential* without ἄν (e.g., "The gods may feel no sorrow," Nisetich) or *concessive* (e.g., "Though God alone never tastes woe," Bowra),[37] and making it gnomic. Admittedly, such statements to the effect that the gods live free from sorrow while men do not are commonplace in Greek thought from Homer on,[38] and it is tempting to see the same sentiment expressed here. To be sure, in a large sense Pindar contrasts men's limitations with the power of the gods in many passages (including the one in lines 27 ff. and similar "seek not to become Zeus" injunctions, e.g., *Ol.* 5.23–24 and *Isthm.* 5.11–15), but a contrast of this specific sort is *not* in Pindar.[39] Furthermore, to introduce the motif of πόνος/κάματος suddenly at this point is inappropriate because there is no contrast with any πόνος that Phrikias has (supposedly) undergone. I suspect that these interpreters are looking forward to the "go no further" motif in

[36] Cf. *Ol.* 1.114, *Ol.* 3.44–45, *Ol.* 5.23–24, *Nem.* 3.19–21, *Isthm.* 6.10–13, and *Isthm.* 7.39–44. The last two passages bear close resemblance to the one under discussion.

[37] Note how the words "alone" (the legacy of Hartung's οἶος) and "never" (the legacy of Schneidewin's αἰεί) have crept into Bowra's translation, although his own text (OCT) maintains the reading of the MMS. Both words represent an effort to make a gnome of the phrase.

[38] Cf. *Il.* 24.525 ff. (echoed at *Pyth.* 3.80 ff.). O. Schroeder, *Pindars Pythien* (Leipzig 1922) 94, notes an interesting parallel at Aesch. *Ag.* 553–54: τίς δὲ πλὴν θεῶν / ἅπαντ' ἀπήμων τὸν δι' αἰῶνος χρόνον; some such idea undoubtedly lies behind attempts to make θεὸς εἴη ἀπήμων κέαρ a gnomic statement, but the differences of language and context of the Aeschylean passage do not support a similar interpretation of the Pindaric phrase. L. Farnell (note 11 above) suggests a similarity with Simonides, *fr.* 542.14–16 (PMG):

θεὸς ἂν μόνος τοῦτ ἔχοι γέρας, ἄνδρα δ' οὐκ
15 ἔστι μὴ οὐ κακὸν ἔμμεναι,
ὃν ἀμήχανος συμφορὰ καθέλῃ.

As in the case of the messenger's statement in the *Agamemnon* above, there are tantalizing similarities. But what is clearly expressed in Simonides' observation (ἂν . . . ἔχοι, μόνος, and ἄνδρα δ') must be read into the Pindaric passage.

[39] As far as I know, only two Pindaric parallels have been suggested: *Isthm.* 3.18: αἰὼν δὲ κυλινδομέναις ἁμέραις ἄλλ' ἄλλοτ' ἐξ / ἄλλαξεν. ἄτρωτοί γε μὰν παῖδες θεῶν (Donaldson [note 22 above]), and *Pyth.* 5.54: πόνων δ' οὔ τις ἀπόκλαρός ἐστιν οὔτ' ἔσεται (Fennell [note 24 above]). It is apparent that neither one is sufficiently close in language or thought to serve as a model for *Pyth.* 10.21–22. Even the opening of *Nem.* 6, which discusses the relationship of gods and men in some detail, does not provide a convincing parallel.

lines 27–29 and to the description of the Hyperboreans in lines 29 ff., and seeking to introduce the motif of πόνος (cf. πόνων, 42) here.

Finally, those who interpret the phrase as a gnomic statement must understand an ellipsis in order to maintain logic, as Farnell's rendition shows: "a god might be free from all sorrow [but no man can be]."[40] or add generalizing words such as "only" (Way, Swanson), "alone" (Bowra), "sooth" (Way), "of course" (Fennell), "all" (Farnell), or else make adjustments in the following statement to provide a contrast.[41] Far from clearing up difficulties, this *consensus paene omnium*[42] really creates greater problems of syntax and logic. How much easier it is to take θεὸς εἴη ἀπήμων κέαρ in its most obvious sense and regard it as a prayer that god may feel no misgivings if Phrikias has reached the limits of human success.

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ATOSSA'S SECOND ENTRANCE: SIGNIFICANT INACTION IN AESCHYLUS' *PERSAI*

Given the above title, the reader will surely think of the queen's second entrance, ἄνευ τ᾽ ὀχημάτων / χλιδῆς τε τῆς πάροιθεν (607 f.), the

[40] L. Farnell (note 11 above) 216–17. Similar is Gildersleeve's rendition (note 5 above) 350: "Granted that God's heart suffers no anguish, 'tis not so with men."

[41] For example, Donaldson (note 22 above) inserts "enough": "but a *man* is blest enough. . . ." Also, the emphatic εὐδαίμων δὲ καὶ ὑμνητός (22) tends to be reduced, as in Nisetich's translation (note 17 above) 216: "but a man / should be accounted happy / and worthy of song. . . ."

[42] A. Puech (note 17 above) 147, alone among the modern editors I have examined, regards the phrase as a prayer: "Puisse la divinité montrer un coeur indulgent." He does, however, go on to make the observation: "Le sens de cette phrase est controversé; d'autres entendent que Pindare oppose aux Dieux, qu'aucun mal ne saurait atteindre, les hommes, qui, tout soumis qu'ils sont aux vicissitudes du sort, ont cependant aussi leur part de joie."

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last word referring specifically to her previous appearance, when the audience saw her in royal finery befitting any Persian monarch and especially appropriate in a play in which clothes—whether golden or black, whole or ripped—become a visual symbol of the current state of Persian might.[1] But whatever Atossa wears at her second entrance, it is presumably plain enough to allow full play to the negative force of ἄνευ: it is what she *lacks*—chariot-drawn entrance and royal robes—that is significant here.[2] It is the aim of this brief note to demonstrate that among the infinitude of other things not happening at Atossa's second entrance there is one more of significance, and that the significance of this non-action is also determined primarily by her first entrance.

At 150–54 the chorus, or perhaps only the coryphaeus, announce the arrival of their queen; at 152, making up a whole clause, occurs the word προσπίτνω, whose paroemiac ending, as Broadhead notes, provides a suitable stopping place for them to perform their *proskynesis*.[3] Although such a spectacle of oriental obsequy would have been a strik-

[1] W. M. Thalman, "Xerxes' Rags: Some Problems in Aeschylus' *Persians*," *AJP* 101 (1980) 260–85; E. Petrounias, *Funktion und Thematik der Bilder bei Aischylos* (Göttingen 1976; Hypomnemata 48) 24 f.

[2] O. Taplin, *The Stagecraft of Aeschylus: The Dramatic Use of Exits and Entrances in Greek Tragedy* (Oxford 1977) 75–79, reverses the emphasis: "Aeschylus has used the imaginative and unusual technique of making some stage business, apparently unremarkable, significant in retrospect. Attention is, therefore, drawn to the visual meaning of the event not at the time of its occurrence, but only later" (79). Although I think that at the moment of Atossa's second entry the audience feels the lack of chariot etc. more than a belated sense of the earlier scene's significance, they clearly need the latter to experience the former; so there is no major point of disagreement between Taplin and me—only, as was said, a difference of emphasis. On the role of the chariot, see also Petrounias (note 1 above) 14 f.

[3] H. D. Broadhead, *The Persae of Aeschylus* (Cambridge 1960) ad loc. T. Musenides, *Aischylos und sein Theater* (Berlin 1937) 89, as his stage direction for 155, writes "Chor: niederkniend," which suggests that when Musenides directed the *Persai* in Athens he had the chorus on its knees for the trochaic tetrameters of 155–58. But to keep the chorus dancing throughout the anapests, it seems better to have them perform their act of prostration between 152 and 153, the time spent in which would also explain what would otherwise be a slight metrical anomaly, i.e., a paroemiac in the middle of an anapestic system. It is not possible to say whether Aeschylus had his chorus merely drop to their knees (cf. Hdt. 2.80.2 κατιέντες μέχρι τοῦ γούνατος, Eur. *Ph.* 293), or (as the etymology suggests) had them lie prostrate. If only for its greater dramatic effect, I prefer the latter. For more on the act of *proskynesis*, in general and in Aeschylus, see P. Keiper, *Die Perser des Aischylos als Quelle für altpersische Altertumskunde* (Erlangen 1877); A. S. F. Gow, *JHS* 48 (1928) 135 f.; H. N. Crouch, "Proskynesis and Abasement in Aeschylus," *CP* 26 (1931) 316–18.

ing bit of stagecraft all by itself, there is more to it than this alone. All acts of this sort—from vestigial bowing and curtseying to the most "humiliating" pronation—are meant to demonstrate the *sub*servience of one person or group to another. Originally it was falling on the battlefield that led to the symbolic recreation of this literal fall. It is because the Persians have laid low so many enemies that even the loyal elders of the court prostrate themselves before Atossa. What I wish to show is that Aeschylus has explored and exploited this connection between the literal and symbolic falls in the lines between the first and second entrances to find a visual counterpart for the "fall" of Persian power.

When Atossa first enters we learn that she has had a disturbing dream. She fears, not for herself, but μὴ μέγας πλοῦτος κονίσας οὖδας ἀντρέψῃ ποδὶ / ὄλβον, ὃν Δαρεῖος ἦρεν (163 f.). As has been recently shown, this is an image from the wrestling pit (κονίστρα): "lest much wealth raising dust from the ground trip up true prosperity."[4] Wrestling, as such, however, forms no part of the extended imagery of the *Persai*;[5] it is referred to here primarily for its "falls," three of which determine the victor in a match.

Atossa goes on to narrate her dream: Xerxes yokes two women, one Greek and one Persian, to his chariot. The Greek, however, not fully broken in, struggles and pulls her own way, with the result that Xerxes falls to the ground (πίπτει δ' ἐμὸς παῖς, 197), where he now tears his clothing and sees Dareios, who has, *more somnium*, suddenly appeared before him. The image of the yoke along with that of clothing has been noticed,[6] but nobody has looked beyond the obvious sense (that Xerxes' literal fall within the dream foreshadows his defeat at Salamis) to note how Aeschylus has used the idea of falling for dramaturgical purposes.

Note, for example, how the messenger in his first sentence confirms the prophecy of the dream: τὸ Περσῶν δ' ἄνθος οἴχεται πεσόν (252).

[4] D. Sansone, "Aeschylus, *Persae* 163," *Hermes* 107 (1979) 115 f. See Broadhead ad loc. for some ways in which failure to understand this line has led to unnecessary conjectures. On the distinction between *ploutos* and *olbos*, see M. Gagarin, *Aeschylean Drama* (Berkeley 1976) 44 f., with n. 35.

[5] M. Poliakoff, "The Third Fall in the *Oresteia*," *AJP* 101 (1980) 251 n. 2, notes the scarcity of wrestling images in Aeschylus outside the *Oresteia*. He adds (more tentatively than necessary) *Pe.* 929 f. Ἀσία . . . ἐπὶ γόνυ κέκλιται. Perhaps also to be added (for the reason to be given immediately below) is 313 + 312 οἵ τε ναὸς ἐκ μιᾶς πέσον / Ἀρκτεὺς, Ἀδεύης, καὶ Φερεσσεύης τρίτος.

[6] Petrounias (note 1 above) 7–15.

Instead of subject races bowing before the Persians it is now arrows that fall before them: τοξικῆς τ' ἄπο / θώμιγγος ἰοὶ προσπίτνοντες ὤλλυσαν (460 f.). It is true that since the arrows strike the Persians, the literal sense here is "fall upon, strike against" (LSJ s.v. I.1), rather than the word's earlier sense at 152, "fall down at another's feet"(ibid. III), but I think that nobody familiar with Aeschylus' use of language will deny at least the possibility that the second occurrence is meant to echo the first.[7] And whereas the elders had bowed before Atossa almost as to a god (ἥδε θεῶν ἴσον ὀφθαλμοῖς / φάος ὁρμᾶται μήτηρ βασιλέως, 150 f.), in an ironic turn of events, on their desperate retreat from Greece even whoever of the Persians had not believed in the gods now bowed before Earth and Heaven (εὔχετο / λιταῖσι, γαῖαν οὐρανόν τε προσκυνῶν, 497–99). The sense seems to be that all Persians bowed before the king; now, in their desperation, they bow even before the gods. Is it any wonder that after hearing this news the chorus lament (in vivid "prophetic" presents) that Asia is no longer ruled by Persian law, and that the subjects no longer pay tribute nor fall to the ground in obeisance (οὐδ' ἐς γᾶν προπίτνοντες / ἅζονται, 588)?

As this last line occurs just 10 lines before Atossa's second entrance, it seems reasonable to take it along with 607 f. quoted above as a kind of negative stage direction: The queen, in plain robes, walks in and the men remain standing. What more unexciting description can one find of an entrance scene? And yet, as we have seen, the stage action of the first scene combined with the imagery of clothing and falling have turned the most ordinary action into a visual demonstration of Persia's downfall.[8]

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[7] The difference in senses is mitigated by the absolute use at 461—without the usually accompanying πρός, εἰς, or dative.

[8] Taplin (note 2 above) 99, briefly remarks that the queen's first entrance was "accompanied by extravagant prostration: now her entry is made without formal accompaniment." Petrounias, on the other hand (note 1 above), maintains that "Die Proskynese . . . zielt auf den hervorgerufen Gegensatz bei Empfang des Xerxes, der durch keine Proskynese sondern durch Klagen begrüsst wird. . . ." Taplin has the right scene and Petrounias makes the right general point, so both deserve credit for noting what so many have missed, but, as I hope to have shown, Aeschylus' language points toward there being intended a meaningful (*pace* Taplin) contrast between Atossa's first entrance and her second (*pace* Petrounias).

SOPHOCLES, *AJAX* 172–79*

ἦ ῥά σε Ταυροπόλα Διὸς Ἄρτεμις,

. . . . . .

ἢ χαλκοθώραξ ἤ τιν' Ἐνυάλιος

Among important modern editors only Kamerbeek and Stanford retain the MSS reading ἢ . . . ἤ in 179. Most recently R. D. Dawe, editor of the Teubner text, substitutes εἴ for the second ἤ, thereby endorsing one of a number of suggested emendations which have the effect of making χαλκοθώραξ qualify Ἐνυάλιος rather than standing on its own to signify Ares. It thus seems apt to restate the case for the MSS reading and its inevitable consequence that we are dealing with three deities rather than two.

The initial point to consider is the post-Homeric distinction between Ares and Enyalios who, no matter what their origins,[1] are clearly *equated* in Homer.[2] Religious observances associated with a deity named Enyalios at places like Athens, Megara, and Salamis[3] are not in themselves evidence for such a distinction. However, the very existence of these observances as historical phenomena demonstrates that Sophocles was not obliged to think purely in terms of the Homeric Ares/Enyalios concept.[4] This fact is underlined by the more solid evi-

* I am most grateful to the editor and to the anonymous reader for helpful suggestions concerning this paper.

[1] For an early record of the name Enyalios, see M. Ventris and J. Chadwick, *Documents in Mycenaean Greek*[2] (Cambridge 1973) 311–12.

[2] See especially *Il.* 13.519–22 and 20.69. Cf. also *Il.* 2.651 and 13.528. Homer can also use ἐνυάλιος as an epithet of Ares (*Il.* 17.210–11).

[3] For Enyalios at these and other places, see, e.g., L. R. Farnell, *The Cults of the Greek States* vol. 5 (Oxford 1909) 396 ff., M. P. Nilsson, *Geschichte der Griechischen Religion*[2] vol. 1 (Munich 1955) 519, and Jessen, *R.E.* s.v. "Enyalios." With regard to Salamis in particular, see also L. Deubner, *Attische Feste*[2] (Darmstadt 1966) 218–19. For an interesting discussion of Enyalios at Argos, see W. Vollgraff, "Une Offrande à Enyalios," *BCH* 58 (1934) 138–56.

[4] Indeed, it may be precisely because of the Salamis cult that Sophocles actually included a reference to Enyalios, as especially appropriate on the lips of a chorus of Salaminian sailors. This, of course, if true, would not prove anything one way or the other about the relationship between χαλκοθώραξ and Ἐνυάλιος in *Ajax* 179.

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dence[5] for a distinction as such (Schol. A ad *Il.* 17.211; Pollux 8.106; Ar. *Pax* 457 and Schol. ad loc.)[6] drawn at least by the Athenians.[7] It is quite clear from this that reference to Enyalios by a Sophoclean chorus would not exclude the possibility of their referring to the separate deity Ares as well.

The next points at issue are (1) whether χαλκοθώραξ would be a suitable epithet for Ares and (2) whether the epithet *by itself* could signify this deity. These interrelated questions lie at the heart of the problem and have elicited very different responses. Jebb, for example, does not even consider the *possibility* that χαλκοθώραξ alone could designate Ares. Kamerbeek, on the other hand, glosses over the difficulty: "Ares, denoted by χαλκεοθώραξ [*sic*], is due to *Il.* V 704 χάλκεος Ἄρης." It does, however, seem clear that χαλκοθώραξ would in theory be a suitable epithet for Ares, whose Homeric associations with bronze[8] are echoed by a number of later passages. Stanford cites as examples χαλκοβόαν Ἄρη (*O.C.* 1046) and Ἀρεά . . . ὃς/νῦν ἄχαλκος ἀσπίδων (*O.T.* 190–91), to which may be added Ἄρες . . . χαλκοκορυστά (*h. Mart.* 1–2), χαλκεοστέρνου τ' Ἄρηος (B. 5.34), χαλκάρματός . . . πόσις / Ἀφροδίτας, i.e., Ares (Pi. *P.* 4.87–88)[9] and χάλκασπις . . . Ἄρης (Pi. *I.* 7.25. Cf. E. *I.A.* 764).

[5] The Scholiast's comment (διαστέλλει τὸν Ἄρεα ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἐνυαλίου ὡς ἕτερον δαίμονα ὑπουργὸν τοῦ μείζονος θεοῦ καὶ δῆλον ἐκ τῶν συνδέσμων. δηλοῦται γὰρ ὁ Ἄρης ἐκ τοῦ χαλκοθώραξ), partially reproduced in the *Suda* lexicon, is not really helpful, since it seems to be motivated simply by a desire to explain the received text.

[6] For details of all the relevant evidence, see most conveniently Kamerbeek's note ad loc. Of course, the exact relationship between Ares and Enyalios at various periods of Greek history is a matter of controversy. Differing views are offered, e.g., by Farnell (note 3 above) 402–3, Nilsson (note 3 above) 518–19, Jessen (note 3 above) and Sauer, *R.E.* s.v. "Ares." Cf. also Wilamowitz, *Der Glaube der Hellenen* vol. 1 (Berlin 1931) 104–5, and Stoll, in Roscher's *Lexicon der Griechischen und Römischen Mythologie* 1.1, who denies a distinction between the two deities as early as the Fifth Century B.C. Among Sophoclean commentators, Lobeck, who rejects the MSS reading, in the course of a characteristically exhaustive note interprets the evidence available to him as showing only that the names Ares and Enyalios could have been different cult titles of the one deity. Jebb (Appendix on 179), however, though also an opponent of the MSS reading, argues strongly that the distinction *was* made.

[7] Even though distinguished, Ares and Enyalios obviously had very similar functions and attributes, the factor upon which Ar. *Pax* 456 ff. depends for its point.

[8] Cf. also *Il.* 16.543.

[9] Pindar also uses the Homeric χάλκεος Ἄρης (*O.* 10.15. Cf. *I.* 4.15).

This is not to deny that χαλκοθώραξ would be equally suitable as an epithet of Enyalios.[10] Indeed, it may even be used as such in the expression χαλκοθώρ]ακος 'Ενυαλίου (Pi. *Fr.* 169.12) where, however, the restoration of χαλκοθώρ is clearly based on the proximity of χαλκοθώραξ and 'Ενυάλιος in *Ajax* 179. Even if the restoration itself is correct,[11] it still proves nothing about the Sophoclean passage. After all, an epithet can often be applied differently in different contexts. For example, as well as being used of Ares, χάλκασπις is also used of Heracles (S. *Ph.* 727). Poseidon is designated by the epithet ἐλελίχθων (Pi. *P.* 6.50) which is elsewhere applied to Dionysus (S. *Ant.* 154) and even to the inanimate τετρασορία (Pi. *P.* 2.4). Even Athene's special epithet γλαυκῶπις which also on occasion stands alone (e.g., Pi. *O.* 7.51) can be applied by Euripides to the moon (*Fr.* 1009 N²).[12] Thus there is no reason why χαλκοθώραξ could not be associated with Enyalios by Pindar and with Ares by Sophocles.

[10] It is also applied by Pindar to Abderus (*Pae.* 2.1 = *Fr.* 52b.1) and by Bacchylides to the Atreidae (11.123) and to Theseus (17.14–15). Cf. also the Homeric phrase ἀνδρῶν / χαλκεοθωρήκων (*Il.* 4.447–48 and 8.61–62).

[11] It certainly does seem attractive. For a start, the context is a straightforward lineage formula, which virtually rules out any epithet displaying the innovative character of, e.g., Sophocles' δεξιόσειρος (applied to Ares at *Ant.* 140). Routine poetic epithets of the War God, whether Enyalios or Ares, tend to fall into three main categories. The first of these draws attention to his essential nature, e.g., μιαιφόνος (*Il.* 5.31), ὄβριμος (*Il.* 5.845), ὠμόφρων (E. *El.* 1260). The second highlights his activities, e.g., βροτολοιγός (*Il.* 5.31), πτολίπορθος (*Il.* 20.152), βαθυπόλεμος (Pi. *P.* 2.1). The third focuses on his accoutrements of war, e.g., ἐγχέσπαλος (*Il.* 15.605), χρυσ(ε)οπήληξ (*h. Mart.* 1, A. *Th.* 106), ['Ενυάλιος] δοριμήστωρ (E. *Andr.* 1015–16), κελαινεγχής (Pi. *N.* 10.84). There are, in fact, few epithets for the War God appropriate to Pindaric Greek which (a) belong to one of these categories and (b) have a genitive in -ακος. Cf., e.g., the comparatively barren field in C. D. Buck and W. Petersen, *A Reverse Index of Greek Nouns and Adjectives* (Illinois n.d.) 615–20. A -φυλαξ compound (e.g., ὁπλοφύλαξ; see entry in *LSJ*) is unlikely, since it would have a defensive flavor foreign to the essentially aggressive character of the War God, although it could not be ruled out altogether, given the use of πολισσόος (cf. ἐρυσίπτολις of Athene, e.g., at *Il.* 6.305) with the apparent sense of "saving the city" (*h. Mart.* 2). There is always, of course, the option of another -θωρ(α)ηξ compound such as αἰολοθώρηξ which is used of Antiphos and Menesthios at *Il.* 4.489 and 16.173 respectively. It is perhaps worth noting in this connection that κορυθαίολος, the epithet especially associated with Hector, is actually applied to Ares at *Il.* 20.38.

[12] In cult contexts too, individual epithets are sometimes applied to more than one deity, e.g., ἐναγώνιος (Dionysus as well as Hermes), ἀγοραῖος/α (Zeus and Hermes; Artemis and Athene), γενέθλιος (Poseidon and Zeus), νικηφόρος (Aphrodite as well as Athene), ταυροπόλος (Demeter as well as Artemis). Cf. Farnell (note 3 above) vols. 1–5 *passim*. This usage reflects a certain overlap of function and in some cases perhaps even of identity.

The question as to whether χαλκοθώραξ *by itself* could signify Ares is more difficult. There is certainly no direct parallel, nor is any other epithet used for Ares in this way. However, as Stanford points out, χαλκοθώραξ occurs "in a context suggesting a divinity," and if Sophocles *did* use it for Ares there would at least be no doubt as to which deity was meant, given the fact that Enyalios, the only real alternative, is named straight afterwards anyway. Moreover, the *practice in general* of designating a deity by epithet alone is a well-known feature of Greek poetry. Homeric examples include ἀργυρότοξος (*Il.* 1.37), ἑκάεργος (*Il.* 1.147), ἑκηβόλος (*Il.* 1.96) and ἑκατηβόλος (*Il.* 15.231) of Apollo, γλαυκῶπις (*Il.* 8.406) of Athene, ἰοχέαιρα (*Il.* 21.480) of Artemis, ἐννοσίγαιος (*Il.* 15.218), ἐνοσίχθων (*Il.* 13.89), and γαιήοχος (*Il.* 13.83) of Poseidon.

These particular titles are otherwise used in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* only as epithets of the relevant deities.[13] The word κυανοχαίτης, however, which as well as functioning as an epithet of Poseidon can also by itself signify this deity (*Il.* 20.144), is elsewhere applied as the epithet of a horse (*Il.* 20.224).[14] Similarly, outside the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, among those epithets used substantively as in Homer to designate particular deities, there are several which also function in different areas. Thus ἀργειφόντης, for example, used substantively of Hermes in Hesiod and the Homeric Hymns as well as in Homer, is used by Sophocles, on the assumption of an alternative etymology, with reference to Apollo (*Fr.* 1024 Radt). And again, Poseidon's title γαιήοχος, which appears in Pindar as well as in Homer, is used as an epithet of Zeus by Aeschylus (*Supp.* 816) and of Artemis by Sophocles (*O.T.* 160), while ἑκηβόλος, used substantively of Apollo by Pindar again, is employed by various authors to qualify such nouns as χέρες, τόξα, and σφενδόναι, as well as being applied by Sophocles to Artemis (*Fr.* 401 Radt). The use of γλαυκῶπις of the moon by Euripides has already been noted.

In addition, post-Homeric writers employ as noun substitutes a number of epithets not occurring in Homer at all. Under this category

[13] Some of them, when used as nouns, on occasion have a further epithet. In this context, mention should be made of Athene's titles τριτογένεια and ὀβριμοπάτρη which are always used as nouns in Homer, sometimes with another epithet, and sometimes alone (*Il.* 22.183, *Il.* 5.747). Hephaistos' epithet ἀμφιγυήεις, when used as a noun, is always qualified by another epithet.

[14] This usage is possibly a reflection of the horse associations of Poseidon Hippios. Outside the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* κυανοχαίτης is used substantively of Poseidon (Hes. *Th.* 278), as an epithet of specifically named horses (Hes. *Sc.* 120, Thebais IV), and also as an epithet of Hades (*h. Cer.* 347).

come ὀρσοτρίαινα, εὐτρίαινα, and ἀγλαοτρίαινα used by Pindar[15] to denote Poseidon in the same way as ἐλελίχθων already mentioned, while Hades is represented in the Homeric Hymns by πολυδέγμων (*h. Cer.* 17) and πολυδέκτης (*h. Cer.* 9). In these cases, of course, it is obvious which deity is meant. A more significant parallel perhaps is κουροτρόφος. This particular epithet *is* used in Homer, but not of a deity.[16] In post-Homeric poetic contexts it is associated with Eirene (Hes. *Op.* 228 and E. *Ba.* 420), Hecate (Hes. *Th.* 450 and 452), Brimo[17] (A.R. 3.861), Aphrodite (Pl. Com. *Fr.* 174.7 and *AP.* 6.318) and Leto (Theoc. 18.50). In addition, Diodorus Siculus (5.73) applies it to Artemis, and Pausanias (1.22.3) and the *Suda* to Ge, while the Hesychius entry mentions Demeter. The use of the epithet *by itself* naturally leads to confusion. The Κουροτρόφος to whom the Samian women offer sacrifices ἐν τῇ τριόδῳ (Ps.- Hdt. *Vit. Hom.* 30) is presumably Hecate,[18] though Hera is a possibility.[19] Aphrodite too has claims, given the content of the prayer ascribed to Homer in the story, the use of the same prayer in the anecdote told about Sophocles by Athenaeus (592a), and the courtesan's oath πρὸς τῆς κουροτρόφου (Luc. *DMeretr.* 5.1). By contrast, ἡ Κουροτρόφος seems to indicate Ge when it occurs immediately after ἡ Καλλιγένεια (presumably Demeter) in the list of deities at Ar. *Th.* 299.[20] We are clearly dealing with an epithet which in addition to other uses can be applied to a wide range of female deities with overlapping functions, but which can also be used on its own in any given situation to refer to one of them. The potential application of this principle to an epithet at least *appropriate* to male war deities is obvious, and in the light of what is clearly an *ongoing* creative process involving both cult and literature, it would be rash in the extreme to endorse Lobeck's confident conclusion about χαλκοθώραξ: "Quid Sophocles h.l. intelligi voluerit, apertum est, quum χαλκοθώραξ numquam sic ut Ἀργυρότοξος vel Ὀρσοτρίαινα pro nomine proprio poni soleat."

[15] Pindar also uses ἐννοσίδας (e.g., *Pae.* 4.41), a form of ἐννοσίγαιος.

[16] Homer applies it to Ithaca (*Od.* 9.27). It is also used metaphorically by Pindar (*Fr.* 109), by Euripides (*Tr.* 566) of Hellas (or the noun στέφανος), and by Callimachus with reference to Delos' nurture of Apollo (*Del.* 2 and 276).

[17] For this deity see Kern, *R.E.* s.v. "Brimo."

[18] Cf. West at Hes. *Th.* 450.

[19] Cf. Farnell, *Cults* vol. 1, 196.

[20] For the name in other cult contexts, cf. *LSJ* s.v. "κουροτρόφος," Farnell, *Cults* vol. 3, 17–18 and 231, and Eitrem, *R.E.* s.v. "Gaia."

Contextual and stylistic considerations remain to be taken into account. First, is there any valid reason why both Ares and Enyalios should not be named in this context? The evidence for distinction between the deities by Athenians shows incidentally that the two could readily be mentioned in the same breath. Some commentators, however, make an issue out of the chorus' suggestion that if Enyalios is responsible for Ajax's madness then perhaps it is because of some resentment arising out of a shared military enterprise (μομφὰν ἔχων ξυνοῦ δορὸς 180). The point is that the war god under the name of Ares tends in Homer to act on the Trojan side. Thus Schneidewin/Nauck, who assume the presence only of Enyalios in the *Ajax* passage, suggest this factor as a possible reason for Sophocles' decision *not* to specify Ares as such. However, the μομφὰν ἔχων ξυνοῦ δορὸς clause need not also apply to χαλκοθώραξ (= Ares). In this case, the range of the chorus' speculation will include a basically hostile war deity and a friendly but offended one. But the clause may equally well apply to both deities, since Sophocles was not obliged to keep the partialities of the Homeric Ares in focus.[21]

The second and more important question is whether two or three deities are stylistically more appropriate. The choral strophe as a whole (172–81) is in the form of a series of speculative questions. As W. Kranz suggests,[22] this form is probably an echo of the old religious formula in which the worshipper asks under which cult title the relevant deity should be invoked or which of several possible services is required. In literature, the formula is divorced from the specifically religious sphere and adapted with varying degrees of artistic refinement[23] to any situation which demands speculation about different possibilities. Often, however, some connection with the gods is retained. Sophocles exploits the form in *Ajax* 172 ff. for the purpose of dramatic irony since Athene, the deity who is in fact responsible for Ajax's madness, is not one of the deities tentatively proposed by the chorus. A similar irony lies behind the chorus' speculation about the identity of Oedipus' parents (*O.T.* 1098 ff.) and the cause of Phaedra's sickness in the parodos of Euripides' *Hippolytus* (141 ff.).

[21] For that matter, ξυνοῦ δορὸς could refer to an incident prior to the Trojan War. We are in the realms of fine distinction in any case, since Ares and Enyalios are equated, as we have seen, in some Homeric contexts.

[22] W. Kranz, *Stasimon* (Berlin 1933) 188. See also T. B. L. Webster, *An Introduction to Sophocles*[2] (London 1969) 188 n.T.

[23] In the case of Pindar, see C. M. Bowra, *Pindar* (Oxford 1964) 280–81.

It does seem significant that in the majority of such cases three possibilities at least are mentioned. This is true, for example, of A. *Ag.* 55–56,[24] Pi. *Fr.* 29, *h.Ap.* 207 ff., E. *Hec.* 444 ff. and E. *Tr.* 205 ff. These passages embrace a variety of situations,[25] both simple and more elaborate, which range from options involving individuals through different aspects of the same individual to different geographical localities. Other Sophoclean examples are *O.C.* 1048 ff. in which the chorus speculate about the site of the battle between Theseus and the kidnapping Thebans, and *Aj.* 879 ff. in which three possible sources of information about the missing hero are mentioned. The *three* possibilities formula as such may simply represent an extension of the practice of invoking deities in triads.[26] There may be the further point, however, that quite apart from the question of stylistic neatness, three is felt to be the minimum number of examples needed to imply a multiplicity of possibilities as opposed to a straight choice between two specific alternatives.[27] But whatever the implications, the practice itself strongly suggests that on stylistic grounds three deities are involved at *Ajax* 172 ff. Artemis would be introduced first with extensive qualifying material, then χαλκοθώρας alone, then Enyalios with brief qualification. The technique of variation is paralleled for example by *O.C.* 1048 ff. where the first possible battle site receives a bare mention, the second is elaborated, and the third more briefly qualified.

The conclusion is clear. The points considered above, especially the last, taken in conjunction with the fact that none of the proposed emendations is entirely satisfactory or universally accepted,[28] strongly suggest that the MSS reading should stand.

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[24] Cf. Fraenkel's note ad loc.

[25] Examples such as Pi. *O.* 2.2 (τίνα θεόν', τίν' ἥρωα, τίνα δ' ἄνδρα) belong to a different category although they show a stylistic affinity, as in other ways do the numerous passages included under such labels as "priamel" or "recusatio."

[26] This practice can be seen applied to literature in passages such as S. *O.T.* 159 ff.

[27] If this is so, to Fraenkel's comment at A.*Ag.* 55 f. ("The idea is 'some one of the Most High, no matter which: either Apollo or Pan or Zeus.'") should be added the rider "or any other appropriate deity if such a one (or ones) exists."

[28] Elmsley's εἴ has proved the most influential, being adopted by Pearson (OCT) and the Budé editors as well as by Dawe.

REVIEWS

C. W. MacLeod. Homer: Iliad Book XXIV. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1982. Pp. ix + 161. £15 (cloth), £5.95 (paper).

New commentaries on the *Iliad* are rare. There is still no equivalent in print of Stanford's *Odyssey*, and readers of the *Iliad* in Greek who have progressed beyond the beginner's level must rely instead on two old school texts: Monro (1884) and Leaf and Bayfield (1908), both reprinted constantly but never updated. While these venerable editions have their virtues, they contain of course no account of twentieth-century scholarship on Homer, and in the case of the latter, analyst certitudes make much of the commentary very debatable. (For beginners the situation is slightly less grave with the appearance of Willcock on *Iliad* 1–12 and the second year of Cambridge's *Reading Greek*. But here too there is much that could be done—an updated version of Benner's selections [1903] would be very useful, for instance.) For these reasons the late C. W. MacLeod's new commentary on *Iliad* 24 is especially welcome.

In the preface, the author states two main purposes: ". . . to give some at least of the help which unpractised readers might want in tackling *Iliad* 24," and, ". . . to show in detail, over a continuous stretch of the poem, something of Homer's skill and greatness" (vii). In both of these aims M. succeeds admirably, providing a commentary which, though apparently directed primarily to advanced undergraduates, could be read with profit by more experienced Homeric enthusiasts as well.

The introductory material is divided into five main sections: "The *Iliad* as a tragic poem," "Book 24 and the spirit of the *Iliad*," "Book 24 in the structure of the *Iliad*," "Language and style," and "Metre and prosody." These are followed by a brief bibliographical note and an explanation of the text and apparatus. The first essay is an interesting discussion of the songs of Demodocus in *Odyssey* 8, which M. says ". . . may be regarded both as a complement to the *Iliad*, in that they recount stories which are closely connected with it but lie outside the scope of the narrative, and as a reflection upon the *Iliad*, in that they embody in a condensed and significant form some of its major themes and aims" (2). The arguments here are intriguing and do introduce in their course some of the major themes in the *Iliad* (e.g., ". . . the quarrel of the two 'best' men as the beginning of a series of trouble [Book 1], and the deception by a god of the Greek leader [Book 2]—or more broadly, men's unwitting fulfillment of a divinely determined pattern of events . . ." [2–3]), but the whole approach seems rather oblique given the momentous title of the section. There is virtually no discussion of Achilles, for instance, and the explanation of what is "tragic" in the poem (the term is used rather loosely [7]) does not quite draw together the various aspects of a rather intricate argument. M.'s assertion at the end of this section perhaps gives a better indication of what he is getting at: "The poetics implicit in Homer himself, rather than any preconceived notions of 'oral' or 'heroic' poetry, should guide our reading of his work" (8). The polem-

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ical tone here surfaces elsewhere in M.'s discussion of critical issues in the service of a rather narrow approach to Homeric scholarship which mars his otherwise admirable book.

The second and third sections are more successful. The former, a refutation of the idea that Book 24 is uncharacteristic of the spirit of the rest of the poem, compares to it two scenes in Book 6, the meetings of Hector with Andromache and Glaucus with Diomedes, and then notes how certain earlier trends are reversed in the last scenes of the poem. The third section is divided into three subsections, on Book 24 as a completion of the story, on Books 23 and 24 as complementary conclusions to the story, and on echoes of Books 1, 2, and 9 in Book 24. All of this is very helpful, putting Book 24 in the larger context of the entire poem and preparing the reader for the various levels of resolution occurring in the final scene between Priam and Achilles.

M.'s discussion of language and style is fairly straightforward and clear, with an explanation of dialect mix, of the influence of Parry's work (though here the bibliography is deficient for an introduction to the subject, omitting any mention for instance of Lord's extension of Parry's work or Fenik's studies of larger narrative patterns), of modifications of standard phrasing, repeated lines and patterns, ritual actions (M.'s definition of "ritual" is slightly odd, since he seems to ignore the sacral overtones which the term usually carries), everyday formulae and their modifications (again the title is a bit misleading in the context of Homeric studies, as M. is talking about everyday phrases of polite discourse, not traditional language based on oral composition), descriptions of dawn as an example of formulaic composition and variation, similes, and assonance. The final section on meter and prosody is again clear and helpful though a fuller explanation of the difference between quantitative and qualitative metrical systems would be useful. M.'s text is, as he says, conservative, with divergences from Allen's text noted in a workmanlike, abbreviated apparatus and discussed in the commentary, a system which will encourage students actually to pay attention to textual problems rather than mystifying them with arcane symbols.

The coverage and level of explanation in the introduction establish fairly clearly the work's intended audience. It is not aimed at beginners, grappling with the forms of the optative (though aid in these matters is not lacking), but at those students of Greek who have read some Homer early on and now want to explore the *Iliad* in more depth, learning the varieties of Homer's expression, studying the poem as literature, and beginning to read some Homeric scholarship. For this reason, M.'s "Bibliographical Note" (58–60) is very disappointing. He begins by drawing welcome attention to the scholia, but then proceeds through a lofty and acerbic dismissal of most of the previous commentaries (e.g., ". . . dull and sketchy, but not worthless . . . ," ". . . not contemptible . . ."). These works are flawed in various ways, no doubt, but the recital is a very dreary experience nonetheless. This is followed by a list of works frequently cited, some of which would be of interest to the student (Chantraine, Wace and Stubbings, Parry, Griffin) but more often rather recherché (a Norwegian monograph on the Diomedes episode, a technical study of Gorgias, etc.). There is no general bibliography which gives the outlines of the field, and this is surely a major omission.

M. states clearly in his preface that he has been influenced most by the work of three German scholars, Schadewaldt, Reinhardt, and Beck (viii), and his remarks elsewhere indicate that he, like Griffin in his recent book, is reacting against the strong influence of Parry on English and American scholars. One cannot object to this preference, and a variety of perspectives in the field is welcome. To offer, on the other hand, a commentary aimed primarily at those who are presumably entering into the vast wealth of secondary material on Homer with no mention in a bibliography or in the notes of the work of Kirk, Lord, Whitman, or Fenik (to name only a few) does no service to M.'s intended audience.

But the commentary itself is the heart of the enterprise and here M. is uniformly excellent, providing certain kinds of information available nowhere else in English. All the grammatical difficulties which might trip up the reader are covered fully, and there is sensitive appraisal too of small details of expression which particularize the traditional language of Homer, indicating tact, compassion, despair, etc., in the speaker (e.g., on Hermes' tact at 391–404; τόνδ' at 702). Frequent attention is given to the rhetorical structure of individual lines or short passages, something which tends to get lost in theoretical discussions of Homeric style (e.g., on Helen at 771–72), and there is full treatment of the larger structure of the narrative, something entirely missing from the older commentaries. Finally, extensive citations in the commentary place the style and content of Book 24 in the larger context of Greek and Latin literature.

Amidst this generally high level of achievement, M. is particularly good on: the delicate nuances of the exchange between Hermes and Priam (esp. *ad* 339–48, 362, 390, 398, 423–31, 433); the meeting of Priam and Achilles (*ad* 523, 534–38, 542, 551, 587–89, 594–95, 614–17, 629–32); the laments for Hector (*ad* 702, 721–22, 723–76). I have only two small reservations: I am not convinced by M.'s support of the condemning of lines 6–9 (Nagler's discussion is challenging and might have been mentioned, along with his treatment of the consolation scenes), and there is no mention of the *katabasis* element in Priam's journey.

Apart, then, from the problem of bibliography, MacLeod's work is a valuable addition to the meager selection of commentaries on the *Iliad*. One hopes that his example will encourage the writing of other new commentaries, perhaps even the monumental scholarly treatment of the entire poem which is long overdue.

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'Ε. Ν. Πλατής, *Οἱ κατήγοροι τοῦ Σωκράτη*. Φιλολογική μελέτη. (E. N. PLATIS, The Accusers of Socrates. A philological study.) Athens, 1980. Printed privately.

Platis examines virtually every scrap of ancient testimony bearing on the identity and character of the three accusers and on the motives of the prosecution. He canvasses the whole gamut of scholarly opinion on all aspects of the subject, illustrates it by copious quotations, and appraises it critically. This is the most

thorough treatment of the topic yet produced in any language, and the conclusions it reaches are in every case entitled to respect. I shall review them briefly.

To start with Meletus. An influential view, vigorously championed by John Burnet (*Plato's Euthyphro, Apology, and Crito* [Oxford 1924] *ad Euthyphro* 2B9), still favoured by W. K. C. Guthrie (*History of Greek Philosophy,* vol. 3 [Cambridge 1969] 381), identifies him with the Meletus who is named by Andocides as one of the prosecutors at *his* trial for impiety (*de Myst.* 94). On the further assumption that the latter was *also* identical with the author of ps.-Lysias 6 (*Ag. Andocides*)—that "monument of religious fanaticism," Burnet rightly calls it (*loc. cit.*)—this produces an attractive hypothesis, affording all by itself, Burnet argued, "an intelligible motive for the prosecution" (*loc. cit.*). However, the hypothesis is doubly insecure: neither of its assumed identities is attested by ancient authority. And Platis adduces a variety of circumstances which make it unlikely that the prosecutor of either Andocides or Socrates could have been that fledgling poet, "young and unknown" (Plato, *Euthyphro* 2B8) at the time of those trials. Standing on the same description of Meletus in the *Euthyphro*—our clearest and firmest clue to his identity—Platis also rebuts another well-sponsored misidentification (traceable back, as he shows, to Greco-Roman times), the one with the tragic poet and scoliographer by that name (cf. Aristophanes, *Frogs* 1302; frgs. 149, 150, 435 Koch). Since this man is satirized in Aristophanes' *Georgoi,* produced not later than 422 B.C., he could hardly have been described as "young and unknown" in 399. I need not go into the other misidentifications Platis rebuts in his careful review of the evidence. He leaves us with no choice but to agree that Meletus, though formally the mover of the *graphé,* was a person of no account, used as a mere tool by Anytus whom, as is well known, Plato regards as in all but name the effective accuser (*Ap.* 31A5 taken with 18B3). *Pace* Burnet, Meletus would not need to be (though, for all we know, he may have been) a hyper-fanatic to have served as a front man for Anytus.

In Lycon's case the interesting question is whether he could have been the character by that name in Xenophon's *Symposium,* chaperoning at that banquet his beautiful young son, Autolycus, current inamorato of the host, the superrich, bland, and dissolute Callias. A variety of scholars—among them the most recent editor of Xenophon's *Symposium* (Francois Ollier, *Xenophon: Banquet, Apologie de Socrate* [Paris 1961] 28)—had argued that Xenophon could not have given a future accuser of Socrates the role assigned to Lycon here, that of a father, solicitous for the morals of his son in the delicate social circumstances of that occasion, grateful to Socrates for his praise of *sōphrōn erōs* (his parting words are, "By Hera, Socrates, you seem to be *kalos kagathos*" [9.1]). Platis argues persuasively on the other side: Xenophon's apologetic interests would have been well served by a dramatic fiction where Socrates, so far from "corrupting" young men, incites them to *kalokagathia.* The picture which emerges from Platis' discussion of assorted references to Lycon in the comic poets is that of a petty political boss who makes his way in the world as the complaisant husband of the beautiful and brilliant Rhodia and as the client and political handyman of rich Athenians—a "spineless" individual, whose personal feeling for Socrates, whatever it may have been at the time of the trial, would not likely stand in the way of rendering his current patron whatever services might be demanded of him.

Now for Anytus. Powerful and honoured leader in the newly restored democracy (Plato, *Meno* 90B; Andocides, 1.150), admired for his scrupulous adherence to the provisions of the amnesty at grave personal loss (Isocrates 8.33), he has had a good press: Heinrich Maier (*Sokrates* [Tübingen 1913] 472), "ein ehrlicher patriotischer Mann"; Bury-Meiggs (J. B. Bury, *History of Greece,* 3rd ed., rev. by Russell Meiggs [London 1951] 580), "the honest democratic politician." Platis agrees ("honest—this is beyond doubt," [200])—too easily, it seems to me, in view of what he does with two reports which reflect unfavorably on Anytus' personal character:

(1) Aristotle's *Ath. Pol.* (27.5) reports that Anytus had once bribed wholesale a heliastic court (the first occurrence of *dekazein to dikastērion,* according to Aristotle) to win acquittal on a charge of treason—an unfair one, no doubt: the squadron under his command had been prevented by a storm from coming to the relief of Pylos. The veracity of this report (though supported by both Diodorus and Plutarch) has been rejected (most recently by J. Humbert, *Socrate et les petits Socratiques* [Paris 1967] 47, n. 1) by scholars who follow Wilamowitz (*Aristoteles und Athen* [Berlin 1893] vol. 1, 128) in holding that Aristotle had been deceived by a malicious fabrication of the Socratics. Under Platis' critical scrutiny this suspicion proves groundless. Should he not then concede that accolades to Anytus' character need to be taken down a peg or two, if at one time in his life he had not scrupled to save his skin by subverting judicial process?

(2) Platis makes a convincing case for taking our Anytus to be the *sitophylax* by that name in Lysias 22.8–9, holding office in 388–87. The defendant in that trial is a metic wheat-retailer, accused of buying from the importers more than the legally permissible maximum of 50 *phormai,* who claims that he had done so "at the bidding of the magistrates." The other *sitophylakes* deny the charge. Anytus, called to the stand, is handled with kid gloves by the prosecution, which is not surprising, considering the great power he had exercised in the state not so long before. He is not required to answer the plain question, "Did you, or did you not, bid this man *buy* more than fifty *phormai?*" and is let off with the plea that "he had not ordered [the wheat-retailers] to buy *and hold in store* [more than 50 *phormai*] but had only counselled them not to buy against each other [i.e., not to engage in competitive bidding]" (*ibid.* 9). Whatever may be the truth of this matter (Platis adopts a plausible conjecture by Wilamowitz as to what really happened), what remains beyond doubt, as Platis observes (184), is this: Anytus gave some instruction or other to the retailers—small fry, people with no political clout—which put them in breach of the law and exposed them to a capital charge, while leaving him judicially invulnerable. Added to the preceding, far graver, blot on Anytus' record, it leaves one still more skeptical of the image of the "honourable man" built up for Anytus in the scholarly literature.

What personal motives might he have had for prosecuting Socrates? We hear of none in Plato's *Apology.* (The "many resentments" aroused in those subjected to elenctic examination by Socrates [22E6–23A2] and by youthful imitators of him [23C2–D2] could hardly qualify: even extreme exasperation at such harassment could not have led one of its victims to indict Socrates for an offense punishable by death.) But Xenophon appends the following tale to his *Apology of Socrates:* After the trial, Socrates, looking at Anytus, declares: "He

killed me because I had said that a man accorded the highest offices by the city should not have educated his son among hides [i.e., in the tannery business]," and prophesies that "for lack of a worthy supervisor" the lad would come to a bad end—and, true enough, the boy becomes a drunkard (30–31). What shall we think of this story? If true, it offers us on a silver platter Socrates' personal estimate of *the* motive for the indictment ("he killed me because . . ."). I submit that we should be very suspicious of it on several grounds (see K. von Fritz, "Zur Frage der Echtheit der Xenophontische *Apologie des Sokrates*," *Rhein. Museum* 80 [1931] 36–69 at 44–49) and especially on one to which little attention seems to have been paid: the lack of any recounting of it by later authors hostile to Anytus: eager to blacken his name, they would have been strongly inclined to regurgitate it, if they had had any confidence in its truth. Particularly significant, it seems to me, is its cold-shouldering by Libanius, given his own (rather absurd) conviction that the reason for Anytus' hostility to Socrates was the latter's habit of referring to tanners, which Anytus mistook for disparaging allusions to the source of his own wealth (*Apology of Socrates* 26, 28–29). If Libanius had given any credence at all to Xenophon's tale, he would have had ample reason to advert to it: it would have cast a glaring light on Anytus' villainy, making Socrates the scapegoat for his own self-reproach at the sorry education he was giving his son. The same would be true of two much earlier authors, both of whom wrote Apologies for Socrates—Lysias, not long after Socrates' death, and Demetrius of Phalerum, late in the fourth century. Though both are lost, it is a reasonable guess that neither of them repeated that story, for had they done so it is hard to believe that others would have failed to follow their example. That the tale has left no trace in the whole of the tradition that has survived to us is tantamount to antiquity's vote of nonconfidence in it.

Platis appears to think he can extract a sliver of evidence in support of that lurid tale in Xenophon—"a clear hint of its truth" (p. 195)—from Anytus' encounter with Socrates in Plato's *Meno* (89E ff.). In that passage Socrates argues that if political virtue were teachable, Themistocles and other famous Athenians would have succeeded in passing on theirs to their sons. This angers Anytus and he responds with a veiled threat: those who slander others may be made to suffer for it, "especially in this town, as you yourself may come to know" (94E–95A). I submit that this exchange, viewed in context, though entirely consistent with the truth of Xenophon's story, gives no evidential support to it—not the slightest. Certainly, if Anytus had had a son stuck away in the family tannery it would have touched a raw nerve to be reminded that the sons of illustrious predecessors of his had been learning music, riding, and wrestling (93D1–5, 94B2–C5) at the same age. But the text does not say or imply that this is what provoked him. Nothing is said by Socrates in Plato's text to suggest that Anytus had done worse for his son than they had done for theirs. Socrates makes no such comparison at all. It would not have been to the point for what is being debated: Anytus shares the common belief (he implies as much at 92E3–6) that any Athenian who is *kalos kagathos* can teach virtue to others; and Socrates cites outstanding cases of reputed *kalokagathia* where this is manifestly false. Anytus' annoyance is sufficiently motivated in the text by the collision of incontrovertible fact with a dogmatist's fancies. It does not need to be explained by going outside the text to postulate a father's sense of guilt for putting his son into trade instead of sports and music.

I trust I have not made too much of the tale in Xenophon, a minor item in Platis' account of Anytus on which he puts no weight when he comes to construct his positive view of Anytus' reasons for contriving the prosecution. Platis sees these reasons as strongly public-spirited: he acted to protect Athens' traditional values from the corrosive acids of that rationalist criticism of moral ideas which found in Socrates its most energetic agent. In support of this judgment Platis makes excellent use of the same Platonic text: the encounter of Socrates with Anytus in the *Meno.* He focuses on the latter's outburst at Socrates' mention of sophists as professed teachers of virtue—"may no such madness seize anyone close to me, relative or friend, citizen or alien, to make him go to such men to be ruined by them . . ." (91C)—a remark whose vehemence is unsurpassed by any of the nasty things said about sophists elsewhere in our sources and which is, in any case, rude in the extreme, for it is made in the presence of Meno, Anytus' own *xenos,* professed pupil of Gorgias, and is followed up crescendo, moments later, by a tirade against the "madness" of "parents and guardians who let their wards suffer such damage" and "of the cities which let those people get in and don't drive them out—be it an alien or a citizen who tries to do that sort of thing" (92B). Anytus is depicted here as being only a step away from the decision to institute the suit against Socrates: when a powerful leader inveighs at the "madness" of a city that suffers such pests in its midst, he is all but saying that Socrates should be flushed out of Athens. For who would doubt that in Anytus' eyes Socrates himself is a sophist? That is how he lived in the tradition, as is clear from Aeschines' well-known remark, half a century later ("Athenians, you put to death Socrates the sophist because he had educated Critias" [1.173]), and it could hardly have been otherwise in his own lifetime. As Grote remarks (*History of Greece* [vol. 8, Everyman ed., London 1906] 315): "It is certain that if in the middle of the Peloponnesian war, any Athenian had been asked, 'who are the principal Sophists in your city?' he would have named Socrates among the first." In the *Apology* we see Plato making Socrates impute directly to Anytus the identical sentiment Anytus is made to express about Socrates in the *Meno:*

> He [Anytus] said [in his prosecutory address to the court] that either this suit should not have come to court [i.e., that Socrates should have preferred self-exile to standing trial: Burnet's reasonable interpretation of the remark *ad loc.*] or, once it did, it is imperative that you should put me to death for, if I were acquitted, your sons, practicing what Socrates teaches, would be thoroughly corrupted. (*Ap.* 29C1-5)

Thus we are told twice over—both in the *Meno* and the *Apology*—that what Anytus takes to be Socrates' deleterious effect ("corruption," *Meno* 91E4, *Ap.* 29C5) on the minds of those affected by his teaching is *the* motive, the only one worthy of mention, in Anytus' prosecution of Socrates. In arguing for the same thing, Platis has the full support of our most perceptive and trustworthy witness.

Did Anytus think of that "corruption" in political, no less than moral, terms? In particular, did he think of it as subversive of loyalty to the democracy? The view that Socrates was in fact an ideologist of the extreme right, a crypto-oligarch, dies hard. It was resuscitated recently in a book which appeared too late to reach Platis' bibliography: *Class Ideology and Ancient Political Theory* (Oxford 1978) by Ellen M. Wood and Neal Wood. An even less critical version

of that view had previously appeared in Greece: John Kordatos, *History of Ancient Greek Philosophy* (in Greek), 2d ed., Athens 1972. Platis argues strongly against this position. Having laboured in the same cause (cf. my review of the book by Wood and Wood in *Phoenix* [34 (1980), 347 ff.]), I can appreciate all the better the force of a new agrument Platis brings to the case by citing the stand of Lysias, whose political orientation is not in doubt: it is manifest in the lavish aid he furnished from his own purse to the embattled exiles at Phyle (cf. Paul Cloché, *La restauration démocratique à Athènes en 403* [Paris 1915] 164, 467) and in the sentiments voiced in the fragment of the speech (*Oratio* 34 in Lamb's edition of Lysias [London 1930]) he wrote for an upper-class Athenian speaking in opposition to Phormisius' motion which, if passed, would have disenfranchised five thousand landless Athenians. Certainly, we must agree with Platis that if Lysias had thought Socrates an enemy of the restored democracy he could not have entered the lists on Socrates' behalf by producing for him an *Apology*, probably in rebuttal of Polycrates' *Accusation of Socrates*, whose attack on Socrates had been strongly political. But I think that Platis overstates his case when he argues not only that Socrates was no partisan of oligarchy but that he could not have been so perceived by a responsible leader of the restored democracy. Why couldn't he? Was Anytus in a position to know what Socrates was saying in his personal contacts? Could we blame him if he believed the worst? We know how harshly Socrates judged the democracy in public criticisms of it: we have a perfect specimen of them in the Platonic *Apology:*

> If I had entered politics long ago I would have perished long ago. . . . There is no man who will preserve his life for long in Athens or anywhere else if he genuinely sets himself against the multitude to prevent the perpetration of much injustice and illegality in the city. (31D)

If in a public speech Socrates could imply that political life in Athens was such a jungle of iniquity and lawlessness that an Athenian undertaking to fight for just causes in his own city would be virtually signing his own death warrant, why should not Anytus see in Socrates a disaffection that was so extreme that it would not stop short of subversion?

I regret that in the space at my disposal I cannot proceed to develop this and related points or to review much else well worthy of comment in Platis' book. In closing, let me say that, despite the criticisms I have offered, I consider this work an admirable book. I have learned more from it than from anything I have ever read on its topic. And may I add that it is written in elegant demotic Greek. Those who can read it will enjoy it on this count, no less than for its learning and for its strongly argued—at times impassioned, but never intemperate—historical judgments. Though its author does not hold a university post, the quality of learning he displays in this book would do credit to a university.

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JANET FAIRWEATHER. Seneca the Elder. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Classical Studies, 1981. Pp. xii + 418.

The anthology of declamatory excerpts compiled at the end of his long life by the Elder Seneca is scarcely an inspiring work of literature, but its value for the literary historian has always been apparent. Only recently, however, has Seneca's work been examined (at least by English-speaking scholars) not as a source to be mined, but as worthy of consideration in its own right. L. A. Sussman's *The Elder Seneca* (Leiden 1978) offers a general introduction to the subject and provides a much-needed starting point. Janet Fairweather's new book is not, as its title might imply, another work of the same sort. Rather, it offers detailed examinations of various aspects of the history of ancient rhetoric and declamation as related to Seneca's anthology. Discussions of his life, his family, and his own style are brief and somewhat perfunctory, but there is an immense amount of detail about his views on the history of rhetoric, on the oratorical theories revealed by his comments, and on other similar matters.

Fairweather's book is divided into four sections. The first is biographical and descriptive, discussing various problems in his life and works, and offering little new that is of significance. The second contains an examination of Seneca's references (or lack of references) to earlier oratory and rhetoric and a detailed discussion of his summary history of declamation in the preface to *Controversiae* I. The third and longest collects Seneca's evidence for the theory of rhetorical composition, examined under the traditional five headings (*inventio, dispositio, elocutio, memoria, actio*), and the fourth is principally concerned with disputing Norden's contention in *Die Antike Kunstprosa* that all the early imperial declaimers were "Asianic" in style.

Much of the material assembled by Fairweather will be useful for the historian of rhetoric, but whatever value the book may have as a compendium of evidence is seriously lessened by the presentation. That the work is more a collection of studies on particular topics in the history of declamation, without much connection between the various sections, is understandable even if it makes the book difficult to read. Unfortunately, however, even chapters on specific topics are hard to follow, owing to the author's predilection for unnecessary details and digressions from the main argument. No thorough review, or even summary, of the book is possible in the space alloted, and a few examples will have to suffice.

Perhaps the most sensible and valuable observation in the book comes in its third chapter, where Fairweather rightly emphasizes that the type of criticism that Seneca is writing is descriptive rather than normative and that, as such, it is comparatively rare among the ancient rhetoricians. Seneca does not, for the most part, judge the declaimers whom he quotes in terms of a dogmatic theory: he takes specific passages and shows what he thinks is good or bad about them. But Fairweather's own work, of necessity, tries to fight against the natural disorganization and randomness of Seneca's observations; by attempting to systematize in terms of rhetorical theory and literary history a work which is anecdotal and descriptive, she displays not only much repetition but also some misrepresentation of the basic nature of the anthology. The comments made by Seneca and the declaimers whom he cites concerning the style of Licinius

Calvus (*Contr.* I pr. 12, VII 4.6–8) are indeed important, but Fairweather's discussions of these passages are scattered over the entire book. The related problem of the nature of Asianism is treated in the same way. The desire to impose a theoretical scheme on Seneca's anecdotes appears at its most absurd in the long discussion of the five parts of oratory: there is a great deal to say about *inventio* and *elocutio*, some of it useful, since those are the rubrics under which the items of Seneca's title, *sententiae, divisiones, colores,* most naturally fall. But the section on *dispositio*, for instance, is nothing more than an extensive summary and series of quotations concerning the parts of a speech. One should not look to the Elder Seneca for evidence about a subject in which he was not interested. It would have been much more interesting had Fairweather examined, in the context of the rise of declamatory rhetoric, the very fact that Seneca is not interested in some of the standard elements of traditional oratory.

Even when Fairweather is dealing with a significant subject, however, she imports irrelevancies and gives exhaustive discussions of problems that do not need it. The use of the term "enthymeme" before and after Seneca receives four learned, but unnecessary, pages (202–6). In discussing Seneca's familiarity with Cicero's works (84 ff.), Fairweather takes ten pages, and the citation in full of almost every possible allusion to Cicero, to expand the notes to Winterbottom's Loeb edition without, as far as I can tell, adducing a single new passage. The discussion of Cicero's use of *thesis* in his own private declamations (118 ff.) says no more, as far as argument is concerned, than two sentences in Winterbottom's preface (viii). In considering the authenticity of the declamatory excerpts, she devotes several pages and an appendix to an analysis of clausulae, leading to findings which are, as the author admits (44), no better than provisional.

Combined with the tendency to cite everything that might even remotely be considered relevant to the subject at hand is a worse failing, the desire to find a novel interpretation where none is needed. The description of Seneca as a critic whose mode of analysis is anecdotal and biographical (59 ff.) is good and valid; indeed, one might wish that she had said more about Seneca's relationship to other nontechnical critics. But Fairweather uses her valid observation as the occasion for a search for precedents for Seneca's biographical method, going back to Ion of Chios and Antigonus of Carystus—and since she stresses the near-total absence of citations of Greek authors in Seneca, this can scarcely be considered an exercise in source criticism—and dwelling for some time on the possible similarities between the almost entirely lost work of Cornelius Nepos and Seneca's anthology. The only possible source that does not receive an extensive discussion is the obvious one, Cicero's *Brutus*, which is given only a brief and dismissive reference.

For a student of ancient rhetoric, moreover, Fairweather is curiously insensitive to the rhetoric of the passages of Seneca on which she bases some major arguments, notably her chapters on Seneca's summary of the history of declamation (*Contr.* I pr. 12) and on his explanation for the decline of rhetoric (*Contr.* I pr. 7). The first of these receives a lengthy and detailed analysis (104–31); some of it is useful, but the final argument is peculiar. Seneca was clearly wrong in saying that *thesis* was only an early form of declamation and in ignoring Cicero's use of that form in his last years. But to explain it as

distortion in order to promote the "satisfying notion of steady progress along lines familiar from Greek literary history" (131) distorts the central fact about this passage, that Seneca was justifying his composition of the anthology on the grounds that there was no significant declamation at Rome before his lifetime and thus that he was qualified to write about it: "ideo facile est mihi ab incunabulis nosse rem post me natam."

The argument of the chapter on the decline of rhetoric (132–48) is even more strained. Seneca in *Contr.* I pr. 7 gives three traditional explanations—luxury, the loss of the rewards of eloquence, and fate. Fairweather gives a detailed commentary on this set of cliches. She suggests (138 ff.) that Seneca was wrong to say that oratory no longer received its rewards, and points out the numerous examples of famous and wealthy orators in the early principate, minimizing the effects of the change in the political system on oratory. The principal reward of oratory in the republic, to which Seneca was referring, was not fame or fortune, but political office and influence; and when Seneca says that "the whole contest was transferred to disgraceful matters that flourished with honor and profit," he is disparaging precisely those areas in which Fairweather thinks the rewards of eloquence lie. And when she finds it odd that he fails to mention a significant cause of the decline of oratory, the schools of declamation themselves, she seems to expect him to attack in his preface a subject to which he was about to devote an extremely long book. Her arguments are both historically and rhetorically naive.

Insofar as there is one dominant argument in this book, it is that Seneca is a "modernist." She finds it significant that there are almost no references to Roman oratory before Cicero while there are numerous citations of Ovid and post-Ovidian poetry. "The almost total absence of references to early Latin literature in the elder Seneca's book probably reflects a decided modernity in his literary outlook" (317). This inference is perhaps valid, but given that Seneca's subject was modern declamation, could one expect anything else? Fairweather goes on to trace the "distaste for the archaic felt by modernists in the age of Augustus as in the late Republic" (319) less, at least initially, to the dominance of rhetorical education, which reached its peak somewhat later, than to pride in recent Roman literature. But her examples are disingenuous: Horace's strictures on archaic style are prominent, but there is not one word of the debt of either Virgil or Propertius to Ennius, and not a trace of Sallust. Her final conclusion, that declamation did play a central role in the literary culture of the early Empire, is perfectly reasonable, but scarcely needs a detailed defense.

In sum, Fairweather's book demonstrates a great deal of work on a subject of considerable importance, but it is not a good book. It would have been more useful to have some of the research published as separate articles. As it stands, *Seneca the Elder* is lost in a mass of details presented as evidence for an argument that is too slight to bear their weight.

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Tituli Asiae Minoris, Vol. V, Tituli Lydiae, fasc. 1, Regio septentrionalis ad orientem vergens, ed. Peter Hermann. Vienna, Oesterreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften. Pp. x + 293, 20 plates, 1 folding map. DM 234.

At first sight, a folio volume containing inscriptions from unfamiliar places in the backwoods of Lydia might seem of little appeal to nonspecialists. The wealth of the material, however, combines with the skill of the editor to produce a corpus which is a model of its kind, full of interest for most aspects of classical antiquity. The volume contains 851 inscriptions, 283 of them unpublished, with almost no debris of unintelligible fragments. Much of it is based on the notes of Josef Keil, Professor Hermann's teacher; the work stands as a tribute to both and to the tradition which also features the names of Karl Buresch and Louis Robert. An introduction to each site, by making thorough use of the sources, the coins, the bishops' lists (unfortunately the new edition of the *Notitiae* by J. Darrouzès appeared too late to be used), and the travelers, gives a view of local history, institutions, territory, and eras. All is written in a clear and elegant Latin, the obvious international language for such a study. The texts are clearly presented, many accompanied by drawings or excellent photographs, all by a sparse but adequate commentary. For more detailed commentary, and further facsimiles (which might all have been reproduced here), it is necessary to consult Keil and Premerstein, whose *Reisen* should surely now be reprinted.

A few examples may give an idea of the scope and interest of the material, which in general will be of great value for onomastics (and the related question of Hellenization), toponymy, and religion. The 120 inscriptions of Saittae and its territory reveal *collegia* and something of the local economy, suggest that life was relatively short (only one of 38 lived past 60), and show by many dated examples that the absence of the name Aurelius is no criterion for excluding a date after 212 for an inscription. The collection of documents from a temple of Men and Anaitis in the Catacecaumene gives much insight into local life and its problems, while those of the region of Maeonia (caps. x–xii) show a vast number of local cults. One of the most striking aspects of the collection is the temporal distribution, which suggests that classical culture had a brief bloom in the region. There are only 17 inscriptions of the Hellenistic period, when this part of Lydia was barely Hellenized and most important for its military outposts. The vast majority are from the age of growth and urbanization in the first, second, and early third centuries A.D., with several from the mid-third and a few of the early fourth. These last examples, from Julia Gordus and the neighbouring mountains, use the same formulas and dating (by the Sullan era) as much earlier texts. Thereafter, the end is sudden: only 23 inscriptions represent all of Late Antiquity (IV–VI c.), and the even longer Byzantine period, from the early seventh to the early fourteenth century, has produced but 13. In the north, the situation is more extreme: among the 210 inscriptions of Julia Gordus and Saittae, only one is later than the early fourth century. Since such places are known to have existed through the Middle Ages into modern times, it is clear that the population did not simply disappear. The explanation probably lies in illiteracy, compounded with poverty. The implications of this as illustration of the history and nature of classical civilization in a remote region will be of interest.

The editor's work is so fine that none but a few trivial errors subsist: in 619, for example, the end could probably be restored as . . . Φλ. Θεοδοσίου τῶν αἰων(ίων) σεβ (?αστῶν), and Tab. IV shows the village of Karayakup rather than the site of Characipolis which lies on Kale Tepe a few miles downstream. Since this is the first of three projected volumes, the indexes are adequate rather than copious. Eventually, a list of verse inscriptions and particularly of the many dated inscriptions would be desirable. The abundance of the latter should support conclusions about palaeography, some perhaps surprising: nos. 772 and 773 would probably not have been assigned to the very late third century on the basis of letter shapes alone. In other cases, though, the writing might give a much needed clue to the date (the editor gives his opinions on this very discreetly), especially in cases where the local era is in doubt. When an inscription gives full date, with month and year, it would be more helpful, if possible, to give an exact Julian equivalent rather than just "122/3 p. Chr.n."

But these are small points. The work will long stand as a monument greater than the sum of its parts and show how far epigraphy had advanced by 1980; it could hardly be improved. The volume is of great value to all interested in classical, especially Roman, culture.

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WILLIAM H. RACE. The Classical Priamel From Homer to Boethius, *Mnemosyne*, Suppl. vol. 74, Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1982. Pp. 171.

In this monograph W. H. Race sets out to provide a treatment of the priamel in Classical literature more comprehensive than any that has appeared heretofore. The book is divided into three parts: an introduction, which traces the brief history of the term as used in classical scholarship, presents a working definition of the figure, and then discusses its relationship with other rhetorical figures such as the *recusatio*, the catalogue, and the simile; and two chapters, entitled respectively "Greek Literature" and "Roman Literature," in which the author lists and comments on examples of the priamel from Homer to Boethius in roughly chronological order.

From the point of view of thoroughness the book is admirable. Race describes clearly the widening use over the last century of a term originally referring exclusively to a particular poetical form popular in Medieval and Renaissance Germany. After surveying the various definitions which previous scholars have contrived, Race himself avoids too narrow a definition and instead describes the priamel as a figure whose function it is to isolate and highlight one subject within a larger context. Taking as example the first line of Sophocles' celebrated "Ode to Man" (*Antigone* 333, πολλὰ τὰ δεινὰ κοὐδὲν ἀνθρώπου δεινότερον πέλει), he lists five features which the priamel tends to exhibit (p. 13):

1) a general context or category (τὰ δεινά)
2) an indication of quantity (or diversity) (πολλά)
3) a capping particle (καί)

4) an indication of relative merit (οὐδὲν . . . δεινότερον)
5) the subject of ultimate interest (ἀνθρώπου).

Race's treatment of the points of contact and divergence between the priamel and other figures of rhetoric, which, unlike it, were known to the ancients, is likewise exhaustive and full of nice distinctions. Finally, the instances of the priamel which he culls from Greek and Roman literature illustrate just about every use the figure might conceivably be put to.

But apart from thoroughness the book has little to recommend it. In the preface, by way of justifying the application to Greek and Latin texts of a term foreign to classical rhetoric, the author pronounces the following admirable manifesto (xi):

> The form of the priamel must be used as a tool for interpretation. It is not enough merely to label a passage a "priamel"; one must show how the author used that form for a specific intention, and what effects are achieved thereby. In so far as it is possible, that is the goal of this study. I have attempted to view each passage *in its context* and to assess the function of the priamel, for the ultimate test of literary analysis does not lie in rigid consistency of method, but in understanding individual texts, both in their own right as well as part of a larger literary community. The priamel is important for illuminating both aspects.

The book fails to live up to these ideals. In general the analysis of texts is superficial, there is no attempt at a comprehensive theory of the priamel, and the format of the second two chapters, a chronological list, makes for less than stimulating reading.

To illustrate the usual level of literary appreciation exercised by the author, I choose, pretty much at random, the following analysis of Aeschylus' *Agamemnon* 1008–21 (87):

> The contrast is drawn between a ship, which can be saved by jettisoning some cargo (1008–1013), a bountiful crop, which can stave off famine (1014–1016), and human lifeblood (1017–1021). In the case of shipwreck and famine, there is a degree of salvation possible, whereas in the case of human life (adversative δέ, 1017, the new subject introduced before the question, and αἷμα, 1020 withheld for effect), "who could recall it?" (τίς = οὐδείς).

The banality of these particular comments is the more surprising, when we consider the importance of blood as an image in the *Oresteia* and its frequent association with images of material wealth as, for instance, in Clytemnestra's gloating speech to the chorus after the murder of Agamemnon (1372–98). The problem with this book is that, essentially, it consists of one such passage after another, in which Race in fact does not "show how the author used that form for a specific intention and what effects are achieved thereby" (xi).

Which is a shame. For here and there we encounter certain *obiter dicta* which indicate the author's more than adequate literary acumen. For example, the discussion of Aeschylus' pre-Sophoclean πολλὰ τὰ δεινά ode (*Choeph.* 585 ff.) accomplishes almost everything I faulted in his treatment of the *Agamemnon*. After an intelligent analysis of the priamel Race concludes (90):

> It comes as no surprise that the crowning example should be the Lemnian women, who murdered their husbands. The chorus is too discreet to add a καὶ νῦν, but the

> inference is clear: Clytemnestra's fame will rival that of the Lemnian women. Thus, in this grand ode, all the horrors of nature, of man, and of legend are summoned to give depth and emphasis to the unspeakable crimes of Clytemnestra (love for Aegisthus and murder of Agamemnon), which will be expiated with Orestes' subsequent knocking at the door of the palace (652).

This statement at least represents an honest attempt to assess the role of the priamel in its immediate context.

Furthermore, from time to time Race lets drop hints of a general theory of the priamel—hints which, unfortunately, he never develops. In the course of his analysis of a priamel in the Homeric *Hymn to Apollo* (45–49), he makes the following intriguing comment (50):

> There is a natural relationship between a priamel and a journey, for each arrives, through a series, at a final point or destination.

The derivation of the word "priamel" from "praeambulare" might well be seen to point in the same direction, and Race himself, in a footnote to this passage, cites examples of "journeys" which are priamel-like and which could be used to illumine the nature of the figure. But no such attempt is ever made.

The underlying defect of this book is the unrelenting chronological presentation, which reduces the mustered wealth of material to a catalogue *peu raisonnée*. In his discussion of the differences between the priamel and the catalogue Race observes (25):

> The priamel . . . culminates in a point by singling out the precise object of interest, [whereas] a catalogue is simply a specific enumeration which comes to an end because the items have been depleted or because the poet simply stops.

While reading through this catalogue of priamels we constantly ask ourselves, "This is all very well, and very obvious, but what is the point?" The author's refusal to hazard any theory as to the general significance of the priamel form is particularly unsatisfying in the context of contemporary literary studies where formal and structural analyses have yielded large and fruitful gains. The best, I fear, that can be said for Race's book, is that it displays in an easily accessible format examples and scattered suggestions that might one day serve as basis for such a study.

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

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HOMERIC QUESTIONS AND HITTITE ANSWERS

Curiously specific lexical and substantive accordances between Greek and Hittite have long been observed; the "Anatolian connection" in fact dates back to P. Kretschmer's *Einleitung in die Geschichte der griechischen Sprache* of 1896, before J. A. Knudtzon, let alone F. Hrozný, had surmised the true nature of the Hittite language. I am concerned in particular neither with general Indo-European archaic similarities (of the type ἀργι- : *harki-* "white," πῦρ : *pahhur* "fire," or σκῶρ : *sakkar* "excrement"), nor with blatant technical loanwords or areal culture terms such as ἀμάρη : *amiyara-* "ditch, channel," βύρσα : *kursa-* "hide, skin," or νίτρον : *nitri-* "sodium carbonate," nor even with clearly old but unique matches (e.g., κατά, κασί-γνητος : *katta, katti-smi,* or the multiplicative suffix -άκις : *-anki*). I am interested rather in all accordances, etymological and other, whenever they might entail contextual values beyond the merely formal or barely semantic, so as to elucidate not merely the Greek and Hittite lexica but also shed light on the cultures and literatures which the languages sustain. In particular, as the title intimates, I hope to look into sober Hittite prose to find answers to some *Quaestiones Homericae* which the near-century since Wilhelm Schulze's youthful days has not yet fully unraveled. To some, such a tack may smack of *obscurum per obscurius,* but hopefully in this manner at least some *Homerische Wörter* still dangling in the wake of Manu Leumann can be brought closer to elucidation. I have previously in various publications[1] tried similar pairings (e.g., Gk. αἰσχύνω : Hitt. *iskuna-* [literally "make ugly"], Gk. σοφίη "insight" : Hitt. *sakui-* "eye," Gk. δάκτυλος : Hitt. *kalulupa-* "finger") and would commend attempts such as R. Gusmani's confrontation of Homeric ἦρα φέρειν "gratify" with Hitt. *warri-* "help."[2] Here, as always, excesses need to be

[1] Collected in *Analecta Indoeuropaea* (Innsbruck 1981); cf. pp. 373–78, 313–21, 349–52.

[2] *Studi micenei ed egeo-anatolici* 6 (1968) 17–22.

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resisted, such as O. Szemerényi's wholesale derivation of Greek words and names from Hittite sources: ἀσκέω "work with materials, fashion" from Hitt. *anisk(i)-* (iterative of *an[n]iya-*, "work"),[3] διοσκέω "look earnestly" from Hitt. *usk(i)-* (iterative of *au[s]-*, *u[wa]-* "see"),[4] or 'Ασκληπιός from Hitt. **assulāpiya-* "health-giver."[5] The studies that follow attempt a less flimsy and more considered approach.

1. στεῦτο δὲ διψάων

An Indo-Iranian and Greek isolexeme **steu-* "laut preisen" figures among Pokorny's roots (*IEW* 1035) on the basis of Skt. *stáuti,* Avest. *staoiti* "praise" and Gk. στεῦται "(rühmt sich,) verspricht prahlend." J. Wackernagel found the common semantic denomination in "feierliche öffentliche Kundgebung."[6] The "praise" meaning of Indo-Iranian is not in doubt, although "celebrate" may be slightly more accurate. But the precise synchronic and more remote historical sense of the mostly Homeric third person singular middle present στεῦται (preterit στεῦτο) is less easy to ascertain. Menace is implicit in Hektor's reported intent to cut down the mastheads of Achaean ships (*Il.* 9.241 στεῦται γὰρ νηῶν ἀποκόψειν ἄκρα κόρυμβα), and equally viciously Laomedon had threatened to lop off the ears of his divine wall-builders (*Il.* 21.455 στεῦτο δ' ὅ γ' ἀμφοτέρων ἀπολεψέμεν οὔατα χαλκῷ) when they asked to be paid on completion. In a more benign vein, Thetis had promised Achilles new armor by Hephaistos (*Il.* 18.191 στεῦτο γὰρ 'Ηφαίστοιο πάρ' οἰσέμεν ἔντεα καλά). In rare imitation of such Homeric usage, the Persian enemy threatens Greece with the yoke of servitude (Aeschylus, *Persae* 49: στεῦται . . . ζυγὸν ἀμφιβαλεῖν δούλιον 'Ελλάδι). As opposed to this construction with future infinitives, a sense of "declare, claim" occasionally appears with aorist or present infinitives (*Od.* 17.525 στεῦται δ' 'Οδυσῆος ἀκοῦσαι "he claims he has heard of Odysseus," or Apollonius Rhodius 2.1204 στεῦται δ' 'Ηελίου γόνος ἔμμεναι "he boasts that he is the offspring of Helios").

Yet older than these infinitive constructions must be such seemingly semi-pleonastic passages as στεῦτο γὰρ εὐχόμενος νικησέμεν (*Il.* 2.597) and στεῦτ' ἀγορεύων Τρωσὶ μαχήσεσθαι (*Il.* 5.832–33). The first

[3] *Mélanges . . . P. Chantraine* (Paris 1972) 252–53.
[4] *Gnomon* 43 (1971) 665.
[5] *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 94 (1974) 154–55.
[6] *Sprachliche Untersuchungen zu Homer* (Göttingen 1916) 202.

is supposed to mean "he declared boasting[ly] that he was going to win," and the second, "made a promise saying he was going to fight the Trojans." Yet here the true verba dicendi are εὔχομαι and ἀγορεύω, and στεῦτο is somehow auxiliary or circumlocutional.

An aporia is reached in *Il.* 3.83: στεῦται γάρ τι ἔπος ἐρέειν κορυθαίολος Ἕκτωρ: Hektor has not said a word, and a translation as a verbum dicendi is entirely out of place; it must mean rather that in Agamemnon's perception he is about to speak, and therefore Agamemnon, to hear him out across the battle-line, imposes quiet and a momentary cessation of hostility.

Such a sense is even clearer in the construction with a participle alone in *Od.* 11.584 στεῦτο δὲ διψάων, πιέειν δ' οὐκ εἶχεν ἑλέσθαι. Here Tantalus is thirsting but cannot get to drink. He is not saying anything, and Odysseus merely reports his somewhat distant and fleeting visual observation of him (ἐσεῖδον) in the underworld. στεῦτο διψάων must mean literally "he was manifest being thirsty," that is, "he was visibly (or plainly) thirsting." The participial construction with στευ- is thus parallel but antonymical to that with λανθάνω "escape notice, be unseen" (λάθε βιώσας).

We can now see the stages of epic formula reduction and consolidation:

1. στεῦται + participle "is manifest doing" = "plainly does."
2. στεῦται (+ participle of verbum dicendi) + (future) infinitive "plainly (says) he will do."
3. στεῦται + infinitive "declares (claims, boasts, promises, threatens) he will do (does, has done)."

Hence στεῦτο . . . εὐχόμενος and στεῦτ' ἀγορεύων mean "he openly boasted" and "he openly stated," and στεῦται . . . τι ἔπος ἐρέειν amounts to "he is visibly about to say something" (cf. the usual φαίνεται + infinitive).

If στεῦ- thus means "be manifest," where does this leave Pokorny's **steu-* "laut preisen"and Indo-Iranian **stu-*? It is entirely conceivable that the original meaning of Indo-Iranian **stu-* is likewise a medial-intransitive "be(come) manifest," so that, for example, *RV* 10.22.2 *ihá śrutá Índro asmé adyá stáve* "here Indra [is] heard of, by us today he is celebrated" means originally "here Indra [is] heard of, to us [dat. or loc. *asmé*!] today he is manifest"; there is a correlation of aural-oral fame with a "visibility" quotient, the godhead being not only *inclutus* but *spectabilis,* as an avatar should. The development of a productive transitive paradigm of **stu-* in the sense of "celebrate, praise" (unlike the

Greek medium tantum) may have occurred in early Indo-Iranian hymnic-poetic diction via elliptic formula-reduction similar to the Homeric. In a medial-intransitive Indo-Iranian construct *(*šru-* +) *stu-* "be (heard of and) manifest" **śru-* was incapable of secondary activization into "celebrate" due to the preexistent transitive meaning "hear"; but *stu-*, denoting in statival fashion visual and by extension cognitive celebrity (cf. IE **weyd-* "see" > "know"), first acquired de facto diathetic passivity in contexts such as *RV* 6.26.7 *tváyā yát stávante . . . vīrâs* "that through you heroes have visibility" > "that by you heroes are celebrated." From there the way was clear to an active paradigm (*RV stoṣi* "thou praisest" vs. *stavase nas* "thou art celebrated by us," or Avestan *staoiti*, with a new, secondary, post-*RV* middle *stuté* patterned on the active). *RV stutí-* "hymn of praise" would thus mean originally "celebrity" (> "celebration"), vs. *śrúti-* "auditory lore."

The Hittite tertium of this comparison, *istuwa-*, harmonizes with these conclusions. The medium tantum *istuwa-* means "be(come) manifest, be exposed, get out in the open," as in *KUB* XXX 10 Rs. 19 *nu-mu-ssan sēr assul natta isduwari* "over me (divine) favor is not manifest," or *KUB* XXIII 11 III 7 *nu-smas-(s)ta uttar arha isduwati* "the plot was exposed on them," or *KBo* III 1 II 11 *nu uttar isduwāti* "word got out." The reduplicated gloss-wedged noun *dusdumi-* means "evidence, manifest, voucher" or the like, so that *KUB* XIII 35 I 4–6 [*nu*] *UNUTUM kuit kedani pieskit n-at ŪL siyaeskit nu-ssi dusdumis ŪL ēsta lalamies-si* can be rendered "what object he had given to whom, that he had never documented; he had neither voucher nor receipt." The Luwian-type adjective *dusdumassi-* means "evidentiary," so that ibid. 15–16 ANŠU.KUR.RA-*wa* ANŠU.GÌR.NUN.NA *kui[n h]arkun nu-wa-mu* GIŠ*L[EU] dusdumassa siyan ēsta* comes out in translation "as for the horse and mule that I had, there were wooden voucher-tablets as documentation." In any event *dusdumi-* denotes visible proof (not oral testimony or hearsay).

Hitt. *istuwa-* was connected with Gk. στεῦται by E. H. Sturtevant,[7] who tried not to worry about Skt. *stu-* and correctly saw a basic meaning φαίνεται in στεῦται ("looks as if he will"). This etymology lay long dormant, but those few who have recently mentioned it, C. Watkins,[8] H. Eichner,[9] N. Oettinger,[10] and J. Tischler,[11] seem comfortable with

[7] *Language* 4 (1928) 4–5; 6 (1930) 31.

[8] *Indogermanische Grammatik* III/1 (Heidelberg 1969) 115–16.

[9] H. Rix, ed., *Flexion und Wortbildung* (Wiesbaden 1975) 99.

[10] *Münchener Studien zur Sprachwissenschaft* 34 (1976) 112.

[11] *Hethitisches etymologisches Glossar*, Lieferung 3 (Innsbruck 1980) 437–38.

such base-meanings for Indo-European **stew-* as "durch Worte hervorheben" (Eichner), "verkünden" (Oettinger), "laut preisen, öffentlich verkünden" (Tischler). Yet not only do the Greek and Hittite semantics favor a visual term, but their media tantum forms also harmonize with ancient layers of Indo-Iranian morphology: thus the Rig-Vedic nonthematic 3 sg. pres. midd. *stáve* "is celebrated" closely matches Gk. στεῦται or στεῦτο, which latter is to the Avest. *staota* what, e.g., Gk. κεῖται is to Avest. *saēta* beside *RV śáye;* on the other hand, the Rig-Vedic thematic variant *stáve* (beside *stávate*) can be closely paired with Hitt. *istuwa-ri.* Thus, formally Indo-Iranian has the full range of medial-voice archaisms, whereas single items survive separately in Greek and Hittite. These point to a basic Indo-European middle paradigm imposed by the semantics of the root **stew-* itself, rather than a mere intransitive-stative formal offshoot of a transitive verb "proclaim." The isolated fringe areas of the spread of **stew-* (Greek and Anatolian) have kept the original meaning intact, whereas the productive Indo-Iranian center has developed an active-voice paradigm as a secondary development. Thus Hitt. *istuwa-* supports and elucidates the revised interpretation of the Homeric verb στευ-.

2. Διὸς ἱρὰ τάλαντα

Only once in Homer do we find a scene of weighing from everyday life, in the simile of a poor but scrupulous spinster who, holding weights and wool-ration, balances scales evenly on both sides (*Il.* 12.433–35 ὥς τε τάλαντα γυνὴ χερνῆτις ἀληθής, ἥ τε σταθμὸν ἔχουσα καὶ εἴριον ἀμφὶς ἀνέλκει ἰσάζουσα). All other occurrences of τάλαντα "scales" involve symbolic weighing on Zeus' golden fate-scales, the ἱρὰ τάλαντα (*Il.* 16.658) on which he places two doom-lots (δύο κῆρε [*Il.* 8.70]) and "tilts" them (κλίνῃσι) as the dispenser of war (ταμίης πολέμοιο [*Il.* 19.223–24]). When Zeus stretches his scales (ἐτίταινε τάλαντα) and lifts them (ἕλκε), the losing side's doom sinks (ῥέπε) and settles to the earth (ἐπὶ χθονὶ πουλυβοτείρῃ ἑζέσθην, with incorrect dual), while the fortunes of the victor are lifted to high heaven (πρὸς οὐρανὸν εὐρὺν ἄερθεν [*Il.* 8.69–74]). The mere thought of such potential fatality fazes Hektor and turns him to flight (*Il.* 16.658 γνῶ γὰρ Διὸς ἱρὰ τάλαντα), and in due time his own fate is so weighed and takes a chthonian dip to Hades (*Il.* 22.209–13).

One may wonder whether this Homeric formula is a poetic conceit spun from idiomatic material, based on a set of polarized opposites no

stranger than the German "himmelhoch jauhzend, zum Tode betrübt." More probably, however, half of the locution, the *in malam partem* one of sinking to the earth, has independent significance, is so to speak the marked member of the opposition, while the more trivial half about rising to the heavens may well be a mere occasional stylistic pendant to it; when Hektor's doom sinks to Hades, nothing at all is said about Achilles' side of the scales.

Can scales and weighing in Hittite[12] shed light on the Homeric material? As there are few economic records but an enormous amount of religious and legal texts, there is little reference to mundane weighing but considerable material on ritual and symbolic use of scales. Formal weighing was done preferentially in sight of the all-seeing sun-god, the guarantor of justice, as we can glimpse in *KUB* XXX 10 Rs. 12–13 LÚDAM.GAR-*sa* [. . .] DUTU-*i* GIŠ*ēlzi harzi nu* GIŠ*ēlzi marsanuzzi* "the merchant holds the scales before the sun-god and (yet) falsifies the scales." In *KBo* XVII 95 III 6–10 a ritual involves lead being placed on scales by the king and taken before the sun-god. In *KBo* XV 10 II 41–42 true valuables (silver, gold, gemstones) are weighed on scales before the sun-god six times. In the royal funerary texts (*KUB* XXX 15 + XXXIX 19 Vs. 26–28) a sorceress weighs the same valuables against clay-mortar, thus symbolically pitting human clay against worldly wealth, and later the scales themselves are broken in a further gesture of vanity of vanities.

The king's (and queen's) very life span is symbolically hung in the balance in *KBo* XXI 22 Vs. 18–19 *kāsa* GIŠ.RÍN *karpiyemi nu Labarnas taluqaus* MU.HI.A-*us usneskimi* "behold, I pick up scales and put up for weighing the long years of the monarch!" Such a living second-millennium Anatolian ritual tradition of weighing the lives of rulers may have relevance to the Homeric mythical-literary theme of Zeus placing on scales the fates of heroes.

Most obscure, and potentially most important, is paragraph 69 of the Hittite Law Code: *KBo* VI 13 I 6–8 *takku* A.ŠÀ-*LAM kuiski wāsi ta* ZAG-*an parsiya* NINDA*harsin dāi t-an* DUTU-*i parsiya* GIŠ*elzi-mit-wa taknā arsikkit* "if someone buys a field and breaches the boundary, he [i.e., the wronged party] takes bread and breaks it to the sun-god [and says]: 'He has planted my scale [-tray] in the earth.'" This latter formulaic legalism seems idiomatic for "he has tipped the scales against me," "he has given me a raw deal"; expressing such sentiments of getting the short end of the stick and suffering miscarriage of justice we

[12] Cf. J. Puhvel, *Bibliotheca Orientalis* 38 (1981) 352–53.

thus find phraseology closely akin to the Homeric ἐπὶ χθονὶ ἑζέσθην "(the loser's doom-scale) settled to the earth" and ᾤχετο δ' εἰς 'Αΐδαο "ended up in Hades." Possibly the Hittite expression may also have some mythical background, much as the *tagnas* ^{D}UTU-*us*, the chthonian replica of the witnessing sun-god, is paralleled by the routine threats of the thwarted Homeric 'Ηέλιος (Παντόπτης) to go and shine amidst the dead in Hades. But more probably we have merely common phraseology from using a twin-scale, center-mounted weighing contraption (= the Latin *bilanx libra*); it has been preserved in the legal sphere in Hittite while surviving in mythical-literary imagery in Homeric Greek. Thus, once again Greek and Hittite reinforce one another: Greek helps elucidate an obscure paragraph of the Hittite Law Code, while conversely Hittite illuminates an otherwise somewhat outlandish formula of the Homeric text.

3. ἠΐων θημῶνα

The word ἤϊα occurs once in the *Iliad* (13.103; stags as "food" for wolves) and half a dozen times in the first half of the *Odyssey* ("provisions," especially for a journey). The one remaining Homeric occurrence, however, appears in a simile and means rather "chaff": *Od.* 5.368–69 ὡς δ' ἄνεμος ζαὴς ἠΐων θημῶνα τινάξῃ καρφαλέων, τὰ μὲν ἄρ τε διεσκέδασ' ἄλλυδις ἄλλῃ "as a gale wind scatters a heap of dry chaff and spreads it all over . . ." (even so Poseidon's monster-wave smashes the planks of Odysseus' raft). How can the same word mean both "provisions" and "chaff"? Hesychius had no trouble, glossing βρώματα, ἄχυρα, ἐφόδια, but Frisk and Chantraine in their etymological dictionaries posit two unrelated and obscure homophones.

The Hittite word for "chaff," the neuter noun *ezzan* (or *izzan*), likewise occurs once in an elaborate simile, in a great cathartic ritual conjuring the infernal powers: *KUB* XLI 8 II 15–17 *izzan* GIM-*an* IM-*anza pittenuzzi n-at-kan aruni parranta pedai* "even as the wind makes chaff fly and carries it over the sea . . ." (even so let it sweep away the blood-defilement of this house and carry it over the sea!). Such closely parallel Homeric-Hittite similes are surely no nonce creations but highly traditional formulaic lore, albeit literarily embedded in one case and ritually employed in the other. The Homeric simile, applied to a violent storm at sea, uses only land-based descriptive matter, whereas the Hittite ritual, taking place on an inland plateau hundreds

of miles from any large bodies of water, conversely speaks of the sea. But even such discrepancy (and seeming inappositeness) points to a fund of tradition rather than instant whimsy; the Hittite ritual petrifact harks back to a time of yore when its inheritors still dwelt on a litoral.

In the Ullikummi myth, the expression *ezzan* GIM-*an arha pussai-* "pound like chaff" serves to denote extreme physical violence. In the funerary rituals *ezzan* is burned repeatedly. But there are several occurrences of *ezzan* alone or in the asyndetic combination *ezzan* GIŠ-*ru* "chaff (and) wood" which point to an alternative meaning, something like "(stored) holdings, (material) goods"; thus in *KUB* I 1 IV 82–83 Hattusilis III speaks of those who covet the *ezzan* GIŠ-*ru* of Ishtar's storehouse and threshing floor ("chaff" would hardly be worth their trouble), and the Edict of Telipinus (*KUB* XI 6 II 6–7) interdicts the disposal of a prince's *izzan* GIŠ-*ru*. A badly broken simile in the Hittite *Gilgamesh* (*KUB* VIII 50 II 4–7) describes the hero's pitiful wailing, comparing it to what issues forth when "they bring off the *izzan* from a woman's house." In the listing *KBo* XX 64 Rs. 5–6 *ezzan* GIŠ-*ru hahhal* ("brush") precede YÀ.NUN LÀL KASKAL-*as* "butter (and) honey for the road," which brings us very close indeed to the "journey provisions" denoted by ἥϊα in the *Odyssey*.

In both Homer and Hittite a word for chaff (alternatively combined with "wood" in the latter) was thus also symbolic of or idiomatic for "stuff." We may compare the sumerographic expression IN.NU.DA-*as iwar* "like straw" (= amply, profusely), and further Gk. ὕλη "wood" > "stuff, material, matter," or even "scratch" denoting both poultry food and money in American English.

Etymology is of subordinate interest in this instance, but perhaps ἥϊα can be reconstructed as **ēsíyo-* and the *-zz-* of *ezzan* explicated as either a product of **-sy-* in **esyo-* or as matching IE **s* in an **eso-* (same *s* : *z* variation as in, e.g., *zena-* "autumn" beside Russian *osen'*, or in *zamankur* "beard" beside *samankurwant-* "bearded").

4. ποτὶ ζόφον ἠερόεντα

Words for "dusk" are numerous in Greek (ζόφος, δνόφος,*δνέφας [in ἰο-δνεφής], κνέφας, ψέφας), but ζόφος stands out not only by its probable cognate relationship to ζέφυρος but also by being used in Homer (along with the epitheton ornans ἠερόεις "murky") as a designation for "west," in antonymy with ἠώς "dawn" and/or ἠέλιος "sun,"

e.g., *Il.* 12.239–40 εἴτ' ἐπὶ δεξί' ἴωσι πρὸς ἠῶ τ' ἠέλιόν τε, εἴτ' ἐπ' ἀριστερὰ τοί γε ποτὶ ζόφον ἠερόεντα "whether (the ornithomantic birds) go to the right eastward, or to the left westward," or *Od.* 10.190 οὐ γὰρ ἴδμεν ὅπῃ ζόφος οὐδ' ὅπῃ ἠώς "we don't know in which direction either west or east is." Perhaps even a compass correction to "northwest" is in order, judging from *Il.* 9.5 where Ζέφυρος blows from Thrace along with Βορέης (cf. Aristotle, *Politics* 1290a, 19).

Hittite has wind-related terms for the four *halhaltumari* "corners" (i.e., cardinal points), but these are mostly hidden under sumero- and akkadography. The same cover hides ŠÚ.A ^{D}UTU-*as* "seat (= setting) of the sun" = "west" and *ṢET* ^{D}UTU-*as* "start(ing point) of the sun" = "east." Yet we do possess one precious passage which may illuminate not only Hittite terminology but the Homeric ζόφος as well: *KUB* XXXVI 89 Rs. 12–14 ^{ÍD}*Marassantas-wa annallaza ipattarmayan ārsas* ^{D}U-*as-ma-war-an wahnut nu-war-an* ^{D}UTU-*i* DINGIR-*LIM-an arsanut* ^{URU}*Ner[ikki-war-an] manninkuwan arsanut* "the Halys river once upon a time flowed *ipattarmayan,* but the storm-god turned it and made it flow toward the sun of the gods, and made it flow close to Nerik." A glance at a map of Turkey indicates that this passage has no reference to the great bend of the Halys but to a directional oddity much farther downstream toward the Black Sea, in the area of the Gasgas, the classical Paphlagonia. It contains an aetiological mythologem of direction reversal by the Halys near Nerik, probably relating to the 140° turn from northwest to east that the lower course of the Kızıl Irmak still makes at its confluence with the Devrek near the town of Kargi. While ^{D}UTU-*i* DINGIR-*LIM-an* = *istanui siunan* means "east(ward)" (cf., e.g., *KUB* XLI 23 II 18 *siunan* ^{D}UTU-*ui* "o gods' sun!"), *ipattarmayan* must be "(north)west(ward)." Elsewhere *ipatarma(yan),* with gloss-wedges, describes ornithomantic directions (*KUB* XVI 57 Vs. 4 and 6; *KUB* XXII 17 I 3).

ipat(t)arma(yan) (cf., e.g., *arha[yan]* "apart") may be a compound *ipa-tarma-*, where *tarma-* means "nail, peg, stake," often in ritual and magical uses and here apparently for cardinal "point" (in place of *halhaltumari* "corner"); Luwian has a matching *tarmi-*. The "west" word proper would then be *ipa-*. Because gloss-wedges point to a Luwianism, the closest comparison is with Hieroglyphic Luwian *ipami-* "west" in the newer reading (formerly *apami-*),[13] and a more remote cognate might be Gk. ζόφος < *Hyobho-* (beside **Hibho-* in

[13] Cf., e.g., J. D. Hawkins, *Anatolian Studies* 25 (1975) 151.

South Anatolian /iba-/). The same word may also occur in the Hittite ornithomantic adjective *ipa(r)wassi-* describing a direction or reference point in augural context, thus perhaps "northwest(erly)." In this manner the Homeric ζόφος vs. ἠέλιος finds not merely a close parallel in Anatolia but perhaps also an etymological cognate.

5. κειμήλιά τε πρόβασίν τε

In the Telemachy (*Od.* 2.75) the young prince lashes out at the suitors' conspicuous consumption of his family's substance: ἐσθέμεναι κειμήλιά τε πρόβασίν τε "eating away at stored goods and livestock alike." This well-known dichotomy of inert vs. walking wealth resembles both the Old Norse distinction of *liggjanda* vs. *ganganda fé* and the Roman house search *lance et licio* "with platter and tether," for removal of two types of larcenous items. The neuter plural πρόβατα, dat. pl. πρόβασι "livestock," and the secondary singular πρόβατον "sheep" are paralleled by Hittite *iyant-* "sheep," literally "going (one)." All this is well known and noncontroversial, but C. Watkins[14] has further combined κειμήλιά τε πρόβασίν τε chiastically with the Hittite asyndetic binomial *iyata tameta,* comparing *iyata(r)* with πρόβασις as a term for "moveable wealth" and trying to see in *tameta(r)* the inert variety, thus a match for κειμήλια. Yet the close philological study which I have made of both these words for the *Hittite Etymological Dictionary* compels rejection of Watkins' attempt. *iyatar* is indeed an abstract noun from *iya-* "go," but in the special sense of "grow" (similarly *huwai-* "grow," literally "run"), as in *KBo* VI 34 + *KUB* XLVIII 76 III 43–45 *n-asta apell-a IŠTU* A.ŠÀ-*ŠU* ZÍZ-*tar* ŠE-*AM sarā le uizzi n-asta* UGU *zahhali iyataru* "from his field wheat (and) barley shall not come up, but let weed grow up!" *iyatar* is thus "vegetal growth, fertility, fecundity" and more resultatively "plenty, prosperity"; *KUB* IV 5, 13–14 *nu nepisaza iy[ata] hūman heyauwani[skizzi]* means "from heaven growth rains down all over" (livestock dropping from the sky would be too much metonymy). Similarly *iyatnuwant-* "luxuriant" and *iyatniya-* "be in growth" are used exclusively of vegetation (*uktūri iyatniyant-* "evergreen"), while (SÍG)*iyatar* means literally "wool-growth," that is, thick wool. Similarly *tameta(r)* signifies "fat of the land, abundance" (likewise "raining from the sky" in *KUB* IV 5, 15–17 + *KBo* XII

[14] E. Neu and W. Meid, eds., *Hethitisch und Indogermanisch* (Innsbruck 1979) 282–83.

73, 2), and *tametarwant-* is "abundant, profuse, luxuriant." The semantic shift away from literal fatness to fertility of the land resembles that of the Homeric πῖαρ ὑπ' οὖδας "fat under the soil" or οὖθαρ ἀρούρης. Yet a door-socket can still be described as *tametarwanza* "well-greased" (*KBo* XXI 6 Vs. 4), and the plausible etymon is Gk. (mostly Homeric) δημός "fat," with *tameta(r)* as verbal noun from a stative denominative stem **tame-* < **dm̥m-ē-* or **dām-ē-* "to be fat." Thus Hittite *iyata tameta* fails to match the Homeric κειμήλιά τε πρόβασίν τε but is an archaic, probably irreversible binomial in its own right (even spelled *iyatada[meta* in the Old Hittite text *KUB* XLVIII 6, 6), expressing not a binary dichotomy of two kinds of wealth but rather a nominalized version of the biblical injunction (*Genesis* 1:28) which the LXX phrases as αὐξάνεσθε καὶ πληθύνεσθε, and which Jerome rendered as *crescite et multiplicamini.* The final word of this study is thus that we should not only try to find Hittite answers to Homeric problems but also know when to stop short.

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SENSE-EXPERIENCE AND RECOLLECTION IN PLATO'S *MENO*

Perhaps the most striking feature of the slave-boy experiment (82B–85C), the purpose of which is to demonstrate the truth of the theory of recollection,[1] is the manner in which Socrates makes conspicuous use of sensible diagrams without telling us whether we are to think of sense-experience as an important element in the process of recollection or not. Nor, indeed, does he tell us what the objects of recollection are, though he does suggest that "forms"—εἴδη (72C)—or realities—οὐσίαι (72B)—are the objects of definition. However, in the *Phaedo,* which was probably written not long after the *Meno,*[2] we are explicitly told that the objects of recollection are the separately existing Forms; and there the importance of sense-experience in the process of recollection is duly stressed. For these reasons some scholars have maintained that at the time of writing the *Meno,* Plato had not formulated his metaphysical theory of Forms. As Norman Gulley[3] puts it:

> There is . . . no explicit association between recollection and "forms," and no evidence in the dialogue that Plato had given any consideration to the question of the metaphysical status of "forms" as contrasted with particulars.

On the other hand, Malcolm Brown,[4] who rightly draws attention

[1] For the view that what is envisaged in the *Meno* is the recollection of things learned in previous incarnations, see Klara Buchmann, *Die Stellung des Menon in der platonischen Philosophie* (Leipzig 1936) 60, note 142, 65, 70; and Charles Mugler, *Platon et la recherche mathematique de son époque* (Strassbourg 1948) 302–3, 368, 370, 373. Against this view see esp. H. Cherniss, *AJP* 58 (1937) 498, and *Rev. of Metaphysics* 4 (1951) 421; N. Gulley, "Plato's Theory of Recollection," *CQ* n.s. iv (1954) 196–97, referred to hereafter as Gulley (1), *Plato's Theory of Knowledge* (London 1962) 17–18, referred to hereafter as Gulley (2); and R. S. Bluck, *Plato's Meno* (Cambridge 1964) 9–10.

[2] See R. S. Bluck (note 1 above) 108–20.

[3] Gulley (2), 19. Cf. also R. E. Allen, "Anamnesis in Plato's *Meno* and *Phaedo,*" *Rev. of Metaphysics* 13 (1959) 174, where he says, ". . . in the *Phaedo,* Anamnesis solves epistemological problems generated by a χωρισμός between Forms and particulars which Plato, when he wrote the *Meno* was perhaps groping for, but had not yet clearly formulated."

[4] Malcolm S. Brown, "Plato Disapproves of the Slave-boy's Answer," *Rev. of Metaphysics* 21 (1967) esp. 57–77. I do not, however, think he is right in maintaining that

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to the precise parallelism between Socrates' dialogue with the slave and his dialogue with Meno, has argued that since Socrates says at the beginning of the dialogue that *ti esti* questions must be settled before the consideration of *poion* questions, the emphasis on sensible diagrams in the second part of the experiment (i.e., after the interruption occasioned by the *aporia* of the boy), which contains a preponderance of *poion* questions, indicates that Plato means us to see that Socrates is conducting the enquiry improperly.[5]

I think that both of these views on Socrates' conspicuous use of sensible diagrams in the slave-boy experiment derive from failure to appreciate that Plato's way of writing philosophy is essentially maieutic. Unlike Aristotle, Plato does not set out to state his views plainly and systematically, believing that knowledge is not something that can be handed over from one person to another and that the proper method of teaching and writing philosophy is to offer the reader hints and reminders. Thus, he is not always as explicit as we would like him to be, and a good deal of elaborate artistry goes into the writing of his dialogues.[6] In this paper, I propose to show that Plato was consciously aware of the importance of sense-experience in the process of recollec-

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the slave-boy experiment "is a model of the dialogue as a whole" (p. 65). As I shall argue, it is a model of Socrates' dialogue with Meno, but only up to the end of the argument "from a hypothesis," i.e. 89C, at which stage Meno attains true opinion about virtue namely "virtue is knowledge," corresponding with the true opinion attained by his slave at the end of the experiment. See note 21 below.

[5] Brown (note 4 above) 63. As he says: "Plato presents Expt. II [i.e., the second part of the experiment] critically, as a sophistic counterfeit of geometry, a kind of ocular geometry." He also suggests that at 84D what Socrates and the boy ought to be talking about is "the square itself": "It is the ἡμῖν which is noteworthy. It introduces a relativizing suggestion, to the effect that it makes some difference whether the square in question is sensibly present to the men working out the argument. Such a consideration is foreign to the mathematical argument as such; 'the square itself' is what is being argued about, not this or that square 'present to us'" (p. 66).

[6] It is in the *Theaetetus* that Plato makes Socrates liken his technique of cross-examination to the art of a midwife (148E–151D). For the view that this maieutic art or Socratic midwifery is based on the belief in the theory of recollection, see my unpublished PhD thesis, "Plato's Theory of Knowledge: A New Interpretation of the *Theaetetus*," submitted to the University of London in January 1969, pp. 387–91. On Plato's conception of the nature of philosophical writing, see *Phaedrus* 276C–D and *Epistle* VII, 344C; and cf. my articles "A Theory of Mental Development: Plato's *Republic* V–VII," Pts. I & II, *Platon* 28 (1976) 288–300 and 29 (1977) 212–24, and "On the Alleged Abandonment of the Good in the *Phaedo*," *Apeiron* 13 (1979) 104–14. Hereafter I shall refer to these articles as BA(1) and BA(2), respectively.

tion, and that at the time of writing the *Meno,* he had already formulated his metaphysical theory of Forms. I shall argue (1) that Plato thinks of knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) as being essentially *knowledge by acquaintance,* in Russell's sense, [7] with *non-sensible realities;* (2) that he means that though one cannot know *what a thing is like* (ποῖόν τι) who does not know *what it is* (τί ἐστι), the actual process of recollecting what a thing is begins with the "stirring up" of *innate* true opinions about what it is like (ποῖόν τι); (3) that the summary of the *Meno* theory of recollection at *Phaedo* 73A–B indicates that Plato was aware of the importance of sensible diagrams in the slave-boy experiment; and finally (4) that Plato's choice of the problem of doubling the square rather than that of quadrupling it suggests that his conception of the nature of knowledge in the *Meno* is substantially the same as that stated in the middle dialogues.

I

When Meno asks Socrates at the beginning of the dialogue whether virtue (ἀρετή) can be taught or is acquired by practice or is present by nature, Socrates protests that he does not know what virtue is and hence cannot know whether it is teachable or not. He explains that in general if one does not know what a thing is (τί ἐστι) one cannot know what it is like (ὁποῖον) (71B):

> ὁ δὲ μὴ οἶδα τί ἐστι, πῶς ἂν ὁποῖόν γέ τι εἰδείην;

Thus if, for example, one does not know (γιγνώσκει) Meno at all, one cannot know (εἰδέναι) what sort of person he is (71B):

> ἢ δοκεῖ σοι οἷόν τε εἶναι, ὅστις Μένονα μὴ γιγνώσκει τὸ παράπαν ὅστις ἐστί, τοῦτον εἰδέναι εἴτε κάλος εἴτε πλούσιος εἴτε καὶ γενναῖός ἐστιν, εἴτε καὶ τἀναντία τούτων;

There are two main problems connected with the interpretation of this passage: (i) Does Plato mean to suggest that if one does not know Meno in the sense of being acquainted with him (γιγνώσκειν) *one cannot say*

[7] In his "Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description," reprinted in his *Mysticism and Logic* (New York 1929) 220–21, Bertrand Russell says: "Whenever a relation of judging or supposing occurs, the terms to which the supposing or judging mind is related by the relation of supposing or judging must be terms with which the mind in question is acquainted."

truly what sort of person he is? (ii) Are we meant to see in this example that "knowing Meno" is a typical instance of knowledge in this dialogue?

(i) Admittedly this assertion of the impossibility of knowing what a thing is like (ποῖόν τι) without knowing what it is (τί ἐστι) sounds rather paradoxical, and some scholars have suggested that what Socrates is saying here is that if one does not know (γιγνώσκει) Meno one cannot say what sort of person he is.[8] But surely, if Plato had wanted to say something of this sort, he could have written . . . οἷόν τε εἶναι, ὅστις Μένονα μὴ γιγνώσκει . . . τοῦτον λέγειν (or εἴπειν) . . . ; rather, in both places he uses the verb *to know*—γιγνώσκειν, εἰδέναι. It is, of course, quite possible for one who does not know (γιγνώσκει) Meno to say quite truly what sort of person Meno is from hearsay, but it would seem that to Plato this is only an opinion which, however true it may be, does not constitute knowledge (εἰδέναι). And this is precisely how he distinguishes between knowledge and true opinion of the road to Larisa (97A ff.).

Indeed, the fact that throughout the dialogue Plato is operating with a conception of knowledge which distinguishes it sharply from true opinion[9] makes it rather unlikely that he means to suggest that if one does not know Meno[10] one cannot say, or entertain a true opinion about, what sort of person he is. Thus, the boy who at the end of the geometry lesson is said not to know the answer to the problem of

[8] Thus I. M. Crombie, commenting on this paradox, says: "It is defended in this place by an unfortunate, not to say sophistical, analogy—namely that *I cannot say* what sort of person Meno is if I do not know who he is." (*An Examination of Plato's Doctrines* [London 1963] vol. 2, 532). The emphasis is mine. Cf. also R. Robinson, *Plato's Earlier Dialectic* (Oxford 1953) 51–2, where apparently ignoring the possibility of having "true opinions" about matters of which one has no knowledge, he observes: "A twentieth century philosopher would reply that it is a matter of experience that we can and do make useful statements about X without being able to say what X is in the way Socrates desires; and therefore the above argument must conceal some false premise or fallacious inference."

[9] As he makes Socrates say: "That there is a difference between correct opinion [ὀρθὴ δόξα] and knowledge [ἐπιστήμη] is not at all a conjecture with me, but something I would particularly assert that I knew. There are not many things of which I would say that, but this one, at any rate, I will include among those that I know" (98B).

[10] It is perhaps necessary to point out here that there is a sense in which one may know who Mr. X is without really knowing him. If I can identify or recognize him, I know him in the first sense. To know him in the second sense, I need to have considerable insight into his character. It seems unnecessary to suppose that Plato was unaware of this distinction, for he must have known that he knew Socrates whereas many a man in Athens who could recognize him did not really know him.

doubling the square whose side is 2 feet can say, or entertain a true opinion about, what sort of line is the required length (85B). Significantly, Socrates explains here that one can have true opinions about matters of which one has no knowledge, when he observes (85B):

> Do you see then that he who does not have knowledge has true opinions about the things of which he has no knowledge?[11]

(ii) As we have seen, in his statement of the paradox, Plato uses the verb γιγνώσκειν for knowing Meno, whereas he uses εἰδέναι for knowing facts about Meno. Γιγνώσκειν is regularly used, like the French *connaître,* in the sense of knowing *objects,* and εἰδέναι may also be used in this sense (as in the previous statement of the paradox; ὁ δὲ μὴ οἶδα τί ἐστιν, πῶς ἂν ὁποῖόν γέ τι εἰδείην;), but it is regularly used, like the French *savoir,* in the sense of knowing *that something is the case.* I submit that in this statement of the paradox Plato uses γιγνώσκειν and εἰδέναι the way he does advisedly. He wants to convey the idea that any claim to knowledge that something is the case must involve acquaintance with the object about which the claim is made.[12] In some languages it is a misuse of the verb *to know* (in everyday speech) to assert that you know *that* X is, for example, handsome or rich when you are not acquainted with X.[13] It is significant that Meno admits that it is not

[11] This passage makes it clear that when Socrates says that if one does not know X, one cannot know what sort of thing X is, he is conscious of the fact that he is enunciating a paradox which requires for its resolution a clear distinction between knowledge and true opinion.

[12] I cannot understand why R. S. Bluck, who rightly says that "it is interesting that γιγνώσκειν is used here of 'knowing Meno,' whereas εἰδέναι is used of knowing facts about him," still maintains that we do not have in our present passage "a deliberate distinction between γιγνώσκειν and εἰδέναι" (note 1 above, p. 213).

[13] In languages with a long history of writing, it seems quite natural to make knowledge claims of things about which one has read but has no personal experience. Presumably, however, this was not always so (see note 14 below). For instance, in Akan, the language of the Akan people of Ghana, it is, strictly speaking, a misuse of the verb to know (*nim* or *nyim,* the root of which is the same as that of the word for "eye" [*eni* or *enyi*(*wa*)]) to say *me nyim de Meno no ho ye few, oye sikafo,* etc. (I know that Meno is handsome, he is rich, etc.) when one is not acquainted with Meno. The correct thing to say is: *maatse de* . . . (I have heard that . . .) or *me gye dzi de* (I believe that . . .). In much the same way, in Yoruba, the language of the Yoruba people of Nigeria, it is a misuse of the verb to know (*mo*) for one to claim to *mo* something, or *mo* that something is the case when one has no direct experience of that thing. See Barry Hallen and J. O. Sodipo, "An African Epistemology: The Knowledge-Belief Distinction and Yoruba Thought" (paper read at the International Symposium on Philosophy in Africa, February 15, 1981, University of Ibadan, Nigeria) esp. 38 ff.

possible for one who is not acquainted with him (or cannot recognize him) to know (εἰδέναι) whether he is handsome or rich or not; and this would seem to suggest that in everyday Greek the verb εἰδέναι connoted acquaintance with the object about which the knowledge claim was made.[14]

Now, since we are explicitly told in this dialogue that all knowledge is the result of the recollection of things known in a previous *discarnate* existence (81C–D), it is almost certainly a misunderstanding to see in this analogy with "knowing Meno" an instance of what Plato means by knowledge in this dialogue. However, some scholars seem to find this analogy rather disturbing. As R. S. Bluck[15] observes:

> This example looks at first sight strange, in view of the fact that according to Aristotle Plato posited Forms precisely because he believed that there could be no knowledge of transient sensibles, but agreed with Socrates that the *universal* is the object of knowledge. . . . Surely there could be no definition of anything that was not an object of knowledge.

Indeed, this analogy is of a piece with "knowledge" of the road to Larisa (97A ff.). In both analogies Plato is making use of the Greek conception of knowledge in everyday speech to illustrate the nature of knowledge that is the result of recollection. Thus, if, as it is generally recognized, Plato, by pointing out a correspondence between the stages in the slave-boy's progress at recollection and the stages in that of Meno (80A ff. and 84A ff.), makes it clear that the theory of recollection is introduced as a foundation for the Socratic search for definitions, then it is reasonable to suppose that Plato has in mind οὐσίαι (72B) and εἴδη (72C) as the objects of recollection.

Failure to recognize that the examples of knowing Meno and knowing the road to Larisa, which involve acquaintance with objects, are being used as examples from everyday life to illustrate the nature of knowledge properly so called (i.e., the result of recollection) naturally leads to the view that in the *Meno* Plato is not clear in his mind as regards the objects of knowledge. Thus, after several attempts to explain why the man who is acquainted with the road to Larisa can, within the context of the *Meno,* be said to possess knowledge, especially as we are

[14] The verb to know εἰδέναι is from the verb to see εἴδω (no active present in use). The aorist εἶδον is always used in the sense of "see"; cf. Latin *vidēre* with ἔ(F)ιδον. See also note 13 above.

[15] Bluck (note 1 above) 211.

explicitly told that true opinions can be converted into knowledge "by reasoning out the cause" (αἰτίας λογισμῷ [97E–98A]), Crombie observes:

> This catholicity is perhaps a little puzzling, for if the typical instance of knowledge, and of insight into necessity, is given by the understanding of a geometrical theorem, one wonders how it is possible to know the road to Larisa. . . . *But we shall still have to say* that in this dialogue the notion of insight into necessity which is used to characterize knowledge is a very wide notion embracing the understanding of theorems and the understanding of terrain.[16]

However, it would seem that from the distinction drawn at 97A–B between "knowledge" and true opinion of the road to Larisa, to convert one's true opinion of the road into "knowledge" one only has to walk there; it does not involve "reasoning out the cause" (αἰτίας λογισμός).[17]

Perhaps the clearest evidence in the dialogue that Plato does not consider that acquaintance with sensible particulars constitutes knowledge is to be found in the slave-boy experiment. By the end of the

[16] Crombie (note 8 above) 52. My emphasis. We should expect Plato to use the phrase αἰτίας λογισμός in connection with the conversion of the slave-boy's true opinion (which is the result of recollection) into knowledge. However, there, Plato merely says that the boy's true opinion can be converted into knowledge by further questioning (85C). This is one of the methods by which Plato offers his readers reminders while at the same time confusing the unwary. As Bluck, (note 1 above) 31, points out, "In view of the suggestion that αἰτίας λογισμός is recollection 'as we agreed before' we may assume that although the expression αἰτίας λογισμός was not used earlier on, we may gloss with these words what was said at 85C about the possibility of converting true opinions into knowledge by further questioning."

[17] Cf. also the "eyewitness" knowledge of *Theaetetus* 201Aff. which, like the "knowledge of the road to Larisa" in the *Meno,* has been held to be an instance of knowledge properly so called in the *Theaetetus.* See, for instance, John McDowell, *Plato: Theaetetus* (Oxford 1973) 227, where he says, ". . . it is implied that an eyewitness can know the truth about, say, a robbery. On the face of it, this contradicts the most characteristic expositions of the Theory of Forms, which indicates that the title 'knowledge' should be reserved for a relation between the mind and the Forms untainted by any reliance on perception." However, in view of the refutation of the thesis that knowledge is perception, and the suggestion that follows the refutation, namely, that "we have progressed so far at least as not to look for knowledge in perception *at all* [τὸ παράπαν], but in some function of the mind . . . when it alone and by itself is engaged with realities"—ὅταν αὐτὴ καθ' αὑτὴν πραγματεύηται περὶ τὰ ὄντα (187A), this view is almost certainly mistaken. On this notorious "eyewitness knowledge," see my doctoral dissertation (note 6 above) 289-98 for the view that this argument, in which Plato is using the verb εἰδέναι in the everyday sense, is in effect a *reductio ad absurdum* of the thesis that true opinion constitutes knowledge.

experiment Socrates has drawn no less than sixteen different squares.[18] In spite of the fact that the boy has seen them all and answered questions about them, Socrates' language and behaviour seem to indicate quite clearly that he thinks the boy does not yet know what the square and the diagonal are. He only has a number of true opinions about what they look like, "stirred up in him like a dream" (85C), not only by Socrates' skillful and systematic questioning, but also by actually being made to see what the square and the diagonal look like. For example, at the beginning of the experiment, Socrates draws a square and asks (82B):

> Tell me, boy, do you *know* [γιγνώσκεις] that a square figure is like this [τοιοῦτον]?

When the boy replies that he does, Socrates says (82C):

> A square figure, then, has all these lines equal being four in number.

If Socrates really thought that the boy knew what the square is like he would not feel it necessary to give him one of the principal properties of the square. Plainly, Socrates is only "stirring up" true opinions in him (cf. 85C).

By the end of the experiment, the boy has attained true opinions about what sort of things the square and the diagonal are; but he does not yet know what they really are. Thus, when he points to the diagonal as the length of the side of the square twice the size of the given square, Socrates describes this as a true opinion and not knowledge (85C); for, as Socrates has already explained, if one does not know what a thing is one cannot know what it is like. We are meant to understand that the

[18] These are as follows:

A



B



In A we have ten square figures drawn by the end of the first part of the experiment (82B–84A). In B we have six more square figures drawn by the end of the second part of the experiment (84D–85B).

boy does not yet *know* that the square of the diagonal is twice the size of the given square precisely because he does not know what the square is.[19]

II

The slave-boy experiment is intended to demonstrate the truth of the theory of recollection. It is, however, something more than that; it shows us the process whereby the mind can begin to recollect its prenatal knowledge. Socrates, as we have seen, gets the boy to recollect (up to the stage of true opinion) how to construct a square twice the size of a given square making conspicuous use of sensible diagrams and systematic questioning. Thus, if, as I have argued, Plato does not mean us to think that acquaintance with sensible particulars constitutes knowledge properly so called, then it seems reasonable to suppose that he wants us to see in this conspicuous use of sensible diagrams that sense-experience is an important element in the process of recollection.

As in the case of the impossibility of knowing what sort of person Meno is when one does not know who he is, when Socrates protests that he does not know what virtue is and hence cannot know whether it is teachable or not, he does not really mean to suggest that he and Meno cannot say or entertain a true opinion about what sort of thing virtue is. In his dialogue with Meno up to 89C, Socrates proceeds exactly on the model of the slave-boy experiment. As Malcolm Brown points out, whereas in the first part of the experiment (82B–84A) Socrates' question is in the *ti esti* form, implying that he wants a number for an answer, in

[19] This knowldege can only be attained αἰτίας λογισμῷ. See note 16 above. As J. Gould rightly says, the αἰτίας λογισμος "consists in elevating the object of cognition from particulars to Forms" (*The Development of Plato's Ethics* [Cambridge 1955] 139). This, as we are told in the *Phaedo* and the *Republic*, can be achieved only by "true philosophers." See BA(1) pt. 1, 296 ff. For the view that the dianoietic mathematician cannot attain knowledge of Mathematical Forms, because the hypothetical treatment of the propositions (or hypotheses) of dianoietic mathematics belongs to philosophical dialectic, see my "Mathematics, Dialectic and the Good in the *Republic* VI–VII," *Platon* 30 (1978), hereafter referred to as BA(3), esp. 120 ff. In the *Meno* Plato only says that the boy's true opinion can be converted into knowledge by a further course of questioning; but it is almost certainly a misunderstanding of Plato's procedure to suppose that at the time of writing the *Meno* he thought that complete recollection of "the square itself," i.e., the Form, can be achieved in a day or two by a boy. See BA(1), pt. 1, 292 ff., and pt. 2, 221–24.

the second part (84D–85B) he puts his principal question in terms of *poion* (85B1) instead of *ti*.[20] Similarly, whereas in the first part of Socrates' dialogue with Meno (70A–79E), his principal question is in the *ti esti* form, in the second part, that is, in the argument "from a hypothesis" (86E–89C), he puts his question in the *poion* form.

It is significant that in both dialogues the interlocutors reach the stage of *aporia* at the end of the first part when the question is in the *ti esti* form. It is at the end of the second part in which Socrates puts his question in the *poion* form that the slave-boy attains true opinion. However, it does not seem to be generally recognized that, in the same way, Meno attains true opinion about the nature of virtue, namely that it is knowledge, at the end of the argument from a hypothesis (89C). This is mainly due to the fact that when at 86E Socrates says that he is yielding to Meno's request to settle the *poion* question of whether virtue is teachable or not, leaving the *ti esti* question unsettled, it is not recognized that he is merely pretending to yield to Meno and that the introduction of the argument "from a hypothesis" is really a subterfuge on the part of Socrates to facilitate Meno's recollection of the nature of virtue. Indeed, as F. M. Cornford[21] rightly says:

> The Socratic definition of virtue as knowledge is actually reached about half-way through [89A], and yet the conversation ends with the remark that we shall never be sure how virtue is acquired until we have found out what virtue is. The concealment is so cunningly effected that many readers of the *Meno* do not realize that we have found out what virtue is. . . .

[20] Brown (note 4 above) 60.

[21] F. M. Cornford, *Plato and Parmenides* (London 1939) 245. Failure to recognize that the argument "from a hypothesis" ends at 89C, and that by the end of the argument the proposition that virtue is knowledge has been proved, and hence that Meno attains true opinion corresponding with that attained by his slave at the end of the experiment, leads to the view that the introduction of this argument "from a hypothesis" marks the abandonment of the enquiry into the nature of virtue. This seems to be the reason why Malcolm Brown considers that (1) in the argument "from a hypothesis" Socrates "is operating in flat contradiction to the rule which he himself had enunciated in 71B" (note 4 above, 64), and (2) "the characteristic of the hypothetical method is simply to assume an answer to the *ti esti* question, and then proceed (in the manner of geometers) to a *poion* question" (note 4 above, 65). Cf. also R. E. Allen, *Plato's Euthyphro and the Earlier Theory of Forms* (London 1970) 96, where he says: "Socrates and Meno have tried to settle the question of whether virtue can be taught without first finding out what virtue is. They end in bewilderment, and even the new method of hypothesis . . . borrowed from the geometers, cannot save them." I discuss this method in some detail in "Recollection and the Argument 'From a Hypothesis' in Plato's *Meno*," *JHS* (forthcoming).

I submit that Plato means us to see that though one cannot know what virtue is like who does not know what virtue is, the actual process of acquiring knowledge of what virtue is *begins* (as in the slave-boy experiment) with the "stirring up" of innate true opinions about what virtue is like. Thus, having given the geometrical illustration of the argument "from a hypothesis," Socrates says (87B):

> In the same way concerning virtue [περὶ ἀρετῆς] since we know neither what it is nor what sort of thing it is, let us make a hypothesis and consider whether it is teachable or not, saying as follows: if virtue were *what sort of thing* [ποῖόν τι] concerning the soul would it be teachable or not teachable? In the first place, if it were other than knowledge, is it teachable or not . . . ?

We do not know what virtue is, nor do we know what sort of thing it is, but we do have opinions about what sort of thing it is, by the consideration of which opinions we may attain true opinion about what virtue is; and this will enable us to answer the subsequent question of whether it is teachable or not. However, until we are able to convert this true opinion into knowledge "by reasoning out the cause" (αἰτίας λογισμῷ), our answer to the subsequent question will only be a true opinion—a very unstable thing (cf. 97E–98A)—and not knowledge.

It seems clear then that in both the slave-boy experiment and the dialogue with Meno, Plato wants his readers to see the importance of proceeding from the consideration of the ποῖον question towards the settlement of the τί ἐστι question. Plato seems to be hinting at this when he makes Socrates begin the slave-boy experiment by drawing a square and asking the boy whether he knows (γιγνώσκει) that a square figure is like this (τοιοῦτον [82B]), for τοιοῦτος is the demonstrative pronoun correlative with ποῖος.[22] It is thus almost certainly a misunderstanding to say with Malcolm Brown that in the first part of the slave-boy experiment Socrates could have dispensed completely with sensible diagrams; for Socrates seems to consider that, untutored as the boy is, sensible diagrams are an indispensable aid in the boy's recollection of what the enquiry is about, that is, "the square itself." Indeed, "The imagery of the moving and visible order" and the "discrimination

[22] But see Allen (note 3 above) 70–1, where he argues against the view that in his use of τοιοῦτος and οἷος, which are respectively demonstrative and indefinite pronouns correlative with ποῖος, in the early dialogues, Plato may well have had the relationship of resemblance between Forms and particulars at the back of his mind.

between *gignesthai* and *einai*"[23] do not first occur in the second part of the experiment. At 83A in the first part, Socrates says:

> Well, this line *becomes* [γίγνεται] double, if we add [προσθῶμεν] here another of the same length?

And again, the phrase ἀπὸ ποίας (γραμμῆς) is not confined to the second part of the experiment.[24] This phrase first occurs at 83C in the first part, where Socrates asks the boy:

> What line will give us a space of eight feet?
> ὀκτώπουν δ' ἀπὸ ποίας γραμμῆς;

Similarly, in the first part of the dialogue with Meno, Socrates and Meno do not dispense with what each of them supposes to be instances or cases of what virtue is like. If, as I believe, Malcolm Brown is right in pointing out that the slave-boy experiment is a precise model of Socrates' dialogue with Meno,[25] then we are meant to understand that Meno, in his attempts at defining virtue, and Socrates, in his examination of Meno's definitions, are drawing upon their previous experience of what each of them supposes to be instances or cases of what virtue is like. In the case of Socrates himself, it seems fairly obvious that he considers that all instances of virtue involve knowledge of what is good and what is bad. Later on, in the *Phaedrus,* Plato explains that few people are capable of achieving complete recollection. He goes on to say that in the earthly copies (ἐν τοῖς τῇδε ὁμοιώμασιν) of Value Forms like justice and temperance which are precious to souls there is no light (φέγγος οὐδέν), and that few people can discern in these images (εἰκόνας) through dull organs (δι' ἀμυδρῶν ὀργάνων) the nature of the reality they imitate (*Phdr.* 205A–D). Plato, however, does not suggest that in the process of achieving recollection of Value Forms we can dispense with previous experience of such images.[26]

Indeed, far from meaning that in the process of acquiring knowledge of the essential nature (οὐσία) of anything we should eschew all considerations of what sort of thing it is (ποῖόν τι), Plato means us to

[23] See Brown (note 4 above) 66, 67–9.

[24] Brown (note 4 above) 60–1.

[25] But see notes 4 and 21 above.

[26] Gulley (1) p. 200 ff. argues that what Plato says at *Phaedrus* 250A–D (and *Politicus* 285D–286B) suggests that the formula of *Phaedrus* 249B, which recommends the use of sense-experience in recollection, does not apply to the recollection of Value Forms. Against this view, cf. Bluck (note 1 above) 55–7.

see in both the slave-boy experiment and Socrates' dialogue with Meno that the process of acquiring knowledge or recollection of the essential nature of anything begins with precisely these considerations of what the reality in question looks like. Thus, it would seem that in the slave-boy experiment, Plato, by the conspicuous use of sensible diagrams, is deliberately preparing his readers' minds for what is to come in the *Phaedo,* namely that sensible particulars are images of Forms, and that we obtain all our conceptions of Forms from no other source than from sense-experience (*Phd.* 75A ff.).[27]

III

I shall now proceed to show that the manner in which Plato introduces his discussion of the theory of Recollection in the *Phaedo* indicates that he has the *Meno* presentation in mind, and that he is conscious of the importance of sense-experience in the slave-boy's progress at recollection.

At *Phaedo* 72E ff., Cebes says that the view which Socrates often expresses, namely, that what we call learning is nothing but recollection, supports Socrates' argument for the immortality of the soul. To remind Simmias, who says he does not quite remember Socrates' theory, Cebes explains that when people are properly questioned they answer correctly about everything, though they would not be able to do so if they did not possess within themselves knowledge and right reason, and that besides, if one introduces diagrams or some other thing of that nature, this theory is very clearly shown to be true (*Phd.* 73A–B):

> ἐρωτώμενοι οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ἐάν τις καλῶς ἐρωτᾷ, αὐτοὶ λέγουσιν πάντα ᾗ ἔχει· καίτοι εἰ μὴ ἐτύγχανεν αὐτοῖς ἐπισῖήμη ἐνοῦσα καὶ ὀρθὸς λόγος, οὐκ ἂν οἷοί τ' ἦσαν τοῦτο ποιῆσαι. ἔπειτα ἐάν τις ἐπὶ τὰ διαγράμματα ἄγῃ ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων, ἐνταῦθα σαφέστατα κατηγορεῖ, ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει.

As the Meno is the first dialogue in which Plato introduces the theory of recollection, it seems reasonable to suppose that this passage is a summary of the theory as presented in the *Meno,* and that since in the *Phaedo* Plato stresses the importance of sense-experience in the process of recollection,[28] the passage indicates that Plato was aware of

[27] See BA(2), pp. 108–10, and my "The Role of the Hypothetical Method in the *Phaedo,*" *Phronesis* 24 (1979) 111–27, referred to hereafter as BA(4).

[28] See esp. *Phd.* 75A ff., where we are explicitly told that (1) we derive our notions or conceptions of the Form Equality "from no other source—*to do so, indeed, would be*

the importance of sense-experience in the slave-boy's recollection. However, some scholars have argued that the passage is not a good piece of evidence for the view that in the *Meno* Plato has the separately existing Forms in mind, for the following reasons: (1) Plato only says "they answer correctly about everything" (λέγουσιν πάντα ᾗ ἔχει) without mentioning the Forms;[29] (2) since the word διάγραμμα sometimes means simply a geometrical demonstration or mathematical proof, we cannot be sure that διαγράμματα in this passage refers to sensible diagrams;[30] and (3) Plato is here only giving an example of how careful questioning can elicit correct answers, and hence, Burnet's argument that the process ἐπὶ τὰ διαγράμματα ἄγειν is opposed to, rather than included in the process καλῶς ἐρωτᾷν is mistaken.[31]

(1) In the *Meno* argument for recollection, Plato makes no mention of the separately existing Forms; thus, λέγουσιν πάντα ᾗ ἔχει is only a faithful statement of the *Meno* argument. In the *Phaedo*, however, Socrates is arguing that the objects of recollection are the separately existing Forms. Thus, if Plato finds it appropriate to introduce his discussion of the theory of recollection in the *Phaedo* with a summary of the *Meno* argument, then he seems to be revealing that the ability to "answer correctly about everything" presupposes at least some recollection of Forms, and that in the *Meno* argument he had the separately existing Forms all along at the back of his mind.[32]

(2) It is true that the word διάγραμμα sometimes means simply a

impossible—than from sight or touch or from some other one of the senses": καὶ τόδε ὁμολογοῦμεν, μὴ ἄλλοθεν αὐτὸ ἐννενοηκέναι μηδὲ δυνατὸν εἶναι ἐννοῆσαι ἀλλ' ἢ ἐκ τοῦ ἰδεῖν ἢ ἅψασθαι ἢ ἔκ τινος ἄλλης τῶν αἰσθήσεων (75A5–8); (2) we acquired knowledge before we were born and lost it at birth; afterwards, however, *by the use of our senses*, we regain the knowledge we had previously possessed—ὕστερον δὲ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι χρώμενοι, περὶ αὐτὰ ἐκείνας ἀναλαμβάνομεν τὰς ἐπιστήμας ἃς ποτε καὶ πρὶν εἴχομεν—which process is rightly called recollection (75B10–E7). On Cornford's view that in the *Phaedo*, "the fact that sensible experience may be the occasion of Recollection is lost sight of" (*Plato's Theory of Knowledge* [London 1935] 6), see BA(2) pp. 109–10.

[29] Cf. Bluck (note 1 above) 46–7.

[30] Cf. Gulley (1), p. 197.

[31] See Gulley (1), p. 197, where he says: "Since Plato is here giving an example of how careful questioning will elicit correct answers, it is obvious in any case that he is not referring to the role played by sense-experience in anamnesis, and thus anticipating what he goes on to introduce in 73C ff. *as a new aspect of the doctrine*. If taken in that sense, the reference would no longer be the kind of example the context requires. This is . . . a sufficient answer to Burnet's argument that the process ἐπὶ τὰ διαγράμματα ἄγειν is opposed to, rather than included in the process καλῶς ἐρωτᾷν." My emphasis.

[32] This presumably is why Plato makes Socrates mention εἶδος (72C) and οὐσία (72B) as the objects of definition.

geometrical demonstration or mathematical proof; but surely, if as it is generally agreed, the passage is an allusion to the *Meno* argument for recollection, διαγράμματα must refer to the sensible diagrams actually employed in the slave-boy experiment and not to a geometrical demonstration or mathematical proof. Besides, we are explicitly told in the *Meno* that the boy has never had any formal training in geometry (85E); thus we can hardly expect him to be capable of following a rigorous geometrical demonstration without the aid of sensible diagrams.

(3) According to Gulley, the role assigned to sense-experience in recollection in the *Phaedo* is a new aspect of the theory:

> It is quite different from anything to be found in the *Meno*. What appears to be envisaged here is an immediate transition from the sensible to the intelligible world, the argument relying on a contrast between sensation and a conceptual level of apprehension. Plato is apparently saying that the fact that we attain this conceptual level in describing what is given in sense-experience constitutes recollection of Forms.[33]

On this view recollection of Forms in the *Phaedo* involves no method of reasoning.[34] Indeed, Gulley's view, as he admits, implies that Plato in the *Phaedo* assumes the impossibility of false judgments.[35] This, as I have argued elsewhere,[36] reckons completely without the "philosopher's practice of death" and the hypothetical method described in the *Phaedo*.

Now, Burnet's argument is that if ἔπειτα means, "secondly," the process ἐπὶ τὰ διαγράμματα ἄγειν must be opposed to, rather than included in, the process καλῶς ἐρωτᾷν, and διαγράμματα will mean geometrical figures. Thus, the passage is divided into two parts, namely an "asking and answering" part and a part "based on diagrams." Malcolm Brown accepts this interpretation of the passage, which he describes as "a curious point about Plato's own summary of the slave-boy passage in the *Phaedo* 73A–B."[37] He argues, however, that the first

[33] Gulley (1) pp. 197–8.

[34] As he says in Gulley (2), p. 37, "He [Plato] interprets conceptual apprehension as being reminded of an archetypal Form by any *one* of its sensible copies. Perception of a single instance is assumed to be sufficient as a reminder, and the question of reflective comparison and progressive clarification does not enter the argument." Cf. also Ovidia Hansing, "The Theory of Recollection in Plato's Dialogues," *Monist* 38 (1928) 237. Against this view of "recollection" in the *Phaedo*, see H. D. Rankin, "Immediate Cognition of Forms in the *Phaedo*?" *Dialectica* 12 (1958) 81–6, and BA(2) pp. 109–10.

[35] Gulley (2), p. 37.

[36] BA(2) pp. 109–10, and BA(4) esp. pp. 120–1.

[37] Brown (note 4 above) 61.

part, namely the "asking and answering part," is an allusion to the arithmetical part of the slave-boy experiment in which, he says, "the diagrams could have been eliminated without essential loss [the numbers suffice]," while the second part (i.e., the part "based on diagrams") refers to the geometrical part in which the diagrams could not have been eliminated.[38]

As I have argued, the manner in which Socrates begins the slave-boy experiment indicates quite clearly that Plato himself considers that even in the arithmetical part of the experiment the untutored boy requires the aid of sensible diagrams to enable him to recognize a square figure and thus attain true opinion about what sort of thing the square is. Indeed, by the end of the arithmetical part of the experiment (84A), Socrates has drawn no less than ten different square figures out of a total of sixteen used in the entire experiment.[39] Thus, the "asking and answering" part of the *Phaedo* passage can hardly refer to the arithmetical part of the slave-boy experiment.

It would seem that many scholars tacitly assume that recollection in the *Meno* is confined to the slave-boy experiment. As Malcolm Brown himself sees, the slave-boy experiment "is a model" of Socrates' dialogue with Meno. Thus, we are meant to understand that Meno, in the dialogue with Socrates, is gradually recollecting the nature of virtue. Diagrams are not required in the case of ethical enquiries; what is required here is previous experience of particular instances or cases of virtue. It would seem then that Burnet's interpretation of the *Phaedo* passage is correct, and that the "asking and answering" part of the passage refers to Socrates' dialogue with Meno, that is, the enquiry into the nature of virtue, while the part "based on diagrams" refers to the slave-boy experiment as a whole. Thus, what Plato is saying in the *Phaedo* passage is that careful questioning indicates that knowledge is innate and can be recollected, but that this is so is shown most clearly when visible aids are introduced to supplement such questioning. The *Phaedo* passage, then, seems to indicate that Plato in the *Meno* was conscious of the importance of sense-experience in the process of recollection.

In the *Phaedo* Plato does not mean to suggest that sense-experience is sufficient for the complete recollection of any Form. Presumably, he means that though we derive our opinions, which involve notions or conceptions of Forms, from no other source than from sense-experience, these opinions may be true or false, and that it is only by means of the

[38] Brown (note 4 above) 61, n. 5.

[39] See note 18 above.

hypothetical method that the mind can form true opinions about the essential nature of the things it perceives through the senses, and subsequently convert these true opinions into knowledge by means of the "upward path" of the method.[40] This process of attaining knowledge is in harmony with what Plato says in the *Symposium* about the process whereby knowledge of Beauty may be attained. There, it is particularly noteworthy that the process is said to begin in childhood with the experience of particular beautiful things. Knowledge of Beauty itself, which comes much later in life, is the result of a process of generalization repeated at progressively more abstract levels, while sense-experience gradually ceases to play a part (*Symp.* 210A–212A).

These are precisely the views about the nature of knowledge and the manner whereby it may be attained expressed in the central books of the *Republic*.[41] Here in the *Meno*, Plato means us to understand that the process of acquiring knowledge (or recollection) of what a thing is (τί ἐστι) begins with the consideration of what sort of thing it is—ποῖόν τι.[42]

IV

Another significant point about the slave-boy experiment is Plato's choice of the problem of doubling the square, rather than the much simpler problem of quadrupling it, to demonstrate the nature of recollection. I shall now proceed to show that this choice indicates that at the time of writing the *Meno*, Plato had already formulated his metaphysical theory of Forms.

[40] For an interpretation of the "upward path" of the hypothetical method, see BA(3), p. 124 ff. and BA(4) p. 112 ff.

[41] On Plato's awareness of the importance of the use of sensible images in the process of acquiring knowledge in the *Republic*, see BA(3) esp. p. 112 ff., and my "Διάνοια and the Images of Forms in Plato's *Republic* VI–VII," *Platon* (1979), esp. 89–110.

[42] It is interesting to note that this is precisely the role assigned to τὸ ποῖόν τι (περὶ ἕκαστον) or "what the nature of each thing *is like*" in the process of acquiring knowledge of "the real nature of each thing"—τὸ ὂν ἑκάστου or τὸ τί at *Epistle* VII 342E and 343B. The genuineness of this letter is disputed. However, whoever wrote it must have considered that, according to Plato, situated as we are, we can only approach τὸ ὂν ἑκάστου or τὸ τί through the consideration of τὸ ποῖόν τι (περί ἕκαστον). In his dialogues, the nearest Plato comes to stating explicitly that the approach to knowledge of Forms must be indirect—starting with sensible images through verbal images—is Socrates' account of his "second voyage" (δεύτερος πλοῦς) in the *Phaedo*. See BA(2), esp. pp. 104–7, and BA(4), p. 112 ff. See also note 6 above.

Malcolm Brown suggests that if Plato's point was to stir in the slave-boy "a recollection for a piece of eternally true knowledge," he could have chosen the much simpler problem of quadrupling the square:

> Indeed Socrates could have elicited from the boy equally naturally nearly identical incorrect answers (by "quadrupling the side" and by "tripling the side") to the ones which he elicits in the text. But in that case he could have proceeded to guide the boy to an answer which is both arithmetical in form and absolutely correct; by doubling the side.[43]

Now, this is precisely what Plato should not do if he wants to show in this dialogue not only that knowledge is attainable, but also that (1) true opinion is something quite different from knowledge; (2) the attainment of true opinion is a necessary stage in the process of acquiring knowledge (i.e., recollection); and (3) this true opinion can be converted into knowledge "by reasoning out the cause"—αἰτίας λογισμῷ.

Besides, if the slave-boy experiment is to serve as a model of Socrates' dialogue with Meno, Socrates has to produce *aporia* in the boy by the end of the first part of the experiment to correspond with Meno's *aporia* at the end of his dialogue with Meno;[44] and the problem of quadrupling the square is quite unsuited to this purpose. Surely, if Plato had chosen the problem of quadrupling the square, he would have been hard put to it to justify his claim that there is a world of difference between true opinion and knowledge, for the boy's "absolutely correct" answer would make it seem that he has indeed attained knowledge properly so called and not merely true opinion; and, of course, there would be no room here for "reasoning out the cause" (αἰτίας λογισμός).[45]

Indeed, contrary to what Socrates says about knowledge at the beginning of the *Meno,* Brown's view makes it possible for one who does not know (γιγνώσκει) what the square is to know (εἰδέναι) that the square of the length twice that of the side of a given square is quadruple the size of the given square. But why should Plato choose a problem that he must have known is, strictly speaking, insoluble for the demonstration of the theory of recollection?[46] I submit that if at the time of

[43] Brown (note 4 above) 77.

[44] See 84B ff. where Socrates points out the usefulness of producing *aporia* in the slave-boy, as well as the correspondence between the boy's stage and that of Meno (80A ff.) in almost identical words.

[45] See note 19 above.

[46] The problem of doubling the square is strictly speaking insoluble arithmetically. Cf. Aristotle, *Analytica Priora* 41a 26–30. As Malcolm Brown himself says, "Plato must

writing the *Meno* Plato thought that knowledge involved the mind's direct acquaintance with Forms, he would not consider it possible to stir up "a recollection of a piece of eternally true knowledge" in a boy, or indeed in anyone else, which could be recognized as such by any chance reader; for the recollection of the reality (οὐσία) of anything would be a matter of personal experience which cannot be adequately expressed in words. That is to say, for anyone operating with this conception of knowledge, a statement or proposition, however true it may be, does not by itself constitute knowledge. If this was Plato's conception of the nature of knowledge at the time of writing the *Meno*, then the problem of doubling the square is eminently suited to his purpose; for just as it is impossible for the boy or anyone else to give an absolutely accurate, arithmetically correct answer to the problem of doubling the square whose side is 2 feet, so it is impossible for Meno or anyone else to express the οὐσία of virtue in a definition.[47]

Thus, in Socrates' dialogue with Meno, though Socrates seems to be asking for the expression of the οὐσία of virtue, he is really thinking of the attempts at defining virtue only as an aid in the recollection of something that cannot be adequately expressed in words. As Bluck aptly puts it:

> The vision resulting from recollection would transcend definition, but attempting to define a thing by reference to other things would aid recollection of it, and make possible agreement as to its nature.[48]

Socrates explains at the end of the slave-boy experiment that the boy's true opinion, namely, that the square of the diagonal of the given square is twice the size of the given square, can be converted into knowledge by a further course of questioning (85C). This process is

have been familiar with the elementary fact about the technical difficulties (for the arithmetician) implied in this problem" (note 4 above, 60, n. 8). In this particular example the boy has to find a number which when multiplied by itself will give the number 8; but the square root of 8 is a surd—an irrational number, or what the Greeks called irrational line (ἄλογος γραμμή). Plainly, Plato deliberately chose a problem for which he knew the boy could not give an arithmetically accurate answer. Cf. *Theaetetus* 147E–148B, where Theaetetus says he and his friend, the young Socrates, listened to a demonstration by Theodorus that the sides of squares three and five square units in area are not commensurable in length with the unit itself, and that the same is true of other "non-square" numbers. On the discovery of the theorem on incommensurables, see Sir Thomas Heath, *A History of Greek Mathematics* (Oxford 1921) 1:155.

[47] Cf. Bluck (note 1 above) 4–7.

[48] Bluck (note 1 above) 7.

later described as tying down the true opinion "by reasoning out the cause" (αἰτίας λογισμῷ), which process is said to be recollection "as we agreed before" (98A).[49]

But what precisely constitutes an αἰτίας λογισμός? This phrase occurs only here in the *Meno,* and Plato never uses it again in any of his subsequent dialogues. However, if, as I have argued, Plato means us to understand that the boy does not know that the square of the diagonal of the given square is twice the size of the given square precisely because he does not know what the square is, then whatever αἰτίας λογισμός is, it must culminate in the mind's complete recollection of "the square itself," or the Form; and this is something that can be attained only by "true philosophers" as we are told in the *Phaedo* and the *Republic.*[50] I submit, then, that αἰτίας λογισμός is identical with the "upward path" of the hypothetical method as described in the *Phaedo* and the *Republic,* and the "cause" (αἰτία) of the *Meno,* the "something adequate" (τὶ ἱκανόν) of the *Phaedo,* and the "beginning" (ἀρχή) of the *Republic* are one and the same thing, namely, a proposition that is adequate in the sense that it cannot itself be established by a "higher" hypothesis within the limits of the particular dialectical enquiry. It is at the end of this "upward path" that complete recollection is attainable.[51]

Now, Plato does offer us a good example of an αἰτίας λογισμός in the *Meno.* As Cherniss[52] has pointed out, in calling the proposition "virtue is good" a hypothesis (87D), Socrates is exemplifying the "upward path" of the hypothetical method as described in the *Phaedo* (101D):

> And when you should have to give an account [διδόναι λόγον] of the hypothesis itself, you will do so in the same manner, hypothesizing another hypothesis which seemed best of those above, until you came to something adequate—τὶ ἱκανόν.

Thus, the proposition "virtue is good" functions as the "something adequate" in the argument "from a hypothesis"; and the entire proof which gives the account of the hypothesis "virtue is knowledge" as recommended at *Phaedo* 101D is to be seen as an instance of "tying

[49] See note 16 above.

[50] See BA(1), pt. 1, p. 296 ff. and BA(4), p. 127.

[51] See BA(3), p. 122 ff. and BA(4), pp. 121–4.

[52] Harold Cherniss, "Some War-Time Publications Concerning Plato," *AJP* 67 (1947) 140.

down" the true opinion, namely, virtue is knowledge "by reasoning out the cause" (αἰτίας λογισμῷ). This, however, does not mean that Meno attains knowledge in respect of the propositions "virtue is good" and "virtue is knowledge"; for he has obviously not attained the level of thought or state of mind of the "true philosopher" at which alone knowledge properly so called is attainable.[53]

Indeed, it would seem that the deduction of the proposition "virtue is knowledge" from the proposition "virtue is good," which is significantly said to stand (μένει) (87D),[54] is meant to be a hint that "virtue is knowledge of the Good" is a more satisfactory definition of virtue than simply "virtue is knowledge." Thus, since virtue and knowledge are not really Forms, but rather psychical endowments,[55] it would seem that Plato has in mind even here in the *Meno* the view of the *Republic,* namely, that virtue is the effect of knowledge of the Good on the soul.

Conclusion

I conclude, then, that the aporetic conclusion of the *Meno* is not genuine, and that (1) at the time of writing it, Plato's conception of the nature of knowledge and the process of acquiring it was substantially the same as that stated in the *Phaedo,* the *Symposium,* and the *Republic;* and (2) in it, Plato is making use of the maieutic art of Socrates to prepare the minds of his readers for the major themes in his metaphysics, epistemology, and methodology, which he later develops in the middle dialogues.[56]

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[53] See the articles cited in notes 50 and 51.

[54] This presumably means that the proposition "virtue is good" cannot be refuted.

[55] Cf. *Meno* 87B and *Epistle* VII 342D.

[56] Cf. H. Erbes, "Über Platons Methode in den Sogenannten Jugenddialogen," *Hermes* 96 (1968) 21–40. Erbes argues convincingly that in the aporetic dialogues Plato was not merely experimenting, but was rather producing artistically framed teaching works designed to prepare his readers step by step towards his main philosophical doctrines which he had already developed to a considerable degree.

FATE, APOLLO, AND M. JUNIUS BRUTUS

Plu. *Brut.* 24.4–7

ἀρξάμενος δὲ τῶν πραγμάτων ἀναφανδὸν ἅπτεσθαι, καὶ πυθόμενος πλοῖα Ῥωμαϊκὰ μεστὰ χρημάτων ἐξ Ἀσίας προσφέρεσθαι καὶ στρατηγὸν ἐπιπλεῖν <Ἀπουλήιον>, ἄνδρα χα-
5 ρίεντα καὶ γνώριμον, ἀπήντησεν αὐτῷ περὶ Κάρυστον. ἐντυχὼν δὲ καὶ πείσας καὶ παραλαβὼν τὰ πλοῖα, λαμπροτέραν ὑποδοχὴν ἐποιεῖτο· καὶ
6 γὰρ ἦν ἡμέρα καθ' ἣν ἐγεγόνει πρῶτον ὁ Βροῦτος. ὡς οὖν ἐλθόντες εἰς τὸ πίνειν ἐπιχύσεις ἐποιοῦντο νίκης τε Βρούτου καὶ Ῥωμαίων ἐλευθερίας, ἔτι μᾶλλον αὐτοὺς ῥῶσαι βουλόμενος, ᾔτησε ποτήριον μεῖζον, καὶ λαβὼν ἀπ' οὐδεμιᾶς προφάσεως ἀνεφώνησε τὸν στίχον τοῦτον (*Il.* 16.849)·

ἀλλά με μοῖρ' ὀλοὴ καὶ Λητοῦς ἔκτανεν υἱός.

7 ἔτι δὲ καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ἱστοροῦσιν, ὅτε τὴν τελευταίαν ἐν Φιλίπποις μαχούμενος ἐξῄει μάχην, σύνθημα παρ' αὐτοῦ τοῖς στρατιώταις Ἀπόλλωνα δοθῆναι. διὸ καὶ τῆς συμφορᾶς τίθενται σημεῖον ἐκείνην τὴν ἀναφώνησιν.

Appian 4.134.564

Βροῦτον δὲ ἐν Σάμῳ γενεθλιάζοντά φασι παρὰ τὸν πότον, οὐδὲ εὐχερῆ πρὸς τὰ τοιαῦτα ὄντα, ἀλόγως τόδε τὸ ἔπος ἀναβοῆσαι· "ἀλλά με μοῖρ' ὀλοὴ καὶ Λητοῦς ἔκτανεν υἱός."

Val. Max. 1.5.7

M. etiam Bruti dignus admisso parricidio eventus omine designatus est, si quidem post illud nefarium opus natalem suum celebrans, cum Graecum versum expromere vellet, ad illum potissimum Homericum referendum animo tetendit:

ἀλλά με μοῖρ' ὀλοὴ καὶ Λητοῦς ἔκτανεν υἱός,

qui deus Philippensi acie a Caesare et Antonio signo datus in eum tela convertit.

The quotation attributed to Brutus in these passages comes from *Il.* 16.849 (the speech of the dying Patroclus to Hector). The passages are the only indication we have (however vague) of the date of Brutus' birthday. Allusions to the role of Fate are quite common in birthday contexts.[1]

[1]As the *Journal's* reader kindly reminds me. In both Greek and Roman religion, the Fates are often seen as birth-spirits (Hom. *Il.* 20.127 f., *Od.* 7.197 f.; Hes. *Theog.*

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Three questions arise: (i) Is the incident historical? (ii) If so, what did Brutus mean? (iii) When should the incident be dated? These questions are interrelated. In this paper I shall argue that the incident is indeed historical, that it should be dated to about December 44, and that it provides a revealing insight into Brutus' state of mind at that time. The investigation will also shed light both on problems of *Quellenforschung* and on the literary techniques of Valerius Maximus, Plutarch, and Appian.

On the face of it, the incident looks like a fabrication of Caesarian propaganda, a *post eventum* demonstration of the inevitability of the Republican defeat at the hands of the divinely inspired forces of Caesarism. The emphases of all three sources show that the incident was in fact exploited by Caesarian propaganda, and the coincidence between Brutus' quotation of *Il.* 16.849 and the use of Apollo as a password at the decisive battle of Philippi (whoever used it) seems too good to be true. So it is tempting to dismiss the incident as a transparent fiction, of the same general type as the stories of the apparitions that appeared to Brutus, Cassius, and Cassius of Parma.[2] But closer examination suggests that this may be a superficial view.

In the first place, there is every reason to believe that "Apollo" was the password of one or the other of the two sides at the second battle of Philippi. Apollo was an important deity in the political propaganda of the 40s. Julius Caesar may have been the first to revive interest in the cult. Brutus himself had set great store by the celebration of the *Ludi Apollinares* in July 44, and in Greece both he and Cassius issued coins with the bust and symbols of Apollo. After Philippi Octavian seems to have claimed Apollo for himself.[3] But which side used "Apollo" at Philippi? Valerius Maximus and Plutarch apparently disagree on this point. It is true that Schaefer tried to harmonise the two by reading

904 ff.; Gell. 3.16.9–11, etc.; see S. Eitrem, *RE* 15 [1932] 2485 ff.); for the Fates in connection with birthdays, cf., e.g., Cat. 64.321 ff.; Tib. 1.7.1 ff.; Ov. *Met.* 8.451 ff., *Tr.* 5.3.25 f.

[2] Apparitions: Plu. *Brut.* 36.1–7, *Caes.* 69.6–13, Appian 4.134.565, Florus 2.17.8, Zonaras 10.20; Val. Max. 1.8.8; Val. Max. 1.7.7. The incident is dismissed by (e.g.) S. Weinstock, *Divus Julius* (Oxford 1971) 14; neither M. Gelzer, *RE* 10 (1917) 974, nor E. M. Kniely, *Quellenkritische Studien zur Tätigkeit des M. Brutus im Osten* (44–42 v. Chr.) (diss. Graz 1973) 83 f., attempts to interpret it, though both apparently accept its authenticity; it is not discussed by H. Bengtson, *Zur Geschichte des Brutus, SBAW* (1970) 3 ff., or M. L. Clarke, *The Noblest Roman: Marcus Brutus and his Reputation* (London 1981).

[3] Cf. Weinstock (note 2 above) 14 f.; M. H. Crawford, *Roman Republican Coinage* (Cambridge 1974), nos. 503–4, 506; II, 741 (better than Clarke [note 2 above] 66 and 142, n. 15).

in *Brut.* 24.7 παρ' Ἀντωνίου instead of παρ' αὐτοῦ. But this is unsatisfactory. Not only is the sequence envisaged ("when *Brutus* went forth to battle, the password given by *Antony* was Apollo") stylistically unhappy, but also, as Voegelin points out,[4] Valerius makes Apollo the password of *both* Caesarian commanders. The discrepancy therefore is real. On general grounds Valerius is more likely to be reliable on such a point of detail. His literary art, such as it is, consists of bravura rhetoric, not manipulation of his basic material, whereas Plutarch would be perfectly capable of transferring the password to Brutus in order to sharpen the parallelism between 24.6 and 24.7 for ominous effect.[5] Moreover, it is known that the password used by Brutus and Cassius in the *first* battle of Philippi, and indeed the propaganda keynote of their entire campaign, was "Libertas." Hence it seems safe to accept that "Apollo" was the Caesarian password at the second battle of Philippi.[6]

In the second place, there are grounds for supposing at least some degree of historicity in the incident. Although the accounts of Valerius Maximus and Appian are brief, Plutarch's looks full and circumstantial. From a purely methodological point of view, it is better to try to make some sort of sense of the story of Brutus' quotation than to reject it out of hand. And if Plutarch's account can be shown to derive from a good contemporary source, the case for taking the incident seriously is naturally strengthened. What source, then, lies behind *Brut.* 24.4–7? In order to clear the ground, two other questions must first be answered: (i) Is Appian merely following Plutarch? (ii) Is Plutarch merely following Valerius Maximus?

(i) The extent of Arrian's use of Plutarch is debatable.[7] But even if firm general conclusions could be reached, they would be of little help in resolving a particular problem such as this. In 4.134, which

[4] In his edition of the *Brutus* (Zurich 1833).

[5] Valerius' version is generally accepted (Clarke [note 2 above] 66 follows Plutarch but overlooks Val. Max.); for such "transferences" in Plutarch, cf. recently C. B. R. Pelling, *JHS* 100 (1980) 129 (who uses *Brut.* 24.7 to exemplify the technique).

[6] The Republicans and "Libertas": Dio Cass. 47.43.1, 47.38.3, 47.42.2–4; Appian 4.90 ff.

The *Journal's* reader ingeniously suggests that Antony and Octavian might actually have chosen "Apollo" as their password because they had heard of Brutus' ominous quotation. In the nature of things this can only remain an ingenious suggestion. If they did know of the quotation, this would have given their choice of Apollo an added edge, but, given the general political struggle between Republicans and Caesarians for the propaganda rights to Apollo, they might well have chosen "Apollo" anyway.

[7] See E. Gabba, *Appiano e la storia delle guerre civili* (Firenze 1956) 225 ff.

comes after his narrative proper of the Philippi campaign, Appian is trying to substantiate the proposition that the heavenly powers were against Brutus and Cassius by documenting various omens and peculiar circumstances. All have their parallel in Plutarch's *Brutus*.[8] In the present case, Appian differs from Plutarch in setting the incident in Samos, which would presumably date it to sometime in 42.[9] In itself this does not prove that Appian is using a source other than Plutarch. The discrepancy could be explained as an example of Appian's notorious carelessness about places and names. A more creditable explanation might also be advanced. Whatever his shortcomings as a historian in the strict sense, Appian is a skillful artist, adroit at the manipulation of his material for literary effect. Appian himself might have post-dated the incident in order to increase the impact of the omen by bringing it nearer in time to the event it was meant to foreshadow. Certainly Appian's wording ἀλόγως is very close to Plutarch's ἀπ' οὐδεμιᾶς προφάσεως. As against this, the description of Brutus as οὐδὲ εὐχερῆ πρὸς τὰ τοιαῦτα ὄντα is not at all the impression that a reader would get from Plutarch's *Brutus*. Taken in conjunction with the discrepancy over the placing, and by extension the dating, of the incident, this tends to argue that Appian is here not following Plutarch. Appian's apparent independence of Plutarch and the fact that the story has also found its way into Valerius Maximus combine to indicate the latent presence of a main-line historical source. On general grounds that source is likely to be Asinius Pollio, Appian's basic narrative source in this part of his *History*. But, although Asinius Pollio is also Plutarch's basic narrative source in the Roman *Lives* of the Late Republican period, it does not necessarily follow that he is using him (or only him) here. Cases can be demonstrated where Plutarch uses a minor source directly whose version has also got into Pollio.[10]

(ii) Plutarch certainly knew, and apparently sometimes used, Valerius Maximus.[11] In the present case, the discrepancy between Valerius and Plutarch over the question of who adopted Apollo as a

[8] Cf. Plu. *Brut.* 39.3–4, 5–6; 36.1–7; 48.5; 47.6–7.

[9] Though *autumn* 42 (Weinstock [note 2 above] 14) is too late.

[10] Appian's use of Pollio: E. Kornemann, *JKPh* Supp. 22 (1896) 555 ff., is basic and widely accepted; Plutarch's use of Pollio: Kornemann 672 ff.; H. Peter, *Die Quellen Plutarchs in den Biographien der Romer* (Halle 1865, repr. Amsterdam 1965) 124 ff., and many others; minor source used directly by Plutarch but appearing also in Pollio: Plu. *Brut.* 51.1 (Volumnius) // Appian 4.130.546 is one example of many.

[11] Cf., e.g., *Brut.* 53.5.

password is not sufficient to prove that Plutarch is not following Valerius, since Plutarch has probably transferred the item for literary reasons (cf. above), whatever his source. Nor should too much be made of the attractive and apparently circumstantial detail of *Brut.* 24.6: the invention of vivid detail is a Plutarchean specialty.[12] But skepticism can be carried too far. Plutarch certainly seems to be well informed about the *broader* circumstances of the incident: neither Valerius Maximus nor Appian connect it with Brutus' reception of Apuleius at Carystus, and indeed Plutarch's whole account of Brutus' dealings with Apuleius is more detailed than that of any other source.[13] While almost any conclusion in the field of *Quellenforschung* falls theoretically short of proof, in the absence of explicit attestation, it seems clear enough that Plutarch is following his own source and not Valerius Maximus nor the main-line historical source underlying Valerius Maximus and Appian.

In trying to determine the identity of Plutarch's source, speculation is inevitable. But speculation can be controlled. The general feel of the incident, with its vivid, dramatic character and concentration upon the personality of Brutus, itself suggests Bibulus' Ἀπομνημονεύματα Βρούτου, extensively used by Plutarch in the *Brutus*. Moreover, Bibulus was probably with Brutus in the winter of 44, Plutarch's dating for the incident. Bibulus' work did contain information about this stage of Brutus' career: Plutarch's description of Brutus' leavetaking of Italy in *Brut.* 23.2–7 is explicitly from Bibulus (*Brut.* 23.7), and his account of Brutus' activities in Greece (*Brut.* 24.1 ff.) may well also derive from the same source.[14] The probable Bibulan provenance of *Brut.* 24.4–7 provides a further reason for taking the incident seriously. The next step therefore

[12] Cf. in general Pelling (note 5 above) 129 f.

[13] Appian 3.63.259, 4.75.316; Dio Cass. 47.21.3; Cic. *Phil.* 10.11.24, 13.16.32, *Ad Brut.* 1.7.2; the contention of B. Perrin, *Plutarch's Lives* VI (Loeb ed. 1918) 181, n. 1, that in his subsequent narrative (*Brut.* 25.1) Plutarch has confused Apuleius and Antistius Vetus, is incorrect: *Brut.* 25.1 is wholly consistent with Cic. *Ad Brut.* 2.3.5 and 1.11.

[14] Bibulus' work: Plu. *Brut.* 13.3; Peter, *Quellen,* 139; *HRR* II, lxvii; C. Theander, *Eranos* 57 (1959) 120 ff.; Pelling, *JHS* 99 (1979) 88 f.; cf. also my unpublished doctoral dissertation, *A Commentary on Plutarch's Brutus* (Oxford 1979) xxxii, liv; R. Flaceliere and E. Chambry, *Plutarque: Dion-Brutus* (Paris 1978) 86.

Bibulus with Brutus in winter 44: Plu. *Brut.* 23.7 with *Brut.* 24.1 and Cic. *Ad Att.* 12.32.2; cf. also Clarke (note 2 above) 139, n. 25.

Bibulus as the source for Plu. *Brut.* 24.1 ff.: Theander 123; my dissertation, xxxvi f.; Bibulus as the source for *Brut.* 24.5–7: cf. also Peter, *Quellen,* 140.

is to find an interpretation of Brutus' citation of *Il.* 16.849 which does not involve the supernatural.[15]

Early editors of the *Brutus,* accepting the historicity of the incident, conjectured that Brutus meant that Caesar was killed not by men but by God. But this interpretation is very implausible. It seems, firstly, far too oblique: Brutus does seem to be referring to himself. One might indeed argue that though Brutus was in fact referring to Caesar, his quotation was subsequently turned against him for ominous effect. But that seems unlikely, at least in the case of Plutarch's version if we suppose his source to be Bibulus. Secondly, this interpretation distorts the meaning of Patroclus' speech. Patroclus is arguing that Hector has no justification for boasting since he has only succeeded because the real work was done by Μοῖρα, Apollo, and, among men, Euphorbus. It would have been very inapposite for Brutus to have used the quotation with reference to Caesar, for Patroclus' words imply a contemptuous dismissal of human agency. Of course on any interpretation we may admit that Brutus made a very inopportune remark, but that is perfectly feasible: the ability to say the right thing at the right time was not always a characteristic of Brutus, who could be a very tactless man. If we make allowance for this fact, it is relatively easy to understand the quotation on a commonsense level.

Plutarch's detailed and well informed narrative (as it appears) of Brutus' activities in Athens and Greece seems to go back to Bibulus. This narrative dates the incident to December 44.[16] This dating is in any case intrinsically preferable to a dating in 42 (*if* that is the dating offered by Appian), because it is less sensational. Brutus was then already having considerable success in amassing support from various quarters, but from a normal *political* point of view his position remained very unsatisfactory and constitutionally highly anomalous. When he and

[15] If Bibulus was the source for *Brut.* 24.5–7, this *need* not imply that Bibulus gave the incident a supernatural colouring: he could have retailed the incident straight (i.e., along the lines I advocate below), but his version might then have been adjusted by Caesarian propaganda. Alternatively, Bibulus *may* have given the incident a certain supernatural colouring, without going as far as Caesarian propaganda: Brutus' friend P. Volumnius recorded omens unfavourable to Brutus (*Brut.* 48.2 ff.) and an incident such as Brutus' leavetaking of Porcia, which was recorded by Bibulus (*Brut.* 23.2 ff.), and at which Brutus and his friends were themselves conscious of a parallel with Hector's leavetaking of Andromache, might obviously have lent itself to tragic foreshadowing.

[16] Or thereabouts (cf. Gelzer [note 2 above] 974; Kniely [note 2 above] 83 and n. 4), because of the link with Apuleius' return from Asia. Val. Max.'s wording also perhaps supports a 44 dating.

Cassius were virtually forced to leave Italy in the summer of 44, it was precisely because in normal political terms they had completely failed. Hence, despite the successes that they rapidly gained in Greece and the East, Brutus might well still have been feeling depressed about his political future. His last properly constitutional attempt to reverse the inexorable decline of the Republican cause in Rome and Italy had been his staging of the *Ludi Apollinares* in July.[17] Brutus' apparently inappropriate quotation of *Il.* 16.849 can be understood as an expression of his deep continuing distress at the political failure of those games, on whose success he had staked so much. Brutus would be saying that the collapse of his fortunes should be put down to the fortuitous failure of the *Ludi Apollinares,* not to the superior abilities of the Caesarians. Patroclus' words could have had a further application to Brutus' situation:[18] Brutus might also, like Patroclus, have scoffed at the "great boasts" of his enemies, and, again like Patroclus, have prophesied their downfall. Brutus was a ready man with detailed Homeric quotation and such a "prophecy" would have been very much in the manner of the Brutus who later bitterly foretold war between Antony and Octavian (*Brut.* 29.11).[19]

So interpreted, the story of Brutus' quotation of *Il.* 16.849 can be accepted as historical. The quotation, while doubtless unnerving at the time for his friends, was indeed apposite to Brutus' situation from several points of view: in the propaganda battle for the favour of Apollo he had been decisively defeated and the failure of his *Ludi Apollinares* had effectively sent him into exile, yet he could comfort himself with the thought that his enemies were not better men than himself but merely more fortunate, and he could look forward to their downfall. So too after the second battle of Philippi, when all was lost, Brutus echoed the words of Medea (E. *Med.* 332) in her prayer for vengeance against Jason (Plu. *Brut.* 51.1),[20] and just before he committed suicide he reproached τῇ τύχῃ . . . ὑπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος (i.e., for favouring the cause of the Caesarians) but asserted his moral superiority over his enemies

[17] For Brutus and his great hopes of these *Ludi,* see Cic. *Ad Att.* 15.10.1, 15.11.3, 15.12.1, 15.18.2, 15.26.1, 15.28, 15.29, 16.2.3, 16.4.1, 16.5.1, and 16.5.3; *Phil.* 1.15.36, 2.13.31; Appian 3.23.87 and 3.24.90; Dio Cass. 47.20.2; Weinstock [note 2 above] 156 f.

[18] I owe this further suggestion to Dr. Pelling.

[19] Brutus and Homeric quotation: *Brut.* 23.6; Flacelière (note 14 above) 175 doubts the authenticity of *Brut.* 29.9–11, but Appian 4.130.547—a clearly bogus reworking of Brutus' sentiments—confirms authenticity.

[20] According to Appian 4.130.547, Brutus was referring to Antony; in fact Octavian seems much more likely.

(*Brut.* 52.5). The thought pattern is essentially the same. As a politician and a soldier Brutus was unsuccessful, but in his own opinion at any rate he was always a man of consummate *virtus,* impregnable against the blows of Fate.[21]

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[21] The tradition that Brutus' dying words took the form of the quotation of a tragic couplet in reproach of Virtue (Dio Cass. 47.49.1–2, cf. Florus 2.17.11) should be rejected: cf. my dissertation (note 14 above) 473 f.; Clarke (note 2 above) 71 f.

ANDROMACHE AND DIDO

Although Andromache makes only a brief appearance in the *Aeneid,* close attention to Vergil's portrayal reveals the art with which the poet delineates his major characters through minor figures. Andromache's determined devotion to her dead husband, Hector, indicates, by parallel and contrast, the significance of Dido's feelings of faithful love and, later, of guilt toward Sychaeus. Dido's way of life at Carthage, outwardly so different from Andromache's, nonetheless turns out to be directed toward the same moral goal of chaste fidelity to a dead husband. Through Vergil's implicit comparison of the two women, we come to see that Dido's loyalty to Sychaeus, which has impelled her to leave her old home and establish a new city, at the same time constitutes an important source of weakness in her rule and hence an infirmity within the foundation upon which Carthage depends.

Vergil takes up Andromache where Homer and Euripides left her. In the *Iliad* she is last portrayed as a widow foreseeing her captivity and subjection (24.725–45); *Andromache* ends with a prophecy of marriage with Helenus (1243–45). In the *Aeneid* all this has come to pass. Homer's scenes with Andromache are images of happy family life disrupted and finally destroyed as Troy itself will be; for Euripides she seems to epitomize the suffering of all conquered peoples. In the *Aeneid* Andromache's outstanding quality, as Heinze noticed,[1] is her love for Hector and Astyanax, her husband and her son. She has been completely devoted to her family, a fact indicated by Aeneas' moving recollection of her at the moment of the fall of Troy. In his unavailing attempt to defend the burning city, Aeneas uses the same private passageway that Andromache, *infelix* even in happier days (2.455), once traversed in order to bring the young Astyanax to Hector's parents (2.453–57).

Aeneas' meeting with Andromache in Buthrotum emphasizes yet more forcefully the depth of her loyalty and love, which extend beyond death itself. The exiled Andromache, after a time of humiliating servitude to Pyrrhus, has again found freedom, but is still unhappy and

[1] R. Heinze, *Vergils Epische Technik*[5] (Darmstadt 1970, repr. of 3rd ed. Berlin 1915) 108–9 and 269–70. See also L. Kosthorst, *Die Frauen-und Jünglingsgestalten in Vergils Aeneis,* diss. Münster 1934, 89–91 and É. Évrat, *Le Feminisme dans l'Énéide de Virgile et dans la Jérusalem du Tasse* (Paris 1930) 75–80. All references to the works of Vergil are taken from the OCT edition of R. Mynors (Oxford 1972).

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unfortunate. Aeneas finds her making sacrifice before an empty tomb she has erected to Hector's memory (3.300–5), and at the sight of her old friend she is overwhelmed. The first words she utters in her amazement also attest to her constant care for her dead husband—and her tears following the words, her disappointment. Her prayers have not been answered; she is not dead and so cannot yet be reunited with the man she loves:

> "verane te facies, verus mihi nuntius adfers,
> nate dea? vivisne? aut, si lux alma recessit,
> Hector ubi est?" dixit, lacrimasque effudit et omnem
> implevit clamore locum.
>
> (3.310–13)

Her continuing love for the lost Astyanax and for Hector finds expression in eager concern for Aeneas' young son Ascanius: Is Ascanius alive? And is his uncle Hector a model for him of manly virtue (3.339–43)? At the leave-taking it is Ascanius who is the recipient of Andromache's gifts and her renewed maternal solicitude. Here again, however, she emphasizes her love for her husband no less than her son, of whom Ascanius is the living image:

> accipe et haec, manuum tibi quae monimenta mearum
> sint, puer, et longum Andromachae testentur amorem,
> coniugis Hectoreae. cape dona extrema tuorum,
> o mihi sola mei super Astyanactis imago.
>
> (3.486–89)

Andromache's outpouring of love and loyalty to her dead is at once heroic, tragic, and pathetic. Nevertheless, as Vergil makes clear, there is something wrong with it.[2] Hector and Astyanax have been her dearest loves. But since their deaths Andromache has had—and still has—others to care for; if not the proud Pyrrhus (3.326), at least the child she has borne him (*enixae,* 3.327),[3] or Helenus, her present husband

[2] For a complete treatment of Andromache in this respect, see R. E. Grimm, "Aeneas and Andromache in *Aeneid* III," *AJP* 88 (1967) 151–62. I am greatly indebted to him for his discussion of the difficulties inherent in Andromache's loyalty to the past. See also B. Otis, *Virgil: A Study in Civilized Poetry* (Oxford 1964) 260–61.

[3] In Euripides' *Andromache* she has a son by Pyrrhus, Molossos. As Heinze surmised, Euripides' tragedy surely inspired Vergil's basic portrait of Andromache here—she is "unlucky" (note 1 above) 108, but the emphasis is totally different. With *enixae* Vergil evokes the Euripidean mother who cared only for saving this son of hers by Pyrrhus, but Vergil's Andromache does not even dignify the child of her slavery with a name. For

(3.295–97). But Andromache does not live in the present, indeed scarcely "lives" at all. In fact she wants to be dead. She spends her time brooding over Hector's tomb. Her presents to Ascanius (*monimenta, dona extrema*) remind us of funeral gifts, but she, the giver, is virtually already dead herself. Helenus has used his opportunity of power to create a "small Troy" (349), and Andromache, a wraith within it, clings firmly to the past. Hector is still even now her husband, as both she and Aeneas affirm (*Hectoris Andromache,* 3.319; *coniugis Hectoreae,* 3.488).

Helenus, her present husband, seems content to let Andromache have her memories, but he also deludes himself with past glories. Buthrotum's rivers have been renamed Simois and Xanthus, but the new Simois is "false" (302) and the second Xanthus is a small stream (350), a mere "copy" (497) of the great Trojan original. When Aeneas calls Buthrotum "the Troy which your [pl.] hands have made" (497–98), we realize that Helenus and Andromache have not founded a city, but instead have produced a miniature model of the old Troy, which has vanished forever. Helenus' gift of prophecy enables him to see a part of the future and thus to help Aeneas undertake his journey toward greater things, but Helenus himself has no future.

Several readers have noticed Andromache's significance at this point as a foil for Aeneas.[4] The "toy Troy" and Andromache's excessive emotional nostalgia reveal a recidivist sentimentality which he ought to avoid. Aeneas' farewell to Andromache and Helenus shows that he himself does not understand this; he exhorts them to "live happy" and plainly envies them their *quies* and *fortuna peracta* (493–95). But, as R. E. Grimm has observed,[5] Aeneas' words contain an irony he does not intend. Andromache is not happy; her "quiet" is that of the tomb. In contrast, Aeneas' fates require him to live for the future, elusive as it may appear to him (493–97). Much as he might wish to, he cannot join Andromache in her devotion to a past long dead.

But Andromache is also of consequence for our understanding of Dido. At the end of Book 1, "unhappy Dido was drinking long love"

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other echoes of Andromache from other works, see Heinze (note 1 above) 108, n. 1. It is perhaps significant that Andromache uses the "royal" plural (*enixae tulimus*) when speaking of her worst humiliations, thereby creating a contrast between her dignity and its degradation.

[4] Grimm and Otis (note 2 above); see also C. F. Saylor, "Toy Troy: The New Perspective of the Backward Glance," *Vergilius* 16 (1970) 26–28, and most recently M. Di Cesare, *The Altar and the City, A Reading of Vergil's Aeneid* (New York 1974) 67–68.

[5] Grimm (note 2 above) 161–62.

for her new love, Aeneas (*infelix Dido longum . . . bibebat amorem,* 1.749). When Vergil introduces the *infelix* (2.455) Andromache with her "long love" for Hector (3.487–88) into Aeneas' narrative, he subtly reminds us that Dido has loved Sychaeus devotedly (*magno . . . amore,* 1.344), and that the god Cupid must "abolish" Sychaeus from her heart to make room for a "living love" (*vivo . . . amore*) for Aeneas (1.720–22).[6] Now Andromache appears as an emblem of passionate loyalty to her first husband at the precise moment in dramatic time when Dido is being moved to forget the past and to dream of another future than that of respected but loveless widowhood.

In the narrative of Book 3, Vergil makes Aeneas stress Andromache's subsequent marriages to Pyrrhus and Helenus, while Andromache just as emphatically denies them. Before he meets her, Aeneas reports that Helenus has inherited Pyrrhus' "marriage and his scepter" and that Andromache is now married to Helenus (3.296–97). Later, Aeneas tactlessly asks Andromache if she is still married to Pyrrhus (*Pyrrhin conubia servas?* 319).[7] But Andromache, though thrice married, considers her marriage to Hector the only true one. She wishes that she had died at Troy, thereby avoiding "the bed of the victor," as the virgin Polyxena did (321–24).[8] According to her, she was Pyrrhus' captive, not his wife (*captiva,* 324); sharing his bed and bearing his child was servitude, not marriage (*servitio enixae,* 327). When Pyrrhus married Hermione, he handed Andromache over to Helenus. This too was no marriage, merely a matter of one slave receiving another: *me famulo famulamque Heleno transmisit habendam* (329).[9] In Andromache's opinion her subsequent

[6] It is perhaps also significant that the *longus amor* of both women is revealed through maternal feelings for children who are not their own: Cupid, the "false" Ascanius, inspires Dido's love for Aeneas, while Ascanius, because he is the "image of Astyanax" (3.489), evokes Andromache's love for both husband and son.

[7] According to Donatus, Aeneas is by implication charging Andromache with sexual immorality, which her speech is designed to refute; see G. Highet, *The Speeches in Vergil's Aeneid* (Princeton 1972) 6. We need not see a defense against promiscuity, but may well infer an apology for what Andromache views as unintentional disloyalty to Hector through her unwanted marriages. Grimm (note 2 above) 156 maintains that Vergil's point here is to underscore the fact that both Aeneas (despite his bluntness) and Andromache still think of her as Hector's wife.

[8] "O felix una ante alias Priameia virgo, / hostilem ad tumulum Troiae sub moenibus altis / iussa mori, quae sortitus non pertulit ullos / nec victoris heri tetigit captiva cubile!" Her exclamation is similar in tone to the one Aeneas utters at 1.94–101. Noble death for a man is viewed as dying in defense of the city; noble death for a woman, dying unviolated by the enemy; see Grimm (note 2 above) 157.

[9] Her words indicate her scorn; see *P. Vergili Maronis Aeneidos liber tertius,* comm. by R. D. Williams (Oxford 1962) on 329.

marriages are the result of bad fortune. She is *univira*[10] at heart, Hector's widow, not Helenus' wife.

At the beginning of Book 4, when Vergil has Dido speak of her continued devotion to the dead Sychaeus, it is not difficult to remember Andromache.[11] Although Dido has not endured the humiliations of a captive, we realize that she has simply been more fortunate. As Anna reveals, Dido faces constant danger from rejected suitors who still want to force her into marriage (4.35–43).[12] For Dido, again resembling Andromache, has not wished to remarry, and, as she renews her vow of chastity to Sychaeus, a faint echo of Andromache at Hector's empty tomb is heard:

> ille meos, primus qui me sibi iunxit, amores
> abstulit; ille habeat secum servetque sepulcro.
>
> (4.28–29)

Dido's standard of conduct is the same as Andromache's. The difference between them is one of situation: Dido has been able to maintain her status as *univira* in fact,[13] whereas Andromache has had to sustain hers by illusion.

But of course this evocation of Andromache is heavy with irony. Dido reaffirms her vows but the next minute bursts into tears (30). She now loves Aeneas. Andromache will forever be the same as she appears in Aeneas' story, a static image of perfect love and fidelity beyond the grave. Dido has wished to remain loyal to the dead but now cannot,

[10] The woman who had only been married once was highly respected in ancient Rome; see, e.g., J. P. V. D. Balsdon, *Roman Women, Their History and Habits* (London 1963), who notes that only *univirae* could perform such sacred tasks as undressing a bride on her wedding night (185) and worshipping at the temple of *Fortuna muliebris* (29).

[11] W. S. Anderson, *The Art of the Aeneid* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J. 1969) 42–43, remarks that Andromache "provides a link between 3 and 4," but emphasizes the contrasts between the two women, ". . . despite . . . analogous misfortunes." However, it is perhaps instructive that in *Les Troyens*, Hector Berlioz, himself a sensitive interpreter of Vergil, chooses to make a direct connection between Dido's loyalty to Sychaeus and Andromache's to Hector. Berlioz' Dido refuses to yield to the power of love until she learns that Andromache, having become "unfaithful to her dearest memories," has actually fallen in love with Pyrrhus and has married him, although he is "her father's assassin, the son of the murderer of her illustrious husband." See *Hector Berlioz, New Edition of the Complete Works*, ed. Hugh Macdonald (Kassel 1969) v. 2b, *Les Troyens*, Act IV, no. 35, Recitatif et Quintet.

[12] Later (4.326) Dido fears that because of Aeneas' desertion she will be enslaved by Iarbas.

[13] See V. Pöschl, "Dido und Aeneas," *Festschrift Vretska* (Heidelberg 1970) 150, for this view of Dido's determination against remarriage.

and in fact is not faithful, for she has been filled with "living love" (1.721) for a living man.[14]

Dido's change points to another difference in circumstance between herself and Andromache. Dido leads a life unlike Andromache's quiet retirement near Hector's tomb in Buthrotum. Carthage is growing. It is a time of new beginnings, requiring an active dedication from the founder of the infant city.[15] Dido has proved equal to the task and now meets Aeneas, in whom she recognizes the nobility, generosity, and heroism characteristic of her own nature.[16] Inasmuch as we have learned from Andromache's example that clinging to the past precludes a genuine life in the present, we would expect Dido's new love to be harmonious with her new life. But Vergil seems never to forego an opportunity to imply that Dido's erotic passion is a terrible disaster through the blatant references to her love as wound, fire, deception, and fault. In explanation of Vergil's treatment, Edward Phinney has suggested that Dido's love is wrong and ultimately destroys her because she never ceases to feel guilty over breaking her vows to Sychaeus.[17] This is indeed an important facet of Dido's tragedy. Andromache's emblematic fidelity to Hector sharpens our perception of it.

Dido seems to forget Sychaeus in the consummation of her passion for Aeneas, but her bad conscience, which has led her to call her love a *culpa* (4.19) and then to conceal it by the name *coniugium* (4.172), returns to torment her when Aeneas rejects the marriage.[18] It is then that we first learn to our surprise that Dido's loyalty to her dead husband

[14] For the following discussion of Vergil's presentation of Dido, though not with respect to Andromache's role, I am most indebted to E. Phinney, "Dido and Sychaeus," *CJ* 60 (1965) 355–59, and V. Pöschl, both in "Dido und Aeneas" (see note 13 above) and in *The Art of Vergil, Image and Symbol in the Aeneid,* trans. G. Seligson (Ann Arbor 1962).

[15] Anderson (note 11 above) 42–43 finds Andromache's situation similar to Dido's, in that Andromache too is now ruler of a city (". . . [she] shares in the rule of Buthrotum"). But sharing the rule with a man is surely different from Dido's independent rule of Carthage. In fact we are told that Helenus rules (3.295). He has "got possession of Pyrrhus' marriage" (296), i.e., Andromache, and she "has yielded" to him as husband (297), language that implies a subordinate role. However, Anderson is right to notice striking differences in nature between the two women. Unlike Andromache, Dido "asserted her character" in the face of misfortunes and adapted to the situation. Paradoxically, her stronger will makes her all the more unable to compromise with her loss of Aeneas later.

[16] Pöschl, *Art of Vergil* (note 14 above), especially 70–72.

[17] Phinney (note 14 above), especially 359.

[18] See Pöschl, "Dido und Aeneas" (note 13 above) 150–51. In his discussion of *omnia tuta timens* (4.298), he shows how important Aeneas' continuing presence was for repressing secret feelings of guilt.

once surpassed even Andromache's. Sychaeus has all along had his own marble temple in Dido's palace:

> . . . fuit in tectis de marmore templum
> coniugis antiqui, miro quod honore colebat
> velleribus niveis et festa fronde revinctum.
> hinc exaudiri voces et verba vocantis
> visa viri. . . .
>
> (4.457–61)

Sychaeus was murdered at Tyre and was unburied (*inhumati,* 1.353) when his *imago* appeared to Dido in a dream. Dido's temple dedicated to Sychaeus is no less empty than Andromache's tomb consecrated to Hector. However, from this other empty tomb we learn of the large measure of Andromachean loyalty that Dido has always carried in her heart and now wishes to recover. When Dido thinks she hears Sychaeus calling her, it is a pointed reminder of Andromache's faithful worship of Hector. The "marvelous honor" which Dido used to accord Sychaeus now rebukes her with her disloyalty. The "voices and words" are manifestations of Dido's own guilt and self-reproach.

Finally, Dido gives voice to a thought rather like Andromache's own wish for deliverance from disloyalty:

> non licuit thalami expertem sine crimine vitam
> degere more ferae, talis nec tangere curas;
> non servata fides cineri promissa Sychaeo.
>
> (4.550–52)

Leading one's life in innocence, like a creature of the wild, is not after all so different from wanting to die like the virgin Polyxena, who avoided the conqueror's bed. Dido, in imagining that such a life would be free of marriage and the cares of love, seems to envision an altogether celibate existence.[19] Both Dido and Andromache want to be loyal to

[19] I am here relying on R. G. Austin's view of this admittedly difficult passage, *P. Vergili Maronis Aeneidos liber quartus* (Oxford 1955) on 550–51, taking *thalami expertem* (with an understood *me*) as "a widow" and *more ferae* as "innocently," "like a creature of the wild." It is most likely that the unifying theme in these lines is indeed Dido's obsession with her vows to Sychaeus, as observed by M. B. Ogle, "On a Passage of Vergil, *Aeneid* IV, 550–551," *TAPA* 56 (1925) 26–36, and A. S. Pease ed., *Publi Vergili Maronis Aeneidos liber quartus* (Cambridge, Mass. 1935) on 550–51. However, I cannot accept Pease's conclusion that with the phrase *more ferae* Dido accuses herself of promiscuity, or that *thalami expertem* acknowledges that her relationship with Aeneas was adulterous (Ogle, 36). Nor is it helpful to agree with K. Quinn that she is merely trying to "lighten the burden of blame" by referring to her vows against remarriage instead of her

their first loves. Circumstance does not allow Andromache to achieve her goal, and, hence, to this misfortune she prefers death. Dido's own attraction to love and life have not permitted the fidelity and innocence she requires of herself. Because she has failed, she conceives of death as the last means of affirming the integrity of her will.

Our awareness of the similarities between the two women enables us to see an important difference in their characters. Andromache is resigned to living out the natural course of her life, despite her preference for death. In contrast Dido embraces suicide, even though we can imagine a less tragic outcome of Aeneas' departure: she might continue to live, as Andromache does, worshipping an empty tomb. But this is impossible in view of Dido's immense self-respect. Aeneas' abandonment has, she says, "extinguished" her *pudor* and the *fama* which it supported (4.321–23). Because of these losses, she momentarily creates a fantasy of herself as a weak woman, Andromache-like in her helplessness: the evil Pygmalion will tear down her walls; Iarbas will take her captive (325–26).[20] Significantly, however, she refuses even in her imagination to bear such humiliations (*moribundam,* 323; *quid moror?* 325). Her chastity has been her glory; its ruin signifies her downfall in her own estimation.[21] She considers her betrayal of the vows to Sychaeus her own fault; it is not an unfortunate circumstance, like Andromache's unwilling "betrayals" of Hector. Andromache claims she never married anyone else; in contrast Dido has tried very hard to persuade herself that she has married Aeneas.[22] Her decision to die reveals a nature more

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passion for Aeneas which even now, according to Quinn, she cannot regret and so does not mention; see *Virgil's Aeneid, A Critical Description* (Ann Arbor 1968) 336–37, and "Virgil's Tragic Queen," *Latin Explorations: Critical Studies in Roman Literature,* ed. K. Quinn (London 1963) 55. Her erotic passion is surely implied in the *curae* she deplores (551).

[20] At 4.656 Dido will imply that she has already destroyed Pygmalion. Both her earlier fear and later heroic claims indicate the extremes between which her mind is wandering; she is neither as weak nor as strong as she maintains.

[21] See Otis (note 2 above) 77–78. Dido's guilty conscience and her pride in her chastity are not the only reasons for suicide, but they are the most relevant ones when she is compared with Andromache. See Pöschl, *Art of Vergil* (note 14 above) 82–91 for a fuller discussion.

[22] G. Williams, "Poetry and the Moral Climate of Augustan Rome," *JRS* 52 (1962) 44–45, and especially *Tradition and Originality in Roman Poetry* (Oxford 1968) 374–87 tries to establish that Dido believed that she was married to Aeneas, in keeping with the practice of "free" marriage which occurred commonly in Vergil's time. But why should Vergil be portraying marriages of his own time? There were scarcely any *univirae* of his

intransigently proud than Andromache's. Returning to worship at an empty temple is not good enough; she must make more drastic restitution.

In addition, however, Andromache's devotion to the past, so similar to Dido's, alerts us to the very different ways in which Dido and her fellow ruler Aeneas regard the basis of rule. For Dido the past has meant Sychaeus and the happily married life that she once enjoyed with him. From Dido's resolve to die we learn that her present life as founder and ruler of Carthage has been integrally based on a strong loyalty to that past and to that man. Love with a new man proves all-consuming, and she neglects her duties as ruler. But she has felt guilty. Now that Aeneas is abandoning her, guilt begins to haunt her: Sychaeus is calling her from his tomb. Aeneas does not place such great importance on loyalty to the dead Creusa. His love for her was true and deep (2.768–71 and 790–91), but it has become for him a part of his past, not the whole of it, much less a present obsession. Like Dido, Aeneas "forgets" his mission for the time they are together, but, significantly, when he speaks of those whose trust he has betrayed, it is the *imago* of his father Anchises which terrifies him, not Creusa's. Elements of Aeneas' past affect him still, but they point to the future, not a return to the past: he heeds the warnings of Anchises' ghost and Mercury's reminder of responsibilities toward Ascanius. His attitude toward his past with Creusa is perhaps best expressed in what he says to Dido:

> me si fata meis paterentur ducere vitam
> auspiciis et sponte mea componere curas,
> urbem Troianam primum dulcisque meorum
> reliquias colerem. . . .
>
> (4.340–43)

Creusa is only one of the "sweet remains" he would prefer to worship,[23] but since that has not been allowed, he follows the future. Aeneas views

own time, yet he shows that Dido embraced this standard of conduct. In any event, Williams' point is not well taken, for it is not likely that even free marriages occurred under such clandestine circumstances as the union in the cave. Finally, if Vergil does refer obliquely to free marriage here, he would seem to criticize its ambiguous quality; in a free marriage the partners can feel free to deny its very existence, as Aeneas does. But see Pöschl, "Dido und Aeneas" (note 13 above) 165–67, who discusses the powerful effect of Dido's marriage claims on the reader. Aeneas certainly did not hinder the queen's self-deception that he considered it a marriage as well—until his flat denial.

[23] Pöschl, "Dido und Aeneas" (note 13 above) 158, also believes that there may be a concealed reference to Creusa in this passage.

his forgetfulness with Dido as the neglect of his duties to father and son, both of whom represent his future as founder of a new race.[24] Dido in contrast sees her lapse as a betrayal of promises to her dead love. Through this betrayal, her position as ruler and founder of another new race—Carthage—has lost all meaning. She has cut herself off from Sychaeus for a "living love" with Aeneas. But with Aeneas' departure she will be alone. Cast adrift, she tries to recover her moorings in the only way left to her; she attempts to return to Sychaeus through death.[25]

Dido's similarity to Andromache reveals her ultimate weakness as a ruler—and points to Aeneas' strength. For Dido's rule has been dependent on the very thing Aeneas must leave behind to succeed in founding Rome: a nostalgic attachment to the past. We know that Dido flees her old home at the behest of an image from the past, Sychaeus' *imago* (1.353–60), rather as Aeneas is exhorted to flee by the dead Hector who appears to him in a dream (2.270–97). In the first half of the poem, Vergil carefully shows us the gradual weaning of Aeneas from his longings to reestablish the lost Troy. Creusa's *imago* prophesies a new bride for Aeneas in Hesperia and adjures him not to grieve for his lost wife (2.783–84). In contrast Vergil provides Dido with no such emotional odyssey.[26] Her old grief and love for Sychaeus, so movingly

[24] For Anchises' close connection with the future, see Otis (note 2 above) 250 and 261. Pöschl, "Dido und Aeneas" (note 13 above) 157, also sees Dido's inability to return to being ruler as a fundamental difference between men and women, but bases it on the assumption that love for Aeneas was Dido's whole being. "Aeneas hat nicht begriffen, dass Dido nicht mehr Königin, sondern nur noch liebende Frau ist und dass sein Hinweis auf ihre Bindung an Karthago ungehört verhallen muss. Er kann zu seiner politischen Aufgabe zurückkehren, sie aber nicht, weil sie in der Liebe ihr wahres Selbst gefunden hat." Later he speaks of Aeneas' inability to see "welche tiefe Verwandlung in Dido eingetreten ist"; i.e., her love transformed her from queen (ruler) to woman (158). In fact, love for a man was always Dido's whole being. Her first man "deceived her by dying" (4.17), but she followed his advice and founded the new city. Now the second man is leaving her, and, having cut herself off from Sychaeus by loving Aeneas, she cannot face life alone. She was never really capable of that *amor patriae* to which Aeneas must devote himself (4.345–47).

[25] Dido never says plainly that her death is a return to Sychaeus in any literal sense. However, when she claims as a part of her "great image" that she got revenge from her brother (4.656), she is clearly thinking of Sychaeus and is struggling to regain and carry with her into death that state of fidelity and devotion she has lost. It is a struggle because she still desperately loves Aeneas (see 4.651–52 and 657–58). In the context of Andromache's story, Dido's last appearance in the poem with Sychaeus in the *lugentes campi* (6.472–74) presents us with the queen's final ironic success. Just as she, being more fortunate than Andromache, could maintain her chastity, so too she achieves the return to her husband for which Andromache was longing (see 3.310–13).

[26] I wish to thank Professor David Bright for helping me to see this point.

detailed by Venus (1.343–68), have continued, made conspicuous by her vows of chastity and by the temple to her "ancient husband" (*coniugis antiqui,* 4.458) in her new palace at Carthage. Just as the new palace contains a shrine to the old husband, so too is Dido's new life intimately bound to her old devotion. Dido has already begun life anew—her city is founded—but her success, and hence that of her city, depends upon her remaining a faithful widow. She has insisted on remaining loyal to the past in this narrow and literal sense. Such fidelity requires, ultimately, her death. Carthage, though now alive and thriving, just as Dido is at first busy and *laeta* when she encounters Aeneas, is in its own way as stunted and ephemeral as Andromache's miniature and ghostly Troy at Buthrotum. Sychaeus is Carthage's ghost and, because of Dido's own conscientious attachment to him, he cannot set her free.

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HOUSMAN AND POLAR ERRORS

If volumes like *The Classical Papers of A. E. Housman* can be reduced to a single subject, that subject may be said to be the ability of the author to solve the problems he addresses: his intelligence, his temperament, the validity of his method, and the consistency with which he applies it.[1] When Housman deals with a particularly rare but nevertheless real error, he reveals some of his greatest strengths as a text critic and at least one of his chief weaknesses, for it is typical of his always acute perception that he recognizes unusual errors that go unperceived or rejected by lesser critics, but also it is typical of his occasionally blinkered obstinacy that, in rejecting the reading of another scholar, he can be led not only to a bad reading but to an absurd defense of it.

Polar error is a phenomenon known to critics for centuries but first given the name by Douglas C. C. Young in 1972.[2] As treated by Housman, it may be defined as the recording of a word whose exact opposite is intended and for which no paleographical explanation can be found.[3] It is thus a kind of last resort, when all other possibilities

[1] Unless otherwise noted, the passages cited in this paper come from *The Classical Papers of A. E. Housman,* collected and edited by J. Diggle & F. R. D. Goodyear, 3 vols. (Cambridge 1972), hereafter "*CP.*"

[2] Douglas Young, "Some Types of Scribal Error in the Manuscripts of Pindar," *GRBS* 6(1965) 267 [=*Pindaros und Bakchylides,* N. M. Calder III and J. Stern (*Wege der Forschung* 1934) (Darmstadt 1970) 119], uses the term to describe the confusion at Pind. *Pyth.* 6.23, where the MSS read μὲν, while V reads δὲ. Leon Kellner devotes Chapter XIII (164–66) of *Restoring Shakespeare* (London 1925; reprint ed. New York 1969) to "Contrasting Words Substituted," which presents 12 examples of polar error in the texts of Shakespeare, which he calls "a well-known slip," 14 others that have been corrected by editors, and 16 from texts of other Elizabethan dramatists. E. Christian Kopff, in "An Emendation in Herodotus 7.9.β.2," *AJP* 96(1975) 117–20, cites further examples from antiquity, including Germanicus 246–47 and Cic. *Arat.* 188, mentioned in this paper.

[3] Various types of technically polar error that can be caused by paleographic means are to be found in the apparatuses of Housman's editions, *D. Iunii Iuvenalis Saturae* (Cambridge 1931), *M. Annaei Lucani Belli Civilis* (Cambridge, Mass. 1927), *M. Manilii Astronomicon* 2d ed., (Cambridge 1937). Citations with an asterisk come from H. C. Gotoff, *The Transmission of the Text of Lucan in the Ninth Century* (Cambridge, Mass. 1971), *A. Persi Flacci et D. Iuni Iuvenalis,* ed. W. V. Clausen (Oxford 1959), and D. B. Gain, *The Aratus Ascribed to Germanicus Caesar* (London 1976). Typical varieties of sight or sound confusion are *Germanicus 171 ab τ: ad O: *om.* Z (see also

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have been exhausted and one must assume an error that is not mechanical, as an eye-skip or an ear-slip, but psychological, a confusion based on linguistic rather than acoustic or graphic association in the mind of either the scribe or author. Thus, critics and those who write handbooks of text criticism have not generally discussed this error in their catalogues, possibly because it stands outside basic paleography, possibly because it relies on a speculative assessment of the writer's mentality, or perhaps simply because this type of error is so rare.[4]

But despite its infrequency, this error is, as we shall see, by no means unknown, either in everyday business or the highest literature, in prose or poetry, ancient or modern, by pagan or saint. For example, an editor of the works of Aquinas says:

> In Medieval dictionaries, it was customary to divide everything into opposites, good/bad, Christ/Satan, and so on. Aquinas makes little Freudian slips all over the place. He writes things like: "All bad things come into the world through the sin of Christ." He writes *priori* when he means *posteriori*.[5]

The term "Freudian slip," used accurately here, derives from

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*Juvenal 16.25 adsit *Collins*: absit *PΦ* sit *F*); Lucan 6.601 mihi Ω tibi ZG (see also Soph. *OT* 376 γε σοῦ MSS. γ'ἐμοῦ Brunck and B. M. W. Knox, *Oedipus at Thebes* [London 1957] 7–8; Plautus *MG* 511, mihi *Lambinus* tibi *cod* [Lindsay]; Manilius 1.585 nobis M: vobis GL, Juv. 7.20 nos Ψ vos PFG); *Lucan 9.133 matris Z^2ABR: patris rell. (See also Soph. *Ant.* 863 ματρῷαι A rec. πατρῷαι LF [Pearson]); Lucan 8.412 non nulli RM non ulli rell., *Lucan 5.111 non nullo Z^2AB: non nulla MZ non ullo rell. non ulla E, Manilius 3.532 ulli GM: nulli L; Lucan 8.724 tunc Z(M)UV nunc PG; Manilius 3.4 dignos LM: indignos G, Juv. 3.237 in flexu *edd. vett.* inflexu P Vind. Ψ, Juv. 13.26 numera P *et man.* ZU: numeres iam Schurtzfleischius: numero Ψ: numerum FU, innumerum G. Other polar errors may likewise not result from psychological slips, as the *ab/ad* confusion at *Ciris* 345, attributed by Housman to an eye-skip to the preceding line (*CP* 573) or *intepet* for *non tepet* at Prop. 4.1.124 (like *inducere* for *non ducere* at ibid., 4.5.9) which may result from a confusion of in for ñ (*CP* 859 & 53). At *Lucan 1.642, the confusion of *sine* for *cum* is explained by Gotoff as a gloss intrusion (op. cit., 66), while *meae* at Ovid *Her.* 2.109, where one would expect *tuas* is the result of transposition (*CP* 383).

[4] Polar error is not recognized as a separate type by Havet, Hall, or Maas. Havet, speaking of the "influence des accidents passagers," says "Pratiquement, les émotions du copiste, ses malaises, ses distractions par le dehors ne peuvent suffire à déterminer des fautes nombreuses" (L. Havet, *Manuel de critique verbale appliquée aux textes latins* [Paris 1911] 126). More recently V. A. Dearing, in *Principles and Practice of Textual Analysis* (Berkeley 1974) 32, says, "We are most likely to be misled when we have variants that are synonymous in meaning. Alternate ideas do not make alternate variants."

[5] Fr. Peter Gils quoted in Cullen Murphy, "All the Pope's Men: Putting Aquinas Together Again," *Harper's* 258(June 1979) 63.

Sigmund Freud's *Zur Psychopathologie des Alltagsleben,* a discussion of various types of mental error.[6] In Chapter Six he describes "Misreadings and Slips of the Pen," usually cases in which one does not alter something that lies before one's eyes, as a copyist might, but rather confuses something learned long ago, a quotation in a foreign language, or a dimly recalled or never-understood concept.[7] Two causes are posited for this, either a lapse of memory, which Freud calls "repression," or ignorance, a lack of information.[8]

One of Freud's favorite examples comes to him from the linguist Rudolf Meringer and may be useful for our discussion:

> You probably still recall . . . the way in which the President of the Lower House of the Austrian Parliament *opened* the sitting a short while ago: "Gentlemen: I take notice that a full quorum of members is present and herewith declare the sitting *closed!*" . . . In this particular case the explanation no doubt was that the President secretly *wished* he was already in a position to close the sitting, from which little good was to be expected. But this accompanying idea, as frequently happens, broke through, at least partially, and the result was "closed" instead of "open"—the opposite, that is, of what was intended to be expressed. Now extensive observations have taught me that words with opposite meanings are, quite generally, very often interchanged; they are already associated in our linguistic consciousness, they lie very close to each other and it is easy for the wrong one to be evoked.[9]

The linguistic association of opposites in Greek literature has been amply demonstrated,[10] and the presence of such parapraxes as

[6] *Monatsschr. Psychiat. Neurolog.* X,1 (1901) 1–32; 2.95–143. First published in book form by Karger of Berlin in 1904. The edition referred to here is *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life,* the Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. VI, tr. A. Tyson, ed. A. Strachey (London 1960), hereafter *SW.*

[7] *SW* VI 106–33.

[8] G. Pasquali, one of the first classicists to apply Freudian theory to text criticism, reports in *Storia della tradizione e critica del testo,* 2d ed. (Florence 1952) 483 and n. 1, that he felt the need to investigate the psychological nature of scribal errors and that while Freud's examples were "istruttivi," his explanations were "più fantastiche." See further S. Timpanaro, *The Freudian Slip: Psychoanalysis and Textual Criticism,* tr. K. Soper (London 1976) 26–28.

[9] K. Meringer, "Wie man sich versprechen kann," *Neue Freie Presse,* (Aug. 23,1900) 59, this version from *SW* VI 59. See also his *Second Introductory Lecture* [=*SW* XV 67] and "Some Elementary Lessons in Psycho-analysis" [=*SW* XXIII 279–86]. Freud also deals with the association of opposite words in "The Antithetical Meaning of Primal Words" (1910) [=*SW* XI 155–61].

[10] E. Kemmer, *Die Polare Ausdrucksweise in der Griechischen Literatur* (Beiträge zur Historischen Syntax der Griechischen Sprache 15) (Würzburg 1903), gives many

Freud describes in common experience should make clear, at least to modern editors who have the advantage of our age's knowledge of psychoanalysis, the susceptibility of both scribes and authors to this kind of inadvertent error.

Of course, one need not have the benefit of Freud's examples and explanations to recognize polar error, and indeed, Housman cites great critics who have done so. At Manilius 3.645, *esse ferunt luces aequantia signa diebus,* "Scaliger roughly alters *luces* to *noctes*" ("Barthius and Bentley more skilfully *diebus* to *tenebris*");[11] at Manilius 1.162, *quoque magis puras umor secessit in undas,* Bentley reads *auras* for *undas*[12] and at Lucr. 5.1189, *per caelum volvi quia nox et luna videtur,* he reads *sol* for *nox;*[13] and at Euripides *HF* 1351, ἐγκαρτερήσω θάνατον, Wecklein, Palmer, and Wilamowitz successively alter θάνατον to βίοτον.[14]

Occasionally a true polar error will turn up in an apparatus, as:

*Germanicus 392:

ante Sagittiferi paulum pernicia crura
paulum E: nullum O

Manilius 1.162–63

quoque magis puras umor secessit in auras
et siccata magis struxerunt aequora terram

auras Bentley: undas O, siccata LG: fetata M

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examples and discusses the psychological basis for such associations (and hence such confusions as this paper describes) as the speech of Hecabe, *Il.* 22.431 ff., esp. 432, ὅ μοι νύκτας τε καὶ ἦμαρ or Ismene, Soph. *Ant.* 40, λύουσ' ἂν ἢ 'φάπτουσα προσθείμην πλέον. For such expressions in Latin, see Catull. 64.405–6, Virg. *Aen.* 12.810–11, Hor. *Odes* 2.18.38–40.

[11] A. E. Housman, "Virgil and Calpurnius," *CR* 16(1902) 282 [=*CP* 561–62].

[12] Bentley's conjecture relies on reading *fetata* in line 163. Instead, Housman reads Munro's *saccata* in that line and thus *undas* in 162: "The MSS read fetata (ex *saecata* ut opinor) M, siccata GL."

[13] Idem, "[Review] C. Bailey, *Lucreti de Rerum Natura Libri Sex,*" *CR* 14 (1900) 367 [=*CP* 523].

[14] Idem, "Remarks on the *Ciris,*" *CR* 17(1903) 310 [=*CP* 594]. Wilamowitz, in *Euripides Herakles* (Berlin 1890) III, 272, reads βίοτον, a conjecture he ascribes to Wecklein and himself only, saying "Das ist kein Schreibfehler: da hat vielmehr die gemeine Menschenansicht geändert, die es zwar für schwerhält zu sterben, aber nicht begreift, dass zu leben unendlich viel schwerer ist." A. Lesky, *Die tragische Dichtung der Hellenen* (Göttingen 1972) 378, n.158, and G. Murray, *Euripides Fabulae* (Oxford 1902), read βίοτον as well. A. Nauck, *Euripidis Tragoediae* (Leipzig 1909) vol. 1, reads θάνατον, but also ἐγκαρτερήσον, with Madvig.

How could *nullum* come to replace *paulum* or *fetata siccata?* "Many a time it is impossible to say for certain where the badness of the author ends and the badness of the scribe begins," says Housman, for copyists are "capable of anything," from altering *Zanclea* to *metuenda,* to confusing *corpora* with *tempora,* which "is common," and *expecto* with *moror,* "because . . . it is possible to connect both . . . with the notion of doing nothing."[15] He even believes that in some cases errors of association are more likely than letter confusions.[16] He corrects one polar error that he ascribes to interference by a copyist. At Tibullus 1.7.40,

> Bacchus et agricolae magno confecta labore
> pectora tristitiae dissolvenda dedit

he approves *laetitiae* for *tristitiae,* saying "Thus does an author suffer when a stupid scribe thinks himself clever."[17]

He cannot be so definite about the polar error at Prop. 1.3.43:

> interdum leviter mecum deserta querebar
> externo longas saepe in amore vias.

> leviter . . . querebar AFN, graviter . . . loquebar DV

"*querebar* is clearly right: between the adverbs the choice is harder, but perhaps the editors do well in preferring *leviter* the less obvious."[18] He is even more vague about *Ciris* 156:

> et si quis nocuisse tibi periuria credat

"The sense required is just the reverse, 'si quis *non* nocuisse credat!,'" but he despairs of a solution.[19]

[15] Idem, "Remarks on the *Culex,*" *CR* 16(1902) 339 [=*CP* 563]; idem, 340 (565); 345 (574); idem, "Virgil, *Aen.* iv.225," *CR* 19(1905) 261 [=*CP* 628].

[16] Idem, "The Ibis of Ovid," *JPh* 35(1920) 311–12 [=*CP* 1037–38], "The change [*clava* to *turba*] could be traced through changes of letters from *clava* to *truba* and so to *turba;* but I should rather suppose that *turba* is due to the infrequency of this noun with an attendant epithet at this place in the pentameter."

[17] Idem, "Remarks on the *Ciris,*" (see note 13 above) 309 (594). The apparatus of F. W. Lenz & G. K. Galinsky, *Albii Tibulli aliorumque Carminum libri tres* (Leiden 1971), reads: tristitia Puccius: laetitiae Statius (cum codd.?) Mu Hs Lu. They read *tristitiae* and make no mention of Housman in the fashion of A. Cartault, *Tibulle* (Paris 1909), K. F. Smith, *Tibullus* (New York 1913), and M. C. J. Putnam, *Tibullus, A Commentary* (Norman 1973). J. P. Postgate reads *tristitiae* but says in his apparatus, "laetitiae *Muretus al. recte ut videtur,*" *Tibulli aliorumque Carminum libri tres* (Oxford 1905).

[18] A. E. Housman, "The Manuscripts of Propertius [II]," *JPh* 21(1893) 182 [=*CP* 292–93].

[19] Idem, "Remarks on the *Ciris,*" (see note 13 above) 306–7 [=*CP* 588–89].

Elsewhere he is more customarily forthright. Twice he argues against the likelihood of a *minus/magis* confusion on the basis of its infrequency. Horace *Epod.* 8.15–18 reads:

> Quid quod libelli Stoici inter sericos
> iacere puluillos amant?
> inlitterati num minus nervi rigent
> minusve languet fascinum?

"Sense requires that 'rigent' should mean 'torpent'; language forbids. In this connexion *rigeo, rigor, rigidus* can only have one meaning, and that is the exact reverse of the meaning required."[20] Meineke suggested *num magis* for *num minus* in v. 17, but Housman reads *pigrent,* still opposite to *rigent,* but paleographically easier then *minus/magis,* which he dismisses on similar grounds at Manilius 2.619–21:

> at cum Lanigeri partus sub ultroque trigono
> non parcit; sed rara gerit pro tempore bella,
> quod feritas utriusque magis pro tempore cogit.

To cope with 619, Housman adds a line of his own, and in 621 he replaces the obviously erroneous *pro tempore* with *praetendere.* For this to make sense, he must assume that *magis* is corrupted from *minas* with this extraordinary justification: "*minas* etiam facilius in *magis* abire potuit quam quod haud raro cum hoc confunditur *minus.*"[21] The vexation of these lines runs far deeper than *magis,* and no one proposes *minus* here or even a *minas-minus-magis* trail of corruption, but Housman's remarks at least establish the existence, if extreme rarity, of the error.

Although Housman twice rejects a *minus/magis* confusion, he deals differently with *parvus/magnus* errors. *Ciris* 441 reads:

> non mihi iam pingui sudabunt tempora myrrha,
> pronuba nec castos accendet pinus honores,
> nec Libys Assyrio sternetur lectulus ostro.
> magna queror: me ne illa quidem communis alumnam 441
> omnibus iniecta tellus tumulabit harena.

Housman says, against the MSS., "Write 'parva queror.' This is the

[20] Idem, "Horatiana [II]," *JPh* 17(1888) 318–19 [=*CP* 103–4].

[21] Idem, *M. Manilii Astronomicon* (see note 3 above) II, 67. D. R. Shackleton Bailey, in "Maniliana," *CQ* 6(1956) 82, finds his eyebrows "raised" by Housman's statement and neither changes *magis* nor reads *praetendere.*

phrase used in such a case, when the speaker passes from a lighter to a weightier matter."[22]

But on a second occasion, at Cicero *Arat.* 187–88, we begin to see his obstinacy at work.

> Arcturo magnum spatium supero dedit orbe
> Iuppiter, huic parvum inferiore in parte locavit.

"*Parvum,*" says Housman, "is the exact opposite of the sense required, so [J. Maybaum] writes *magnum;* I write *par.*"[23] Why would he state so unequivocally that an antonym is required and then propose *par* (or later *parile*) when a more appropriate word had already been suggested? Clearly Housman is trying to avoid a correction he considers "precipitate" here, but not so at *Ciris* 441. In refusing to admit, much less to correct, polar error in another passage, he is worse than inconsistent.

As reported by the two chief families of MSS., Germanicus *Aratea* 246–47 reads:

> Piscis, qui respicit auras
> Theicias, dextram Andromedae cernantur ad ulnam

Anyone familiar with the constellations of the Northern Hemisphere knows that Pisces resides to the left, not the right elbow of Andromeda. Aratus knew it, as did Eudoxus, Cicero, and Avienus, as well as Hous-

[22] A. E. Housman, "Remarks on the *Ciris,*" (see note 13 above) 309 (593–94), cites in support Ovid *Met.* 2.214 and *Ars Am.* 2.631. This correction was originally proposed by K. Ganzenmüller, "Beiträge zur *Ciris,*" *Neue Jhrbb. f. Phil. und Päd.; Jhrbb. f. cl. Phil. Supplmbd.* 20(1893–94) 612, who does not, however, suggest its adoption. A. Vollmer, *Poetae Latini Minores* (Leipzig 1910) I, H. R. Fairclough, *Virgil Aeneid 7–12; The Minor Poems* (London & Cambridge, Mass. 1934), A. Haury, *La Ciris* (Bordeaux 1957), and D. Knecht, *Ciris* (Brugge 1970), read *magna,* while F. R. D. Goodyear in *Appendix Vergiliana,* ed. W. V. Clausen, et al. (Oxford 1967), reads *parva.* None reads Heinsius' *vana.*

[23] A. E. Housman, "The *Aratea* of Germanicus," *CR* 14(1900) 31, n.1 [=*CP* 503 n.1]. See also idem, "Emendations in the *Aratea* of Cicero and Avienus," *CR* 16(1902) 103 [=*CP* 551], where he suggests "*par* or *parile.*" Maybaum's reading is proposed in his dissertation, *De Cicerone et Germanico Arati interpretibus* (Rostock 1889) 11. The lines are modelled on Arat. 404–7, a description of the constellation known as "The Altar." Housman assumes that Cicero follows the view that the Altar is as far from the South Pole as Arcturus is from the North, but this is not true, according to Hipparchus 1.8.14 f. and does not comport with Aratus. Housman's correction is noticed neither by V. Buescu, *Ciceron, Les Aratea* (Paris & Bucharest 1941), nor by W. W. Ewbank, *The Poems of Cicero* (London 1933), who cites Maybaum in his bibliography. M. Salanitro, "Aratea II," *SCO* 15(1966) 258–61, argues against Maybaum and Housman and reads *locatae* in line 188.

man.[24] The same J. Maybaum therefore suggested *laevam*.[25] The additional change of *cernantur* to *cernatur* gives good sense and the singular makes a parallel with *respicit*.[26]

Although Housman recognized the astronomical aspects of the error, he refused to accept Maybaum's change and was led to a characteristically vehement but uncommonly groundless outburst: "But hard as it is to believe that Germanicus wrote *dextram* when he meant *laevam*, it is harder still to imagine how a copyist could write *laevam* when *dextram* stared him in the face."[27] In other words, (1) the error cannot be authorial, for no author, not even Germanicus, could write one thing when he meant another, and (2) the error cannot be scribal, for no scribe could unconsciously alter a text so radically, especially with the benefit of a correct text that "stared him in the face." The only way a text could be so corrupted is by deliberate scribal abuse as in Tibullus 1.7.40.

We are left then to wonder how the errors we have already seen in Manilius, Germanicus, Propertius, Horace, the *Ciris*, and Cicero's *Aratea* could have occurred, for in all those cases, someone, of much skill or, most often, of very little skill wrote the opposite of what the copy text required. Whether Housman is perversely determined not to accept Maybaum's readings out of sheer spite or whether he genuinely believed in 1900, as he did not in 1888, 1893, and 1903, that polar errors were impossible, he could clearly not have intended to convey the idea that no one can make such a slip in writing, whether author or scribe. If such were the case, how could any textual errors except those of conscious emendation ever occur?

Housman's tendency (as in the Tibullus example) is generally to defend the author against the depradations of the copyist.[28] But it is

[24] A. E. Housman, "The Aratea of Germanicus" (see note 23 above) 31(503).

[25] Maybaum (note 23 above).

[26] Both MSS read *cernantur*, as G. Maurach points out in *Germanicus und sein Arat; Eine vergleichende Auslegung von 1–327 der Phaenomena* (Heidelburg 1978) 101, in rejecting any alteration of this passage. The MSS also both read *dextram*, however. Grotius et al. read *cernetur*.

[27] Housman, ibid. His solution is to take *Piscis* as genitive (as no other initial word of a sentence is in Germanicus) and to suggest that *astra* was omitted through haplography: "*-as as* shrank to *-as* and *-tra* suggested dex*tra*m." This reading is accepted by the three most recent editors of Germanicus, A. Le Boeuffle, *Germanicus, Les Phénomènes d'Aratos* (Paris 1975), Gain (see note 3 above), who says that Housman speaks "with far more probability" than Maybaum, and Maurach (see note 26 above).

[28] An exception is *Ciris* 441.

entirely possible that his first assumption, that Germanicus himself cannot be the author of this error, may not be wholly defensible. We know that the confusion of right and left is common in astronomical works of antiquity,[29] and while it is difficult to assign such errors to ancient authors, they are common enough in modern times to allow us to admit the possibility that Germanicus himself may be at fault. Two examples will suffice.

In the first chapter of *Gulliver's Travels,* as it stands thoroughly corrected by Swift himself, Gulliver is shipwrecked on Lilliput, an island described as lying "Northwest of Van Diemen's Land" (Tasmania).[30] However, as Arthur E. Case points out, even in contemporary maps that were surely studied by Swift at great length, the latitude given by Swift would place Lilliput "well inland in Australia."[31] Case suggests emending to "Northeast of Van Diemen's Land" so that "all difficulties vanish."[32]

In the first act of Richard Wagner's *Tristan und Isolde,* where the opening lines of the opera show the boat sailing from Ireland to Cornwall, from west to east ("Westwärts schweift der Blick; ostwärts streicht das Schiff"), Brangäne's first words are "Blaue Streifen tiegen im Westen auf."[33] The "blue streaks" refer to the coast of Cornwall which would, of course, appear in the east, not in the west. Most libretti do not correct this error, which Ernest Newman attributes to Wagner's "slip of the pen."[34]

[29] "The confusion of right and left is not only extremely natural but is also as a matter of fact extremely common in ancient accounts of the constellations," writes G. R. Mair in *Callimachus Hymns and Epigrams; Lycophron; Aratus,* ed. & tr. A. W. & G. R. Mair (London & Cambridge, Mass. 1960) 199. Of interest is Mair's discussion of Arat. 246–47 (ibid., 198–99) and 69–70, which Hipparchus considered "more of an oversight [παρόραμα] than an error [ἁμάρτημα] on the part of Aratus." Yet if Aratus makes an error, it is usually followed by Cicero, Avienus, and Germanicus, e.g., Draco's mouth at Germanicus 58 and Avienus 162 (an exception: Avienus 192 places the right foot of Engonasin on the head of Draco, rather than the left, as do Eratosthenes, *Catas.* 4, Hyginus, *Astr.* s.v. "Engonasin," and Germ. 68).

[30] J. Swift, *Gulliver's Travels,* I.1.5. For the text "exactly reprinted from the First Edition," see the edition of Henry Morley (London 1890). The standard modern text of Herbert Davis (Oxford 1965) and the 1902 Oxford popular edition show the error as well.

[31] Arthur E. Case, *Four Essays on Gulliver's Travels* (Princeton 1945) 55.

[32] Case (note 31 above) 56.

[33] It appears thus in *Gesammelte Schriften und Dichtungen von Richard Wagner* (Leipzig 1888) VII 1. It is first changed to "Osten" in the C. F. Peters edition (Leipzig n.d. [1911 or slightly thereafter]) 22.

[34] Ernest Newman, *The Wagner Operas* (New York 1949) 217, n.1. The Fürtwangler and 1941 Metropolitan Opera recordings read "Westen" while the later recordings of Karl Böhm and Herbert von Karajan read "Osten."

Of these cases we can say, as we cannot with ancient works, that the authors themselves have caused the error. It is clearly to Housman's credit that he not only recognized this type of error, but on occasion corrected it, as few subsequent editors of these texts have.[35] It is the critic's task to decide if the passages presented in this paper exhibit true polar errors and, if so, whether or not to correct them. Clearly some seemed so to Housman, and he altered the texts as he saw fit. But in the light of his general method of text criticism, that "science conversant with literature," of his perception of polar error in other cases, we must question three of his defenses thus: Is it more likely that either Germanicus or a scribe, thinking *laevam,* wrote *dextram* than, as Housman proposes, that a scribe thinking *astra* wrote *dextram?* Is it likely that Housman would have suggested *par* for *magnum* if Maybaum had not already suggested *parvum?* Would he have read *pigrent* for *rigent* if Meineke had not already written *magis* for *minus?* In each case, Housman argues for a word "of opposite meaning," but stops short of accepting an already proposed polar correction.

We cannot know for certain whether to blame author or scribe for the slips described in this paper, but we do need to realize, as Housman does when he is not being merely bullheaded or perverse about another critic's anticipation of him, that this phenomenon is not always the result of deliberate interference but can have psychological causes and that as such it has been recognized by critics, linguists, psychologists, and even the classical editors Housman deigns to have himself compared to.[36]

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[35] For those editors who have not accepted Housman's corrections of polar error, see notes 14, 17, 22, 23. I have found only one case in which an editor adds a polar error, that mentioned in note 3 above where Clausen (and U. Knoche, *D. Junius Juvenalis Saturae* [Munich 1950]) reads *adsit* for *absit* at Juv. 16.25.

[36] I wish to express my deep gratitude to Prof. E. Christian Kopff, who read early versions of this paper and pointed out to me the polar errors in Sophocles, Euripides, and Plautus.

INTERPRETATIONS

"REGES ARMENII PATRICIOS RESALUTARE NON SOLENT?"

A Note on Cicero, *Ad Att.* 2.7.2 f.

The cheerful mood in which Cicero, in the spring of 59, took the news of the adoption of P. Clodius Pulcher by a certain P. Fonteius was not to last through summer; but the remarks produced by the *consularis disertus* while he was in that mood make amusing reading to the present day. A letter written in April 59 (*Ad Att.* 2.7) and containing the first extant comment on Clodius' recent transformation from patrician to plebeian[1] shows an exuberant Cicero:

> De Publio quae ad me scribis sane mihi iucunda sunt, eaque etiam velim omnibus vestigiis indagata ad me adferas cum venies, et interea scribas si quid intelleges aut suspicabere, et maxime de legatione quid sit acturus. equidem ante quam tuas legi litteras [in] hominem ire cupiebam, non mehercule ut differrem cum eo vadimonium (nam mira sum alacritate ad litigandum), sed videbatur mihi, si quid esset in <eo> populare quod plebeius factus esset, id amissurus. quid enim? 'ad plebem transisti ut Tigranem ires salutatum? narra mihi, reges Armenii patricios resalutare non solent?' quid quaeris? acueram <me> ad exagitandam hanc eius legationem. quam si ille contemnit et si, ut scribis, bilem id commovit et latoribus et auspicibus legis curiatae, spectaculum egregium.
>
> <Et> hercule, verum ut loquamur, subcontumeliose tractatur noster Publius, primum qui, cum domi Caesaris quondam unus vir fuerit, nunc ne in viginti quidem esse potuerit; deinde alia legatio dicta erat, alia data est. illa opima ad exigendas pecunias Druso, ut opinor, Pisaurensi an epuloni Vatinio reservatur; haec ieiuna tabellarii legatio datur ei cuius tribunatus ad istorum tempora reservatur. incende hominem, amabo te, quoad potest.[2]

With the benefit of hindsight, we know that Cicero's concern

[1] On Clodius' adoption, see Cic. *Ad Att.* 2.12.1; 8.3.3; *De Dom.* 37; Suet. *Div. Iul.* 20.4; Plut. *Cato min.* 33.6; Appian *BC* 2.14; Dio 38.12.2; 39.11.2. Cf. also Fröhlich s.v. "Clodius (48)" *RE* 4.1 (1900) 82–88.

[2] Cic. *Ad Att.* 2.7.2 f., quoted from the edition by D. R. Shackleton Bailey, vol. 1 (Cambridge 1965).

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about a possible lack of enthusiasm on the part of Clodius, as expressed in the quotation's last sentence, was quite unjustified, as was his hope for a lasting discord among the leaders of the coalition that had come to power with Caesar's consulate,[3] or his vision of the valiant stand he would take against the impending attacks of Clodius. But had he been quicker in accurately assessing the situation and the dangers that were likely to emanate from it, this letter might have been written in a discouraged spirit like those of summer and fall 59,[4] and the *bonmot* about Clodius "who once was the only man in Caesar's house" might never have been coined. Nor might we have the opportunity to discuss here another witticism in the letter quoted above.

Ad plebem transisti ut Tigranem ires salutatum? narra mihi, reges Armenii patricios resalutare non solent? jibes at Clodius' transition to the Plebs and his intended *legatio* to the court of Tigranes, King of Armenia.[5] It is a straightforward quip, and to our knowledge, commentators of the letter rarely have felt it necessary to remark on it.[6] Yet the bite cuts deeper, it seems.

In 72 B.C., L. Licinius Lucullus, the commander-in-chief against Mithradates VI Eupator, King of Pontos, sent his brother-in-law, Ap. Claudius Pulcher, to the court of Tigranes, residing, for the time being, at Antiochia in Syria. Appius was to deliver an ultimatum: the Romans demanded the extradition of Mithradates (who after his defeat at Kabeira had fled to Tigranes, his son-in-law); otherwise, there would be war.[7]

[3] *Una spes est salutis istorum inter ipsos dissensio, cuius ego quaedam initia sensi ex Curione* (*Ad Att.* 2.7.3; cf. 2.12.2).

[4] E.g., *Ad Att.* 2.18; 19.1, 4 f.; 20.2 f.; 21; 22.1 f., 5; 23.3; 24.5; 25.

[5] From *Att.* 2.7.3 it would seem that Clodius had originally been promised a different, financially more rewarding mission. In the end, he did not go to Armenia either, but early in 59 his journey seems to have been a real possibility: *Att.* 2.4.2. The object of this *legatio* is not known; W. Drumann, *Geschichte Roms* (2nd ed. by P. Groebe, Berlin and Leipzig 1899–1929) 2.195 f., suggested that it had to do with the confirmation of Pompey's *acta* in the East. That makes sense and finds support in *Att.* 2.7.3, where Clodius' mission is referred to derisively as *haec ieiuna tabellarii legatio:* probably it would have been Clodius' task to inform Tigranes that his rule over his ancestral kingdom was now officially sanctioned by the Roman People.

[6] Manutius (Venice 1557) explained the quip as follows: "Vide Clodi, quam non sapienter egeris. Armenii reges Romam uenire solent, ut patricios salutent. tu autem patricius cum esses, transire ad plebem uoluisti, quam ob causam? ut ipse regem Armenium ires salutatum." I.C.G. Boot (Amsterdam 1865), R. Y. Tyrrell-L. C. Purser (Dublin 1904), L. A. Constans (Paris [5]1962), D. R. Shackleton Bailey (Cambridge 1965), and H. Kasten (München [2]1976) do not comment on this passage.

[7] The fullest account of Appius' negotiations is in Plutarch *Luc.* 19.1; 21–22.2, and Memnon of Herakleia 46 and 55 = *FGrHist* no. 434.31; 38.1. Cf. Josephus *Ant. Iud.*

Tigranes, busy with the conquest of Phoenicia, kept Appius waiting in Antiochia until well into 71, and when he at last received him, the King found it hard to keep his countenance in the face of Appius' insolent language.[8] He refused to extradite Mithradates; worse, while hitherto he had only granted him asylum (under a guard) without seeing him, he now received Mithradates with all due honor. Appius' mission was hardly a success.

This Appius Claudius, it is well known, was Clodius' elder brother, to become consul in 54. He was and remained patrician, and in the light of his ambivalent exploits and experiences at the court of Tigranes, Cicero's *dictum* gains somewhat in subtlety. Not that he was implying that Tigranes did not return Appius' greetings—if we may believe Plutarch, at Appius' departure the King offered him numerous gifts, of which the Roman, with uncharacteristic self-restraint, picked only a single bowl.[9] Atticus, or any Roman hearer or reader of Cicero's remark, however, would be aware of the fact that Clodius' own patrician brother, a dozen years ago, had been sent to the same Tigranes and achieved nothing, in a diplomatic mission of some importance. Now Clodius was about to go himself, but only *salutatum,* as Cicero contemptuously describes the mission's purpose,[10] and he even had to take the precaution, Cicero scoffs, to become a plebeian, to make sure that Tigranes would re-salute him. The King, too, had lost in stature: a sovereign ruler when he met Appius, now by the grace of Pompeius a client prince of the Roman People. Clodius the Plebeian had fallen

13.419; *Bell. Iud.* 1.116; Appian *Mithr.* 83. Lucullus was married to Clodia, Appius' (and Clodius') sister, see Plut. *Luc.* 21.1; 38.1, and Münzer s.v. "Clodius (67)" *RE* 4.1 (1900) 107. Cf. also F. Geyer, s.v. "Tigranes (1)" *RE* 6A.1 (1936) 970–78. On the date, see also T. R. S. Broughton, *MRR* 2.106ff., 119, 125. It may be noted that Clodius, too, was serving in Lucullus' army. He was not employed in diplomatic missions and left his mark chiefly by stirring up the mutiny of Nisibis in the winter of 68/7: Plut. *Luc.* 34; cf. Dio 36.14.3 f.

[8] Plut. *Luc.* 21.6 writes: φωνῆς σχεδὸν ἐλευθέρας ἀκούοντα διὰ πέντε καὶ εἴκοσιν ἐτῶν. It is a matter of one's point of view, of course, but the peremptory manner of Roman diplomats is well-attested; one needs but think of the embassy delivering the ultimatum to Karthago in 218, or of C. Popillius Laenas' behaviour towards Antiochos IV in 168. Lucullus, in a letter handed over by Appius, had neglected to address Tigranes as *King of Kings;* Tigranes in his response omitted the title *imperator* (the Eastern Barbarians, it seems, were quite well versed in the nuances of Roman protocol): Plut. *Luc.* 21.7; Memnon 42.3.

[9] Plut. *Luc.* 21.8; on Appius' greed, see Cic. *De Dom.* 111, and Münzer, s.v. "Claudius (297)" *RE* 3.2 (1899) 2849–53.

[10] For another derisive epitheton, see note 5 above.

deep indeed—morally, socially, and politically. Or so it seemed, to Cicero, in those joyful days at Antium in April 59.

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PROPERTIUS 4.7.94 YET AGAIN*

D. R. Shackleton Bailey's criticism of my note, "Propertius 4.7.94: A Reply," in a recent issue of *AJP* calls for brief comment ("Propertius 4.3 [*sic*]. 94: An Appendix," *AJP* 103 [1982] 213–4). His complaint is that I (like Allison and Fedeli) failed to take account of Hosius' introduction and Shackleton Bailey's own article "Echoes of Propertius" (*Mnemosyne* 5 [1952] 307–31) both in the note and in my original *BICS* article. I therefore refer Professor Shackleton Bailey to note 4 of the *BICS* article (*BICS* 24 [1977] 86), where he will find his *Mnemosyne* article actually cited. As for my *AJP* note, a full bibliography was not appropriate, but I certainly was not suggesting that Fedeli and I were alone in observing the similarity between Prop. 4.7.94. *et mixtis ossibus ossa teram* and *Carm. Epigr.* 1136.2 *ossibus hic uxor miscuit ossa meis* (a point to which I shall return). I wished merely to stress that, since "bone-mixing" expressions are (*pace* Allison) quite common in sepulchral epigram and funerary contexts, Propertius might well have chosen to establish a "funerary atmosphere," as it were, by using a motif commonly found in such contexts, as he does elsewhere in the poem. Thus, the elegist and the author of *Carm. Epigr.* 1136 can be seen as writing within the same tradition and we need not assume *Carm. Epigr.* 1136.2 to be a "Propertian echo," as is suggested by Allison (and, indeed, by Shackleton Bailey in his *Mnemosyne* article).

As for bibliographical omissions, though I am not guilty of overlooking Professor Shackleton Bailey's article, I should now refer to a work which I did *not*, in fact, cite either in *BICS* or in *AJP*, namely

* And for the last time. Ed.

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Ewald Lissberger's *Das Fortleben der Römischen Elegiker in den Carmina Epigraphica* (Diss. Stuttgart 1934). This contains *all* the "bone-mixing" examples given by Hosius, by Fedeli, and (with the exception of the two prose inscriptions)[1] by myself, including the all-important *Carm. Epigr.* 1136.2 (Lissberger 96). It also contains *both* of the examples given by Shackleton Bailey in his *Mnemosyne* article and referred to again in his note, namely *Carm. Epigr.* 157.2 and Ovid *Met.* 11.706 f. Considering Professor Shackleton Bailey's insistence on bibliographical citation, I am surprised that Lissberger appears in neither his article nor his note.

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CASH FROM THE EMPEROR

A Veteran's Gravestone at Elecik in Galatia

Honorable discharge from the Roman army brought with it tax exemptions, legal privileges, and a cash or land award (*immunitates, praemia, beneficia, commoda*), according to the rank of one's branch of service.[1] And since it was also an honor, veterans frequently mention their discharge with pride: *missus honesta missione.*

Three inscriptions, however, show an unusual variation of this theme in that they mention the receipt of retirement benefits rather than the honorable discharge. The first is an undated gravestone from the Eastern Djebel of Tripolitania with the following text:[2]

C(aius) Clodius C(aii) f(ilius) Col(lina tribu)
Paulus, veteranus commodis honoratus sibi fecit.

[1] Dessau *ILS* 8469 *ossibus permixtis* and *CIL* 13.4640 *ossa commixta* (the latter incorrectly cited by me as Dessau 8640. I thank Professor Shackleton Bailey for pointing out the false reference).

[1] *BGU* II, 628 Verso II = *W.Chr.* 462; *W.Chr.* 463. See, e.g., M. Grant, *The Army of the Caesars* (New York 1974) 80 ff. R. Taubenschlag, *Die kaiserlichen Privilegien im Rechte der Papyri, Opera Minora* II (Warsaw 1959) 45–68.

[2] *ILT* 872 = *ILAfr.* 3 = *AE* (1910) 155.

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Unusual is the expression *commodis honoratus*. It is without exact parallel, but a somewhat comparable gravestone, datable to A.D. 86, comes from Henchir Brighita in Africa:[3]

> *P. Ennius T(iti) f(ilius) Eppilli n(epos) Quir(ina tribu)*
> *Paccianus, commodis acceptis ex leg(ione) III Aug(usta)*
> *ab imp(eratore) Domitiano Caesare Aug(usto) Ger(manico)*
> *co(n)s(ule) XII[---].*

As with the preceding text, one is surprised to see the phrase *missus honesta missione* replaced by a reference to the *commoda*.

Together, the two inscriptions help to clarify the text of a recently published tombstone from Elecik in northern Galatia. The editor of the highly welcome catalogue of inscriptions from this area gives the following drawing:[4]



[3] *CIL* VIII, 12241; cf. *AE* (1979) 657.

[4] S. Mitchell, *Regional Epigraphic Catalogues of Asia Minor II, The Ankara District, The Inscriptions of North Galatia* (Oxford 1982) no. 200.

He reads and comments:

- - - - - - -
. . . commodis· An-
c. Caesari · Augusto · mil.
[an·?]XII, vixit · an · LXIV
h. s. f.
monimentum · fecit
C·Avianius·f· eius.
cura · agenti ·C Avia-
nio Secundo procur-
atore · eius

Translation: (? C. Avianius) . . . commodis of Ancyra, served as a soldier for Caesar Augustus for ?12 years, and lived for 64 years. His heirs made this. C. Avianius, his son, made the memorial, and C. Avianius Secundus, his procurator, took care of the matter.

Commentary: 1: The last letter of the line is uncertain, but the traces most clearly resemble the N in Secundo (1.8).

3: Caesari Augusto: the dative case is to be taken with militavit, he did service for the emperor. The titles most naturally refer to Augustus in which case this text might be compared with *ILS* 2231 C. Edusius Sex. f. Clu. natus Mevaniae, centurio legion XXXXI Augusti Caesaris et centurio classicus, ex testamento. However, as Dessau notes on *ILS* 977 Claudius and Nero could both simply be called Caesar Augustus. In any case this appears to be the gravestone of a Galatian recruit from the early Empire.

Date: First century A.D.?

The parallels offered by the two inscriptions quoted above show that we have here instead a reference to the *commoda* of a veteran: *honoratus commodis a C(aio) Caesari Augusto.* This reading deletes the reference to Ancyra as well as the awkward dative case with *militavit.* Moreover, the discharge of our veteran is thereby dated to the reign of Gaius (A.D. 37–41).[5] Restoring the last letter in line 6 to be an E rather than an F, one obtains the following reading:

[5] For the titles and names of Caius (Caligula), see, e.g., P. Bureth, *Les titulatures impériales dans les papyrus, les ostraca et les inscriptions d'Égypte (30 a.C.–284 p.C.)* (Brussels 1964) 28 f.

[C(aio) Avianio veterano
leg(ionis) --- honoratus]
commodis a
C(aio) Caesari Augusto. Mil(itavit)
[. . .] II vixit an(nos) LXIV.
H(ic) s(itus) ẹ(st).
Monimentum fecit
C(aius) Avianius f(ilius) eius
cura agentẹ C(aio) Avia-
nio Secundo procur-
atore eius.

How this veteran with an Italian name came to settle in Galatia is unknown, nor do we know his unit, which was probably a legion, since auxiliaries may not have received *commoda* at this early period.[6]

The Elecik gravestone thus constitutes the third case where the expression *missus honesta missione* is replaced by a reference to *commoda,* the cash grants made by the emperors to their veterans.[7] How is this phenomenon to be explained?

Augustus did not always give these grants on the day of discharge, which led to the mutinies in A.D. 14 when the soldiers demanded to receive their grants on the spot, while still in the camps: *ne ultra sub vexillis tenerentur, sed isdem in castris praemium pecunia solveretur* (Tac. *Ann.* I.17). Likewise, under Nero the treasury had become so exhausted that payment of the *commoda* had to be delayed: *ita iam exhaustus et egens ut stipendia quoque militum et commoda veteranorum protrahi ac differri necesse esset* (Suet. *Nero* 32).

The three inscriptions mentioning the *commoda* instead of the *missio honesta* thus seems to confirm our literary sources in documenting this dangerously weak spot in the imperial administration. They

[6] For the Italian name Avianius see W. Schulze, *Zur Geschichte lateinischer Eigennamen* (Berlin 1904) (Reprint 1966) 18 and 348. For legionaries in the area, see M. Speidel, *Legionaries from Asia Minor ANRW* II, 17.2 (1980) 730–46. The only possible reference to an auxiliary with *commoda* at the end of the first century is known from *AE* (1915) 69: *Marti Aug(usti) et Genio Coloniae sacr(um) T(itus) Flavius Quir(ina tribu) Breucus veteranus acceptarius militavit in ala I Pannonioru(m) dec(urio) et princeps an(nos) XXVI, flamen colon(iae) perpetuus s(ua) p(ecunia) p(osuit).* The *accepta* here seem to be a land grant, but that grant may have been in exchange for previously owned private property; see J. C. Mann, *Legionary Recruitment and Veteran Settlement* (London 1983) note 571.

[7] While the term *commoda* at times had a wider meaning, it certainly could also mean cash grants, see Suet. *Calig.* 44: *commoda emeritae militiae ad sescentorum milium summam recidit.* In *AE* (1937) 232 *commoda* are tax exemptions for veterans.



express a certain triumph and relief at the receipt of the *commoda,* suggesting that these grants were not given automatically upon discharge.[8] Perhaps as late as A.D. 86 one had to wait for, and to worry about, one's *commoda.* Yet it is hardly a coincidence that the two inscriptions that can be dated come from the reigns of Gaius and Domitian (i.e., from the first century A.D.), even though most soldiers' gravestones come from the second and third centuries. Beginning with Trajan's reign, irregularities such as inordinate length of service and the retention of veterans were gradually abandoned—and so was undoubtedly the time lapse between the day of discharge and the receipt of the *commoda.*[9]

Another possibility must be taken into account, though. Perhaps the three inscriptions refer to a special category of veterans, men who because of disability were discharged before they could complete their term of service. Later emperors legislated in detail just what *commoda* such men should receive, but often their status may have depended on the emperor's special consideration (which would explain the naming of the emperors in two of these texts).[10] The question could be decided if the Elecik inscription would clearly show that the deceased served less than twenty years. As it is, the three texts may express either a concern about cash grants common to all legionaries, or a concern peculiar to men discharged before their time.

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[8] Contra (without evidence): A. Neumann, *Veterani, RE* Suppl. 9, 1605.58 ff. For land grants promised, but not yet given at the time of the issue of a diploma, see *CIL* XVI, 25: *quos agros a me acceperint* (A.D. 79).

[9] For the retention of veterans see L. J. F. Keppie, *Vexilla Veteranorum, PBSR* 41 (1973) 8–17. The years of service of legionaries are tabulated by G. Forni, *Il reclutamento delle legioni da Augusto a Diocleziano* (Milano 1953) 142–44: they show a certain decrease over time; for a similar phenomenon with the auxilia see G. Alföldy, *Zur Beurteilung der Militärdiplome der Auxiliarsoldaten, Historia* 17 (1968) 215–27. Those having served longer in the later period may have been *voluntarii,* see M. Speidel, *The Captor of Decebalus, A New Inscription from Philippi, JRS* 60 (1970) 142–53, esp. 151, n. 102.

[10] For such *causarii* see Neumann, l.c.1599 f.; for pertinent legislation see the discussion and documents in D.V. Berchem, *L'armée de Dioclétien et la réforme constantinienne* (Paris 1952) 75 ff. For a special consideration see CIL XVI, 10.

DIOGENES LAERTIUS 3.6: PLATO AND EURIPIDES

In a notorious passage (3.6) Diogenes Laertius writes that Euripides accompanied Plato to Egypt. Whatever one may think of Plato's alleged visit to Egypt, he did not, in the words of Eduard Zeller, travel "accompanied by Euripides, who had died some time before, however"[1] (precisely 406 B.C.). The passage is:

οὗ φασι καὶ Εὐριπίδην αὐτῷ συνακολυθῆσαι

A solution is at hand. For Εὐριπίδην read Εὔδοξον. Strabo (17.1.29) was shown the schools of Plato and Eudoxus at Heliopolis. The reason for the error is the erroneous expansion of an abbreviation (here Εὐ.) in Diogenes' first draft: see the examples at Jørgen Mejer, "Diogenes Laertius and his Hellenistic Background," *Hermes Einzelschriften* 40 (Wiesbaden 1978) 25–28 (e.g., *Xeno*crates for *Xeno*phanes at 1.16, *So*lon for *So*crates at 2.13, *Anax*imander for *Anax*agoras at 8.70, etc.).

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ON AN EPIGRAM OF AGATHIAS (*AP* XI 382)

For Professor L. G. Westerink on His Seventieth Birthday*

Κεῖτο μὲν Ἀλκιμένης κεκακωμένος ἐκ πυρετοῖο
καὶ περὶ λαυκανίην βραγχὰ λαρυγγιόων
νυσσόμενός τε τὸ πλευρὸν ἅτε ξιφέεσσιν ἀμυχθέν
καὶ θαμὰ δυσκελάδοις ἄσθμασι πνευστιόων·

[1] See Eduard Zeller, *Plato and the Older Academy* (London 1888) 16, n. 28, and compare W. K. C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy* IV (Cambridge 1975) 15.

* Τοῦ διδασκάλου πολλὰ τὰ ἔτη.

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ἦλθε δὲ Καλλίγνωτος ὁ Κώϊος, ὁ πλατυλέσχης, 5
τῆς παιωνιάδος πληθόμενος σοφίης,
πᾶσαν ἔχων πρόγνωσιν ἐν ἄλγεσιν, οὔ τι περιττὸν
ἄλλο προαγγέλλων ἢ τὸ γενησόμενον.
Ἀλκιμένους δ' ἐδόκευεν ἀνάκλισιν ἔκ τε προσώπου
φράζετο καὶ παλάμης ψαῦεν ἐπισταμένως 10
καὶ τὸ περὶ κρισίμων φαέων ἐλογίζετο γράμμα
πάντ' ἀναπεμπάζων οὐχ ἑκὰς Ἱπποκράτους.
Καὶ τότε τὴν πρόγνωσιν ἐς Ἀλκιμένην ἀνεφώνει
σεμνοπροσωπήσας καὶ σοβαρευόμενος·
« Εἴ γε φάρυγξ βομβεῦσα καὶ ἄγρια τύμματα πλευροῦ 15
καὶ πυρετῷ λήξῃ πνεῦμα δασυνόμενον,
οὐκέτι τεθνήξει πλευρίτιδι· τοῦτο γὰρ ἡμῖν
σύμβολον ἐσσομένης ἐστὶν ἀπημοσύνης.
Θάρσει· τὸν νομικὸν δὲ κάλει καὶ χρήματα σαυτοῦ
εὖ διαθεὶς βιότου λῆγε μεριμνοτόκου, 20
καί με τὸν ἰητρόν, προρρήσιος εἵνεκεν ἐσθλῆς,
ἐν τριτάτῃ μοίρῃ κάλλιπε κληρονόμον. »

Apart from a short article by Schuster[1] and the annotated edition of Viansino,[2] this poem about a doctor called Callignotus has not received much individual attention, and scholars have generally been content to formulate its point and to characterize the protagonist. In Beckby's edition the epigram is given the title "The Greedy Doctor";[3] Viansino judges the piece to be a general attack on laziness and ignorance in the medical profession;[4] Aubreton and Jacoby settle primarily on the man's incompetence,[5] while for Schuster he is not a genuine physician at all, but a legacy hunter in the guise of a doctor.[6]

It is clear, then, that no single interpretation has won acceptance. It may even be in the nature of some epigrams to have their points dulled with the passing of time and by distance from the original atmosphere. There are, however, certain elements of Agathias' poem that have not been observed before and a discussion of them might be

[1] M. Schuster, "De Agathiae scholastici epigrammate quodam," *Wiener Studien* 45 (1926–27) 120–22.

[2] G. Viansino, *Agazia Scholastico: Epigrammi* (Milan 1967) 149–51, 154–55.

[3] H. Beckby, *Anthologia Graeca* III (Munich 1958) 734–37: "Der habgierige Arzt."

[4] Viansino (note 2 above) 150: the epigram "è scritto contro i medici di cui si proclama l'infingardaggine e l'ignoranza."

[5] R. Aubreton, *Anthologie Grecque* X (Paris 1972) 287. Not being able to see a copy of the original, for F. Jacoby's opinion ("*ineptus medicus*") I rely on Schuster's report (note 1 above) 120.

[6] Schuster (note 1 above) 121.

useful for a better appreciation of what the poet had in mind. We will proceed by briefly analyzing the sections.

Lines 1–4. We are introduced to the patient, Alcimenes, sick in bed with a fever (πυρετός), a hoarse cough (βραγχὰ λαρυγγιόων), stabbing pain in the side (νυσσόμενος τὸ πλευρόν), and abnormal breathing (δυσκελάδοις ἄσθμασι πνευστιόων). This description is no haphazard concoction on the part of Agathias, but a very specific syndrome; for in it we are given the four cardinal signs of pleurisy which doctors have long used for diagnosing the condition. Galen presents them as follows: ἐπὶ τοίνυν τῆς πλευρίτιδος ὁ μὲν ὀξὺς πυρετὸς ἅμα τῇ δυσπνοίᾳ καὶ τῇ βηχὶ καὶ τῷ κατὰ τὴν πλευρὰν ἀλγήματι νυγματώδει παθογνωμονικὰ σημεῖά εἰσι.[7] This description became the classic one, as we see from a passage of Agathias' contemporary, the well-known doctor Alexander of Tralles: εἰ οὖν εὕροις ὀξὺν πυρετὸν καὶ δυσπνοίαν καὶ νυγματῶδες ἄλγημα καὶ βῆχα, τότε λέγε ἀκριβῶς εἶναι πλευριτικὸν ἐκεῖνον ᾧ ταῦτα πάντα συμβέβηκε.[8] Another sixth century medical man confirms the point.[9] That Agathias means by βραγχὰ λαρυγγιόων coughing, and not just hoarseness, as others have understood,[10] is proved by the corresponding phrase later on, φάρυγξ βομβεῦσα (line 15).

Lines 5–8. Along comes the Coan Callignotus, never lost for words, full of medical lore, and an unerring forecaster of the outcome in all diseases. We will withhold comment for the moment.

Lines 9–12. Callignotus sets about examining the sick man, to lay the basis for his upcoming prediction, and his method is worth looking

[7] Galen, in his commentary on the *Aphorisms* of Hippocrates, ed. C. G. Kühn 17(2) (Leipzig 1829) [repr. Hildesheim 1965] 399. A similar formulation by Galen can be found in vol. 9, p. 563, and there is a slightly more elaborate description in vol. 8, p. 326, where a peculiar pulse is added to the signs and the respiration is characterized as frequent (πυκνόν) and shallow; the quality of the breathing is noteworthy, because in our poem too it is said to occur θαμά (line 4) and to be δασυνόμενον (line 16), which has to be the equivalent of πυκνόν in this instance.

[8] Ed. Th. Puschmann, II (Vienna 1879) [repr. Amsterdam 1963] 229.

[9] Stephanus (of Athens) in his lectures on the Hippocratic treatise *Prognostic,* ed. F. R. Dietz, *Scholia in Hippocratem et Galenum,* I (Königsberg 1834) [repr. Amsterdam 1966] 52 (new ed. of J. M. Duffy [Berlin 1983] 28): . . . οἰκεῖα (sc. συμπτώματα) μὲν καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῆς πλευρίτιδος τὰ τέσσαρα ἐκεῖνα, ἡ βήξ, ἡ δύσπνοια, ὁ ὀξὺς πυρετός, καὶ τὸ νυγματῶδες ἄλγημα.

[10] For example, J. D. Rolleston, "The Medical Aspects of the Greek Anthology," *Janus* 19 (1914) 35–45, 105–31 (the translation of our poem is on p. 45), "his voice hoarse and husky"; W. R. Paton, Loeb *Greek Anthology* IV, p. 253, "hoarse wheezings from his windpipe"; H. Beckby (note 3 above) 735, "hohl und heiser entwand sich seine Stimme dem Schlund."

at more closely. He observes the patient's position in the bed (ἀνάκλισις). This is one of the first procedures recommended by Hippocrates in the *Prognostic*,[11] most of whose third chapter is devoted to a discussion of the various postures (κατακλίσιες) assumed by patients and their significance. Callignotus also inspects Alcimenes' face, and this too is Hippocratic, being the first step proposed in *Prognostic* (chapter 2), where the details of an abnormal face make up the famous *facies hippocratica.* We are then told that Callignotus takes the pulse with a skillful touch. Here we can no longer speak of Hippocratic procedure in the strict sense, but the name of doctor would hardly be deserved at this period by anyone who ignored the pulse as a diagnostic tool.[12] Finally, a calculation is made about the critical days, the days on which crises in diseases could be expected to occur, according to a general law expressed in several works of the Hippocratic collection,[13] and dominant in ancient and medieval medical theory thereafter. In line 11 Agathias, I believe, intends to refer to a specific treatise, and from the phrase τὸ περὶ κρισίμων φαέων γράμμα we should hear τὸ Περὶ κρισίμων ἡμερέων.[14] In line 12 I understand πάντ' to refer to the four procedures which Callignotus has used; he takes all of these into account in the Hippocratic manner.[15]

The following couplet (lines 13–14) introduces the pronouncement.

Lines 15–18. Alcimenes is assured that if his cough, pain, fever, and dyspnea disappear, he will not die and recovery is on the way. We note that the symptoms are the four described at the beginning, expressed in a slightly different way, and the condition is identified as pleurisy.[16]

[11] Ed. É. Littré, *Oeuvres Complètes d'Hippocrate,* II (Paris 1840) [repr. Amsterdam 1978] 110–91; Loeb *Hippocrates* II, ed. W. H. S. Jones (London and New York 1923) 6–55. The question of precise authorship is not relevant to the present discussion.

[12] Sphygmology only developed in the Alexandrian period, a couple of centuries after Hippocrates. We note with interest that Alexander of Tralles (note 8 above) II 229, still on the topic of diagnostic signs in pleurisy, says: διακρίνεις δ' αὐτοὺς καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἰδιαζούσης ὀδύνης καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν σφυγμῶν μάλιστα· ἐμπρίοντα [sc. σφυγμὸν] μὲν γὰρ καὶ σκληρὸν ἔχουσιν οἱ πλευριτικοί.

[13] E.g., in *Prognostic* ch. 20, and *Epidemics* I ch. 26.

[14] It is true that, as far as we know, Hippocrates never wrote a separate work on the subject; it is also a fact, however, that many of the manuscript collections of the *Corpus Hippocraticum* include a treatise with the title Περὶ κρισίμων or Περὶ κρισίμων ἡμερῶν (cf. Littré [note 11 above] I 398), making it likely that already in antiquity such a work was attributed to the famous doctor.

[15] If the idea of counting were thought to be uppermost in the verb ἀναπεμπάζω, then the phrase could be taken to describe only his calculations of the critical days. I prefer to see it in the sense of "pondering all" the factors in preparation for the prediction that he is about to make.

[16] Why Rolleston (note 10 above) 45, should call it "a case of acute bronchitis" is not clear.

Lines 19–21. Alcimenes is told to cheer up; he is encouraged to call in his lawyer, to get peace of mind by putting his affairs in order,[17] and to leave a third of his inheritance to Callignotus in return for the good forecast.

The conclusion I should like to draw from this analysis is that Callignotus, as presented by Agathias, is indeed a doctor, and one who knows very well what he is doing, in more senses than one. On the level of medical procedure, he follows the orthodox methods and is labelled a Hippocratic (line 12 οὐχ ἑκὰς Ἱπποκράτους).[18] Further, he proves his competence in diagnosis by drawing the correct conclusion from the patient's symptoms.

It is when we come to the prediction itself and its aftermath that we clearly see the other side of the doctor's character.[19] First the prognosis. On closer inspection it turns out that what Callignotus makes is not really a prediction, but a statement based on a contingency. He seems to be saying no more than "if the symptoms go away, you will not die of pleurisy, for their disappearance is a sign of a cure," which is hardly any more than "if you get better, you will not die." On the strength of this he goes on to request a considerable reward. But how can he dare to expect anything for such a flimsy pronouncement? Probably because the patient, impressed and bedazzled, understands it to be an optimistic forecast and a promise of recovery. For everything about this doctor is apt to create a strong impression: he has a way with words; he enjoys a reputation for (or lays claim to) knowledge and perfect prognosis; he scrutinizes the patient in the bed, looks into his face, touches his hand expertly, consults the book on critical days, and, after reflection on all the factors, puts on a solemn face to announce the verdict in a superior voice.[20] And if we assume that Alcimenes acts on

[17] Taking βιότου λῆγε μεριμνοτόκου in the sense of "stop living a worry-filled life" rather than "depart from this life, the mother of care," as Paton (note 10 above) translates. Other versions are ambiguous on the phrase.

[18] At the same time we realize that Agathias may be giving us the man's opinion of himself. In another epigram of similar spirit (*AP* XI 354), the philosopher butt of Agathias' wit is styled ἄλλος Ἀριστοτέλης and ἰσοπλάτων. Still, Callignotus' approach can be legitimately called Hippocratic.

[19] We already have a hint in πλατυλέσχης (line 5) that something is not quite right; lines 7–8 sound like a hyperbolic business motto.

[20] Another possibility is worth bringing up, even though one cannot insist on its being in Agathias' mind. Callignotus may have helped himself to win Alcimenes' trust by a practice well known to the ancients as an integral part of prognosis. To Hippocrates and other Greek physicians, forecasting meant not only divining the future course of an illness, but also telling the patient, without being previously informed, his present and past symptoms. The procedure is discussed in the opening sentences of *Prognostic,*

the request, then the doctor can scarcely lose. For if the patient survives, the "prognosis" will have been accurate and the grateful man will certainly keep the name of his benefactor in the document; and if he dies, it will still be there.[21]

Agathias, then, paints Callignotus as a clever but unscrupulous doctor who uses the advantage of his special position and powers to defraud the patient for personal gain. He describes him as τῆς παιωνιάδος πληθόμενος σοφίης (line 6), which is probably meant to indicate expertise in theory as opposed to practice. In any case Callignotus does not even consider treatment for Alcimenes; he is only interested in winning over the patient's mind and using to his own advantage the confidence gained. In short, he is a doctor turned "confidence man."

The poem belongs to a well-known class of epigram which points a satiric barb at a character type.[22] But the doctor's behavior in this case

where the idea is expressed by the term πρόνοια. Even more explicit is a passage from an unknown commentator on *Prognostic,* incorporated in the lectures of Stephanus mentioned earlier (note 9 above) 61–62 (new ed. 40), where the point under consideration is the distinction between πρόγνωσις and πρόρρησις: Ἰστέον τοίνυν ὅτι πρόγνωσις καὶ πρόρρησις οὐδὲν διαφέρει, πλὴν κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν τοῦ ἰατροῦ καὶ τοῦ νοσοῦντος. προγινώσκειν μὲν ἐκεῖνα λέγεται ἅτινα τῷ κάμνοντί ἐστιν ἀγνώριστα, οἷόν τί ἐστι τὸ λεγόμενον οἷον εἰσελθόντες πρὸς ἄρρωστον εὕρομεν αὐτὸν ὀδυνώμενον τὴν πλευρὰν καὶ ἔχοντα τὰ πολυθρύλλητα ἐκεῖνα τέσσαρα σημεῖα, βῆχα, πυρετὸν ὀξύν, δύσπνοιαν, νυγματῶδες ἄλγημα. αὐτὸς μὲν οὖν ἐπιδείκνυσι τὴν πλευράν, ἡμεῖς δὲ λέγομεν ὡς οὐκ ὀστέον ἐστὶ τὸ πεπονθός, οὐ μῦς, ἀλλ' ὁ ὑπεζωκὼς τὰς πλευρὰς ὑμήν. καὶ τοῦτο λέγεται πρόγνωσις. πρόρρησις δέ ἐστιν ὅταν τὰ ἐγνωσμένα τῷ νοσοῦντι εἴπωμεν, ὅτι καὶ βῆξ ἐστι καὶ πυρετὸς καὶ δύσπνοια καὶ νυγματῶδες ἄλγημα. Stephanus himself (ibid. 78, new ed. 64), borrowing an expression from the philosophers, remarks that prognosis gives the doctor a god-like quality: ὡμοίωται τῷ θεῷ ὁ ἰατρὸς κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν ἀνθρώποις κατὰ τὴν πρόγνωσιν. The ancient physician was keenly aware of the psychological benefits of making an impression on the patient. The beginning of Callignotus' pronouncement (lines 15–16) may indeed be his coup: to tell the patient precisely, without prior information, the four conditions that have been giving him trouble.

[21] I realize that a less successful *denouement* may be imagined, but let us give Callignotus the benefit of luck; as far as I know, skullduggery gets few chances to triumph in the literature of the period.

[22] There is a good treatment of the genre in A. Mattsson's study, *Untersuchungen zur Epigrammsammlung des Agathias* (Lund 1942) 89–102. It is not necessary to see in Callignotus an authentic person; he is apparently regarded as one in Pauly-Wissowa's *Real-Encyclopädie* (*s.v.* Kallignotos), where he gets a brief notice as an incompetent doctor. The form itself does not seem to be found elsewhere and it may be an attempt to coin an appropriate name for an "expert in prognosis"; the aptness of Κώϊος is clear. There is no need either to suppose that Agathias is attacking the medical profession as a whole (the view, for example, of Viansino [note 2 above] 150), any more than his strictures on the "philosophers" Uranius (*Historiae,* ed. R. Keydell [Berlin 1967] 78 ff.) and (the fictional) Nicostratus (*AP* XI 354) should be understood as a general denunciation of philosophy. See Averil Cameron, *Agathias* (Oxford 1970) 104–5.

is highly exaggerated, and, while Agathias is no doubt satirizing the professional who overawes the uninitiated (and vulnerable) with his special knowledge,[23] he is at the same time having some fun; one feels that the joke is also at the expense of a mesmerized and gullible Alcimenes.

Some years ago M. Schuster tried to show that, because of what he considered striking parallels in content and expression between this epigram and an episode related in a letter of Pliny the Younger, the story of the poem must come directly or indirectly from the Latin writer.[24] Since Schuster's work still has some influence, his case should be looked at again briefly.[25] The gist of Pliny's account is this: A notorious legacy-hunter, Regulus, pays a visit to a widow who is seriously ill; he sits by the bedside and, with much seriousness and intensity, performs astrological calculations; finally, after a suitable interval of suspense and hesitation, he announces to the woman that she is going through a danger period but will emerge safely. But to be on the sure side—more anxiety here for the poor lady—he has the verdict confirmed by a soothsayer. This done, the much relieved widow includes Regulus in her will.[26] Now it is true that there are elements of similarity between the two descriptions; however, the individual points of resemblance put forward by Schuster do not stand up well to close scrutiny and more or less disintegrate under the light of our explication of Agathias. For example, Callignotus is a doctor, Regulus is a profes-

[23] It is relevant to note that in two other poems of the same class (*AP* XI 352 on the music expert Androtion, and *AP* XI 354 on Nicostratus the philosopher), Agathias also uses the word σοφίη, not with full respect, of purely speculative or book learning. We might add that the adjective ἀδολέσχης, the better known relative of πλατυλέσχης (line 5), has a history of being associated with sophists, and the phrase σεμνοπροσωπήσας καὶ σοβαρευόμενος (line 14) sounds like a shot from the traditional arsenal of words reserved for puffed-up academics and theory mongers. This is not to claim that Callignotus is an iatrosophist, i.e., a professor of medicine; it is merely to suggest a larger context for the spirit and language of the piece.

[24] Schuster (note 1 above); Pliny II, 20, 1–6.

[25] R. Aubreton (note 5 above) 287, writes: "On peut se demander si l'auteur de cette épigramme, qui doit connaître la lettre de Pline le Jeune (II, 20, 1–6), est bien Agathias. Il est possible que, parvenue sous le nom de celui qui organisa la *sylloge,* elle lui soit nettement antérieure et presque contemporaine de l'auteur latin."

Mattsson (note 22 above) 99, n. 1, however, already found Schuster's position "zu gesucht und zu sehr zurechtgemacht zu sein, um überzeugend zu wirken."

[26] The central part of the original is as follows: *at ille etiam proximus toro sedit, quo die qua hora nata esset interrogavit. Ubi audiit, componit vultum, intendit oculos, movet labra, agitat digitos, computat. Nihil. Ut diu miseram expectatione suspendit, "Habes" inquit "climactericum tempus, sed evades. Quod ut tibi magis liqueat, haruspicem consulam, quem sum frequenter expertus."*

sional legacy-hunter. Agathias does not tell us that the doctor sat by the bedside, as the other does. Pliny's *componit vultum* is said of Regulus and cannot be taken as a parallel to ἔκ τε προσώπου φράζετο, which refers to the patient's face. There is a likeness in the computation of significant days, but the phrases *agitat digitos* and παλάμης ψαῦεν have nothing in common. In short, the themes may be similar (confidence artists employ similar tactics), but there is no real connection between the two quite different treatments. The poem cannot be denied to Agathias on the basis of Schuster's arguments.

That the poet is able to handle a medical subject so competently should not surprise us very much. Agathias (c. 532–582) lived at a time when some medical knowledge, at least of the book variety, could be picked up in the course of higher education.[27] We should bear in mind, too, that Agathias had pursued part of his studies in Alexandria,[28] where, even if he did not formally "read" medicine, he could have attended lectures on the subject.[29]

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[27] We can point to several writers of the same or a slightly later period who bear this out. The philosopher John Philoponus (d. 570) shows a good familiarity with medical literature, discussed, but perhaps underestimated in Robert Todd's article "Galenic Medical Ideas in the Greek Aristotelian Commentators," *Symbolae Osloenses* 52 (1977) 117–34; for other philosophers of the sixth century and the special circumstances of their dealings with medical literature, see the general comment of L. G. Westerink, *The Greek Commentaries on Plato's Phaedo* I (Amsterdam etc. 1976) 27. The well-educated John Climacus (c. 570–649), author of the *Heavenly Ladder*, is very fond of medical metaphors, which he uses extensively and with great confidence. Sophronius (c. 560–638), rhetorician and later Patriarch of Jerusalem, displays such acquaintance with medical theory and practice that in part of the manuscript tradition he picks up the title of iatrosophist. The poet George of Pisidia (fl. 630) is quite at home in at least the technical language of the subject; see J. D. C. Frendo, "Special Aspects of the Use of Medical Vocabulary in the Poems of George of Pisidia," *Orpheus* 22 (1975) 49–56.

[28] He studied rhetoric there, the usual preliminary to reading law; see A. Cameron (note 22 above) 1. Alexandria remained the medical capital of the ancient world until its takeover by the Arabs in the fifth decade of the seventh century.

[29] There may be another explanation. I have recently come across, in a 13th century Greek manuscript (Jerusalem, Panagiou Taphou, 6ᵛ-7ᵛ), a reading list for students of rhetoric which recommends, besides the expected models of ancient and Byzantine times: Holy Scripture and selected exegetes, Aristotle and his commentators, and several treatises of Galen and Hippocrates. This allows us at least to speculate that, in a civilization now known for frequent or major changes in pedagogy, there may have been a tradition, going back to Late Antiquity, of including some works of the "classical" medical writers on the rhetoric syllabus.

REVIEWS

MINNA SKAFTE JENSEN. The Homeric Question and the Oral-Formulaic Theory. Copenhagen, Museum Tusculanum Press, 1980. Pp. 226

The aim of this imaginative and entertaining study is to "argue that the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* were orally composed, and that their composition took place in the sixth century B.C. on the initiative of Pisistratus" (p. 9). The first part of the book sets forth the first of these arguments, the second essays the latter; it is convenient to review them in the same order.

That the poems could very well have been orally composed and dictated is a defensible position, and J defends it against the currently regnant view that Homer must have used writing. In a section on "Premeditation and correction" (pp. 40–45), she shows how memorization, repeated performances of the same song, and deliberate rehearsal, as part of the oral technique, allow an oral poet to foreshadow and echo, to move back and forth over a long text, one in the process of becoming fixed. The offer of ransom by Chryses to Agamemnon in *Iliad* 1 can be based on the offer of ransom to Achilles by Priam in *Iliad* 24, if the critic insists on it: there is nothing in that process to baffle the oral poet. And the problem of the duals in the *Embassy* is no more or less embarrassing to him than to a literate poet: he is in the process of revising Book IX when the *Iliad* is dictated, and either he is still experimenting with the adding of Phoenix or has simply not completed his revision.

To argue this way is to depart from the strict interpretation of Lord's "composition in performance." Lord in 1976 remained convinced that the oral mentality "has no idea of a fixed text" and that memorization is "written composition without writing" (see *Oral Literature and the Formula* [Ann Arbor 1976] 175–76). J severs herself from Lord on this point unwillingly and almost wistfully (p. 42). In making the break she acknowledges the importance of Ruth Finnegan, to whose paper Lord was responding in the remarks I have just cited, and whose *Oral Poetry* (Cambridge 1977) sets forth in detail the case against a "clear-cut differentiation between oral and written literature" (Finnegan 1977, 272). It is Finnegan who has stressed the importance of memorization and of "self-conscious and painstaking composition separated from the act of performance" (p. 82), Finnegan who has made possible J's arguments for premeditation and correction.

J goes on to offer a perceptive critique of Finnegan's account of Parry and the formula (J 25–26; Finnegan 1977, 59–61). Finnegan does not, in fact, appear to have grasped one of Parry's great early accomplishments, the establishment of the principles of economy and extension. These state that in any given metrical situation there is ideally only one formulaic way to say a thing, and that for every appropriate metrical situation such a way ideally exists. It is these principles, more than the mere presence of formulae, which invite a theory of *improvisation* in Homeric composition. And it is these principles which therefore provide a snag in J's own theory. In arguing from parallels in

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modern cultures that oral composition of the Homeric epics was perfectly possible, J draws from cultures where memorizing long passages is common. Does such poetry show formulaic economy and extension? Finnegan does not say. Lord, challenging Bowra, claims that *individual* Yugoslavian poets observe economy (see *Singer of Tales* [Cambridge, Mass. 1960] 50–54), but the discussion is far too brief. Russo argues that memorization and premeditation are compatible with highly traditional and formulaic language in Gaelic stories (*Oral Literature and the Formula* 49 n.), but does not tell us whether the Gaelic tradition is economic and extensive. Whatever the answer may be, J does not offer it and does not appear to see the problem. Are economy and extension maintained by poets who memorize long passages? If not, J's structure collapses. If so, we need to see the evidence. If it exists, there is nothing to prevent us from holding that the Homeric style, once intended for simple improvising, was now used by a poet who also memorized whole passages. This is apparently Russo's view, and most scholars who reject a literate Homer must agree. But such a break in the evolution of oral composition is unwelcome to J, who wishes to preserve simplicity. "If the style of the poems is oral, the simplest explanation must be that the poems were orally composed" (p. 29). If the style is oral-improvisatory, but the composition oral-premeditated, matters are no longer so simple, and the inference becomes importantly wrong.

J argues well that the epic poets could have composed poems as long as the *Iliad* without writing. She also shows that "enormously long oral poems are not necessarily produced at the instigation of collectors" (p. 51)—or of any other force outside the oral context. But then she goes on to say that the length of the *Iliad* can be explained by the "circumstances of the process of dictation" (p. 61)—that is, by the presence of an outside force entirely comparable to a collector. The "possible explanation" of p. 61 becomes reality on p. 87: "the length . . . of the poems testif[ies] . . . to his 'audience' having been stimulating"—the "audience" here being the scribe taking the poet's dictation. Presumably J thinks that the length of the *Iliad* does not *necessitate* writing or dictation, but that we cannot understand why and how so long a poem was composed unless we conceive it as dictated. This is not quite a contradiction, but it makes a distinction many will consider overfine.

The second half of J's position, the sixth century date, is supported by five main arguments. She finds a *terminus post quem* of 650 B.C., a *terminus ante quem* of "before Plato" (p. 106). The vulgate (150 B.C.) was founded on an Athenian text, of which all other pre-Aristarchan texts are copies (pp. 110–11). She feels that orality persisted until after 500 B.C., and at no time revealed a distinctly creative or reproductive phase (Chapter VIII). She supports the tradition of a Pisistratean recension, only she says it was in fact the first and only (p. 133) written text, apart from its copies. She finds the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* to be "poems about the power of Athena and the glory of her favourites, the city of Athens with its ruler Pisistratus" (p. 171).

J's *terminus ante quem* of around 400 B.C. for the *Iliad* is surely 250 years too late. For one thing, Xenophanes, who was born before 570, knows of a definite Homeric text, from which all people "have learned from the beginning" (D-K, B10), and which sets forth all manner of outrageous things about the gods (D-K, B11). Such a text was certainly not produced by "Homer, nothing

but a name, legendary inventor of epic" (p. 157). Xenophanes' Homeric text need not be the same as ours or Plato's, but why should we think it radically different? (To use one of J's favorite arguments, if it were, surely antiquity would have recorded the fact for us.) Xenophanes reacted to his Homer as Plato did to ours. And if we "have all learned from Homer from the beginning," he was in his grave well before Xenophanes' boyhood, and certainly composed before 650. For another thing, Hesiod was alive before 650 (see M. L. West's *Theogony* [Oxford 1966] 40). Whoever wants to put the *Iliad* much later than this must meet Edwards' argument that Hesiod is more deeply Ionicized than Homer (see *The Language of Hesiod* [Oxford 1971] 206).

That the Vulgate is founded on an Athenian text is true and well set forth. But that all other pre-Aristarchan texts are copies of the Athenian text is not shown; if this text was authoritative for several centuries, it could have contaminated others that were originally independent. J's position that orality persists in Greece until after 500 is attractive, and the point is worth making. But her discussion of Phemius in the *Odyssey* as a typical singer-rhapsode of this oral culture contains some alarming errors. "Phemius knows many other songs, and they are known by other singers as well" (p. 118) is offered as a paraphrase of πολλὰ . . . ἄλλα οἶδας, ἔργ' ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε, τά τε κλείουσιν ἀοιδοί (*Od.* 1.337–38). But the Greek means other *deeds*, not songs, thus giving Phemius more latitude to improvise than J allows him. And this misdirection is furthered when J renders "songs . . . known by other singers." The Greek means "deeds of the sort which singers celebrate," and is far from implying that other singers know other songs. J may not be at ease with Homeric τε (cf. for this use Denniston 555), just as at another point she apparently gives ἄρα an emphatic force of "therefore" or "it must be that," which is hardly appropriate before Plato (J 71–72; cf. Denniston 41).

The discussion of the Pisistratean recension is unsatisfactory. What is needed, and not offered, is a careful analysis of the *relationship* among our sources, a stemma of our data—else why go to the trouble of collecting all the information in an appendix? Some particulars: of her text, just dictated by an esteemed Homerid, J asserts that "nobody would find that this was something newly concocted" (p. 134). Really? When these poems are said to be about "the power of Athena and the glory of . . . the city of Athens with its ruler Pisistratus" (p. 171)? When the structure of the *Odyssey* has been radically altered to suit Athens' eminence (p. 169)? The possibility that Solon played a role in the Salamis-interpolation is dismissed much too cursorily. The question of when the text was fixed relative to the institution of the Panathenaic rule is clumsily dealt with: our Greek sources suggest that the text was fixed first; J thinks that the text could have been fixed later (p. 148); then she speaks in the next paragraph as if the same person were responsible for having the text written and for instituting the rule as if the fixing and the rule were simultaneous.

J thinks that Pisistratus engaged the singer Cynaethus to dictate the poems to the scribe Onomacritus: Cynaethus is the author of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. The assertion is not dogmatic: it might have been another Homerid (p. 166) or two (p. 8), but it was probably Cynaethus. Now when Pisistratus did this, were there long epic poems already in existence? If there were, that wreaks havoc with J's idea, discussed above, that the length of the poems is due to the

circumstances of dictation. If there were not, then Pisistratus' gesture was a radical innovation, and J does not want this (his text was not "something newly concocted," p. 134). Another serious problem with the Cynaethus-author theory is that the language of Homer is deeply Atticized; but Cynaethus is from Chios. And after all, the best reason for believing in something like a Pisistratean recension is not the ancient testimonia, which are far from conclusive, but the need to assume an oral Attic *period* in the history of the text.

"Cremation is the only way of disposing of the dead in the poems; this must mean that both poet and audience have lost knowledge of a past when inhumation was the normal practice" (p. 163). If we accept this remarkable claim, and if the poems were composed at Athens, then the only conceivable date is Early Geometric, 850–800 B.C. At no other time (and hardly then) could inhumation have seemed abnormal; indeed, during the *sixth* century it appears to have been increasingly fashionable, at least at the Ceramicus. J makes this blunder in the course of arguing that Pisistratean Athens and the Homeric poems exhibit close ideological ties, among which she stresses the significance of Athena. The poems were "meant to be recited in her honour" (p. 165); to accommodate her, the order of the *Odyssey* story was changed, in that her failure to help Odysseus for 10 years "was blurred over by letting Odysseus tell the story himself" (p. 169). In fact, we have seen that on one level the poems are *about* "the power of Athena and the glory of her favourites, the city of Athens with its ruler Pisistratus" (p. 171). Never mind Athens and Pisistratus; is the poetry about Athena? Indeed is she any more important in the *Iliad* than is Apollo? The formula αἴ γὰρ Ζεῦ τε πάτερ καὶ Ἀθηναίη καὶ Ἀπολλον keeps matters in proportion. This formula also poses another (unrecognized) problem for J: did Cynaethus invent it? If so, he himself put Apollo on Athena's level; if not, as is more probable, then before he composed she had already risen as high as she was to rise in the Homeric text, and we need no Cynaethus nor Pisistratus to explain her prominence. In any case, a book on the oral-formulaic theory which claims such prominence for Athena might have been expected to investigate her formulae.

Many readers will simply dismiss J's Cynaethus. In choosing instead to argue against his claim to authorship, I have made the tone of this review pretty negative. J's imagination is flawed, but she does have an imagination, and her attempts to justify its overeager vision are more interesting than many another writer's cautious contemplation of the familiar.

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VIRGINIA HUNTER. Past and Process in Herodotus and Thucydides. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1982. Pp. xviii + 371.

Past and Process deals with the methodologies of Thucydides and Herodotus. From the texts of the two historians, Hunter draws out the concepts or, as she prefers, the "generalizations" which each brought to his work. She concludes that the two shared a conceptual basis or, more specifically, that for both men history is a process rather than a sequence of events or dates. This concept of

history involves phases characterized by similar types of actions, such as *stasis* or war, not their chronological relationship. These conclusions confirm one of Hunter's claims for the book's originality: ". . . it is the first systematic attempt to compare Herodotus and Thucydides as contemporaries, that is, as pre-Socratic thinkers who employed rather similar concepts and intellectual tools" (p. 4). The analyses in accomplishing this aim are compelling, even if one disagrees with her interpretation of some details. Some will question, for example, Hunter's views on Thucydides' method of chronology (pp. 43, 167–68) or her understanding of how he intended to "publish" his history (pp. 288–94).

The book has two parts; the first (Chapters I–III) is devoted to analysis of the methods of inquiry and composition both historians use in presenting the past. In the second part (Chapters IV–VI) Hunter applies the conclusions of Part I to sections of narrative and concludes with more general observations on the concepts and methodologies of the two in conjunction with modern theories of historiography.

Chapter I is a well-organized investigation of Thucydides' methodology as it emerges from the Archaeology. It has five sections. The first is an outline of the basic features of the past (pp. 20–30), followed by a discussion of Thucydides' method in selecting these specific aspects and the suppositions which must underlie his choices (pp. 30–41). The third section provides an evaluation of the generalizations he held about the fifth century and how they come to function as the principles in the composition of the Archaeology (pp. 41–43). A short discussion of chronology and Thucydides' notion of time follows (pp. 43–44). In a concluding section Hunter addresses Thucydides' purpose as revealed by the methodology she has uncovered. The results are convincing: Thucydides possessed certain general concepts (e.g., how *arche* comes about, what is needed for successful collective achievement) through which he viewed and explained the past and which generate the inner logic of his account of the past.

The only disturbing elements in this chapter are the repeated references here and *passim* (e.g., pp. 105–6, 228) to the Archaeology as a "history of civilization" (see also the phrases "development of" and "indices of civilization" [pp. 20–21, 24–25, 42, 44–49, etc.] or the chapter's title, "mankind's progress to civilization"). Thucydides never professes to "embark" (p. 17) on as expansive a chore as the word "civilization" commonly implies. The Archaeology more accurately, it seems to me, serves to disclose the accretion of power which leads to the kind of *kinesis* the war represents. In it Thucydides answers some very basic questions about how political units acquire and maintain power.

Chapter II is divided into two sections. In the first Hunter considers Herodotus' procedures in investigating the past (pp. 50–65) by looking at a selection of chapters from Book II (*viz.* 43–45, 49–53, 116–20). In the second section she examines how the principle behind his researches is also the thesis that provides the logic for the entire Egyptian Logos. In the case of Herodotus the principle with which he works is the authority he grants the Egyptian priests. It derives from two sources: the existence of written records and the antiquity of these accounts. Against this authority he measures the *mythoi* and *gnomai* of the Greek tradition. This chapter is not as tight as Chapter I; Hunter's thesis is proved more by repetition of examples than by argument.

Chapter III functions essentially as a transition from the first two, in

which Hunter had successfully isolated basic similarities in Herodotus' and Thucydides' conceptualization of the past. Now in III she assures the reader of the integrity of those conclusions by acknowledging the obvious differences between the two. And she concludes:

> Both employ generalizations and argue in such a way as to produce a synthesis. Thucydides alone begins with a theoretical and highly speculative construct and consciously applies it to the early history of Greece. (p. 107)

The second part of Chapter III, entitled "Rationalism, Rationalization, and Rationality," does not enhance the argument. Hunter does not discuss the rational element in the respective histories. Rather, without warning, she sets about making unnecessary distinctions among rationalism, rationalization, and rationality (pp. 107–13). The philosophical definitions she gives are suitable to a handbook, are never adopted, and so have no purpose.

Part II begins with two chapters in which the principles used by each historian in constructing the past are now revealed from an analysis of two narrative passages of like components (military exploits under great leader figures): Thucydides IV.78–135, Brasidas in Thrace, in Chapter IV, and Herodotus IV.83–142, Dareios' retreat from Scythia, in Chapter V. The descriptive titles of these two chapters, "Generalization, Process, and Event" and "Cause, Event, and Chronology in Relation to Process," reflect no distinctions in the respective chapters and disguise the fact that both are divided into four parts with the same considerations in the same order:

1. The application of the concept of process to the narrative (Ch. IV, pp. 119–42; Ch. V, pp. 176–83).

2. Selection and explanation in elucidating the process (pp. 142–66, pp. 183–218).

3. Chronology. By showing that process is essential to understanding their views of history, Hunter explains why the two historians beg demands for chronological precision (pp. 166–69, pp. 218–24).

4. Conclusions. Hunter ties up in a useful manner the connections between the reasoning about the past with the presentations of the respective narratives (pp. 169–75, pp. 224–25).

Chapter VI is the conclusion to Part II and the book. Five appendices offer bibliographical summaries on some of the more controversial issues in the works of the two historians. These will be helpful to the nonspecialist who is unfamiliar with the scholarship.

Chapter VI is particularly disappointing, for instead of showing the student of the philosophy of history how by virtue of this book he can understand what Thucydides and Herodotus were doing in modern terms, Hunter presents a series of what amount to book reports and summaries of modern thought, which are only superficially related to her own theories and exposition of the concepts found in Herodotus and Thucydides. Technical terms abound, but only to be discarded, redefined, and scarcely ever directly linked to the historians (pages 240–52 and 277–82 are particularly onerous: see, e.g., the use made of *episteme*, paradigm, and problematic). Some of the ideas we have not encountered since the introduction. At times the discussion is obtuse and struggles, as

if Hunter needed to get a new notion on paper in order to understand it. For example, in discussing some statements of Chatelet, she writes:

> . . . he looks at a particular aspect of historical time that manifests itself in Thucydides' *History*: it is defined first as "temps de l'homme profane." Hence, historical time is "un temps d'intelligibilité." Though this is only one aspect, a first aspect, of historical time, it is a valuable formulation. It remains, nonetheless, a first aspect of historical time. (p. 241)

Scattered among these attempts to deal with modern theory are interesting but unattached discussions of *arche*, the *nomos/physis* distinction, and the concept of *logos*. In the end the second claim Hunter makes for the uniqueness of the book (p. 4)—"It brings to the study of the ancient historians widely accepted and recognizable concepts derived from contemporary historiography and the methodology of the social sciences"—goes unfulfilled, because the author is not yet comfortable with these modern concepts and cannot, therefore, bring within easy reach of the modern theorist or historian the methodologies and concepts of the ancients. The areas of the book that move in this direction, primarily the Introduction and Chapter VI, read too much like unassimilated notes.

Hunter is at her best when she is dealing with the texts, especially with Thucydides. The discussion of Brasidas in Chapter IV is welcome. In it she provides a coherent picture of what Thucydides seems to have intended in his presentation of the capitulation of the northern cities. She controls the text so well that the non-Greek reader can follow even a detailed analysis (a glossary of the transliterated words is included).

A few isolated points remain. Often phrases and ideas are repeated without new insights or as if we had never heard them before (e.g., pp. 237, 231, and 219, especially the use of "links," or compare 86, 97, and 111). The word "ultimately" appears scores of times, sometimes in several pages in succession (e.g., pp. 263, 266, 267, 268, 269, 272). Albeit a small point, the word becomes distracting and seems to force conclusions on the reader. Finally, I was somewhat puzzled by two statements in the preface (which would have profited from being less ebullient and half as long). On page xi Hunter acknowledges the help of a graduate student with whom she "read and summarized a whole mountain of articles and books . . . ," and again on page xiii of another student she says that his "care in searching out new bibliography, his meticulous summaries, and his boundless curiosity bespeak a fine intellect. . . ." I do not understand the process, but perhaps it is reflected in the notebook-like quality of the last chapter and some of the appendices.

For this reviewer the substance of the book resides in those chapters (I, II, IV, and V) where Hunter has argued her thesis from the ancient texts. *Past and Process* will be of greatest value to classicists and ancient historians because of Hunter's solid comparative study of the methods and concepts of Herodotus and Thucydides.

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MARIO PINTACUDA. Interpretazioni musicali sul teatro di Aristofane. Palermo, Palumbo, 1982. Pp. 138. (Letteratura classica v.9.)

M. Pintacuda has written a useful and perceptive book. There is no doubt that the musical aspects of Greek tragedy and comedy have received insufficient attention from modern critics. Certainly it is true to say (as Dr. Pintacuda ultimately does at the beginning of his fourth chapter): "Della musica di Aristofane non una nota ci è pervenuta." (The same is true, with the possible exception of a single fragment [Vienna, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, Musiksammlung, papyrus G 2315], of the music of classical tragedy.) And yet to ignore the structural features, the parodistic possibilities, the intensifying nature of Old Comedy's music is to be deaf to one of its most vibrant qualities.

Pursuing the lines laid down in his *La Musica nella tragedia greca* (Cefalù 1978), M. Pintacuda treats the musical elements in the plays of Aristophanes with a fine critical sense. The dazzling richness and variety of rhythm; the self-satisfaction of the final victory songs; the flexibility of lyric structure; the sly overtones to the topical musical references—these are deftly handled. Less satisfying (because more meretricious) are the occasional analogies to more familiar music. Bach, Beethoven, Offenbach, Palestrina, Schumann, Wagner, and eighteenth century opera have no place here. In music especially, analogy is a dangerous siren.

Following Gevaert's tripartite grouping of the comedies (François-Auguste Gevaert, *Histoire et théorie de la musique de l'antiquité* [Ghent 1875–81]), Pintacuda analyzes every sung section and musical reference in each of the plays. Pintacuda is particularly good on musical satire in the *Clouds* and the famous contest in the *Frogs*, though more might have been made of the general musical changes taking place c. 400 B.C. and attendant aesthetic controversies with their roots in Sophism. In part these stylistic changes were the result of technical developments (or did they occasion them?). Timotheus of Miletus, who was censured for adding more strings to the lyre, was an almost exact contemporary of Aristophanes; and we know that the αὐλός increased in size, range, and versatility during the course of the fifth century.

It was the αὐλός that accompanied the most high-flown musical portion of the plays: the anapaestic παράβασις—a richly variable, parenthetical (to the action) opportunity for generalized comments or needling *nugae*, ending with the virtuosic πνῖγος. The plangent, nasal αὐλός must have underlined this section to special effect and with piquant commentary. (Is there some way to prevent yet another generation of students from learning to mistranslate αὐλός as "flute"? The instrument almost certainly was played with a double reed, and with sufficient force to require sometimes a special band worn around the cheeks of the αὐλητής. [See, e.g., Attic red-figure amphora (c. 480 B.C.), British Museum, London, or Archaic period votive table (540 B.C.), National Archaeological Museum, Athens.])

The final chapter of the book is an informative but unilluminating purview of modern musical performances of, or compositions inspired by, Aristophanes' plays. There are short bibliographies.

Pintacuda is quite right to draw attention to the referential, parodistic, structural, and performing aspects of music in Aristophanes, for we still need to be reminded that for the Greeks poetry and music were inseparable. Stephen

Daitz has brought this powerfully to our notice in his recent series of cassette recordings *The Living Voice of Greek and Latin Literature* (Jeffrey Norton, Conn.). Through a careful and sensitive approach to the accentuation, rhythm, and emotional resonance of the text, and supported by judicious analysis and reinterpretation (*pace* W. B. Stanford) of those vexed passages in Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Daitz has tellingly recreated the flexible, the varied, the rhythmic, above all the *musical,* sound of ancient Greek poetry. A recording of Aristophanes' *The Birds* is projected.

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LEONARD R. PALMER. The Greek Language. Atlantic Highlands, Humanities Press, 1980. Pp. xii + 355. $57.50.

In 1954, when he published *The Latin Language,* L. R. Palmer promised a companion volume on Greek as part of the Great Language series. That this intention was not fulfilled for 25 years is due to decipherment of the Mycenaean Linear B script by Michael Ventris in 1952. The interpretation of the Linear B texts, written in an extremely archaic Arcado-Cyprian-like Greek dialect, has been a necessarily slow and laborious process, to the progress of which Mr. Palmer himself has made notable contributions. Now, convinced that "Linear B studies have virtually reached the end of the road" (an assertion many, including the reviewer, would strongly dispute), P has stepped back to view the development of Greek over 3½ millennia and has published his interpretation as *The Greek Language.*

As he did with *The Latin Language,* the author divides the new volume into two parts. The first, entitled "An Outline History of the Greek Language" (pp. 3–198) is a history of the Greek tongue from its origins in Indo-European through the Bronze and Dark Ages to the Classical, Hellenistic, and Roman periods and beyond, ending with the triumph of the *dhimotiki* over the *katharevousa* after the fall of the Colonels in 1974. Major authors and genres are discussed in short essays devoted to each; Homer is treated on pages 83–101; Melic poetry on 113–18; tragedy on 130–41; Herodotos on 142–52; and Thucydides on 152–67. One misses any discussion of Comedy, certainly a linguistically creative genre. The word is not even listed in the index; Aristophanes is mentioned only for his assessment of Euripides and Sophokles in the *Frogs.* On the other hand, the dialects are fully discussed in brief sections giving the chief characteristics of each.

The second section, called a "Comparative-Historical Grammar," is a dense, meaty summary of Greek writing, phonology, and morphology from both diachronic and synchronic perspectives. It covers the features which distinguish Greek from the other Indo-European languages as well as the internal structure of the former.

It is useful to compare Palmer's work with B. F. C. Atkinson's identically titled work (London 1931, 1933), part of the first Great Languages series. It is striking how much new knowledge has been gained and how opinion has

changed in those nearly fifty years. Atkinson knows nothing of Indo-European laryngeals, of Luwians (though he discusses the *-nthos/-ssos* names now connected with them), of Linear B and Mycenaean Greek, of Milman Parry and the origins of the Homeric poems in formulaic oral poetry, of the fruits of modern dialect and literary studies, and of course of post-1933 developments in the modern Greek language.

Yet Atkinson's book still has value. His treatment of Greek poets and prose authors (especially poets) is generally more literary, while Palmer's is more linguistic. Comparing Palmer's section on Pindar (pp. 123–27) with Atkinson's paragraph (pp. 218–19), one finds that while the former dwells on Homeric dialect features, Aeolic dative plurals, and Doric verb forms, the latter, well before Bundy and his followers, emphasized the unity of the mythological and laudatory sections of the epinician odes.

Palmer's treatment of Thucydides and early Attic prose, on the other hand, deals with style at length and also examines in detail the historian's historical background. P stresses Thucydides' roots in Sophism, but also his improvements on the Sophistic style of antithesis and *parisōsis*. The language of Thucydides is itself little mentioned; this may be because it was a generalized Attic, a literary expression of the Athenian imperial *koinē*, which provided the basis for the later Hellenistic *koinē* and hence modern Greek. Atkinson, by contrast, spends little time on Thucydides, stressing the "clumsiness" and "difficulty" of his syntax and style with little attempt at understanding.

The most important part of Palmer's book—and the most controversial—are the sections dealing with the prehistory of Greek, the Anatolian substratum, and the Linear B documents and their language. Here Palmer is a partisan, setting forth his own highly individual views, provoking an attack from John Chadwick in the *Times Literary Supplement*, which led to a bitter exchange of letters.[1]

Palmer believes that place-names of the Parnassos/Erymanthos types are derived from southern Anatolian languages related to Luwian, which was used in southwest Asia Minor during the Hittite period. For these names to be found so frequently in the Greek peninsula, he argues persuasively, Hellas had to have been occupied by Luwians (or people speaking a similar language) at some point during the Bronze Age. He cites evidence that the Luwians only arrived in southern Anatolia at the end of Early Bronze II (ca. 2300–2200 B.C.), giving them little time to occupy Greece before the end of Early Helladic II (ca. 2100) or Early Helladic III (ca. 1900), when there are signs (mostly ash layers and ceramic innovations) suggesting the arrival of new population groups. If the new immigrants were the Greeks, there is no room for the Luwians; therefore they must be Luwians. Middle Helladic peoples spoke Luwian; the Greeks arrived peacefully around 1600, leaving few traces in the archaeological record at first, but soon setting to work building palaces and reducing their language to writing, adapting a Cretan script for that purpose.

Chadwick, by contrast, brings the Greeks down in 2100 or 1900, with fire

[1] Chadwick reviewed *The Greek Language* in *TLS* (Nov. 28, 1980) 1368; Palmer replied on January 9, 1981, p. 34; Chadwick published a retort on January 23; Palmer replied to that on February 20.

and sword. He will hear nothing of Luwians, claiming that the Luwian substratum "is generally rejected."[2] In this, he is wrong; the majority of linguists dealing with early Greece and Anatolia accept the Luwian origin of names like Parnassos. So does the weight of evidence: Parnassas is an actual Luwian mountain name; it means "[place] of the temple"—a fitting one for the massif on whose slopes lies Apollo's shrine. The weakness of Palmer's theory is historical and archaeological; how do the Greeks, simple herdsmen and farmers, arrive in the peninsula, settle peacefully among the native Luwians, absorb them linguistically, then proceed to build palaces when their predecessors, despite their origins in sophisticated Asia Minor, did not—and all this in 100-200 years?

A possible solution to this problem is based on the realization that place names like Parnassos and Korinthos are not *pre*-Greek, merely *non*-Greek. They no more indicate that Luwians preceded the Hellenes than names such as Guadalquivir, Guadalajara, and Mulhacén prove that the Arabs settled Spain before the Romans.[3] It is reasonable to suppose that the fires which marked the end of so many Early Helladic II and III sites marked the coming of the Greeks. Middle Helladic was Greek-speaking; at the close of the period, Luwian princelings, driven from southwest Anatolia by the Hittites—the Luwian kingdom of Arzawa and its probable capital Beycesültan were destroyed in late Middle Helladic times—settled in the valleys of the Greek peninsula. They built palaces, established dynasties, named mountains, rivers, and cities, while falling under the cultural influence of Minoan Crete, possibly itself Luwian-dominated at this time. They left their mark not only in place-names, but in myths (e.g., Tantalos coming from Phrygia; the Near Eastern traditions of the generations of the Gods found later in Hesiod), in art and architecture,[4] in social structure, and in language. It is interesting to note in reference to those last three that early architectural terms in Greek, such as *plinthos* and *thrinkos*, are borrowed from another language and so are most words for ruler: *anax* (Myc. *wanax*), *basileus* (Myc. *gʷasileus*), *prutanis*, *turannos* (cf. Luwian [Hieroglyphic Hittite] *tarwanas*), *koiranos* (cf. Hittite *kuirwanas*). The Luwian immigrants, for all their profound effect on the Greeks, were relatively few in number and became linguistically Hellenized after a few generations, as the Normans were Anglicized and the Spanish Moors to an extent Latinized before their expulsion.

Palmer also reiterates his belief that the Linear B tablets from Knossos are to be dated to 1200, not 1400. This view, while not held by the majority of scholars, has been gaining ground of late and must be treated with respect.[5]

[2] *TLS* (Nov. 28, 1980) 1368.

[3] In Spanish place-names there is often a layering: Latin-Arab-Spanish, as with Guadalupe from Wadi-al-lupus or Guadiana from Wadi-Anas. Erumanthos may be such a name, from Greek *eruma* "rampart" and the Luwian suffix *-nthos*. If so, this would prove that the Luwians came to Greece *after* the Hellenes.

[4] Friedrich Matz, *The Art of Crete and Early Greece* (New York 1962) 180, states that Mycenae of the Shaft Graves had closer links with Asia Minor than with Crete.

[5] For this see for example H. W. Catling, J. F. Cherry, R. E. Jones, J. T. Killen, "The Linear B Inscribed Stirrup Jars and West Crete" *Annual of the British School at Athens* 75 (1980) 49-113, esp. 102-3.

Palmer further defends the old view that four distinct dialect groups existed in Bronze Age Greece: Achaean (proto-Arcado-Cyprian), Ionic, Aeolic, West Greek. After the collapse of Mycenaean civilization, migrations occurred which disrupted this pattern and produced the Classical distribution of dialects, especially the migration of the West Greek-speaking Dorians to the Peloponnesos and Crete. This is more believable than Chadwick's and Hooker's view that the later Doric originated as the speech of the Mycenaean peasantry, while the other dialects represented the lisping, Minoanized language of the palace elite.

I have a few bones to pick with Mr. Palmer. His interpretation of Linear B *e-we-pe-se-so-me-na* as *ewepsĕsomena* "to be woven" instead of as *eu(h)epsēsomena* (Classical *hepsō, hepsēsō*) "to be boiled" (i.e., "to be laundered") is linguistically bizarre. To maintain it he has to postulate an e-grade *H_1webh- instead of the attested zero-grade *ubh in *huphainō* (p. 50). On page 222, however, he reverses himself on the initial laryngeal of *H_1webh, stating that "there is nothing to support a laryngeal explanation for the prothesis in the future participle *ewepsĕsomena*. . . ." None of this should be used to support "the view that Myc. *asesosi* is the future of ἀσ- 'sate' " nor is this evidence for something similar to a Doric future (e.g., *dōseō* vs. East Greek and Mycenaean *dōsō*) in Mycenaean.

Greek *īthus* cannot come from the same root as Sanskrit *sādhu* (*sādh-/ *sidh). The latter would be from Indo-European *seHdh/*sədh (ə being the vocalic form of the laryngeal H), not from *siHdh, as Palmer would have it on page 283.

Palmer's reading of Linear B *e-pi i-ku-wo-i-pi* as *epi hikkwoinphi*, "in honor of the Two Horses" is, on the other hand, well taken. It is not this spelling which is surprising, but the usual *i-qo*, since the IE form was *ekwos, not *eq^{u}os. Two Horses make one think of Demeter and Poseidon, worshiped in Arcadia in the equine form, or of Kastor and Polydeukes, Greek avatars of the Indo-European Horse Twins.[6]

Despite a tendency to tendentiousness in spots, this is a fine book. It is well written, well organized, attractive to the eye. My students, weary from toiling through C. D. Buck's *Comparative Grammar*, found it refreshing and enlightening. We must hope that a paperback version will soon appear, putting it within the financial range of junior faculty and graduate students.

JON-CHRISTIAN BILLIGMEIER

RAMSAY MACMULLEN. Paganism in the Roman Empire. New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1981. Pp. xiii + 241. $23.00.

The scope of this slim volume is very ambitious: the vast topic of paganism (excluding the emperor cult) as found in the two centuries before Nicaea within the area of the Roman empire bounded by Alexandria, Carthage, Lyon, and

[6] For these see Donald Ward, "Separate Functions of the Indo-European Divine Twins" in Jaan Puhvel ed., *Myth and Law Among the Indo-Europeans* (UC Press, Berkeley 1970) 193–202.

Pontus. Whereas monographs and handbooks have tended to treat individual cults vertically, often in isolation, the author presents a horizontal study of the topic as a whole in an attempt to distinguish the broadly shared ideas and practices of "the thing so arrogantly called paganism" (p. xii). As he recognises at the outset, the aim of formulating easy generalizations can conflict with the need for accuracy, particularly when views and practices differ so much from source to source or from one class of person to another.

M begins with "Perceptible—paganism observed." The immense variety of gods and beliefs is, of course, directly ascribable to the historical background of the empire allied with traditional Roman toleration and conservatism; but a bar graph tries to give shape to this chaotic mass by plotting the popularity relative to Jupiter of the fourteen gods most mentioned in the inscriptions of the Latin-speaking regions of the West. This approach tells nothing of the religiosity of the masses who were too poor to commit their faith to stone (cf. p. 119), but M is well aware that his results may largely reflect the preferences of the upper classes, though sacrificial objects of varying quality show rich and poor alike worshiping the same divinities at the same sanctuaries in the same way. In any event we know from the literary sources that the outlook of the rich and educated was different, even aggressively different, from that of unschooled, ordinary folk. The difficulty is that even on its broadest definition literary evidence reveals surprisingly little of educated interest in religion; so one has to turn to other categories of evidence: to public recitations, displays of inscribed texts, temple libraries, cult regulations, sacred laws, aretalogy, hymnology, and the like.

With this review of general knowledge about religion, M turns to its visibility and impact. Here the interest is in the social side of paganism. A survey of theatre temples emphasizes that large numbers of people evidently found it entertaining to hear and witness what must have been danced mimes or hymns; the so-called "mysteries" seem to have attracted large crowds, as also did religious festivals advertised through heralds and coin issues. Conversely pilgrims traveled far and wide, especially to Egypt, which was also a mecca for tourists. And just as people traveled so did the gods: M gives a useful summary of religious parades, when the image might be taken to convenient water for a bath or to watch the spectacle at a secular or cult theatre. The key point is that religion thrust itself upon people's attention, nowhere more forcibly than at sacred enclosures with their objets d'art and forest of statues. Indeed cult places were social centres to which people were attracted not only by zoos, gardens, art galleries, and museums but also by facilities for wining and dining, which M sees as a key part of pagan religion. In that case it is hard not to agree with Clement that drunkenness and indulgence will have often obscured the loftier notion that the god joined the worshipers who dined together in a sodality. Inevitably parasites took advantage and religion provided many with a living—the silversmiths of Ephesus, for example. Yet the essential figure in all this remained the temple servant: the doorkeeper, sexton, sacristan, and above all, the priest, whose religious duties were so closely interwoven with the secular (*fanatici* were a breed apart).

M draws on an impressive amount of material, both primary and secondary, to substantiate his basic thesis of the salience of pagan religion—nowhere

better illustrated, he suggests (p. 46), than at Stratonicea with its nearby sanctuaries of Hecate at Lagina and Zeus at Panamara. In effect his account replaces parts of Friedländer's *Sittengeschichte Roms* as a vivid kaleidoscope of the outer face of paganism. Little would be gained by multiplying the examples he gives, but one or two points of detail or interpretation can be raised without prejudice to the overall picture. The account of a typical sanctuary might be rounded out by reference to the statues that stood in the temple *pronaos*, from where they were transported on festival days—for example, from the Artemesium at Ephesus (J. H. Oliver, *The Sacred Gerousia, Hesperia*, Suppl. 6 [1941] no. 3). It was even possible to place statues of benefactors within the *cella* by the idol, as a mark of gratitude or honour (cf. Suet., *Aug.* 59). With regard to the sequence of activities that went on about the gods during the course of the year, M correctly states (p. 45) that they have left their traces in sources only for Greece and Asia—he means calendars on stone or papyri—but not elsewhere. Still, we do have the evidence of dated inscriptions in the West, and on the basis of these can be drawn up a catalogue of festivals of all kinds (P. Herz, *Untersuchungen zum Festkalender der römischen Kaiserzeit* [Mainz 1975]); iconographical sources can likewise be used to document rites and practices. On a more general level, Vitruvius directs that the altar outside the temple should be placed so as to give an uninterrupted view of the cult idol during sacrifice (IV.5,1; IV.9); but is one justified in reducing the role of the idol to that of a mere aide-memoire (p. 44)? After all, this was where the god lived (p. 59) and idols were known to work miracles on occasion.

From "Perceptible" to "Debatable—paganism felt and thought out." M finds the roots of paganism in answering basic human needs and wants, above all good health, which might seem to have been the chief business of pagan religion. Nor by pagan standards was there anything reprehensible in self-interest: *do ut des*. More debatably M finds little evidence for longing after immortality or for the assurance of it (pp. 53 ff.); though the educated might have vaguely believed in an afterlife of the disembodied soul, the commonly held prospect was one of annihilation after death (N.F.N.S.N.C.). In the larger context religion also strengthened the social order by acting as a policeman and assuring the gods' favour to the community by partnership with the ruling class. (For the background to Cicero's support of Pompey in the "De lege Manilia" see now J. R. Fears, "The Theology of Victory at Rome," *ANRW* II, 17:2 [1981] 797–800). As for the mechanics of contacting the gods, M points to images (the notion of asylum might have been relevantly discussed here), visions, and oracles, particularly those of high repute in the East. But the vitality of religion can best be judged from the dichotomy of views in the ancient sources: from the blasphemies of graffiti to the blind faith of inscriptions, from Lactantius' claim that religion was a matter of the fingertips to Porphyry's stress on loving god—what St. Augustine called *religio animi*. This is a very mixed bag that makes general statements hard to formulate, but M does find one line of convergence. Just as rationalism fell out of favour, so magic and old ideas regarding the direct, visible intervention of the gods spread to the upper classes, perceptibly narrowing the contrast between the lettered elite and the broad masses at the end of the period under discussion.

What then was the mental picture of the divine order? Criticism of old

systems of belief could be countered by reinterpretation, through which the old gods might occupy an intermediate place below the "real gods," with lower "demons" to perform specialized functions. Yet for most people the logic of such a regal, pyramidical structure did not result in one supreme being, since monotheism would have implied intolerance and subordination. In particular, M doubts that solar monotheism would have triumphed but for Christianity. Rather megalodemonia was the rule, one god placed on top of the pyramid by his followers (p. 89); otherwise names and symbols were tossed together and gods easily accommodated within the shrines of others, a symptom not so much of syncretism as of the essential discreteness of polytheism. What produced converts among the masses, then, were miracles that gave visible proofs of divinity; conscious evangelizing was unusual, though not unknown, and ordinarily it was up to the individual to take the initiative (p. 112).

From this M turns to the question of control and uniformity. While the physical features of a cult might be duplicated elsewhere (for Capitolia see now I. A. Barton, "Capitoline Temples in Italy and the Provinces (especially Africa)" in *ANRW* II, 12:1 [1982] 259–342), other evidence points to widespread aberrations and development over time (pp. 106 ff.). Nor, beyond purely practical matters, do we find much evidence for control either on the part of the emperor or locally. Indeed M denies that before A.D. 312 there was such a thing as official or state cults, which he considers a modern notion (p. 103; cf. 111). If by this he means the deliberate attempt to impose a cult (Elegabalus is an exception) he is of course right, but local calendars in Italy certainly followed the Roman, which seems to show that the rites celebrated in Rome (mirrored in part by the Acts of the Arval Brethren) provided the model for others to follow. As for religion in the Roman army, M correctly notes that troops off duty at Palmyra followed their own fancies in religious matters (for a similar point see *Phoenix* 15 [1961] 223), but the Feriale Duranum shows what was prescribed at headquarters and how can one be sure that a similar calendar was not followed elsewhere? At Corbridge, for example, we have iconographic evidence for the *Rosaliae* (*Arch. Ael.* 21 [1943] 163 f.), a festival prescribed in the *F.D.*, and the notion that units in different parts of the Roman world might be issued similar instructions in religious matters is clearly supported in the Severan period by an identical order to troops in Dalmatia, Numidia, Sardinia, and Britain that they should follow an oracle of Apollo of Claros (*RIB* 1579 with refs.). Finally, M weighs the drawing power of immigrant cults brought by settlers and disseminated by their descendants, in particular those of Jupiter Dolichenus and Mithras, both associated with the army. There is a useful survey of the main features of Mithraism, in which he takes aim at Cumont in particular and ancient historians in general, and M finds the attraction of the cult in the sharing of a broad range of feelings and experiences (p. 124). (On the exclusion of women, see further R. L. Gordon, *JMS* 3 [1980] 19 ff.).

The overwhelming impression left by the second half of the book, as indeed of the first, is that the author has made a conscious effort to consider the whole spectrum of evidence and to differentiate between varying outlooks within the social pyramid. Thus criticism in the literary sources of idols, rites, and disreputable representations of the gods can be seen to have had little or no effect upon the masses—or at least it finds barely a trace in graffiti and inscrip-

tions (p. 77). This approach leads M to demolish some standard doctrines and to replace them with generalizations of his own: for example, that the overall picture of religious feeling can have differed little across time, so there is no justification for distinguishing different phases or periods of religiosity (p. 65). Statistics are the key to this approach, and what the author has to say on their uses and misuses will be of value to historians whose interests lie in very different directions (pp. 115 ff.; cf. pp. 5 ff., 127). A case in point is conversion to Isiacism. The increase in testimonia that Cumont emphasized must be judged in the context of the general increase in evidence empire-wide at this period, as demonstrated by Mrozek (*Epigraphica* 35 [1973] 113–18, cf. MacMullen, *AJP* 103 [1982] 233–46), from which it follows that Isiacism remained an exotic cult, as Toutain maintained. Nor broadly speaking were the Latin provinces swept by floods of new beliefs in the early third century, since "the new turns out to be ancestral, *ta patria*—only displaced" (p. 117); rather the old Greco-Roman gods retained their appeal. In the same way, M suggests, the fewer number of inscriptions by the mid-third century shows only that the stonecutter was less active, not that people were less religious. The decline in data on religion is really a symptom of economic decline, for as the "higher" forms of religion became too expensive to keep up, one turned to a less expensive option in the form of old "national" gods. On the other hand, often enough the evidence one would want simply is not there, and when M is tempted to generalize outwards from the single inscriptions of Valens, Diogenes, and Gorgos to whole classes of people (p. 14), one wonders whether the horizontal method is not overreaching itself.

M is not always easy to read. Such is the subtlety of the style that the thread tends to get lost, and this reviewer had to look back more than once to the useful chapter headings simply to keep on track. Against this M has an engaging flare for popularization laced with humour that should appeal to a wider public than just the specialist reader. The Irish stew he wanted to concoct (p. xi) has turned out rich and juicy, and one is left with a lively impression of a paganism that was allegedly moribund by the third century B.C., yet lived on vital and dynamic even after Christianity became the official religion of state under Constantine. As a thoughtful and engrossing portrayal of the many faces of paganism, M's introduction to the topic deserves to become required reading for all who are interested in classical antiquity.

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ANTHONY R. BIRLEY. The *Fasti* of Roman Britain. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1981. Pp. xii + 476. $85.00.

These long-awaited *fasti* live up to all expectations. An established master of prosopographical methods, A. R. Birley has produced a text which in erudition, concision, accuracy, and judiciousness is equaled by few other examples of the genre. Most *fasti* one approaches with the suspicion that the work will have to be done all over again; Birley's will be the solid foundation for all future study of the governance of Roman Britain.

The book falls into three unequal sections. Part I (pp. 4–35) offers a splendid description and analysis of the senatorial career under the principate, incorporating both standard older treatments and the large amount of important recent work, notably that of Alföldy and Eck. It is almost a pity that Birley's account is part of these *fasti,* for it deserves wider circulation among all students of history.

Part II (pp. 37–375), the prosopography proper, sets out carefully and in detail the careers of all the men, some famous, some anonymous, who held or may have held high command in Britain from A.D. 43 to 409. Included are governors and *iuridici* of the province, legates and laticlave tribunes of legions stationed in Britain, procurators and prefects of the fleet, and high-ranking visitors; excluded are equestrian military officers (about 300), centurions (again about 300), members of the *familia Caesaris,* and *curiales.* If all of these had been considered, the resulting tome would have been vast, but the split is still a great pity, since we lose a large part of the civil and military hierarchy in the island: any history built on standard provincial *fasti* will necessarily be a highly top-heavy affair, and it might in the future be preferable strictly to limit analysis of much-discussed senatorial and equestrian careers, and to add brief treatments of all officers omitted. Entries follow a general pattern; that is, the subject's home and family are considered, then his career up to, in, and after his service in Britain. These are models of their kind, highlighted by strikingly cautious and fair-minded discussions of vexing problems (the position of King Cogidubnus 208 ff., the dates of Agricola's command 73 ff., the two Ulpii Marcelli 140 f., or the careers of the Pollieni Auspices 151 ff.). Space does not allow criticism in detail; most is of minor significance.

Part III (pp. 377–424), conclusions drawn from the *fasti,* raises some troublesome questions. Here one must address not the author, whose work is exemplary, but the nature and purpose of such works in general. First, essential though the compilation of *fasti* may be, we are reaching diminishing returns in the results. Thus, regardless of fine-tuning, the conclusions that Italians dominate the lists in the first century only to be displaced by provincials in the second, or that the average governor or legionary legate eventually served roughly three years in office, are simply not surprising. Second, are statistics based on low numbers and much hypothesis significant? Third, in 1967 Birley published the standard article on the governors of Britain; close comparison with the present work reveals very little noteworthy change. Much else has been added, but the question must remain whether such an elaborate and expensive book is justified by whatever significant novelty it may contain. Fourth, as already noted, the majority of Britain's masters are perforce omitted. And fifth, *fasti* tend to fall between two stools. As Birley remarks (p. 2), they provide the framework for the history of the province in itself and in the empire, and they illustrate the social and administrative history of Rome. Yet they provide at best a narrow, partial, fragmented, and potentially misleading view of both worlds. In their nature *fasti* really can provide few new insights; they are simply one basis for further work. One possibility for such work, building on rather formidable material, is Birley's own delightful *The People of Roman Britain* (1980).

Given the format, many virtues are somewhat obscured in this book, not least the author's sure touch in the restoration of inscriptions. Submerged in

the dense prosopography lie excursuses on the first division of Britain (pp. 168–72), its legionary garrison (pp. 219–22), and its government under the later empire (pp. 315–20): they fairly and concisely report ancient evidence and modern controversy, and the author is not afraid to admit uncertainty. In the preface, he admits his reluctant omission of an examination of the workings of patronage; it is left to the alert reader to pick out individual examples, some of them the author's most felicitous hypotheses. Above all, the book is imbued with a spirit of merited *pietas*, dedicated to Anthony Birley's father Eric Birley, who has been so influential in our conceptions of Roman Britain and the Roman army, and based in part on initial labours by the elder Birley. Father and son can be proud of the result, which will not be replaced in the forseeable future.

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LUCIANA AIGNER FORESTI. Der Ostalpenraum und Italien: Ihre Kulturellen Beziehungen im Spiegel der Anthropomorphen Kleinplastik aus Bronze des 7. Jh.s v. Chr. Università Italiana per Stranieri, Perugia. Dissertazioni di etruscologia e antichità italiche pubblicate a cura dell' Istituto di Studi Etruschi ed Italici 3. Leo S. Olschki Editore, Florence, 1980. Pp. xii + 125, pls. 26.

This book on the representation of the human figure in the art of the Iron Age reflects trends and concerns of recent scholarship in European protohistory. First of all, it is the product of international collaboration. Suggested by Massimo Pallottino and carried out by an Italian scholar living in Austria, it was made possible by the work of Italian, German, Austrian, Hungarian, and Yugoslav scholars. Second, the geographical area: the importance of the archaeology of the Eastern Alpine region has been recognized and well studied in recent years as archaeologists have focused on its ancient cultural unity, often obscured by modern political boundaries. Also typical of recent trends is its organization, as a corpus of otherwise scattered material, a basis for the commentary, and a *strumento di lavoro* available for further study.

The statuettes the author has collected represent the beginning of the regular use of the human figure in this Alpine area in the early Hallstatt period of the eighth and seventh centuries B.C., preceding the rise of "situla art" that developed in the region during the course of the seventh century B.C. (O.-H. Frey, *Entstehung der Situlenkunst*, Berlin 1969). For the period with which the author is dealing no written documentation exists: only two or three centuries later do some peoples in the area adopt the alphabet. Because these bronze figurines, often neglected by scholars in the past, have usually been found in tombs, they teach us something of the spiritual beliefs as well as the material world and daily life—art, technical ability, dress, society, economy—of the people who made them and those who placed them in their tombs.

The opening chapter sets out the premises, limits, and method. A succinct survey of nineteenth- and twentieth-century research on the subject benefits

from the author's experience in tracing ancient and modern ideas on the origins of the Etruscans (*Tesi ipotesi e considerazioni sull'origine degli Etruschi,* Vienna 1974). She notes that the area of situla art was included in the Austro-Hungarian Empire and that a pre-World War I national pride formed the background for controversy over the chronological and cultural priority of Etruscan as against middle or north European influence. Theoretical discussion gave way in the 1950s to publication of previously excavated material, including the graves from Hallstatt, which constitute the starting point for any study of the East Alpine area. An important exhibit of situla art and its accompanying catalogue in 1961 once more focused scholarly interest and led to a measure of agreement on this unified though complex cultural phenomenon. Relations between Italy and the north in the period immediately preceding this art, in the early Hallstatt period, had not yet, however, been the object of a study, perhaps because of the reaction against the tendency of some past scholarship (referred to as the "Italic fascination" by Merhart) to attribute every change in the north to the influence of the "higher" culture of the south. The present study thus fills a long-felt need.

The first chapter consists of a catalogue of twelve anthropomorphic bronze statuettes or groups from Austria, Yugoslavia, and Hungary and a discussion of their interpretation and of the development of small-scale sculpture in the Hallstatt period. There follows a catalogue of twenty-six figurines or groups from Italy (seven from north Italy and Picenum, fifteen from the Etruscan and Faliscan areas, four from south Italy and Sicily) and then comes a section on their interpretation. The figurines, all from the eighth and seventh centuries B.C., are listed in geographical and chronological order, with bibliography, technical, iconographical, and stylistic descriptions, and discussions of their dating, which is whenever possible based on tomb context. A third chapter deals with religious, artistic, and social relationships between the East Alpine region and Italy in this period as reflected in the bronze figurines, while the fourth, on the origin of small-scale sculpture in the Hallstatt period, examines changing patterns of culture, influence, and relationships in the area. Conclusions are outlined and summarized in an eleven-page Italian *résumé.* Documentation consists of over 250 footnotes and up-to-date bibliography, with several titles still "forthcoming." Photographs of each item and of comparative material are generally of good quality and well reproduced; occasionally one would like to see a detail of these tiny figures more clearly. English readers will find J. V. S. Megaw, *Art of the European Iron Age: A Study of the Elusive Image* (New York 1970) (not quoted by Aigner Foresti) handy for illustrations, bibliography, and discussion of many figurines; and much Italian material is now included in the seven volumes of *Popoli e civiltà dell'Italia antica,* Rome 1974–78, which the author was able to use.

The author's analysis shows that the representation of human figures in the Hallstatt period developed as a result of changes in this area during the eighth century B.C. The outcome of such changes is for the moment clearer than their cause. Clearly, they paralleled but were different from those which took place in Greece and Italy; and the process which led to the representation of the human figure in art never led, as it did in Italy, to literacy and to the forming of cities, the other two great contributions of Greek culture. The mixture of earlier local traditions and later innovations apparent in these

northern statuettes is similar to that observed in the relief decoration of situla art (under the influence of Orientalizing Greek art, both directly and through the Etruscans, situla art gradually takes the place of this small figurative sculpture). What we see is a creative local reinterpretation of motifs used to express native beliefs and customs in a style which combines realistic details and schematic forms, often giving these tiny figures an impressive force. Neither absolute dependence on the art and culture of Italy, as was once thought, nor complete independence, as some claimed, accounts for the appearance of this sculpture.

Bronze figures from Italy, though relying on much the same limited repertoire as those from the north—a fact that tends to give false emphasis to similarities in fact superficial—exhibit important differences. In Italy a preference for sculptural form marks a style which often includes a direct Oriental as well as a primitive and a geometric component, the latter reinforced by the influence of Greek Geometric art. (To G. M. A. Hanfmann, *Altetruskische Plastik,* 1936, and E. H. Richardson, *The Recurrent Geometric in the Sculpture of Central Italy,* 1962, should now be added O. J. Brendel's chapters, "The Villanovan Style" and "The Rise of Statuary " in his *Etruscan Art,* 1978, and Richardson's recent *Early Etruscan Bronzes.*)

A short review cannot do justice to considerations of social, religious, and economic order which arise from the examination of these statuettes. Made as symbols of status for an elite, whose beliefs in an afterlife they express, in a style that reflects the taste of the common people and of local craftsmen, they often come from tombs that help us reconstruct their owners' lives. Rich burials, some containing chariots, prove that, in both areas, women participated in the wealth and prestige of the men. In the north wealth seems to have come from cattle-raising, metal-working, and trade in amber and glass paste. In Italy those buried with the statuettes were often warriors; figures from votive deposits also reveal to us something about the relationship of these people with their gods.

In the struggle to understand the original meaning of these figures, their poses, attributes, dress or nakedness, groupings and context, iconographic problems are basic. The northern figures are almost always naked; it is hard to determine the significance of this nakedness. (One wonders whether figures here described as nonphallic or even "sexless" or "androgynous" are actually to be thought of as wearing some kind of garment.) The symbolism of axes, wagons, tripods, horses, and riders must have something to do with their function in funerary ritual and procession. The groups of figures on the Strettweg wagon seem to show such a ritual in action, though individual figures are not easy to identify. Is the thin, tall, naked belted image of a woman supporting a vessel (20–21) a goddess, as several scholars believed, or the goddess' servant, as the author suggests? Are the two "sexless" figures with a spread-antlered deer (21–22) servants? The carefully wrought little horse and rider also reflect the Strettweg wagon's basic function and its owner's faith in a higher being whom one could approach by means of cult, processions, and other rituals. Female "water carriers" balancing vessels on their heads seem to denote some kind of purification ritual. Male figures—one a warrior—with exaggerated phalloi, related to funerary ritual, apparently served in an apotropaic capacity. The representation of pairs of men and women together (three couples are included in the group) also probably were meant to symbolize the triumph of life over death.

Bronzes from Italy, like those from the north, represent female water carriers, warriors, phallic males, and figures of "Venus pudica," touching her sex, riders and ploughmen leading their oxen. Terra-cotta figures in hut urns from Etruria and Latium are usefully considered as comparisons: These may have been meant to represent the deceased, like some of the bronzes. (For the world reflected by these urns, see F. Brown, "Of Huts and Houses," *In Memoriam Otto J. Brendel* [Mainz 1976] 5–12.) Two couples present problems as well as interesting features. On one from Vetulonia, man and woman are tied together by a chain issuing from the woman's head. On another—two charming figures from Sicily, standing arm-in-arm and smiling—the female is taller than the male. Does her size necessarily imply that she is a goddess protecting the man, as many scholars hold? The author feels they are more likely to be mortals than, as so often in Greece, a divine couple. Later, Etruscan bronze statuettes of couples also show the woman as taller than the man (e.g., Louvre, Br 296). So do Etruscan mirrors, on which craftsmen were fond of representing mothers and sons like Thetis and Achilles or Eos and Memnon, as well as "older women" with their young lovers, like Venus (Turan) and Adonis. (See *Handbook of Etruscan Mirrors,* edited by N. de Grummond, forthcoming. For the representation of other couples in later Etruscan art, see my article in *Reflections of Women in Antiquity,* edited by H. Foley [1981] 324–41.) Judgments must be made about each figure's meaning: the deceased or an ancestor, divine or mortal, master or slave, myth, ritual, magic or religion?

The importance of the subject and of the author's investigation goes beyond her stated scope, a study of the relationship between the north and the south of the Eastern Alpine area in this crucial period of the development of civilization in Europe; for, like any good original research, her analysis teaches us to look and to question basic premises. The human figure allows people who do not yet write to represent scenes of ritual and daily life that show not only their material culture but their beliefs about life, death, gods, and magic. Because the subject is the emotional impact of the human figure and its use in art to represent complex ideas and beliefs in the absence of a literature which can guide us, the book in a real sense uses archaeology to enlarge the limits of what we call history.

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JAMES L. FRANKLIN, JR. Pompeii: The Electoral Programmata, Campaigns and Politics, A.D. 71–79. Papers and Monographs of the American Academy in Rome, 1980. No price stated.

Among the more useful scholarly undertakings are those that seek to update our understanding of a topic for which the evidence has been significantly augmented by time. The excavations at Pompeii in the last century have dramatically increased the corpus of election posters known from that municipality; and, as J. L. Franklin felt, it was time to look anew at this intriguing facet of provincial political life. His foray into some 2,800 recorded *programmata* proves

to be, as so often happens in archaeology, an expedition of considerable effort but of limited success. After giving a concise summary of the formats of the election bills, the author summarizes what is known of the individuals petitioning the electorate and of the professional guild that painted the notices on the whitewashed facades of the residences of Pompeii.

When Franklin turns to the reconstruction of the electoral slates of the years 71–79 A.D., the superiority of his work over that of P. Willems in 1887 is evident. Where Willems relied on simple statistics to arrive at his conclusions, Franklin argues mainly from the physical layering of the *programmata* on one another to suggest a relative chronology of the office seekers. This chronology can then be pinned to the fixed date of 79 A.D. and built backward to the quinquennial magistracies of 75 and 70 A.D. Unfortunately, fewer than 300 of the *programmata* can be examined in this manner, and a significant number of these are fragmentary or have been misread by the recording scholars.

With 25 percent of Pompeii unexcavated, we quickly realize that despite his greater corpus and superior methodology, Franklin, like Willems, is making judgments from only a small fraction of the evidence. Nonetheless the author is able, with some degree of certainty, to propose a reconstruction of the electoral slates for Pompeii's last decade. The candidates for the two municipal magistracies (duovirate and aedilate) and the political pairings of common support for about two dozen individuals appear securely identified. The paucity of significant and reliably recorded data shows itself most clearly when Franklin turns to the more particular aspects of Pompeian politics and society. Clearly, major thoroughfares were preferred locations for election notices, but there must be some significance to the major variations in the density of notices for particular candidates from neighborhood to neighborhood. Where the houses of one's political allies were located was a major political factor, and who owned a given house was of import, particularly for those *programmata* that petition rather than endorse. The ultimate significance of these preferences can only be guessed at. The relative frequency of notices is taken by Franklin as an inverse variable to the established reputation of a candidate or a candidate's family. Such elements as wealth, political disgrace, or temporary political alliances cannot be factored for Pompeii, however, as they can be for late Republican Rome. We would like to know more about the political side of the patron-client relationship, but only eight pairs of names can be adduced. Since only four men can be shown standing for both the aedileship and the duovirate during the decade, we starve again for evidence.

Franklin concludes with a chapter on Pompeian politics that is as brief as the evidence is scanty; but if his thesis that the duovirate was an uncontested election and gentilic *gloria* the actual motivation for the notices, then we have a fundamental change in our appreciation of the *programmata*. It is to be hoped that the author will reconsider his decision not to publish his location guide to the *programmata*, for that would be as useful a tool as any of the tables in the present work, just as surely as its preparation must have been one of the most laborious of the necessary tasks that this study entailed.

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



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APULEIUS, PLATONIC DUALISM, AND ELEVEN

Much of the debate over the unity of Apuleius' *Metamorphoses* has centered on the question of the eleventh book and its relation to the other ten. Though the preponderance of scholarly opinion now tends to view Book 11 as integral to the plan and purpose of the novel as a whole, and though ever fewer scholars agree with the extreme "separatist" positions of men like Helm and Perry, nevertheless those on both sides of the debate must agree on one point: the eleventh book is incongruous in tone and theme with the ten books that precede it. It was this incongruity which encouraged Helm to describe Book 11 as "a dark patch on a light-coloured garment,"[1] and which led Perry to charge that Apuleius had tacked the book on at the end as an afterthought: "a piece of solemn pageantry . . . to offset the prevailing levity of the preceding ten books."[2] For those whose literary sensibilities urge them to see the novel as a unity, on the other hand, the incongruity of Book 11 must be regarded not as something to be denied but rather as a fact to be explained.

Another feature of the *Metamorphoses* needing explanation, and one which (unlike the problem of the eleventh book's incongruity) has received very little attention, is the strange number of books that Apuleius chose for the composition of his novel. As R. Heine points out, a planned structure of eleven books is "wholly unprecedented in all Latin literature from the origins on up to Isidore."[3] Heine takes this as proof that Apuleius did not plan the *Metamorphoses* as a unified work: "Thus the number of books, unprecedented for centuries . . . ,

[1] R. Helm, "Das 'Märchen' von Amor und Psyche," *NJ* 33 (1914) 175 [= G. Binder and R. Merkelbach, eds., *Amor und Psyche* (Darmstadt 1968) 182]: "Das elfte Buch mit der Mysteriendarstellung ist ein ganz unpassender dunkler Flicken auf einem heiteren, hellen Gewande."

[2] B. E. Perry, *The Ancient Romances* (Berkeley 1967) 244–5.

[3] R. Heine, "Picaresque Novel versus Allegory," in *Aspects of Apuleius' Golden Ass*, ed. B. L. Hijmans Jr. and R. Th. van der Paardt (Groningen 1978) 37.

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gives by itself considerable evidence that book 11 had not been planned and prepared in every detail from the beginning by Apuleius."[4] One of the aims of this essay is to show that the opposite is true: that the structure of eleven books, far from being proof of Apuleian patchwork, in fact provides us with additional evidence for the *unity* of Apuleius' novel. In order to explore both these problems (the eleven books and the disparity of Book 11 with Books 1 through 10), it is convenient to turn first to Apuleius' Platonism.

I. APULEIUS AND PLATONISM

Apuleius' fame in his own time seems to have been due largely to his reputation as a Platonic philosopher. His fellow citizens of Madauros set up in his honor a statue bearing a dedication to the "Platonic philosopher,"[5] and it is as "philosophus Platonicus" that Apuleius liked to refer to himself, even in his nonphilosophical works.[6] Moreover, other writers of antiquity tended to think of him primarily as a philosopher. Augustine, for instance, cites Apuleius extensively as a source for Platonist doctrine, presumably because his literary summaries were more accessible than Plato's Greek.[7]

How, then, does Apuleius' Platonism relate to the *Metamorphoses*? We can surely expect Apuleius' novel to reflect his philosophical leanings—especially when that novel deals with spiritual autobiography, as the *Metamorphoses* appears to do. For many things in the novel do point to its autobiographical nature. Not only does Apuleius identify himself with Lucius near the end of the novel, but the religious fervor of Book 11 seems too real to be mere simulation, even for a gifted rhetorician like Apuleius. Furthermore, the details of Isiac ritual and cult language are too authentic to be mere invention. It seems therefore probable that Apuleius was in fact the enthusiastic follower of Isis that he depicts in Book 11. What, then, of his Platonism? Are we to believe that Apuleius simply set aside the intellectual apparatus that he exhibited in his other works—and which was his claim to fame—in

[4] Heine (note 3 above) 37.

[5] This statue is generally assumed to have been dedicated to Apuleius, though his name does not actually appear on the remains that have come down to us. See J. Tatum, *Apuleius and the Golden Ass* (Cornell 1979) 106.

[6] *Apol.* 10.6; cf. 63.3 (*Platonica familia*); *Flor.* 15.26.

[7] E.g., *De civitate Dei* 4.2, 8.10–27, 9.2–8.

order to be a humble priest of Isis? Though this may be possible, it seems unlikely in Apuleius' case. For one thing, we would expect some kind of disclaimer by Apuleius of his former Platonism, or at least some notice from Augustine or others. But while Augustine seems to think that the *Metamorphoses* was autobiographical[8] (and therefore that the conversion to Isis was autobiographical), he fails to say one word about a repudiation of Platonism. In fact, he continues to cite Apuleius as a model Platonist (*Platonicus nobilis*).[9] Apparently he saw no contradiction between initiation into the priesthood of Isis and Platonic philosophy.

In fact there was no great contradiction, especially in view of the syncretistic tendencies of the first and second centuries A.D. Not only was there no contradiction, but one might almost say that it was the most natural thing in the world for a Platonist to be converted to Isis. The tendency of Middle Platonism to exaggerate the distance between God and man must have enhanced the need for personal salvation—a need that was felt acutely by the men of the first centuries A.D.[10] The perfect solution for Platonists like Apuleius was the religion of Isis. The cult provided a personal link to deity, yet it could also be accommodated to the theoretical tenets of Platonic philosophy with no compromise either of the emotional intensity of the religion or the intellectual rigor of the philosophy.

That the Isis cult could be accommodated to the intellectual framework of Platonism is beautifully illustrated by Plutarch's treatise *de Iside et Osiride*. In this essay I shall use Plutarch's synthesis of Isis cult and Platonism to show that Apuleius could logically have retained his Platonism after his conversion to Isis.[11] Once this is admitted, it becomes apparent that Platonism can be used to explain the disparity

[8] *De civitate Dei* 18.18: *sicut Apuleius, in libris quos Asini aurei titulo inscripsit, sibi ipsi accidisse ut, accepto veneno, humano animo permanente, asinus fieret, aut indicavit aut finxit.*

[9] *De civitate Dei* 8.12.

[10] Cf. J. Dillon, *The Middle Platonists* (Cornell 1977) 51. Dillon sees as characteristic of Middle Platonism ". . . a strong commitment . . . to a transcendent supreme principle, and a non-material intelligible world above and beyond this one. . . ." See also p. 114 and *passim*.

[11] Platonism has, of course, been used more than once before now to help explain Apuleius' novel: e.g., C. Schlam, "Platonica in the *Metamorphoses* of Apuleius," *TAPA* 101 (1970) 477–87; R. Thibau, "Les Métamorphoses d'Apulée et la Théorie Platonicienne de l'Erôs," *Studia Philosophica Gandensia* 3 (1965) 89–144; A. Wlosok, "Zur Einheit der Metamorphosen des Apuleius," *Philologus* 113 (1969) 68–84.

of the two major parts of the *Metamorphoses* (the "dark patch on a light-coloured garment") and also the strange number of books.

Usually a comparison of Plutarch's treatment of Isis religion in *de Iside et Osiride* with Apuleius' in the *Metamorphoses* goes no farther than a contrast between the emotional tenor of the two works. Since they differ so much in emotional tone, it is concluded that their authors also differed so vastly in general outlook that neither one can help shed any light on the other. Plutarch was philosophical, and Apuleius was religious. They both happened to write about Isis, and that is all they have in common. J. Gwyn Griffiths is typical of this view:

> Their purposes differ, it is true, since Apuleius is describing one particular Isiac festival in a highly personal and confessional way, almost in the manner of a sophisticated *journal intime.* Plutarch, on the other hand, professes to expound a whole religion. His manner is usually impersonal and he often indulges in abstract theorizing, whereas Apuleius is sensuously concrete—more Egyptian in his approach, one might say, and Apuleius was indeed at least African. There is a vast difference of *Weltanschauung.*[12]

Their purposes differ indeed, because Apuleius is writing a *novel,* which must be "sensuously concrete" (to use Griffiths' expression) if it is to be successful (even if it has a didactic purpose ultimately), whereas Plutarch is writing a *scientific treatise,* where "abstract theorizing" is entirely appropriate. However, it is a fallacy to conclude that the authors' *Weltanschauungen* are therefore different. Absence of conspicuous emotion in Plutarch's treatise does not mean that Plutarch the man was not a fervent devotee of Isis and Osiris (many scholars believe in fact he was).[13] Nor does the presence of sensuous detail in the *Metamorphoses* prove that Apuleius lacked a theoretical framework. It is the purpose of this essay to show that the *Metamorphoses* does have a theoretical framework—specifically, a Platonizing approach similar at least in general outline to Plutarch's in *de Iside et Osiride.*

We can trace a line of continuity from Apuleius' philosophical works, through Plutarch's *de Iside et Osiride,* to the *Metamorphoses.* This procedure rests on two assumptions: first, that the *Metamorphoses*

[12] J. Gwyn Griffiths, *Plutarch's De Iside et Osiride,* edited with an introduction, translation, and commentary (University of Wales Press 1970) 49–50. Cf. J. C. Fredouille, *Apulée, Mét. Livre* XI (Coll. Érasme) (Paris 1975) 25.

[13] See discussion in J. Gwyn Griffiths, *Plutarch's De Iside et Osiride* (note 12 above) 96–98.

was written later than the philosophical works, as seems likely;[14] and second, that Apuleius synthesized his Platonism with Isis religion in a manner similar to Plutarch's, as also seems likely. Support for the second assumption can be found in the *Metamorphoses* itself. Twice in the novel Apuleius claims kinship with Plutarch.[15] This claim, taken in its literal sense, is absurd. It must, therefore, signal a *philosophical* kinship with Plutarch, and thus it furnishes an important clue to Apuleius' philosophical orientation in the *Metamorphoses.*

The element of continuity that runs through Apuleius' philosophical works, Plutarch's treatise *de Iside et Osiride,* and the *Metamorphoses* is Platonic dualism. In the philosophical works of Apuleius, this dualism takes the form of a drastic split between the highest God on the one hand and the created world on the other. First, there is the extreme transcendence of God. In *de Platone* Apuleius calls the highest god *unus et solus summus ille, ultramundanus, incorporeus* (*de Plat.* 1.11) and *summus exsuperantissimusque deorum omnium* (*de Plat.* 1.12).[16] On the other side is man's lowly existence on earth. At *de deo Soc.* 3.124–6 Apuleius contrasts the highest of the immortal gods with the beastlike existence of men who "care not for the true doctrine" (*incuria verae disciplinae*):

> Here on earth we are the superior animal; and yet the majority of men, because of their indifference to the true doctrine, have become so corrupted by all kinds of errors and sacrilege and so tainted with crimes that, the natural gentleness of their species having been abolished, they have become such savage beasts that they seem to be the lowest animal on earth. (*de deo Soc.* 3.125–6)[17]

If this sounds like a description of the first ten books of the *Metamorphoses,* where lust and error and crime prevail, it is no accident. As I

[14] G. W. Bowersock, *RhM* 108 (1963) 277 ff., argues for a date later than 177. In this case the *Metamorphoses* could be Apuleius' last work.

[15] *Metamorphoses* 1.2, 2.3.

[16] The striking epithet *exsuperantissimus* is also employed at *de mundo* 27, where *summus atque exsuperantissimus* translates the words τοῦ τὸν κόσμον ἐπέχοντος θεοῦ of the Greek original (Περὶ Κόσμου 398b2). J. Beaujeu, *Apulée: opuscules philosophiques et fragments* (Paris 1973) 117–8, 112, points out that Apuleius' adaptation of the Greek treatise Περὶ Κόσμου exhibits throughout a tendency to go beyond its prototype by insisting on the transcendence of God.

[17] *in qua* [sc. *terra*] *praecipuum animal homines sumus, quamquam plerique se incuria verae disciplinae ita omnibus erroribus ac piacularibus depravaverint, sceleribus inbuerint et prope exesa mansuetudine generis sui inmane efferarint, ut possit videri nullum animal in terris homine postremius.* (*de deo Soc.* 3.125–6)

shall show, the dichotomy between the two parts of the *Metamorphoses* corresponds exactly to the Platonic dichotomy between the world and divinity.

Apuleius attempted to fill in the huge gap between God and man by means of an elaborate demonology, but this was only a theoretical expedient, and not a very satisfactory one at that. Philosophy (*vera disciplina*) was still the only means for man to rise above the world of change to true Being, and this required long and arduous training in order to gain even a momentary flash of enlightenment.[18] One can understand why Apuleius would have been attracted to the "philosophical goddess" Isis.[19] She provided a means of ascent to the same old Platonic goals, but with all the emotional intensity that a mystery religion provides.

The same Platonic dualism which we see in Apuleius is evident also in Plutarch's treatise, though it is now meshed with the theology of the Isis and Osiris cults. Osiris, the transcendent deity, is "the First and the Lord, whom only the mind can understand, . . . what really exists."[20] Man in the material world is far below him:

> [Osiris] is actually very far removed from the earth, being undefiled, unspotted, and uncorrupted by any being which is subject to decay and death. The souls of men here, hedged in as they are by the body and its emotions, have no association with the god save for the dim vision of his presence which they achieve by the understanding gained through philosophy.[21]

Plutarch shares Apuleius' dualism, but with an important difference. He adds an agent of salvation to help bridge the gap between the highest god and man. This agent is Isis, the *sospitatrix* who leads men out of the world of becoming into the realm of the noetic and ultimately to a vision of the highest god:

> The end [sc. of Isis worship] is knowledge of the First and the Lord, whom only the mind can understand [νοητοῦ] and whom the goddess

[18] Cf. *de deo Soc.* 3.124: . . . *vix sapientibus viris, cum se vigore animi, quantum licuit, a corpore removerunt, intellectum huius dei, id quoque interdum, velut in artissimis tenebris rapidissimo coruscamine lumen candidum intermicare.*

[19] Plutarch tells us that Isis is "exceptionally wise and a lover of wisdom": ἐξαιρέτως σοφὴν καὶ φιλόσοφον οὖσαν. (*de Iside et Osiride* 351E).

[20] *de Iside et Osiride* 352A.

[21] ὁ δ' ἔστι μὲν αὐτὸς ἀπωτάτω τῆς γῆς ἄχραντος καὶ ἀμίαντος καὶ καθαρὸς οὐσίας ἁπάσης φθορὰν δεχομένης καὶ θάνατον, ἀνθρώπων δὲ ψυχαῖς ἐνταυθοῖ μὲν ὑπὸ σωμάτων καὶ παθῶν περιεχομέναις οὐκ ἔστι μετουσία τοῦ θεοῦ πλὴν ὅσον ὀνείρατος ἀμαυροῦ θιγεῖν νοήσει διὰ φιλοσοφίας. (*de Iside et Osiride* 382E)

> summons one to seek as a being who is near and with her and united to her. The name of her sanctuary also clearly offers recognition and knowledge of what really exists; for it is called the Iseion to indicate that we shall know what really exists if we approach the sanctuaries of the goddess with reason and reverence.[22]

Isis has one other important function, according to Plutarch. She combats Typhon, who is the force of evil in the world. According to Plutarch, Typhon "is closely inbred into the body and into the soul of the world, and goes on fighting constantly and desperately against the better power."[23] Like any good Platonist, Plutarch believes the world is intrinsically imperfect, due to its material component. There is in the world a tendency toward change and chaos which opposes stability, and hence things in the world can never truly *be,* but are always *becoming.*[24] It is Isis' function to combat this tendency toward chaos (Typhon in Plutarch, *caeca Fortuna* in the *Metamorphoses*) and to lead men out of the world of becoming to true Being.

We see, then, that Apuleius' philosophical orientation is in basic sympathy with Plutarch's and would allow him (even encourage him) to embrace Isis religion in the same spirit as Plutarch had half a century earlier—that is, from a Platonic standpoint. In fact, if we assume that Apuleius is Plutarch's philosophical cousin in the *Metamorphoses,* we can begin to understand the huge disparity between Book 11 and Books 1–10. The stark contrast between the two parts turns out to be not an artistic flaw caused by patchwork, but rather a highly effective expression of Apuleius' philosophical dualism. The disparity is intentional. In order to contrast the haven of Rest (*ad portum Quietis . . . , Luci, venisti* [11.15]) with the storms of Fortune, the turmoil of the sea must be depicted as vividly as possible.

Books 1–10 are an allegorical representation of the world of becoming. Things are never what they seem to be, and the reader and Lucius are constantly fooled. The senses are unreliable: the roses that Lucius saw in the valley (*inter varias herbulas et laetissima virecta fulgentium rosarum mineus color renidebat* [4.2]) turn out to be

[22] ὧν [sc. of Isis worship] τέλος ἐστὶν ἡ τοῦ πρώτου καὶ κυρίου καὶ νοητοῦ γνῶσις, ὃν ἡ θεὸς παρακαλεῖ ζητεῖν παρ' αὐτῇ καὶ μετ' αὐτῆς ὄντα καὶ συνόντα. τοῦ δ' ἱεροῦ τοὔνομα καὶ σαφῶς ἐπαγγέλλεται καὶ γνῶσιν καὶ εἴδησιν τοῦ ὄντος· ὀνομάζεται γὰρ Ἰσεῖον ὡς εἰσομένων τὸ ὄν, ἂν μετὰ λόγου καὶ ὁσίως εἰς τὰ ἱερὰ τῆς θεοῦ παρέλθωμεν. (*de Iside et Osiride* 352A)

[23] *de Iside et Osiride* 371A.

[24] Cf. Plato at *Tim.* 27D, who makes a distinction between "that which exists, having no becoming" and "that which is ever becoming, never existent."

poisonous laurel-roses. The three "robbers" turn out to be wineskins. Fortunes and appearances shift rapidly, confusingly. There seems to be no way out of the whirlwind of chaotic change, and Blind Fortune reigns. Lucius is so much buffeted by *nefaria Fortuna* that he seems at last to give himself up to its vagaries.[25] The picture steadily darkens, so as to prepare the contrast with Book 11. Books 7–10, filled with stories of adultery and murder, present a crescendo of crime and perversion that ends with the mass murderess of 10.23–8. At this climax, the time is ripe for Isis to intervene and save poor Lucius from his sea of trouble.

The symbolism of the novel's overall structure is clear. The first ten books represent the world of becoming, where *caeca Fortuna* holds sway. The eleventh book, containing the highest god and his consort Isis, stands, as it were, beyond the world. Not that Isis stands aloof from the world like a transcendent god. She does intervene in order to save Lucius from *caeca Fortuna.* But saving Lucius from *caeca Fortuna* means that she is putting him beyond the reach of the evil inherent in the created world, and thus she effectively delivers him from the world itself. She does this for all the elect: *nam in eos, quorum sibi vitas deae nostrae maiestas vindicavit, non habet locum casus infestus* (11.15). Thus Isis in the *Metamorphoses* performs the same two functions she had in Plutarch's *de Iside et Osiride:* she combats *caeca Fortuna* (Apuleius' equivalent of Typhon), and she leads the elect to Being, beyond the power of the world's vagaries.

The ultimate goal of Isis religion, as Plutarch tells us, is "knowledge of the First and the Lord, whom only the mind can understand, . . . what really exists" (*de Iside et Osiride* 352A). This holds true in the *Metamorphoses* as well, for the epiphany of Osiris represents the high point of Lucius' religious experience. Occurring as it does at the end of the novel, it comes as a climax to all the previous initiations and preparations. Furthermore, if we examine the descriptions of Osiris in Book 11, we find the god described in superlative language typical of the Platonic God: *deus deum magnorum potior, et maiorum summus, et summorum maximus, et maximorum regnator Osiris* (11.30); and *magnus deus deumque summus parens invictus Osiris* (11.27).[26]

[25] As J. L. Penwill observes, *Fortuna* is so often the subject of the sentence after the beginning of Book 7 (e.g., 7.16 *init.*, 7.17 *init.*, 7.20 *init.*, 7.25, 8.24 *init.*) that we get the distinct impression that Lucius has given himself up in despair to the blind force that tosses him back and forth on a sea of uncertainty. Cf. "Slavish Pleasures and Profitless Curiosity: Fall and Redemption in Apuleius' Metamorphoses," *Ramus* 4 (1975) 72 and 81, n. 66.

[26] Superlative language is also characteristic of Isis at 11.5. Much of this, of course, follows the traditional language of Isis Aretalogies, but it accords well also with Apuleius'

The fact that Osiris appears to Lucius in a dream and even speaks to him has seemed to some critics[27] inappropriate for the immaterial and transcendent Platonic god. But to succumb to such scruples is to overlook once again the nature of Apuleius' artistic medium, which calls for sensuous detail, not abstract theorizing. We must remember that the *Metamorphoses* is not a philosophical tract, but an allegorical novel. Consequently, we should no more take the description of Osiris' epiphany literally than we should believe that Apuleius was literally turned into a donkey.

Many critics have misunderstood the general allegorical significance of Lucius' transformation into a donkey. His asinine form represents the beastlike nature of *all* men who live ignorant of the "true doctrine"; it is not simply a special punishment for meddling with magic or for excessive curiosity. All men are born into an imperfect world, where true Being can never be found because things are constantly changing. As long as they pursue things of the material world they will remain imprisoned in their bodies and in the world of change. If, however, men turn their minds to the realm of Being, they will be able to transcend the world and come face to face with pure Being: this is the "true doctrine."

The cause usually given for Lucius' transformation is his *curiositas*.[28] This is indeed one of the causes given by the priest of Isis in his speech to Lucius after the latter has been transformed back into human shape: *curiositatis inprosperae sinistrum praemium reportasti* (11.15). His words are usually interpreted to mean that *curiositas* was the sin for which Lucius was punished by his asinification and because of which he underwent all his trials in Books 1–10. A good spokesman of this view is A. Wlosok. According to Wlosok, Lucius' curiosity, which is described in the first few books of the novel as a general thirst for

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Platonic theology. The emphasis on the god-pair at 11.27 (*quanquam enim conexa, immo vero unita ratio numinis religionisque esset, tamen teletae discrimen interesse maximum*) corresponds with the theology of the philosophic works. Cf. Dillon (note 10 above) 46: "Later Platonists such as Albinus, Apuleius, or Numenius postulate two distinct Gods, both Intellects certainly, but one in repose and turned in upon itself, the other in motion and directed outward, both above and below itself."

[27] F. Solmsen, *Isis among the Greeks and Romans* (Harvard 1979) 109: "The Platonic god would never deign to appear in dreams, as not only Isis but in the end Osiris too see fit to appear to Lucius."

[28] On the concept of *curiositas* see A. Wlosok (note 11 above) 71, n. 1, for bibliography up to the date of Wlosok's article. See also C. Schlam, "The Curiosity of the *Golden Ass*," *CJ* 64 (1968) 120–25; G. Sandy, "Knowledge and Curiosity in Apuleius' *Metamorphoses*," *Latomus* 31 (1972) 179–83; and J. L. Penwill (note 25 above).

knowledge ("one who thirsts after novelty, who wants to know everything or at least very many things"; and "one very desirous of knowing rare and strange things"),[29] takes a very specific direction: Lucius is bent on delving into magic. He is *coram magiae noscendae ardentissimus cupitor* (3.19). And magic, which strives to overstep human bounds and gain control over the spiritual world, constitutes the gravest sacrilege from the point of view of a religion like the Isis cult, since it seeks to seize the initiative on God and alter divine Providence. That is why, according to Wlosok, Lucius' curiosity brought him to grief:

> Die curiositas des Lucius ist bei dieser Zielsetzung [sc. the aim for magical powers] nichts anderes als der eigenmachtige Versuch, in Wissensbereiche einzudringen, die dem Menschen von Natur aus verschlossen sind. Sie ist vom Standpunkt einer Offenbarungstheologie—und einen solchen vertritt die Isisreligion—keine blosse Neugierde, sondern Vermessenheit.[30]

The punishment for Lucius' insatiable curiosity for magic is, according to Wlosok and others,[31] his transformation and subsequent sufferings as an ass.

But this is not what the priest says, as we shall see if we examine his actual words (11.15):

> Multis et variis exanclatis laboribus magnisque Fortunae tempestatibus et maximis actus procellis ad portum Quietis et aram Misericordiae tandem, Luci, venisti. nec tibi natales ac ne dignitas quidem vel ipsa, qua flores, usquam doctrina profuit, sed lubrico virentis aetatulae ad serviles delapsus voluptates curiositatis inprosperae sinistrum praemium reportasti. sed utcumque Fortunae caecitas, dum te pessimis periculis discruciat, ad religiosam istam beatitudinem inprovida produxit malitia. eat nunc et summo furore saeviat et crudelitati suae materiam quaerat aliam; nam in eos, quorum sibi vitas deae nostrae maiestas vindicavit, non habet locum casus infestus. quid latrones, quid ferae, quid servitium, quid asperrimorum itinerum ambages reciprocae, quid metus mortis cotidianae nefariae Fortunae profuit? in tutelam iam receptus es fortunae, sed videntis, quae suae lucis splendore ceteros etiam deos illuminat.

In the main, the priest's speech is an invective against *saeva Fortuna,* not a statement of censure against Lucius. While Lucius' curiosity and involvement with magic were indeed the *occasion* of his transformation

[29] 1.2: *sititor . . . novitatis . . . qui velim scire vel cuncta vel certe plurima;* 2.1: *nimis cupidus cognoscendi quae rara miraque sunt. . . .*

[30] Wlosok (note 11 above) 72–3.

[31] E.g., P. G. Walsh, *The Roman Novel* (Cambridge 1970) 177.

into an ass, the transformation is not said by the priest to be a *punishment* for his curiosity.[32] Indeed, curiosity itself is not said to be a bad thing; it is rather its misdirected application that caused Lucius' accidental metamorphosis. The priest specifically speaks of *profitless curiosity* (*curiositatis inprosperae*),[33] implying that Lucius' curiosity has brought him no good, though it might have if applied correctly.

A longing for knowledge is a necessary condition for reaching the truth, but that intellectual curiosity must be directed to worthy objects. Lucius' trouble is that he thinks that knowledge of the changing world is worth having. In Book 9 Lucius says that his asinine form has at least provided one benefit: it has enabled him to learn many things, even if it has not made him wise like Ulysses (*etsi minus prudentem, multiscium reddidit* [9.13]).[34] The comparison with Ulysses is telling. For when, at the end of *de deo Soc.*, Apuleius delivers what amounts to a diatribe for the contemplative life (*quin igitur et tu ad studium sapientiae accingeris . . .* ? [*de deo Soc.* 24]), it is Ulysses whom he cites as an example of the sage who cares nothing for external things (high birth or riches or social position) but only for the cultivation of his

[32] One might object that Lucius' words at 11.23 contradict this thesis: *quaeras forsitan satis anxie, studiose lector, quid deinde dictum, quid factum; dicerem, si dicere liceret, cognosceres, si liceret audire. sed parem noxam contraherent et aures et linguae illae temerariae curiositatis.* But, though these words refer to a *punishment* for curiosity, they cannot be used to prove that the priest's words (*curiositatis inprosperae sinistrum praemium*) do the same, for Lucius' words at 11.23 refer to a *religious* sense of *curiositas*, to a deadly penalty incurred by revealing *arcana* to the profane. (Lucius is echoing the words of the high priest at 11.21, who says that, without the express command of the goddess, no priest would dare *temerarium atque sacrilegium . . . ministerium subire noxamque letalem contrahere.*) This religious sense of *curiositas* is completely different from the curiosity mentioned by the priest at 11.15. Lucius' transformation into an ass (the *curiositatis inprosperae sinistrum praemium*) was by no means a punishment for any violation of *arcana*—no holy secrets of the Isis cult had been revealed to anyone, sacred or profane. The usual view (e.g., of C. Schlam [note 28 above] 122–3), that Lucius' pursuit of magic was an unholy curiosity and thus brought about his punishment, fails to convince for two reasons: First, Lucius' meddling in magic is instigated by an *intellectual* curiosity (*sititor . . . novitatis . . . qui velim scire vel cuncta vel certe plurima* [1.2]); he is not motivated by a desire to manipulate the powers of the universe for his own selfish ends. Second, the priest, in reviewing Lucius' past, nowhere mentions his involvement with magic, though we would expect him to, if he indeed meant to stress that Lucius had been punished for an unholy pursuit of the black arts.

[33] Cf. J. L. Penwill (note 25 above) 67.

[34] This seems to be a deliberate echo of Heraclitus' "Much learning does not teach understanding": πολυμαθίη νόον οὐ διδάσκει. fr. 16M. Of course we must not overlook the surface reference to *Odyssey* 1 *init.*

soul. In a grand conclusion, Apuleius tells us that Homer meant to present Ulysses as the true sage, and to this end he made *prudentia* (poetically named *Minerva*) Ulysses' constant companion. It was she who enabled him to face all the horrors and to surmount all the obstacles (*de deo Soc.* 24):

> She assisted him when he entered the cave of the Cyclops but escaped again; when he saw the oxen of the Sun but refused to lay a hand on them; when he descended to Hell and then returned. It was with Wisdom [*sapientia*] as a companion that he sailed past Scylla without being devoured; that he was caught in the whirlpool of Charybdis yet was not dragged down; that he drank the potion of Circe but was not metamorphosized [*non mutatus est*]; that he visited the land of the Lotus-eaters but did not remain; that he heard the Sirens' song but was not seduced.

Lucius has been seduced by the Siren song of the physical world. He is indeed *multiscius* like Ulysses, but he lacks Ulysses' wisdom and so remains at the mercy of *nefaria Fortuna.* His high birth, his position in society, his πολυμαθίη have availed him nothing (*nec tibi natales ac ne dignitas quidem, vel ipsa, qua flores, usquam doctrina profuit* [11.15]). Until Isis saves him and imparts to him the true doctrine, he will continue to live the life of a beast, no different from all men who live *incuria verae disciplinae.* His transformation into an ass is not, therefore, a special punishment; it is rather a metaphor for the fallen state of unredeemed man.

II. THE NUMBER ELEVEN

We have seen that the stark contrast in the *Metamorphoses* between the last book and the preceding ones was intended as a structural expression of Platonic dualism. But why did Apuleius choose exactly *eleven* books? The same effect of shocking disparity could have been achieved with 9 + 1 books or with 11 + 1 books to give a more normal 10- or 12-book format. The objection of R. Heine, that eleven books are "wholly unprecedented in all Latin literature from the origins on up to Isidore,"[35] is a real one. We cannot imagine Apuleius having planned from the beginning an eleven-book *Metamorphoses*—unless he had a very specific reason for doing so.

Since Apuleius was a Platonist, we should consider the possibility

[35] R. Heine (note 3 above) 37.

that Pythagorean number symbolism might provide a solution to the problem of the eleven-book structure of the *Metamorphoses*. Platonists were, after all, notoriously fond of Pythagorean number mysticism and often borrowed it for their own writings.[36] There may even be a special connection between Pythagorean numerology and Egyptian cult, or at least some ancient writers seemed to think that there was. Plutarch employs numerology quite liberally in his treatise on Isis and Osiris,[37] and he even suggests that Pythagoras learned his number lore from the Egyptians.[38] More importantly, there is direct evidence in the novel itself: Apuleius overtly refers to Pythagorean number symbolism in the *Metamorphoses* when, at the beginning of Book 11, he has Lucius say, "Seven times I plunged my head under the waves, since the divine Pythagoras pronounced that number to be very specially suitable in sacred rites" (11.1). This should alert us to the possibility that Apuleius employed other significant numbers in the novel.

For a Platonist, the number 11 would have been thought of, not really as one single number, but as two: 10 plus 1. This is because the Platonists followed the Pythagoreans in regarding 10 as the limit of the first series of numbers. Aristotle says at *Phys.* 206B32: "For in numbers [Plato] does not admit either endless reduction (since the monad is the irreducible minimum), or increase without limit, for the series of numbers stops at the decad."[39] Furthermore, 11 plays the role of 1 in a new cycle of numbers, since it exceeds the perfect decad. This is spelled out in the *Theologumena Arithmeticae:* "They call the decad 'All,' because there is by nature no number greater than ten; but if one counts

[36] For the great importance attached by Platonists to Pythagorean numerology, see Dillon (note 10 above): on Plato, pp. 3–4; on Speusippus, pp. 21–2; on Middle Platonists, pp. 51, 114, 159, 182–3, 341, and *passim*.

[37] E.g., *de Iside et Osiride* 363A; 367E–368D; 381E–382A.

[38] *de Iside et Osiride* 354E–F. It is interesting that Apuleius too says that Pythagoras learned numerology from Egyptian priests: *verum enimvero celebrior fama obtinet sponte eum petisse Aegyptias disciplinas atque ibi a sacerdotibus caerimoniarum incredundas potentias, numerorum admirandas vices, geometriae sollertissimas formulas didicisse.* (*Flor.* 15.147)

[39] οὔτε γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς τὸ ἐπὶ τὴν καθαίρεσιν ἄπειρον ὑπάρχει (ἡ γὰρ μονὰς ἐλάχιστον) οὔτε ἐπὶ τὴν αὔξην (μέχρι γὰρ δεκάδος ποιεῖ τὸν ἀριθμόν). Cf. Arist. *Met.* 1073a30, and Arist. *Met.* 1084a12 and 25, where Aristotle blames Plato, and indirectly also the Pythagoreans, for only counting up to ten: "It is paradoxical also that there should be an Idea of 10, but not of 11, nor of the succeeding numbers." Cf. also Nicomachus, *Theologumena Arithmeticae*, p. 25 (Ast): ὅτι δὲ ἄρχεται μὲν ἀπὸ μονάδος, τελειοῦται δὲ ὁ ἀριθμὸς εἰς ι′, λεχθήσεται προϊοῦσιν.

further, one repeats the cycle in a recursive fashion."[40] Given these facts, there are at least two symbolic meanings possible for the number 11. Eleven can either be thought of as somehow beyond or transcending 10—a possibility we shall explore—or it can be thought of as a symbol for rebirth or renewal. The latter significance very possibly plays a role in Apuleius, who clearly views initiation into the rites of Isis as a kind of spiritual rebirth. Significantly, he twice uses the term *renatus* to refer to Lucius' new life in the service of Isis.[41] Furthermore—and this is important to note—ten days of abstention were required before each of Lucius' three initiations, the actual initiation taking place on the eleventh day. J. Bergman has suggested that these ten days correspond to the ten months reckoned in Egypt as the period of gestation and are, therefore, the proper prelude in a process which leads to the initiate's "rebirth."[42] Bergman argues further that Pythagorean number symbolism may play a role in these ten days of ritual "gestation." He lists three points in support of his argument. First, since the decad, in the form of the tetractys (1 + 2 + 3 + 4 = 10), generates the first three-dimensional solid and is presupposed in the generation of all bodies, it provides a perfect symbol for the preparation of the foetus before birth.[43] Second, 10 is the "most natural and perfect number" and was used as a model by the creator of the universe.[44] Third, Pythagoreans (notably Philolaos) sometimes called 10 the ἀρχὴν ὑγιείας ("beginning of health"). Bergman concludes that, since the ten days of abstention symbolically represent the period of gestation, the initiation on the

[40] *Theologumena Arithmeticae*, p. 59 (Ast): [they call the decade] πᾶν δὲ ὅτι ἀριθμὸς φυσικῶς πλείων οὐδείς ἐστιν, ἀλλ' εἴ γέ τις ἐπινοεῖται, κατὰ παλινοδίαν ἐπ' αὐτόν πως ἀνακυκλεῖται. Cf. Hierocles *in Carmen Aureum* 20.13: τοῦ δὲ ἀριθμοῦ τὸ πεπερασμένον διάστημα ἡ δεκάς. ὁ γὰρ ἐπὶ πλέον ἀριθμεῖν ἐθέλων ἀνακάμπτει πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ ἕν. (Hierocles, ed. F. W. Koehler [Stuttgart 1974] 87, line 13.)

[41] 11.16: *ut renatus quodam modo statim sacrorum obsequio desponderetur;* 11.21: *numen deae soleat et sua providentia quodam modo renatos ad novae reponere rursus salutis curricula.*

[42] J. Bergman, "Decem Illis Diebus," *Ex Orbe Religionum: Studia Geo Widengren* (Leiden 1972) 332–46.

[43] The analogy between the generation of the three dimensions and the generation of living beings seems to have been used by the earliest Pythagoreans. P. Kucharski, *Étude sur la doctrine pythagoricienne de la tétrade* (Paris 1952) 66, assigns the notion to the earliest stages of Pythagoreanism: "Le même processus, celui de la génération des trois dimensions, aboutit à la production de la 'chose étendue' (*res extensa*) et de l'être vivant."

[44] Bergman refers to the Speusippus fragment in the *Theologumena Arithmeticae*. For the text, see note 45 below.

eleventh day must represent a mystical rebirth. He fails to see, however, that the number 11 has a special significance in the novel as a whole. As we shall see, his argument should be extended to include not only the ten-day period of abstention and eleventh-day initiation, but also the eleven-book structure of the novel itself and all the other significant instances of 11 which I discuss below.

If 11 signifies rebirth for Apuleius, this does not exclude the second of the two possibilities I named above. For in both instances where Apuleius uses the word *renatus,* he is careful to qualify it by *quodam modo,* thus indicating that it is not *physical* rebirth he is talking about, but rebirth on another level. Indeed, the initiate is said to undergo a kind of voluntary death (11.21 and 23), during which he "passes through all the elements" (*accessi confinium mortis et calcato Proserpinae limine per omnia vectus elementa remeavi* [11.23]) before he returns. This suggests that he is transported beyond the confines of the physical world during his ritual death. After his rebirth the initiate presumably enjoys a new life beyond the limitations and vicissitudes of the physical world. Thus, 11 would symbolize not only rebirth but rebirth into a life somehow beyond the world of change.

If we return to the Platonic conception of 11 as 10 + 1, we find another very interesting possibility for number symbolism. As is well known, the number 10 was sometimes called by the Pythagoreans *cosmos,* or "world," because it contained (according to the Pythagorean conception) the elements of all other numbers, just as the world contains all things.[45] This idea of 10 as *cosmos* is encountered frequently in the

[45] This notion of ten as *cosmos* was closely connected with the important doctrine of the tetractys (1 + 2 + 3 + 4 = 10). See A. Delatte's study, "La tétractys pythagoricienne," in *Études sur la littérature pythagoricienne* (Paris 1915) 260. See also P. Kucharski (note 43 above) *passim;* and M. L. D'Ooge, F. E. Robbins, and L. C. Karpinski, *Nicomachus of Gerasa: Introduction to Arithmetic* (New York 1926) 106–7 [= *University of Michigan Studies: Humanistic Series,* Vol. 16]. An important passage on ten as a model for the physical universe is the report about Speusippus' book Περὶ Πυθαγορικῶν ἀριθμῶν at *Theologumena Arithmeticae,* p. 61 (Ast): μετὰ ταῦτα λοιπὸν θάτερον [τὸ] τοῦ βιβλίου ἥμισυ περὶ δεκάδος ἄντικρυς ποιεῖται, φυσικωτάτην αὐτὴν ἀποφαίνων καὶ τελεστικωτάτην τῶν ὄντων, οἷον εἶδός τι τοῖς κοσμικοῖς ἀποτελέσμασι τεχνικὸν ἀφ' ἑαυτῆς (ἀλλ' οὐχ ἡμῶν νομισάντων ἢ ὡς ἔτυχε) θεμέλιον ὑπάρχουσαν καὶ παράδειγμα παντελέστατον τῷ τοῦ παντὸς ποιητῇ θεῷ προεκκειμένην. ("After this he [sc. Speusippus] immediately devotes the other half of the book to the decad, showing it to be the most natural and most initiative [τελεστικωτάτην] of realities, inasmuch as it is in itself (and not because we have made it so or by chance) an organizing idea of cosmic events, being a foundation stone and lying before God the Creator of the universe as a pattern complete in all respects.")

writings of Neo-Pythagoreans and Platonists, who often spoke of the decad as the pattern used by God or a demiurgos to fashion the world. Examples of this notion are abundant, but I shall cite only Nicomachus of Gerasa, who seems apt for several reasons: first, because he has a strong dualistic orientation, similar to that in Apuleius and Plutarch; second, because he is a near contemporary of Apuleius;[46] and third, and most interesting, because his *Introduction to Arithmetic* is said to have been first translated into Latin by none other than Apuleius himself.[47]

Nicomachus says that the "artistically contriving God"[48] used the decad as a pattern for the *cosmos,* since the decad "embraces in principle all things in itself."[49] His account is based on Platonic principles.[50] Just as the decad is made out of opposite elements (the monad and dyad), so is the *cosmos* made out of discordant elements, "sameness" and "otherness." The conflict between these warring elements accounts for change and imperfection in the world. God, on the other hand, is One and undivided and never suffers any change at all.

We can apply the Pythagorean notion of 10 as *cosmos* to the 10 + 1 book structure of the *Metamorphoses.* According to this interpretation, the first ten books represent the world or *cosmos,* while the eleventh book represents the transcendent god, over and above the world, to whom Isis leads the elect. Thus, Apuleius has used not only the overall bipartite structure of the novel, but also number symbology to express his fundamental Platonic dualism.

That Apuleius employed 11 as a significant number is confirmed by other evidence in the *Metamorphoses.* There are three striking instances where the number 11 occurs in connection with the goddess Isis, and in each case the connection appears significant.

[46] F. E. Robbins, in a very cautious assessment of the evidence, places Nicomachus' life "somewhere between the middle of the first century and the middle of the second century after Christ." In D'Ooge, Robbins, and Karpinski (note 45 above) 72.

[47] Cassiodorus, *de artibus ac disciplina liberalium litterarum,* Migne, *Patrologia Latina,* Vol. 70, p. 1208A–B; and Isidore of Seville, *Etymologiae,* Migne, *Patrologia Latina,* Vol. 82, p. 155.

[48] It is uncertain whether in Nicomachus' cosmogony the act of creation was performed by God himself or by a demiurgos, according to the Platonic scheme. See the discussion by F. E. Robbins in *Nicomachus of Gerasa: Introduction to Arithmetic* (note 45 above) 108 f. In any event, the highest God would transcend the world, whether he had actually put his own hands to the act of creation or not.

[49] Nicomachus, *Theologumena Arithmeticae,* p. 58 (Ast).

[50] These principles are stated most fully in *Intro. to Arith.,* II.17.1; 18.1 and 4; 19.1 and 20.2.

The first is the apotheosis of Isis at the beach at Cenchreae. The goddess addresses Lucius and says: "Lo, I am with you, Lucius, moved by your prayers, I who am the mother of the universe . . . ; my single godhead is adored by the whole world in varied forms, in differing rites and with many diverse names" (11.5). She then lists eleven names, the eleventh of which (the "true name") is "Isis." This catalogue of names clearly follows traditional forms of Isis worship, but it is unique in several ways, if we compare it to papyri and inscriptions containing similar lists. First, these other Aretalogies generally begin with a proclamation of the name "Isis": Εἶσις ἐγώ εἰμι, the other names following. But in Apuleius the name "Isis" climaxes a crescendo of ten names, thus standing in an emphatic position, which happens also to be the eleventh name in the series. Also striking is the fact that the Aretalogy in Apuleius' novel contains *only* eleven names, a number much lower than that found in traditional Aretalogies of Isis. To take one example: *POxy.* 1380, which strikingly resembles Apuleius' hymn in other respects, contains a list of more than fifty names of compared deities.[51] Since, then, Apuleius' catalogue of names diverges from traditional Aretalogies in these two important details, it seems clear that he chose precisely *eleven* names, not on the basis of tradition, but because of the number's symbolic value in the context of the novel.

The second striking list of eleven occurs later, in the description of the Isis procession (11.10–12). Lucius, still a donkey, here will receive from the head priest of Isis the roses that will make him human again. First, though, he enumerates and describes the various priests who make up the procession (and this is the only place in the *Metamorphoses* where Apuleius gives a list of ordinal numbers):

> PRIMUS: a priest with a golden boat-shaped lantern.
> SECUNDUS: a priest holding a sacrificial pot in each hand symbolizing the helping providence of the goddess.
> TERTIUS: one holding a palm-branch with gold leaves.
> QUARTUS: carrying the model of a left hand with the fingers stretched out, which is an emblem of justice. He also carries a golden vessel in the shape of a woman's breast, from which he pours libations of milk.
> QUINTUS: a priest carrying a golden winnowing-basket of laurel twigs.

Then came a man with a wine-jar. Then came the "gods who deign to walk with human feet." The god Anubis, with his dog-head, his face

[51] On traditional Isis Aretalogies, see J. Gwyn Griffiths, *Apuleius of Madauros. The Isis-Book* (*Met. Book* XI), edited with an introduction, translation, and commentary (Leiden 1975) 146–7.

black on one side, golden on the other. And so on. Finally comes the eleventh and final member of the series, the priest holding the crown of roses that is to be Lucius' salvation: "And behold! here come to me the promised blessings of the most helpful goddess and a priest approaches bringing with him my destiny and my very salvation." Here, as in the Aretalogy, the final and climactic member of the series is the eleventh. Surely this is more than mere coincidence. The fact that Apuleius employs ordinal numbers to begin the list suggests that he means to alert the reader that the number of participants in the procession is an important detail.

There is one more significant occurrence of the number 11 in the *Metamorphoses*. Lucius-donkey is sold four times. The first sale (to Philebus, the Syrian priest) is for 17 denarii. Lucius complains bitterly that blind Fortune has devised the sale as yet another means of torturing him: *sed illa fortuna mea saevissima, quam per tot regiones iam fugiens effugere vel praecedentibus malis placare non potui, rursum in me caecos detorsit oculos et emptorem aptissimum duris meis casibus mire repertum obiecit* (8.24–5). The second sale is to a miller for 24 denarii: *septemque nummis carius quam prius me comparaverat Philebus* (9.10). The miller is subsequently murdered through witchcraft at the instigation of his adulterous wife, and Lucius is afterwards sold with the estate. This is the third sale. The price is 50 denarii. On this occasion, Lucius comments: *tunc unum Larem varie dispergit venditionis incertae licentiosa fortuna* (9.31). "Wanton Fortune" scatters the one estate just as Typhon in the Egyptian myth scatters the parts of Osiris' body. The disintegrating power of Blind Fortune is still at work. The last time Lucius is sold, however, is different. His fortune begins to change for the better; and while in the possession of his new owners, two cooks, he begins to take on certain human characteristics (e.g., he begins to eat at table). This time the price is significant: 11 denarii. The number appears to indicate that Isis is beginning to work behind the scenes to save Lucius, since the events that lead up to his ultimate salvation are a direct consequence of this last sale. Even Lucius acknowledges that his fortune has begun to improve: *adsciscor itaque inter duos illos fratres tertius contubernalis, haud ullo tempore tam benivolam fortunam expertus* (10.13).

These three instances of the number 11 (two of them explicitly connected with Isis, the other associated with her by implication), if they do not provide incontrovertible proof, at least reinforce our speculations about the significance of the eleven-book structure of the

Metamorphoses. Our conclusion must be that the total number of books of Apuleius' novel, though completely unheard of in Latin literature, was explicitly chosen by the author in order to give symbolic expression to his Platonic dualism.

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THE ANCIENT ACCOUNTS OF THE BATTLE OF CUNAXA

In the spring of 401 B.C., Cyrus the Younger, accompanied by some 10,000 Greek mercenaries, set forth for the heart of Persia in high hopes of wresting the throne from his brother Artaxerxes II. A few months later he met his death on the battlefield of Cunaxa. Xenophon's description of the battle in the *Anabasis* is a famous one. But Xenophon was not the only Greek to write at first hand of these events. We know of two additional eyewitness reports, one by Sophaenetus, a fellow general of Xenophon on the retreat from Persia, the other by Ctesias, personal physician to Artaxerxes II. Does Xenophon's account deserve the criticisms that it has recently received?[1] What is known of Sophaenetus' report? Some have supposed this to have been an influential work.[2] How well informed are we about Ctesias' history at this point, and is Ctesias as reliable here as some have alleged?[3] Then there is the much later version of the battle in Diodorus. This differs in many details from that of Xenophon. How do the differences arise? What are the ultimate sources of Diodorus in this section of the *Bibliotheca?* Are those who accept details from Diodorus in preference to the information provided by Xenophon correct in doing so?[4]

[1] See especially G. Cawkwell, *Xenophon, The Persian Expedition* (Harmondsworth, Middlesex 1972) 19 ff. (henceforward Cawkwell).

[2] According to W. W. Tarn, *CAH* VI (Cambridge 1927) 8 (henceforward Tarn), it influenced Diodorus' account of Cunaxa; cf. V. Manfredi, "Proposte per una revisione itineraria . . . dell' *Anabasi* di Senofonte," *Aevum* 52 (1978) 63. Cawkwell (17 ff.) believes that it is behind Diodorus' version of the march from Cunaxa to the Hellespont, as does F. Schrömer, *Der Bericht des Sophainetos über den Zug der Zehntausend* (Diss. München 1954), which I have not seen.

[3] Cawkwell (39 f.) looks with favor on Ctesias' account of Cunaxa (cf. W. E. Higgins, *Xenophon the Athenian* [Albany 1977] 95). Recent bibliography on Ctesias is listed in my "Diodorus and Ctesias," *Phoenix* 34 (1980) 195–207. I have read only the German summary of K. Głombiowski, "Der Feldzug Kyros des Jungeren in der Beurteilung des Ktesias und Xenophon," (Polish) *Eos* 61 (1973) 5–31. What is known of Ctesias' stay in Persia and visit to Babylon, I discussed in *AJAH* 3 (1978) 32 f.

[4] Cf. Cawkwell (38 ff.) and Tarn (8 f.). Even J. K. Anderson, *Xenophon* (London 1974) 111 (hereinafter Anderson), seems tempted by some of the details. In contrast the following strongly favor Xenophon: J. Kromayer, *Antike Schlachtfelder* (Berlin 1924–31) IV 235 ff. (hereinafter Kromayer), an important discussion; R. Weynand, "Der Aufmarsch der Heere zur Schlacht bei Kunaxa," *Neue Jahrbuch für Antike und Deutsche Bildung* 4

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Our ancient authorities raise a series of perplexing questions. The answers which have been proposed by scholars conflict. Each account then must be reexamined. It is only when we know the value of the individual sources that we can begin to reconstruct what really happened.

Xenophon's Account

We begin with a brief review of the description of the battle in the *Anabasis* (1.8.1–1.10.19). Xenophon has given us a vivid account of how the Greek mercenaries, who formed the right wing of Cyrus' army, protected on the right by a small cavalry squadron and then by the river Euphrates, swept all opposition before them. However, for the remainder of Cyrus' army things went very differently. At the center, Cyrus himself lost his life in a reckless charge against his brother and against the enemy center. At the news of his death, the left wing, under its commander Ariaeus, broke and fled. The Greek mercenaries were victorious, but the cause was lost.

Xenophon's tale is a stirring one, but it contains innumerable problems. One of the most important of these concerns the relative size of the two armies; hence, first of all we must look at the numbers of fighting men on either side.

Xenophon can presumably be trusted on the number of Greek mercenaries in Cyrus' army. After all, he accompanied the Greek contingent as a friend of the general Proxenus (*Anab.* 3.1.4 ff.). However, like many of his fellow Greeks, he is very unreliable on the size of the oriental armies. Although he should have known the facts about Cyrus' Near Eastern forces, he surely seriously exaggerated when he claimed (1.7.10) that the non-Greek portion of Cyrus' army numbered some 100,000. To provision an army of that size during the march would have been a formidable task, quite apart from other considerations. Modern estimates are closer to 25,000.[5] Even more hopelessly exaggerated

(1941) 106–12, and the useful contribution of O. Lendle, "Der Bericht Xenophons über die Schlacht von Kunaxa," *Gymnasium* 73 (1966) 429–52 (hereinafter Lendle). For the role of the peltasts, see H. Gugel, "Die Aufstellung von Kyros' Heer in der Schlacht von Kunaxa," *Gymnasium* 78 (1971) 241–43.

[5] Anderson (99–100) suggests 20,000, Kromayer (234) circa 30,000, Lendle (436) 25,000–30,000. The text references to Xenophon are to the *Anabasis* except where otherwise specified.

is the size of the opposing force. According to Xenophon (1.7.12), a vast horde of 900,000 took the field with Artaxerxes. Modern scholars suggest instead a number of about 60,000.[6]

Xenophon's figures, implausible in themselves, entail other major difficulties. According to *Anabasis* 1.8.13 and 23, Artaxerxes' army so outnumbered that of Cyrus that Artaxerxes at the center of his forces was outside Cyrus' left. How then could Cyrus have ordered the Greeks who comprised his right wing to attack the enemy center (1.8.12)? They would have been required to march obliquely across the advance of the entire left wing of Artaxerxes' army, which is surely absurd.[7] Again, how could Cyrus have charged directly at Artaxerxes and the enemy center (1.8.24 ff.)? If, as has been stated, Artaxerxes was outside Cyrus' left, the distance between the two would have been considerable. It seems, in fact, as a number of scholars have suggested, that Xenophon has been led astray by his gross overestimation of the size of Artaxerxes' army. The king might well have been beyond the Greek left, but Xenophon must be wrong when he claims that he was outside Cyrus' entire left wing.[8]

Xenophon himself was present on the battlefield (1.8.15 ff.). It is not unreasonable to suppose that during the fighting he accompanied the Greek hoplite force at the side of his friend Proxenus.[9] Thus, he could have witnessed parts of the battle in person. For other details, however, he must have depended on the reports of others, who need not have been particularly reliable.[10] Moreover, there are large gaps in his account.

It would have been difficult for Xenophon to ascertain the facts, given the situation of the Greeks after the battle. Perhaps he was not able to discover the truth, or perhaps he did not trouble to inquire. At any rate, he has no detailed knowledge of the king's army. He is also ill-informed about the part played by Cyrus' non-Greek forces. He tells us nothing, for example, about the Paphlagonian cavalry, stationed on Cyrus' extreme right to protect the right flank of the Greek contingent

[6] 60,000 according to Anderson (100), 50,000–60,000 according to Kromayer (235).

[7] Cf. Lendle (441 ff.) and Kromayer (237).

[8] See Kromayer (236 ff.) and Lendle (440 f.).

[9] Lendle (435) comments on his probable position just before the battle began. Later on the Greek generals seem to have been outside the phalanx, not part of it (Anderson 109).

[10] Lendle (430) discusses possible informants. Xenophon also made some use of Ctesias (note 33 below).

(1.8.5), or about their performance when Artaxerxes' lieutenant Tissaphernes led his cavalry charge along the river bank (1.10.7).[11] More important, he knows virtually nothing about the left wing of Cyrus' army and its role.[12]

In short, this is a most unsatisfactory description of the battle. However, it is not necessarily inferior to any of our other accounts, to which we now must turn.

Sophaenetus and Ctesias

Of the two remaining eyewitness reports,[13] that of Sophaenetus will not detain us. Like Xenophon, Sophaenetus allegedly described Cyrus' march inland, the battle, and the return of the Greeks to the coast of the Black Sea. Some scholars have claimed that this was an influential work, but what do we really know of it?[14] It was apparently not known to Plutarch, who in his biography of Artaxerxes tells us a great deal about the fourth century accounts of Cunaxa. Our sole source of information, Stephanus of Byzantium, alludes to it fleetingly four times in connection with geographical names. Indeed, our knowledge of this account is so meager that one scholar even doubted whether Stephanus refers to a genuine work of Sophaenetus.[15]

[11] According to Lendle (444), when the Greeks advanced, the Paphlagonians would have made their way to Cyrus.

[12] Anderson (100 ff.) believes that for the last part of the journey Cyrus' army advanced in a single column, which according to his calculations would have extended for more than 20 miles. On this view Ariaeus and his men (the left wing) arrived too late for the battle. But it seems more likely that wherever possible Cyrus' army proceeded in several columns. Even so, according to Xenophon (1.8.14) the Greeks were still forming up just before the battle began.

[13] It is generally agreed that Themistogenes of Syracuse (Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.2) is Xenophon himself.

[14] For its supposed influence see note 2 above. The principal argument for the theory that Sophaenetus is Diodorus' ultimate source seems to be that since Diodorus' narrative makes no reference at all to Xenophon, except in a later and separate section (14.37.1 ff.), Ephorus (Diodorus' immediate source: see note 10 above) must be following an account in which Xenophon played a very minor role and this account could only be that of Sophaenetus. Such an argument assumes that neither Ephorus nor Diodorus abbreviated or otherwise adapted their sources, which is absurd. For a judicious review of the evidence for Sophaenetus, see F. Jacoby, *FGrHist* 2 D p. 349 f. (no. 109).

[15] E. Schwartz, as noted by A. von Mess, "Untersuchungen über Ephoros," *RhM* 61 (1906) 372, n. 3.

The situation is quite different with the report of our third eyewitness, Ctesias, which cannot be dismissed quite so lightly. Ctesias' 23-book history of Persia included a detailed description of Cyrus' expedition and of the battle. Photius in his epitome of Ctesias gives us a sketch of this part of the *Persica*.[16] In addition, a large amount of information from it is preserved by Plutarch in his *Artaxerxes*.[17] Chapters 11 through 19 of this biography obviously derive from Ctesias' account of the battle and of the events which immediately followed it. But much of the material for the first chapters also comes from Ctesias' history, which without any doubt Plutarch consulted in the original.[18] Ctesias was important to Plutarch at least in part because he was an eyewitness (cf. *Art.* 1.4 and 6.9). In this life Plutarch appears to accept the testimony of the eyewitness where he had no reason to believe it false.

Thanks to Photius and Plutarch we are thus quite well informed about what Ctesias said of the events of his lifetime, even though we do not possess the account in full. What then was the nature of this part of Ctesias' history? How reliable was he in general as a historian of his own times? The answers will be important for the assessment of his description of the battle, or what has been preserved of it. They will also be of significance for the assessment of Diodorus' account, which, as will be demonstrated, was heavily influenced by Ctesias' narrative.

In antiquity Ctesias was branded as a liar (cf. T 11), a reputation which has followed him as far as the twentieth century. Yet, despite this, some scholars accept details from his account of the contemporary period with hardly a trace of skepticism.[19] Are they justified in this?

It would of course be absurd to argue that Ctesias knew nothing at all about the events of his own lifetime and that he was invariably wrong. Occasionally he made a useful comment. It was Ctesias, for example, or so one can assume, who supplied the name Cunaxa for the village close to the battle site. Otherwise we would not know the name. He seems to have supplied too the information that it was 500 *stades*

[16] *FGrHist* 688 F 16.63 ff. For a brief discussion of this summary, see my "Ctesias' Account of the Revolt of Inarus," *Phoenix* 30 (1976) 2 ff.

[17] There are also the useful citations by Demetrius (F 24) and Apsines (F 25).

[18] In the first part of the biography, Plutarch also makes some use of Xenophon and of the *Persica* of Deinon. In the later chapters the main sources are Deinon and the *Persica* of Heracleides of Cyme. For the full source analysis, see P. Krumbholz, *De Ctesia aliisque auctoribus in Plutarchi Artaxerxis vita adhibitis* (Eisenach 1889).

[19] T. S. Brown, *The Greek Historians* (Lexington, Mass. 1973) 77–86, has too high an opinion of Ctesias, and even D. M. Lewis, *Sparta and Persia* (Leiden 1977), is too trusting.

from Babylon (Plut. *Art.* 8.2 = F 18) and quite possibly he was correct.[20] However, we should also bear in mind that Plutarch, despite his extensive use of Ctesias, had major reservations about his work.

According to Plutarch, the account showed marked bias in favor of Sparta and the Spartan officer Clearchus (*Art.* 13.7 = T 7 b).[21] Certainly Ctesias' adulation of Clearchus, from whom he seems to have acquired a considerable amount of information, is very striking.[22] In Ctesias it was apparently Clearchus alone who strove to dissuade Cyrus from risking his life in the battle (*Art.* 8.2 = F 18; cf. Photius' words at F 16.64: καὶ θάνατος Κύρου ἀπειθοῦντος Κλεάρχῳ).[23] In Xenophon (1.7.9), a number of the Greeks made the attempt. Then there is Ctesias' fantastic tale, on which Plutarch pours such scorn, that it was the queen mother's desire to avenge the death of Clearchus that occasioned her plot to poison Artaxerxes' queen (*Art.* 18.6 = F 28). But even Plutarch may have been led astray by details.

According to our other literary sources, Sparta, in response to Cyrus' request for aid, sent some hoplites with the Spartan Cheirisophus and also a small naval contingent.[24] In Plutarch (*Art.* 6.5), however, where there is no reference to Cheirisophus or to any other commander, Sparta's official emissary is Clearchus, a detail which can hardly be true.[25] Xenophon tells us quite clearly that Clearchus was a refugee from Spartan justice (1.1.9, 2.6.2–4), even though as a friend of Clearchus,

[20] On the difficult question of location, see most recently R. D. Barnett, "Xenophon and the Wall of Media," *JHS* 83 (1963) 16, who argues for Nuseffiat, about 80 km north of Babylon.

[21] For the problem of how much pro-Spartan bias there was in Ctesias' account of the Persian Wars see J. M. Bigwood, "Ctesias as Historian of the Persian Wars," *Phoenix* 32 (1978) 29 ff.

[22] Note the account of the rivalry between Clearchus and his fellow-general Meno and the emphasis on Clearchus' importance to Cyrus (F 16.63), as well as the very negative picture of Meno (below p. 356).

[23] Cf. Polyaen. 2.2.3 (presumably from Ctesias) and von Mess (note 15 above) 385 f. Plutarch's severe criticism of Clearchus for his conduct in the battle (*Art.* 8.3 ff.) may have been inspired by some apology in Ctesias.

[24] According to Xenophon 1.4.2–3, 700 hoplites were sent and 35 ships under Pythagoras: cf. *Hell.* 3.1.1, where the admiral is called Samius. In Diod. 14.19.4–5 there are 800 hoplites and 25 ships under Samus. For the admiral's name, which probably should be Samius, see P. Poralla, *Prosopographie der Lakedaimonier* (Breslau 1913) 112.

[25] It is often accepted—e.g., by E. Meyer, *Geschichte des Altertums* V, 2nd ed. (1913) 185: cf. Lenschau "Klearchos," 3 *RE* 11 (1921) 576. Naturally Isocrates' statements about Clearchus (8.98, 12.104) are rhetoric and not history (note his remarkable claim in 5.97 that Clearchus had no experience as a commander before Cyrus' expedition). But Sparta may well have acquiesced in Clearchus' recruiting in the Chersonese (Xen. 2.6.5: cf. 1.1.9).

he has seriously distorted the facts about Clearchus' career (2.6.2–4).[26] Plutarch's information, it is not unreasonable to suppose, derives from an author who had an even stronger desire to glorify Clearchus and to obscure the truth—from Ctesias.[27]

But Plutarch has other major criticisms of Ctesias which we should do well to remember. For one thing he assails him, with ample justification, for the amount of space which he devoted to his own activities (*Art.* 13.7 = T 7 b). There was clearly a very important autobiographical element in this history, whether Ctesias was laboring to defend himself for failing to help the imprisoned Clearchus to commit suicide (*Art.* 18.1 ff. = F 28), or whether he was dilating on his role in the later negotiations of Artaxerxes, Evagoras in Cyprus, and the Athenian Conon (F 30). But Plutarch goes further and accuses Ctesias of outright fabrication over the claim that he was one of the ambassadors sent with Phalinus to the Greeks after the battle (*Art.* 13.5–6 = F 23). Again Plutarch must be correct. Xenophon surely would have commented if Ctesias had been part of this embassy.[28]

But Plutarch has yet another criticism of Ctesias. In several passages he draws attention to Ctesias' love of the sensational,[29] and quite rightly, for this was certainly a substantial ingredient of the original narrative. The lingering scene in which Cyrus' mother received news of Cyrus' death, which we know in part from Demetrius (F 24) and from Apsines (F 25), would have been heartrending. Pages must have been filled with lurid tales of torture, some of which are reproduced in all their grim detail by Plutarch.[30] Drama of all kinds abounded in the later books of this history as well as in the earlier ones.[31]

Clearly, as far as the contemporary period in general is concerned, Ctesias had preoccupations other than with the truth. But what of his description of the battle, insofar as it is known? Ctesias, after all, as a resident of the court, had excellent opportunities (none better) for acquiring a detailed and accurate knowledge of the king's forces before

[26] Cf. H. W. Parke, "The Development of the Second Spartan Empire," *JHS* 50 (1930) 57, and Diod. 14.12.3–9.

[27] Other details in this chapter could also derive from Ctesias. Jacoby prints 6.6–9 under Deinon 690 F 15 a). But only the reference to the queen mother's plot and Deinon's assertion that it was carried out during the war need come from Deinon.

[28] For Xenophon's allusions to Ctesias, see p. 347.

[29] *Art.* 1.4, 6.9 = T 11 d) & e); cf. *Art.* 18.6 = F 28.

[30] Cf. *Art.* 14.4, 14.10, 16.2, 17.7 = F 26; *Art.* 19.9 = F 29 b).

[31] For this aspect of his history, cf. Bigwood (note 16 above) 21 and Bigwood (note 21 above) 25.

the fight began. He was also possibly in the king's immediate entourage from the beginning of the actual battle, or so he seems to have claimed (*Art.* 11.3 = F 20).

Ctesias' account obviously differed greatly from that of Xenophon.[32] Take, for example, the duel between Artaxerxes and Cyrus and the death of Cyrus. According to Ctesias' protracted tale, the king was wounded by Cyrus and forced to retire to a hill in the vicinity. Cyrus was carried far into the midst of the foe and met his death much later (*Art.* 11.1 ff. = F 20). In Xenophon, who could not of course have personally witnessed these scenes, Cyrus fell in the course of the struggle with Artaxerxes. The king, though wounded, remained in charge on the battlefield. Xenophon, who knew Ctesias' history and in his battle description refers to him a couple of times by name (1.8.26, 27 = F 21), has in fact rejected almost all of Ctesias' story of these events.[33] Even Plutarch, reproducing (in much shortened form, he is careful to state) the tale of Cyrus, carried forward in the darkness and wounded once and then a second time (*Art.* 11.1 ff. = F 20), heaps ridicule upon it. "Such is the story of Ctesias, in which . . . as if with a blunt sword he finishes the man off," is his final biting comment (*Art.* 11.11 = F 21).[34]

There are certainly details in this account that we cannot accept. Ctesias' total of 400,000 for Artaxerxes' army (*Art.*13.3 = F 22), although much more modest than the 900,000 of Xenophon, is still absurd. The force is likely to have numbered, as we saw, only about 60,000.[35]

Other items besides the statistics arouse grave suspicion. Ctesias, for example, placed Cyrus' trusted friend Ariaeus at Cyrus' side (*Art.* 11.1 = F 20), but this must be incorrect. In Xenophon (1.8.5, 1.9.31) he is, as we saw, the commander of Cyrus' left wing, as he is in Diodorus (14.24.1).[36] Surely Xenophon is not in error here. And what of the last events of Cyrus' life? Ctesias could not have witnessed these, if Cyrus had really been borne in the darkness into the middle of the foe. A great deal could be fantasy, whether his own or that of his informants.

[32] Cf. Photius' comment (T 8) that Ctesias' history in general was sometimes at variance with that of Xenophon.

[33] He appears to make some use of Ctesias for details (e.g., possibly for the arrest and release of Cyrus in 1.1.3 and for the death of Artagerses in 1.8.24). But it is hard to see how often; cf. Jacoby "Ktesias," *RE* 11 (1922) 2067. He clearly distrusted much.

[34] It should be noted that Plutarch omits the fine scene where the queen mother learns of the death of her son (F 24, F 25).

[35] For Ctesias' estimate of Artaxerxes' losses, see note 49 below.

[36] In Diodorus he is called Aridaeus.

Some of the statements concerning Artaxerxes can likewise be doubted. Even if we accept that Ctesias was with the king, it is at least legitimate to wonder whether the king received a wound of any significance,[37] and whether he was forced at that point in the fray to retire from the field to a nearby hill. Of course, there is no doubt a kernel of truth in all this. The hill may well have existed,[38] and the king may have withdrawn there at some phase in the contest. As for Artaxerxes' wound, when Xenophon refers to it (1.8.26), he cites Ctesias, as if wishing to divest himself of all responsibility.[39] And even in Ctesias, eager as he is to extract the utmost pathos from Artaxerxes' situation (cf. *Art.* 12.4 = F 21), the king's behavior seems inconsistent with serious injury. On the news of Cyrus' death he leaves his position in order to inspect the body. Then brandishing the head which had been cut off (a gruesome detail of the kind Ctesias loves), he rallies his supporters (*Art.* 13.1–2 = F 21). Ctesias, we recall, went to considerable lengths in his history to magnify his own role in events (above p. 346 f.). It would suit his purposes admirably to exaggerate any trivial wound which Artaxerxes received and his part in treating it.

The conclusion that must be drawn from our discussion of Ctesias' narrative is obvious. This is not a description of the battle in which careful attention has been paid to the facts. It is a sensationalist's account, and some of the information is plainly wrong. Surely we should not search here for details which can be used to correct Xenophon's narrative.

The Sources of Diodorus' Version

We have looked at least in a preliminary fashion at our three eyewitness accounts—those of Sophaenetus and Ctesias, as well as the more famous one of Xenophon—and we have seen some of the problems they raise. It is now time to turn to Diodorus in the first century B.C.

[37] Cawkwell (39) believes it to have been "a bloody and disabling" wound. Ctesias' successor Deinon, who seems to have striven to outdo Ctesias wherever he could while at the same time making extensive use of him (see Jacoby [note 33 above] 2069), also rejected Ctesias' account of the duel. According to Deinon (*Art.* 10.1 ff. = 690 F 17), the brothers charged at each other three times and Artaxerxes apparently did not receive a wound. In Justinus 5.11.9 we have yet another version.

[38] Cf. the hill in Xenophon 1.10.12 ff.

[39] He refers to Ctesias also for the number killed in Artaxerxes' entourage (without quoting it), as if he disbelieved him (1.8.27).

But before we embark on his description of the battle, we must first deal with the question of the source or sources of the *Bibliotheca* at this point. Diodorus' version of Cyrus' expedition, of the battle, and of the Greek return (14.19.2 ff.), a much briefer account of course than that of Xenophon, is often at variance with Xenophon's narrative, and particularly with regard to the events prior to Cyrus' death. How do we explain these differences? From which authors did Diodorus get his facts? The questions are crucial to the proper evaluation of the account and are ones on which there has been some disagreement.

Of course, the immediate source poses no problem. There has been general agreement that this portion of Diodorus' *Bibliotheca* derives from the historian Ephorus, who is in fact cited at 14.22.2.[40] But from where did Ephorus acquire his information?

It has often been claimed that the most likely origin for a narrative which frequently contradicted Xenophon is the account written by Sophaenetus[41]—a desperate hypothesis given that, as we saw, virtually nothing is known of Sophaenetus' work. In fact, if the versions of Xenophon and Diodorus are compared in detail, it will become obvious that Ephorus derived much from a reading of Xenophon and that, despite the differences between the two, Xenophon was indeed his chief authority.[42] However, it is also clear that Ephorus had, in addition, at least one other major source, and some details strongly suggest that this author was Ctesias, whose account, as we have seen, was often at variance with that of Xenophon.

It is significant that in Diodorus the ruler of the Cilicians plays a double game, sending one son with troops to Cyrus, the other to Artaxerxes, to assure the king of his fidelity to the king's cause (20.3).[43] This is not part of Xenophon's account. However, it does remind one

[40] Cf. E. Schwartz, "Diodoros," *RE* 5 (1903) 679. The text references to Diodorus in the following pages are to book 14, except where otherwise specified.

[41] See notes 2 and 14 above.

[42] This is clearly demonstrated by von Mess (note 15 above) 360 ff.; cf. Jacoby (note 14 above) 349 f. It is denied by Bux, "Sophainetos," *RE* 3A (1927) 1008–13, and by Higgins (note 3 above) 93 f. Verbal reminiscences of Xenophon occur throughout, especially in the Katabasis (see von Mess). One or two of the Xenophontean words used here occur nowhere else in the *Bibliotheca:* e.g. φαρμακοποσία 30.2, cf. Xen. 4.8.21; ἐναγκυλοῦντες 27.6, cf. ἐναγκυλῶντες Xen. 4.2.28; and in the account of the battle (23.2), παλτόν (a light Persian spear), a term of which Xenophon is fond (see F. W. Sturz, *Lexicon Xenophonteum* [Leipzig 1803]), but which is otherwise rather uncommon.

[43] Not an implausible story; cf. H. Bengston, *Kleine Schriften* (München 1974) 105 f.

of Ctesias' tale—Συέννεσις, ὁ Κιλίκων βασιλεὺς, ἄμφω συνεμάχει Κύρῳ τε καὶ Ἀρτοξέρξῃ—as Photius reports (F 16.63).

In a later section (26.4), Diodorus states that after the battle the king led his army to Babylon and there rewarded those who had shown courage in the fight. Again, these are not details found in Xenophon. However, we know that Ctesias described the king as proceeding to Babylon from Cunaxa (F 27.69; cf. F 16.66) and that he discussed the rewards meted out to the deserving, which included Ctesias himself, as well as the punishments awarded to those guilty of wrongdoing (*Art.* 14.1 ff. = F 26, 16.67).

Diodorus in fact, as is noteworthy, provides a good deal of information about Artaxerxes' forces and about events on the king's side which we do not find in Xenophon. The authority here is not likely to have been Sophaenetus, one of Cyrus' Greek mercenaries, but a man like Ctesias, someone in the king's entourage. Finally there is the size that Diodorus, citing Ephorus (cf. p. 349 above), gives for Artaxerxes' army (22.2). This is Ctesias' figure (*Art.* 13.3 = F 22), not that of Xenophon, and it gives confirmation that Ctesias is indeed one of Ephorus' sources.

Where then Ephorus has corrected Xenophon's account of Cyrus' march, the battle, and the immediately succeeding events, he seems in many cases to be following Ctesias, and Ctesias, it can reasonably be maintained, has thus made a substantial contribution to the version of Ephorus and hence to what we find in Diodorus.[44] But Ctesias' concerns, according to our earlier discussion, were very far from being centered on the truth. This does not augur well for the accuracy of Diodorus' narrative. However, we must now proceed to the detailed analysis of what Diodorus has to relate.[45]

[44] Discussed by von Mess (note 15 above) 360 ff.; for the influence of Ctesias on earlier portions of Ephorus' history, see Bigwood (note 16 above) 5 f. Anderson (83, 110 ff.), noting the large role of Tissaphernes in Diodorus' battle, suggests that the ultimate source might be Phalinus, the military expert in service with Tissaphernes (Xen. 2.1.7 ff.), but this seems unlikely. Unfortunately, we cannot clearly distinguish between what Ephorus wrote and what Diodorus reports, although the battle, with its conventional patterns of action and stock phrases, is very typical of Diodorus (see below p. 352 f.).

[45] Some of the details in Diodorus' account of the march to Babylon are clearly wrong, whatever the source of the error. Meno, for example, whom Xenophon describes merely as Thessalian, did not come from Larisa, as Diod. 19.8 claims (followed by J. Hofstetter, *Die Griechen in Persien* [Berlin 1978] 128, among others). He is surely a member of one of the most prominent families of Pharsalus; cf. Diog. Laert. 2.6.50, and for the family, J. A. O. Larsen, *Greek Federal States* (Oxford 1968) 22, and Y. Béquignon,

Diodorus' Account of the Battle

First let us consider the problem which was one of the principal difficulties of Xenophon's description, the size of the respective armies. Is Diodorus better informed than Xenophon in this regard? As we have just seen, Artaxerxes' army at 400,000 has the size attributed to it by Ctesias—a less exaggerated total than the 900,000 of Xenophon but nonetheless much too high.[46] Other figures differ from those in Xenophon but are also implausible, whatever their source. Cyrus' orientals, for example, number 70,000 (19.7).[47] This is a smaller figure than the 100,000 of Xenophon (1.7.10), but it is still too large. Moreover, when we include the Ten Thousand Greeks, Cyrus' army is thus one-fifth the size of that of Artaxerxes. We may compare Cyrus' escort, which at 10,000 is one-fifth of the 50,000 who accompany the king (22.6–7),[48] or the casualties on Cyrus' side which number 3,000, when Artaxerxes' losses of 15,000 were five times as high (24.5–6).[49] Schematic figures such as these do little to inspire confidence.[50]

"Pharsalos," *RE* Suppl. 12 (1970) 1054 ff. The substitution of Pharnabazus for Tissaphernes at 22.1 is clearly the work of Ephorus not Diodorus: see Jacoby *FGrHist* II C p. 97 (on 70 F 208).

[46] Cf. notes 2 and 8 above. Deinon, who may have made use of Xenophon here, also gave a very high figure (*Art.* 13.3 = 690 F 16; on Deinon see note 37 above).

The description of Artaxerxes' trench in Diodorus may also have been influenced by Ctesias. In Xenophon (1.7.14–15) we have a defensive ditch 5 *orguiai* wide (c. 30 ft.), 3 *orguiai* deep (c. 18 ft.), and some 12 *parasangs* long (c. 360 *stades;* for the length of the *parasang,* see Becher "Parasanges," *RE* 18 [1949] 1375). Diodorus' trench is no less than 60 feet wide (22.4; for the textual problem which makes the rest of the description uncertain, see Vogel's apparatus). There may be a confusion of Diodorus here, for he apparently associates the ditch very closely with Artaxerxes' camp (22.3). However, the 60 feet, which seem much too great for a camp, perhaps derive from Ctesias. Plutarch (*Art.* 7.2), we should note, who may be following Ctesias at this point, has a trench which is 10 *orguiai* wide or about 60 feet (the depth of 10 *orguiai* is possibly an error of Plutarch).

[47] This includes 3,000 cavalry, a figure which Kromayer (233) is inclined to accept.

[48] Before Cyrus there were also 1,000 cavalry.

[49] This last figure is approximately the midpoint between the 9,000 which Ctesias says was officially reported to Artaxerxes and Ctesias' own estimate of 20,000 (*Art.* 13.4 = F 22), a figure which inspires little confidence in the reliability of Ctesias' statistics. Xenophon does not give the losses for the two armies. He merely states (1.8.20) that no Greeks were killed (cf. Diod. 24.6).

[50] For the ratio of one to five, cf. Salamis (Diod. 11.19.3), where the Greeks lose 40 ships, the Persians more than 200 (apart from those captured with their crews); Plataea (Diod. 11.30.1), where the Greeks number about 10 myriads, the Persians about 50 myriads, and where the Greeks kill more than 10 myriads of the barbarians (Diod. 11.32.5).

From statistics we turn to the battle itself. Like Xenophon, Diodorus devotes much space to the glorious role played by the Greek mercenaries on Cyrus' right, as occasions no surprise.[51] But what is striking is the emphasis placed on Clearchus' part in the events. Clearchus' name occurs repeatedly in the description of the battle, when no other Greek general is mentioned. In fact, in Diodorus he becomes the commander-in-chief of the Greek mercenary forces (see, e.g., 22.5), although officially he held no such position.[52] We should also note his careful organization of the Greek advance (23.1). The Greeks are to proceed at a moderate pace, then break into a run when they are within range of enemy missiles (in Xenophon the quickened pace of the Greeks is unplanned, 1.8.18). We can legitimately be skeptical of Diodorus' narrative here. It sounds too much as if the partiality for Clearchus which we saw in Ctesias' history (p. 345 f. above) has played a role.

But Diodorus' account deserves attention not just because it has obviously been influenced by Ctesias, but also because in some ways it is such a conventional contest.[53] The Greek charge leads to hand-to-hand

[51] Diodorus also singles out the Lacedaemonians for praise at 23.3 (cf. 22.5, 24.5), which distorts the facts. Although we do not know exactly how many Lacedaemonians participated in the expedition, it is certain that they comprised only a small number (J. Roy, "The Mercenaries of Cyrus," *Historia* 16 [1967] 307 f.). This is perhaps a confusion of Diodorus. Or has the pro-Spartan bias of Ctesias' narrative (above p. 345 f.) played a role?

[52] The name occurs at 22.5, 23.1, 24.2, 24.4, 24.5. It is clear from Xenophon that he was only informally the leader; see Roy (note 51 above) 292 f. Diodorus also exaggerates when he implies at 19.8 that Clearchus commanded all the Peloponnesian troops (on the nationality of the various contingents see Roy, 296 ff.). And he is weak altogether on the identity and the exact role of the commanding officers. His list of the generals at 19.8 is incomplete. At 22.5 he has an unknown Sophilus, though perhaps this is a simple error for Sophaenetus. The statements that Xenophon was elected commander for the campaign against the Thracians (37.1), and that Cheirisophus was made commander-in-chief after the capture of Clearchus and his colleagues (27.1), must be simplifications or errors (Roy, 294 f.), even though the latter is often accepted.

[53] The remarks in 23.4 on the superiority of the Greek forces are not likely to be from Ctesias. Moreover, some units of the Persian army did in fact carry large shields (for Persian equipment of this period, see P. A. Rahe, "The Military Situation in Western Asia on the Eve of Cunaxa," *AJP* 101 [1980] 80 ff.). And Diodorus does not note here that Artaxerxes' strength was in his cavalry. However, when Diodorus comments on the small shields of the barbarians (cf. his account of Thermopylae in 11.7.2–3) and their light arms, he is on the whole correct. For the expression "Peloponnesiakos polemos," which is presumably Diodorus' own term, see G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, *The Origins of the Peloponnesian War* (London 1972) 294–5. It does not seem to occur before the first century B.C.

fighting; finally the Greeks rout the foe—with considerable slaughter (καὶ πολλοὺς . . . ἀνῄρουν, 23.4), adds Diodorus, using one of his favorite formulae and one which appears a number of times in the description of this battle alone.[54] The part ascribed to the Greeks later in the hostilities is remarkably similar. After the death of Cyrus and after Artaxerxes' forces have plundered Cyrus' baggage train, Greeks and Orientals face each other once more. Again we have fighting at close quarters, and again the Greeks put the barbarians to flight with considerable slaughter (24.4). Surely we cannot prefer these details to the report of Xenophon that on both occasions the barbarians broke and fled without any fighting (1.8.19, 1.10.11). They are reminiscent of a rhetorical exercise rather than any battle which actually took place.[55]

There is also a stereotyped ring to Diodorus' report of the stout resistance of the commander Aridaeus (i.e., Ariaeus) on Cyrus' left wing before he eventually fled (24.1).[56] In Xenophon nothing is said about participation of the left wing or Ariaeus in the fighting (1.10.1). Is then Diodorus' claim to be believed? Diodorus, it is well known, is exceptionally fond of the unexpected and of changes of fortune. He does not necessarily include words signifying "sudden," "unanticipated," or "reversal of fortune," but it is quite evident that he likes to construct his battles around reversals of situation.[57] Ariaeus' behavior may well be a stereotyped pattern which has been imposed on the real contest.[58]

In Diodorus' version of the battle so far we have noted formulae that mislead and questionable items that derive from Ctesias' history, but we have seen singularly little evidence that where he differs from

[54] Cf. also 23.6, 23.7, 24.4 (the formula uses either the finite verb or the participle). πολλοὺς ἀνελών is noted as one of Diodorus' clichés by C. Vial in her comments on stereotyped phraseology in the battle accounts of Diodorus, *Diodore* XV (Paris 1977) xxii.

[55] We do not know what Ctesias said about the Greek part in the battle.

[56] Kromayer (236) notes those who accept Diodorus' statement. According to Xenophon 2.2.14, Ariaeus received a wound at some point, but we do not know when. Has Ephorus attempted to find an occasion for it?

[57] See Vial (note 54 above) xxi. Moreover, as Vial has also indicated (xx), a large number of Diodorus' battles follow a pattern in which the contest is indecisive or goes badly for the eventual victor until the death of the leader of the opposing side, or until the personal intervention of the general who will be victorious. We have the same schema here, the turning point being the death of Cyrus, upon which Artaxerxes' men gain confidence (23.7).

[58] Cf. Cyrus' success before he is mortally wounded (23.7) and that of Tissaphernes, who retrieves the reverse incurred when the king is wounded (23.6).

Xenophon he has any reliable information to contribute. However, it was at the center that the decisive events took place, for Artaxerxes and Cyrus were stationed in the middle of their respective battle lines. We return once more to the duel between the two brothers and to the death of Cyrus.

Xenophon's tale, we recall, was that Cyrus fell in the course of the contest with Artaxerxes, and that Artaxerxes, although wounded, remained in command on the battlefield (1.8.24 ff.). At a later point he was joined by Tissaphernes, who initially had been in charge of the king's left wing, or so Xenophon was told, and at the beginning of the battle had led an unsuccessful cavalry charge along the bank of the Euphrates.

Diodorus' account (23.6 ff.) is totally at variance with this. In Diodorus the king was wounded and removed from the fray.[59] His place was taken by Tissaphernes, who must already have been at his side.[60] In the meantime Cyrus, elated with success, charged into the midst of the foe. Later, after much slaughter he was mortally wounded by an ordinary Persian soldier.

A number of scholars have been tempted by these details or by some of them.[61] But how many can we trust? The account of the death of Cyrus is obviously a version, although an extremely abbreviated version, of Ctesias' extravagant tale,[62] as is what is said of the king's wound and of the king's departure from the battlefield. Ephorus, without accepting everything, has clearly made extensive use of Ctesias' narrative, and we may note a further detail. In Diodorus night has already fallen when the Greeks face the barbarians for the second time (24.3), which contradicts Xenophon's statement (1.10.15) that by sunset all was over, including the second repulse of Artaxerxes' forces by the Greeks. We are reminded of the darkness which enveloped Cyrus in Ctesias' narrative (*Art.* 11.3 = F 20), a fine dramatic touch, and the darkness which had to be dispelled by torchlight when the king was being escorted to view Cyrus' body (*Art.* 13.1 = F 21). Here once again

[59] The allusion to Eteocles and Polyneices (23.5) is probably an addition of Ephorus (or Diodorus) to his source.

[60] A number of the expressions which describe Tissaphernes' activities here are clichés frequent in Diodorus; for λαμπρῶς ἠγωνίζετο see Vial (note 54 above) xxii; for πολλοὺς ἀνῄρει cf. note 54 above; Diodorus is also fond of μετὰ τῶν ἐπιλέκτων.

[61] See note 4 above.

[62] Note that Plutarch describes Cyrus as elated by his victory and as being wounded by the young Persian Mithridates (*Art.* 11.4–5 = F 20).

Ephorus seems to have added color to his narrative by borrowing from Ctesias.[63]

If we reject, as we must, most of Ctesias' tale, we must also reject those details in Diodorus which derive from Ctesias, such as the manner of Cyrus' end, Artaxerxes' departure from the battlefield, and the fighting by night. We must reject too one final item which several historians have been ready to accept, namely the role ascribed to Tissaphernes, who is apparently from the beginning of the contest at Artaxerxes' side and ready to take over the command (23.6). We cannot be certain of the source for this, but surely this one detail cannot be deemed to be above suspicion in an account where so much else is questionable. Quite possibly here too we have a borrowing from Ctesias. He was wrong about the position of Ariaeus. He might equally well have been wrong about the position of Tissaphernes.[64]

To conclude, Xenophon's description of the battle has serious deficiencies, but we have nothing better to put in its place.[65] The report of Sophaenetus is virtually unknown, while the account of our third eyewitness Ctesias is certainly no improvement over that of Xenophon (rather the reverse). As for Diodorus' version, some of the details arouse suspicion because they conform to the stereotyped patterns so typical of Diodorus' battles. Others are suspect because they originate in an

[63] For the Greeks, fighting normally ceases at nightfall: W. K. Pritchett, *Greek Military Practices* II (Berkeley, Los Angeles 1974) 162 ff. However, Ephorus appears to have been very fond of night battles: see G. L. Barber, *The Historian Ephorus* (Cambridge 1935) 141 f. One may also wonder whether the Greeks would have returned to the battlefield in this very hostile territory and at night in order to erect a trophy, as Diodorus claims (24.4). This is not corroborated by Xenophon, who frequently, though not invariably, records the erection of a trophy after an engagement (Pritchett, II 271).

[64] The fact that neither Photius nor Plutarch mentions Tissaphernes in what they reproduce of Ctesias' account of the actual battle does not mean that he played no role. He was a very important figure in Ctesias' narrative. For his part in the capture of the Greek generals, see F 27.68 and p. 356 below. The queen mother's reference to him in F 24 (Demetrius) should also be noted. After the battle he was amply rewarded according to Diodorus 26.4, a detail which probably derives from Ctesias (cf. p. 350 above) and which is no doubt historically correct. But Diodorus' statement that he was given Artaxerxes' daughter in marriage is perhaps due to a misreading or misremembering of Xenophon 2.4.8.

[65] I am very grateful to Professors J. R. Grant and C. R. Rubincam for their comments on an earlier draft of this article and to the latter also for very generously lending me her computer-generated concordance to Diodorus (revised edition), which supplied information for notes 42 and 60.

untrustworthy authority. The bias in favor of the Spartan commander Clearchus suggests the prejudices of Ctesias. Much of the rest of the information where it is irreconcilable with Xenophon's report clearly derives from unreliable data in Ctesias. In short, if we wish to reconstruct what happened at the battle of Cunaxa, we would do well to concentrate on the account of Xenophon. Sophaenetus, Ctesias, and Diodorus have remarkably little that is useful to offer us.

The Greek Generals after the Battle

Xenophon's account of how the Greek generals fell into Persian hands after the battle has also been criticized. Cawkwell has argued (24 ff.) that it was not Tissaphernes' perfidy which led the generals into a trap, but the treachery of the Greeks. Xenophon, he claims, has tried to obscure Clearchus' perfidious designs and the fact that they were denounced not just by his arch-rival Meno, but also by Xenophon's friend Proxenus.

Now, Xenophon is certainly not a wholly unprejudiced authority. His hostility to Meno is notorious, and he is clearly and understandably far from sympathetic to Tissaphernes. We have also seen (p. 345 above) that, when it suits him, he can distort the facts in favor of Clearchus. However, Cawkwell has not proved his case. Our sole piece of evidence that Proxenus as well as Meno laid an accusation against Clearchus is a statement to that effect attributed to Ariaeus (2.5.38)—hardly reliable testimony in view of the obvious falsity of a second claim in this one short speech of Ariaeus, namely that Clearchus was already dead. Moreover, the fragments of Ctesias lend Cawkwell no support, despite his claim that they do (129, n. 9). Ctesias' story (F 27.68) in the main was similar to that of Xenophon. Ctesias emphasized Tissaphernes' treachery and that of Meno. In fact, at one point he exhibited an even greater animosity toward Meno than does Xenophon. Clearchus insisted, according to Xenophon (2.5.27 ff.), that the generals attend Tissaphernes' conference. In Ctesias (F 27.68), whose source was presumably Clearchus himself, Clearchus saw through the plot, but the majority, deceived by Meno, forced him to attend.

Again, Xenophon, for all his hostility to Meno, was possibly not wrong when he claimed (2.6.29) that Meno was tortured and put to death a year after his colleagues (Cawkwell 135 has suggested that this

too is false). According to Ctesias' tale (F 27.69), Meno was initially spared (cf. Diod. 14.27.2). However, there might have been a sequel to this story in Ctesias.

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ON THE PROGRAMMATIC FORMULA ΠΡΩΤΟΝ ΑΠΟ ΤΩΝ ΠΡΩΤΩΝ IN ARISTOTLE

There are several passages in which Aristotle begins a treatise or subtreatise with a proposition that he explicitly calls an ἀρχή.[1] A first example is at the beginning of *EN* VII.1:

> μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα λεκτέον, ἄλλην ποιησαμένους ἀρχήν, ὅτι τῶν περὶ τὰ ἤθη φευκτῶν τρία ἐστὶν εἴδη, κακία ἀκρασία θηριότης

Aristotle had heretofore divided virtue into two types in the *EN*, ethical and dianeotic (cf. VI.1–2); but now he makes a new beginning with the proposition that ethical φευκτά are of three kinds. This is new since the treatment of ethical virtue in the earlier books had envisaged only κακία as the φευκτόν in the ethical sphere.[2] By adding two new categories of φευκτά, Aristotle can introduce a treatment of ἀκρασία, which had to be postponed until the dianoetic virtues, with which ἀκρασία is involved, had been treated in Bk. VI. This new division of φευκτά is called an ἀρχή, but it is not the premise of a demonstrative syllogism so much as it is a means of broaching a new subject matter.

The parallel passage in the *Magna Moralia* (II.4.1200a36–b6) introduces the new division less abruptly. It opens by announcing the new topic, ἐγκρατεία and ἀκρασία, and then says that just as these are strange types of virtue and vice, so the account of them will be strange. For in other types of virtue, λόγος and πάθος strive for the same things, but here they fight with each other. Only then does the author introduce

[1] ἀρχή may here mean the *act* of starting only (ὅτι going only with λεκτέον) as Bonitz thought (cf. *Index* 424b56, where read "1145a15" in place of the misprint, "1145b15"): for this sense of ἀρχή, cf. *Phys.* 260a20, *Pol.* 1260b22–4. But it can also in contexts like this mean the starting *postulate* itself: cf. *GC* 326b29–30, ἀρχὴν τὴν πολλάκις εἰρημένην; *Meteor.* 345b30–2, τὴν *ὑποκειμένην* ἀρχήν. If the latter is its meaning here, ὅτι goes either with both λεκτέον and ἀρχήν or it goes with ἀρχήν only (for λέγειν can be used absolutely, in programmatic passages, to mean "deliver a λόγος," i.e., "argue": cf. *Phys.* 192b4; *Meteor.* 340b5, 345b31; *Pol.* 1260b22; and perhaps *de An.* 413a20). In either case (i.e., whether the ὅτι clause constitutes the starting move or the starting position), the ὅτι clause is functioning as a principle.

[2] For the abruptness of this transition, cf. R. A. Gauthier, J. Y. Jolif, *Aristote. L'Ethique à Nicomaque*[2] (Louvain, Paris 1970) 2.581, and H. H. Joachim, *Aristotle. The Nicomachean Ethics*[2] (Oxford 1955) 219.

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the new ἀρχή he promised at the opening of the chapter, namely, that there are three grounds on which one is called φαῦλος: κακία, ἀκρασία, and θηριότης.

The redivision of φευκτά (and the new division of grounds for calling someone φαῦλος in the *Magna Moralia*) does not imply a contradiction or even an alteration in Aristotle's (and his imitator's) ethical outlook. These divisions are not fixed principles so much as they are expedients for the introduction of new subject matter. A remote but illustrative parallel is to be found in Hesiod's "redivision" of Eris at the opening of the *Works and Days:* οὐκ ἄρα μοῦνον ἔην Ἐρίδων γένος, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ γαῖαν / εἰσὶ δύω . . . (11–12). This seems to be a revision of his attitude as he presented it in the *Theogony* (225): ἄρα here suggests the sudden recognition of a new truth.[3] However, to argue from this that Hesiod means herewith to announce a *corrigendum* to the *Theogony* would be ridiculous. Instead, by acting as though that inspired work had been in error on this point, he sets into strong relief his late experience with his brother, which, we are left to presume, taught him something new about ἔρις. The feigned revision connects the *Works and Days* with all that is prophetically authoritative in the *Theogony* and, at the same time, promises an improvement on that work, which could only have been borne out by a very moving experience indeed.

The new division of Eris begins the body of the *WD* just as the new division of moral φευκτά begins *EN* VII. In both cases the new divisions provide transitions to new subject matter. They function as principles, but they are not fixed principles or final beliefs. We need only note in the case of *EN* VII how perfunctorily Aristotle deals with the third new category, θηριότης. After a few preliminary remarks about it in VII.1 (1145a18–33), special treatment is postponed (τινα μνείαν, a33–4). The topic reappears in VII.6, where it is brought in not so much for separate treatment as to be distinguished, along with morbidity, from the central subject of the Book, ἀκρασία (1148b17–31). It is therefore clear that Aristotle's real intention in *EN* VII was to deal with ἀκρασία, and that the redivision of φευκτά was merely an initiatory vehicle.[4]

[3] Indeed it is just this ἄρα, presumably, that led West to feel that this passage in the *WD* is a sort of palinode to what was said about Eris in the *Theogony* (M. L. West, *Hesiod. Theogony* [Oxford 1966] 44).

[4] The treatment in the *MM* is even more brief: Preliminary comments occupy eleven lines (1200b9–19) and *obiter dicta* occupy two (1203a18–19), over against three Bekker pages on ἀκρασία.

Another instance of a proposition introduced as an expedient for moving on to a new subject matter, as opposed to introducing a solution to *aporiae,* is in *Rhet.* I.1. At the close of this introductory first chapter, Aristotle proposes to start anew by defining rhetoric and then to treat "the rest":

> πάλιν οὖν οἷον ἐξ ὑπαρχῆς ὁρισάμενοι αὐτὴν τίς ἐστι, λέγωμεν τὰ λοιπά· ἔστω δὴ ῥητορικὴ δύναμις περὶ ἕκαστον τοῦ θεωρῆσαι τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον πιθανόν.
>
> (1355b23–7)

This division of the ensuing exposition into a definition and "the rest" suggests that the definition will imply the rest as its complement. Thus, the definition will serve to introduce order into the ensuing treatment by disposing the subject matter. In a sense, the definition is the *initium* of the μέθοδος and is thus an ἀρχή of the type we have been studying.[5]

Still, the definition is connected with what came before. For the first chapter, besides being a totally conventional preface (one that says a little about the subject to be treated and about the status of the question, and then argues for the usefulness of the inquiry),[6] makes the strong point or claim that existing rhetorical handbooks had totally neglected the subject of enthymemes. Therewith, he argues, they neglected the very aspect of ῥητορική that qualifies it to be a τέχνη (1354a14–15). The definition with which he opens chapter 2 sets this matter straight, for rhetoric is there said to be the ability to discover τὸ πιθανόν in any subject (1355b26–7), and this is immediately made to be dependent upon proof (1355b35 ff.). The sequel subdivides the topic of proof into the types of proof and the materials of proof. So here the new

[5] Note moreover Aristotle's use of ἐξ ὑπαρχῆς. The prepositional prefix ὑπό has the force of stressing the rudimentary (cf. *SE* 183b18–20, *Pol.* 1293a2) or radical (cf. *GA* 745a18) character of an ἀρχή. It is natural, then, that ὑπαρχή should commonly appear in the phrase ἐξ ὑπαρχῆς (cf. LSJ s.v., Bz. *Index* 789b6–16). This phrase is virtually synonymous with the phrase ἐξ ἀρχῆς (cf. *Phys.* 247b29 and compare *de An.* 412a4, *PA* 685b29, and *Rhet.* 1355b24 with parallel programmatic passages done with ἐξ ἀρχῆς: *de An.* 412a4 [*v.l.*], *GC* 316b18, *Pol.* 1300a10), but it stresses more than the latter that the slate is to be wiped *totally* clear, as in English one may start over again or one may start *all* over again. Aristotle's use of ἐξ ὑπαρχῆς here (and in *PA* 685b29, which we shall treat presently) therefore exhibits how free he feels to drop one line or course of inquiry and adopt another.

[6] For parallels, cf. *Phys.* III.4, *init.*; *de Caelo* I.5.271b4–17, III.3.302a11–14, IV.1.307b28–308a4; *EN* III.1, *init.*; VIII.1, *init.* (cf. *EE* VII.1, *init.*).

beginning οἷον ἐξ ὑπαρχῆς clears the slate and initiates a new sequence of arguments, but the premise of that sequence of arguments is borrowed from what came before.

Aristotle uses this locution, ἐξ ὑπαρχῆς, again in the *de Partibus Animalium* IV.10, when he is making a transition from his treatment of the external parts of bloodless animals to that of the external parts of sanguineous animals (685b27–32). Here he does not make a new beginning by introducing a definition (as in *Rhet.* I.1) or a new division (as in *EN* VII.1), but by going back to the head of a series of topics to be dealt with, and in particular a serialized list of the special external parts of sanguineous animals.

Indeed, what governs the order and disposition of treatment throughout Aristotle's biological treatises is always one serialized list or another—of animals, species of animals, organic parts of animals (external or internal), or homogeneous parts (e.g., tissues) of animals. Sometimes he abandons one list for another, especially when he feels that following one list religiously would result in repetition[7] or would relegate to a rather subordinate position in the treatise a topic that deserves to be treated in itself and at leisure.[8]

An especially instructive example of this sort of shift from one list to another occurs at the beginning of *Historia Animalium* V.1 (539a1–10). Aristotle uses the same division of the γένη of animals as he had given in *HA* I (490b7 ff.), but he reverses the order of the list here, in his treatment κατὰ γένη of the different modes of reproduction: whereas there the order of treatment was ἀπ' ἀνθρώπου, now he treats man last, διὰ τὸ πλείστην ἔχειν πραγματείαν (539a8). Yet, in the previous section of the *HA* to which he alludes (i.e., the initial treatment of parts at I.7 ff.), he had argued that we ought to begin from man:

> πρῶτον δὲ τὰ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου μέρη ληπτέον· ὥσπερ γὰρ τὰ νομίσματα πρὸς τὸ αὑτοῖς ἕκαστοι γνωριμώτατον δοκιμάζουσιν, οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις. ὁ δ' ἄνθρωπος τῶν ζῴων γνωριμώτατον ἡμῖν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐστίν.
> (I.7.491a19–23)

The principles governing the order of treatment are therefore not fixed but variable; we should note that the principle adduced in *HA* V.1 is called an ἀρχή (539a6–9).

Again, when Aristotle returns to the topic of reproductive parts in

[7] *PA* I.1.639a23 ff.; cf. I.4.644a23–b1, 645b10–12.
[8] *PA* II.9.655b23–27; IV.5.682a30–34.

the "theoretical" biological works,[9] we note other curious shifts. He does not treat the reproductive parts in the *de Partibus*. In the *Historia* he had placed the reproductive parts right after the viscera (*HA* III.1); in the corresponding passage of the *de Partibus* (IV.4, sub fin.) he announces that the reproductive parts, which would naturally be treated here, might better be postponed to the treatise on generation (678a22–26). If we turn to the opening of that treatise, we suddenly learn that the *PA* had constituted the treatment of the material and formal/final causes of animals, and that the efficient cause will be dealt with by treating the generation of animals, which treatment will include an account of the causes of the reproductive parts. Thus, Aristotle observes,

> ὁ λόγος εἰς ἓν συνήγαγε, τῶν μὲν περὶ τὰ μόρια τελευταῖα ταῦτα, τῶν δὲ περὶ γενέσεως τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐχομένην τούτων τάξας.
>
> (*GA* I.1.715a15–18)

This neat dovetailing of the treatises had not been explicitly previewed in the *de Partibus* (though Aristotle had said there that a postponement of reproductive parts would be fitting: ἁρμόττον, 678a25; ἁρμόττουσαν, 655b25), but seems to the reader to be a sudden discovery available only after the *de Partibus* had been completed.[10]

[9] The sequence *PA, de Mot.An., de Inc.An., GA*. For the distinction between ἱστορία and theory (i.e., the causal explanation) in the zoology, cf. *HA* I.7.491a7–14, and Peck in the Loeb ed. of the *HA*, pp. v, xi.

[10] D. M. Balme, *Aristotle. De Partibus Animalium, I and De Generatione Animalium*, I (Oxford 1972) *ad loc.*, questions the authenticity of 715a1–18 (p. 127). His argument is that this preamble is "stylized" rather than "pointed," and that it is wrong to say that the *PA* had left out the efficient cause. He does admit that the preamble is correct in stating that the *PA* had not treated the reproductive parts. That the contents of the preamble are inaccurate, if they are, may be used as an argument for its authenticity just as well as for its spuriousness (on this, cf. Burnet on *EN* 1181b15 ff.). But I should wish to argue that even the contention that the preamble is inaccurate is wrong.

As for the statement in the preamble that the *PA* had treated the formal/final cause and the material cause, but not the efficient (715a7–14), Balme is on one level right to say that not just three but all four causes were adduced to explain the animal parts in the *PA*. On another level, however, it seems perfectly consonant with Aristotelian theory to say that the parts of an animal are ὕλη with respect to the whole animal, even though any given part might be explained in terms of formal or final or efficient causes. The reference at this point in the preamble to the degrees of material composition (715a9–10) stresses their material aspect in a way perfectly consonant with the first ten chapters of *PA* II. These chapters themselves, with their three grades of material composition, were anticipated by *PA* I.1.640b4 ff., where Aristotle criticized the materialist accounts of his predecessors for having too simple a notion of the ὑλικὴ ἀρχή. In place of their accounts he will differentiate three stages of material composition: the elemental matter, the

We can compare the sudden introduction of a new division (here a division of causes), in terms of which what has been said in previous treatises is suddenly to be seen as part of a larger whole, to the new ἀρχή introduced at the opening of *EN* VII.1. For there we discover that κακία is not the only ethical φευκτόν (though this was the only φευκτόν contemplated in the discussion of ethical virtue heretofore), but that ethical φευκτά are of three sorts. Having established this broad category (φευκτά), Aristotle can then effect a transition from the treatment of κακία to ἀκρασία, for they are both ethical φευκτά. He can then say, as he does at the beginning of the *GA*, "We have dealt with the one; now let us turn to the others." We noted in our examination of *EN* VII.1 that Aristotle was not so much interested in dealing with all sorts of φευκτά as he was with making a transition from regular ethical virtue to ἀκρασία: Had he been interested in all φευκτά per se, he would have given θηριότης a much fuller treatment. So, too, in the beginning of the *GA*, it is not in all strictness but only in a sense that the *PA* dealt exclusively with the formal/final cause and the material cause, and that the *GA* will deal exclusively with the efficient cause. As Balme complained,[11] all four causes are brought in everywhere in both treatises to explain their particular subject matters.

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homogeneous parts composed of the elemental matter, and the heterogeneous parts composed of the homogeneous ones. From this point of view we might easily see how Aristotle could say, in *GA* 715a9–10, that the heterogeneous parts are, in turn, the matter out of which the whole animal is composed.

Further, as for characterizing the *PA* as an account of the formal/final cause of animals (715a8–9), Aristotle had already suggested as much in the first chapter of the *PA*. For he distinguishes there between two methods of zoological inquiry—one that starts with an account of the γένεσις of an animal and thereby explains what it comes to be (its οὐσία) as a result or end of the genetic process, and one that starts with its οὐσία and, using this as the final/formal cause, explains teleologically the stages of its γένεσις (*PA* I.1.640a10 ff.). The *de Partibus* will proceed in the latter way, Aristotle decides, for in a sense the latter method more closely resembles good scientific method: To start with the οὐσία resembles starting with the phenomena (since οὐσία is in a sense the ὅτι or the existent fact) and to give an account of the γένεσις second resembles moving from facts or phenomena to their causes (since γένεσις, besides being mere process, is the process through which [δι' ὅ] the οὐσία is what it is) (640a13–15). In this sense, then, the *de Partibus* does constitute an inquiry into the formal/final cause of animals after which a separate treatment of their γένεσις *qua* efficient cause is to be taken up. It is perfectly natural, then, that the *GA* should be designated by Aristotle to be a treatment of the efficient cause of animals.

For these reasons, the opening eighteen lines of the *GA* should be allowed to stand.

[11] Balme (note 10 above) 127.

A second curious shift in the program, besides this neat postponement of reproductive parts that we have at some length explained, comes at *GA* II.4, when Aristotle sets out to examine the embryology of animals κατὰ γένη, according to a serialized list. Here again the first issue is what the order of the serialized list shall be. In the *HA* (I.7) he began with the γένος man, because human anatomy is γνωριμώτατον ἡμῖν; in *HA* V.1, he put the γένος man last, on the grounds that human reproduction is the most complex. But now, in *GA* II.4, he argues that we should treat the embryology of man first because man is the most perfect and complex γένος of animal! We shall have more to say on this programmatic passage below.

Having thus seen how, in his biology, Aristotle often shifts from one serialized list or program to another, and how the principles that govern the order of treatment are not so rigorous as to be fixed throughout the biological treatises but are variable and serve to give the treatises economy and right proportion, we can return to our passage at *PA* IV.10.685b27–32, where Aristotle uses the programmatic term, ὑπαρχή.[12] For here, too, he shifts from his original plan. He had set out to treat first the organic parts common to all animals, from the head downwards (II.10–III.3, cf. II.10 ad init.). The connection of the neck with the windpipe and esophagus then led to a treatment of the viscera of animals, first those of the sanguineous animals (since only they have viscera in the proper sense; cf. 665a29–31), and then the analogous internal parts of the bloodless animals (III.4–IV.5). In IV.5 (sub fin., 682a30–34), where he might have moved on to the special external parts of animals and might again have adopted the sequence he had just used (sanguineous, bloodless), he explicitly decides to continue the treatment of bloodless animals instead and so to treat the special external parts of animals in the opposite order from that in which he had treated their special internal parts. The reason he gives for altering the order is that by putting the external parts of sanguineous animals last, he will be able to treat them at leisure:

> ἀρκτέον δ' ἀπὸ τῶν νῦν εἰρημένων ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀφ' ὧν ἀπελίπομεν, ὅπως ἀπὸ τούτων διατριβὴν ἐλάττω ἐχόντων ἐπὶ τῶν τελείων καὶ ἐναίμων ζῴων ὁ λόγος σχολάζῃ μᾶλλον.
>
> (*PA* IV.5.682a30–34)

In IV.10, when he has finished the treatment of special external parts of

[12] Cf. note 5 above.

bloodless animals, he announces that he will now make a new beginning, ἐξ ὑπαρχῆς.

> πάλιν δ' ἐξ ὑπαρχῆς περὶ τῶν ἐναίμων καὶ ζωοτόκων ἐπισκεπτέον, ἀρξαμένοις ἀπὸ τῶν ὑπολοίπων καὶ πρότερον εἰρημένων μορίων.
> (685b30–31)

The ἀρχή of this section will then be the next item in the remainder of the list of parts that had provided the treatment of external parts in general (which began at II.10) with its serial organization.

Such programmatic formulae as λέγειν ἐξ ὑπαρχῆς, λέγειν ἀρχὴν ποιησαμένους, and λέγειν ἀρξαμένους are, as we have seen, transitional expressions that introduce new topics or new subtopics. They are particularly common in the biological treatises,[13] since Aristotle chose to organize his biological exposition in sequential treatments that imitated the *scala naturae* itself. Just how much this imitation of the *scala naturae* represents in itself a positive theory of biology, in addition to being an expedient to orderly and perspicuous exposition in that field, is a topic that goes beyond our scope here and has been treated elsewhere.[14] Now that we have briefly reviewed how Aristotle sets about making a beginning, in the biological treatises and elsewhere, we can proceed to a closer study of his use of another initiatory phrase, πρῶτον ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων, and clear up some problems about its meaning in specific passages (*PA* I.5.646a3–4; *EE* I.7.1217a18–20; *PA* II.10.655b28–9; *GA* II.4.737b25–7).

A typical instance of the phrase comes at the beginning of the *Sophistici Elenchi:*

> περὶ δὲ σοφιστικῶν ἐλέγχων . . . λέγωμεν, ἀρξαμένους κατὰ φύσιν ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων.
> (164a20–22)

The particular principle that he adduces as the *initium* of the treatise is the distinction between real and apparent syllogisms (164a23 ff.). Whether the *SE* is a new and separate treatise or merely a subtreatise within the *Topics* cannot be inferred from the presence of this formula, since the formula is used both to begin whole treatises (e.g., *Poetics* 1.1447a8–13; *de Sensu* 1.436a6) and to effect transitions within treatises

[13] Cf. *HA* 539a1–2; *PA* 646a2 ff., 655b28 ff., 682a30–34, 685b27–31; *GA* 737b25 ff.

[14] Cf. D. M. Balme, "Aristotle's Use of Differentiae in Zoology," *Aristote et les problèmes de méthode* (*Symposium Aristotelicum*, II) ed. S. Mansion (Louvain, Paris 1961) 195–212.

(e.g., *Rhet.* II.22.1396b23 πρῶτον δ' εἴπωμεν περὶ ὧν ἀναγκαῖον εἰπεῖν πρῶτον; *HA* V.1.539a1-2 . . . λοιπὸν διελθεῖν, καὶ πρῶτον περὶ τῶν πρώτων [cf. 539a4-10]). In all these cases, the πρῶτον ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων formula and its variations constitute a flat claim that we are beginning at the beginning. Instead of specifying what the first things are, it merely reiterates that they are first.

In two cases this tautological formula marks the transition from a preliminary discussion to the discursive body of the treatise: first, at *PA* I.5.646a3-4 λέγωμεν ἀρξάμενοι, καθάπερ διωρίσαμεν, πρῶτον ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων; and second, at *Eudemian Ethics* I.7.1217a18-20 λέγωμεν ἀρξάμενοι πρῶτον ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, οὐ σαφῶς λεγομένων. . . . In both these cases the preliminary discussion has argued for a certain order of treatment and the general formula receives a specific meaning by being referred back to these discussions.

In *PA* I.5, Aristotle is referring back to the order of treatment he had decided upon above, at 645b1 ff. (cf. 644a34 ff.). According to that passage, needless repetition will be forestalled if we treat the most general facts about animals first and then move on to facts that are idiosyncratic to certain species or groups of species. This course is in fact followed in the ensuing books, as we have seen, for *PA* II, after giving the very general basis of all animal parts in terms of the three degrees of material composition (II.1-9), moves on to a treatment of the external parts common to all animals (II.10-III.3). After this, Aristotle moves to the viscera of animals; and since only sanguineous animals have viscera in the strict sense, he is forced to begin a more specialized treatment of parts (III.4-IV.5: internal sanguineous, internal bloodless). Thereafter, he treats the special external parts (IV.5-end: external bloodless, external sanguineous).

I feel that Ogle's Oxford translation of the πρῶτον ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων formula at 646a3-4 is a bit forced. He translates, ". . . let us follow that order of exposition which conforms, as we have indicated, to the order of nature." Presumably he means by translating the passage in this way to import into the end of *PA* I the order of exposition Aristotle follows in the first ten chapters of *PA* II, where he describes in the order of their genesis the three levels of material composition. By "the order of nature" Ogle seems to refer to this genetic order of material composition; but there is no reference to φύσις or γένεσις in the πρῶτον formula he thus translates, and Aristotle himself argues in *PA* II.1.646a24 ff. that what is first in the process of γένεσις is last in the order of οὐσία, and vice versa. Thus, by importing the notion of genetic

or natural as opposed to essential or logical priority into the πρῶτον formula at the end of *PA* I.5, Ogle assumes exactly what he should have proved, that the formula refers to nature. It is far more natural to let the πρῶτον formula refer back to the order of treatment that had already been propounded at 644a34 ff. (to begin with the common characteristics and move on to special ones: cf. 645b1–14 and Balme *ad* 646a1–4). Under Ogle's interpretation I find no clear antecedent to καθάπερ διωρίσαμεν. We shall see below other passages where errors ensue when one reads too much into the meaning of πρῶτον in the πρῶτον formula; in itself the formula is merely programmatic and means little more than "Let us begin."

In the *EE* we have the πρῶτον formula again referring backwards to an order of treatment previously proposed (cf. ὥσπερ εἴρηται, 1217a19). The reference is to the methodological comments in I.6 (here there is no dispute), where Aristotle argues that we must begin from commonly accepted beliefs, which are essentially true but indistinctly articulated,[15] and proceed from them to a fully perspicuous and accurate account. What is unique about the use of the πρῶτον formula here is that its own inner syntax (the genitive dependent upon ἀπό) is continued by the words οὐ σαφῶς λεγομένων (1217a19–20). Usually Aristotle will say, "Let us begin with first things first," and then argue what is first. Here, however, πρῶτων is not a neuter adjective functioning as a noun, but a neuter adjective modifying the neuter participle λεγομένων, which functions as a noun. To say that the οὐ σαφῶς λεγόμενα are πρῶτα (as an attribute rather than a predicate) is not strictly accurate, since the people who say them do not say them first, but always, and say nothing more. Richards[16] therefore wondered whether a τῶν might have dropped out after πρώτων, for with a τῶν the οὐ σαφῶς λεγομένων would be an appositive following τῶν πρώτων, which would then be a noun: "Let us start from first things first, namely, as we argued, the vaguely stated opinions." Though a τῶν may easily have dropped out after πρώτων (given the homoioteleuton), we might also argue that Aristotle could easily have left the τῶν out, without fearing that πρώτων would then be taken with οὐ σαφῶς λεγομένων, simply because πρῶτον ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων is a formulaic and self-referential phrase that is read as a unit.

[15] On the meaning of σαφές, cf. W. J. Verdenius, "Human Reason and God," *Untersuchungen zür Eudemischen Ethik* (*Symposium Aristotelicum*, V) eds. P. Moraux and D. Harlfinger (Berlin 1974) 286 f.; H. Cherniss, *Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy* (Baltimore 1944) I.29, n. 22.

[16] H. Richards, *Aristotelica* (London 1915) 53.

Aristotle uses this same tautological formula in *PA* II.10 to introduce the treatment of the organic parts of animals (νῦν δὲ λέγωμεν οἷον ἀπ' ἀρχῆς πάλιν, ἀρξάμενοι πρῶτον ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων 655b28–29). Immediately thereupon he explains this proposal (note γάρ in b29) by saying that the most necessary parts are the digestive parts; then he notes that some living creatures, such as plants, have a very simple structure and that others have a more complex structure that suits them not only to live (i.e., by nourishment) but to live well. Such a kind of animal is man; and so, because of this (his more complete participation in φύσις), and also because the parts of man are especially familiar to us, we should begin our account of organic parts with those of man.[17] For in man alone the natural parts are arranged in natural order: His upper parts are in a position that corresponds with the upper parts of the universe. That is, he alone of animals stands erect (655b29–656a13).

Ogle,[18] in a note on the opening formula (655b28–29), asserts that "strangely enough Aristotle after all does not follow the order here indicated, but begins with the brain and the other parts of the head. . . ." By "here" Ogle is referring to 655b28–29, which he translates, "taking those first which are of most importance." Apparently he was led by the γάρ in b29 to assume that the ἀναγκαιότατα μόρια in the next sentence are what is meant by πρώτων in this sentence (thus he translates πρώτων with "of most importance"),[19] and that with the mention of these ἀναγκαιότατα μόρια Aristotle is beginning his serial treatment of organic parts. This, then, was for Ogle the "order of treatment here indicated," which Aristotle strangely abandoned when he began with the brain and head at 656a13 ff. But his presumption that such an order was ever indicated by Aristotle is erroneous. The γάρ in b29 introduces not the first parts to be treated, but a brief and rather dialectical argument extending from 655b29 to 656a13, in which the mention of the digestive parts is merely an expedient for introducing a distinction between higher and lower animate beings, which distinction in turn leads to the notion that man, *qua* higher being, should be treated first (for the τέλεια are πρῶτα: cf. *GA* 737b25–27). The last four lines of this prelimi-

[17] On the first reason to place man first (his perfection), cf. *GA* II.4.737b25 f., where πρῶτον ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων is again used; for the second reason (his familiarity), cf. *HA* I.7.491a19.

[18] W. Ogle, *Aristotle on the Parts of Animals* (London 1882) 172.

[19] ἀναγκαιότατα does not mean "most important" but as often in this superlative, "most indispensible" (cf. LSJ, *s.v.* II.4). The counterpart to τὸ ἀναγκαῖον is not τὸ φαῦλον but τὸ βέλτιον (cf. *PA* I.1).

nary argument (a10–13) specify a certain sense in which man is the highest creation of φύσις (that he is erect), and this specification of his superiority provides the order of treatment of heterogeneous (organic) parts, namely from the top down.

Ogle's error, if I have interpreted his argument correctly, seems to be due to his eagerness to specify as quickly as possible the very general πρῶτον of the opening sentence. As we have seen, however, the πρῶτον in this sentence is part of the self-contained and tautological formula, πρῶτον ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων; as such, the formula should be translated in a way that reproduces its self-referential character: "from first things first." If we read the formula in this way, we are less liable to identify too hastily the "first things" of the formula with the "most necessary" parts of the next sentence.

We encounter a similar problem in Platt's translation of *GA* II.4.737b25–27.[20] Here again the πρῶτον ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων formula is used, and here again the translator wishes immediately to build into the formula a specific reference to the context, rather than to allow the ensuing text to develop an argument as to what comes first. Aristotle opens II.4 by dividing animals in accordance with the degree of development their offspring have reached at the time of birth. The less perfect animals give birth to mere embryos; the perfect animals are internally viviparous and give birth to perfect animals; others are externally viviparous, but internally oviparous. Given this preliminary division, Aristotle is ready to begin a serialized treatment of the various animals and makes his transition to this treatment with the formula, νῦν δ' ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων ἀρκτέον πρῶτον, and then explains: ἔστι δὲ τὰ τέλεια τῶν ζῴων πρῶτα, τοιαῦτα δὲ τὰ ζῳοτοκοῦντα, καὶ τούτων ἄνθρωπος πρῶτον.

Platt translates, "Here we must make our first start from the first class; these are the perfect or viviparous animals, and of these the first is man." By "first *class*" Platt means to refer to one of the three groups of animals that Aristotle had distinguished above; but the first of these groups, the less perfect animals, was postponed in that section for later treatment (737b14–15), and the group comprising viviparous animals and man was mentioned second (b15 ff.). If it be argued for Platt's translation that because Aristotle postponed this first group for later treatment the second group mentioned becomes first, we are left with the fact that Platt himself decided to call the last group mentioned (the

[20] A. Platt, *Aristotle. de Generatione Animalium* (Ox.Tr., V. 5: 1910).

internally oviparous, b18 ff.) the "third class" in his translation, though the text has no such ordinal numbers at all.

The only way to avoid these embarrassments seems to be to avoid taking τῶν πρώτων to refer to anything in the list, but to allow its meaning to be subsumed into the clause in which it appears, by rendering the clause as advocating the unassailable but tautologous rule of procedure, "First things first." It is in the next sentence, then, that Aristotle argues what sorts of things are first, namely, τὰ τέλεια τῶν ζῴων. That is, it is *qua* τέλεια that the τέλεια τῶν ζῴων should be treated first: Aristotle is merely presenting a plausible justification for his ordering, as he did in *PA* II.10, where he began the treatment of heterogeneous parts with man's parts on the grounds that man has the largest share of the perfecting influence of φύσις.

Once he has settled the issue of what the πρῶτα are, that they are the τέλεια, he goes on to observe that according to his preliminary division of animals in 737b8–25 the τέλεια are ζῳοτοκοῦντα, and that the first of this group, again *qua* most τέλειον, is man. Platt failed to translate the two steps of the syllogism (the τέλεια are πρῶτα, and the ζῳοτοκοῦντα are τέλεια; contrast his translation: "these are the perfect or viviparous"); but had he seen that πρῶτον ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων is an opening statement that is meant to be tautological, and thus to require explanation, he would not have taken such liberty with the text.

We have now seen how important it is to recognize that πρῶτον ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων is a tautological formula used to initiate a treatise or subtreatise. Like the initiatory formulae that use the term ἀρχή, this formula introduces the principle that will order the ensuing treatise; but where ἀρχή formulae usually introduce a governing premise, one that is very often in the form of a diaeresis and whose function is to introduce new subject matter, the πρῶτον formula usually introduces a principle by means of which a sequential order can be imposed upon a set of topics already set out for treatment. We should note also that the particular principle of sequential order introduced by the πρῶτον formula is chosen ad hoc by Aristotle: in one place the πρῶτα will be the γνωριμώτατα ἡμῖν (e.g., in *HA* I.7), while in another passage the πρῶτα will be the τέλεια φύσει (e.g., in *GA* II.4, *PA* II.10). Aristotle's flexibility in his choice of πρῶτα at the beginning of a treatise is parallel to his flexibility in choosing ἀρχαί as we saw it in the redivision of ethical φευκτά in *EN* VII.1. ἀρχή, in initiatory formulae like the one at the beginning of *EN* VII.1, refers to a starting point chosen ad hoc, rather than a firm and sovereign philosophical ἀρχὴ ἀποδείξεως; like-

wise, in the initiatory πρῶτον formula, πρῶτα can refer to things that are first in a variety of senses and does not represent the absolute and sovereign πρῶτα of demonstration (for which cf. *An.Po.* I.2.71b21; *Top.* I.1.100a27).

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ANACREON, 358 *PMG*

(ap. Athen. XIII.599C)

Denys L. Page, M. X.

Σφαίρῃ δηὖτέ με πορφυρέῃ
βάλλων χρυσοκόμης Ἔρως
νήνι ποικιλοσαμβάλῳ
συμπαίζειν προκαλεῖται·

ἡ δ', ἔστιν γὰρ ἀπ' εὐκτίτου 5
Λέσβου, τὴν μὲν ἐμὴν κόμην,
λευκὴ γάρ, καταμέμφεται,
πρὸς δ' ἄλλην τινὰ χάσκει.

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1 δεῦτέ A, corr. Seidler πορφυρενι A, corr. Barnes (πορφυρῇ Edmonds) 3 ποικίλος λαμβάνω A : ποικίλους ἀμβάλω Et. Sorb. in adnot. Et. Mag. p. 448.29 Gaisford, corr. Seidler 5 ἀπευκτικοῦ A, corr. Barnes 8 ἄλλην A : ἄλλον Barnes (agn. de Pauw, Daléchamp, Bergk[4], Edmonds)

(i) The key to understanding this elusive short poem is the simple word ἄλλην (8). What does it refer to—ἄλλην κόμην (from line 6) or ἄλλην κόρην (or νῆνιν, from line 3)? The white-haired poet has a rival for the heart of the girl: Is it a younger, black-haired *man,* or rather a *girl,* with the likely implication that the young lady from Lesbos is a Lesbian? Scholars are equally divided on this issue.[1]

[1] Here is a generous selection of scholarship (1899–1979) on Anacreon, 358 *PMG* (hereinafter referred to by the name of the author only) Herbert Weir Smyth, *Greek Melic Poets* (London, Macmillan 1906; repr. New York, Biblo & Tannen, 1963) 288; Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Sappho und Simonides* (Berlin 1913; repr. 1963) 116 f.; Bruno Lavagnini, *Aglaia. Nuova Antologia della Lirica Greca da Callino a Bacchilide* (Torino, Paravia 1932; 3rd ed. 1949) 168 f.; C. M. Bowra, *Greek Lyric Poetry* (Oxford 1936) 294 f., 2nd ed. (Oxford 1961) 285 f.; C. B. Gulick (ed. & tr.), *Athenaeus, The Deipnosophists* (The Loeb Class. Library 1937) 229; Lidia Massa Positano, "Sul Fr.5 di Anacreonte," *La Parola del Passato* 1 (1946) 370–72; Bruno Gentili, in Gennaro Perrotta e Bruno Gentili, *Polinnia. Antologia della Lirica Greca* [1948] (Messina, D'Anna 1953) 234 f., 2nd ed. (1965) 248–50; B. Gentili, *Anacreonte* (Roma, Edizioni dell' Ateneo 1958) 12, 111. Idem, in *Entretiens Hardt* XIV (*L'Épigramme Grecque* 1967) 176. Idem, "La ragazza di Lesbo," *Quaderni Urbinati di Cultura Classica* 16 (1973) 124–28, and "Addendum," *QUCC* 21 (1976) 47. Hermann Fränkel, *Dichtung und Philosophie des frühen Griechentums* [1950]

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Apparently, the interpretation ἄλλην (sc. κόμην) can be traced back to H. W. Smyth (1899), who explained it, "ἄλλην = πρὸς δ' ἄλλου τινὸς κόμην," and is shared by many (e.g., Wilamowitz, Massa Positano, H. Fränkel, del Grande, Gomme, and more recently by M. Campbell, Burzacchini [1977], and Woodbury [1979]). Here belongs also the interpretation of Giangrande, who sees in the girl a Lesbian *fellatrix*, interested in the poet's pubic hair, and Gentili, who prefers to think that our *fellatrix* is rather interested in another man's pubic hair. Some of the representatives of this interpretation seem to be overconfident. So Gomme wrote, "ἄλλη is only feminine because κόμη is—how else can one take it?" And Woodbury (p. 283) wrote: "To introduce 'some other *girl*' at this late point in the poem is syntactically possible but structurally ruinous."

The alternate interpretation, ἄλλην (sc. κόρην), is later. Unless I am mistaken, it goes back to Lavagnini (1932). It too is shared by many, including Bowra, Gulick, Page, Harvey, Marzullo, D. A. Campbell, Labarbe, Gerber, and more recently by West (1970), Kirkwood (1974), and P. E. Easterling (1977).

(München 1952) 333; D. L. Page, *Sappho and Alcaeus* (Oxford 1955) 143; A. E. Harvey, "Homeric Epithets in Greek Lyric Poetry," *CQ* 51, N.S. 7 (1957) 213; Carlo del Grande, ΦΟΡΜΙΓΞ, *Antologia della Lirica Greca* (Napoli, Luigi Loffredo 1957; 3rd ed. 1963) 205 f.; A. W. Gomme, *JHS* 77 (1957) 259, n. 13; J. A. Davison, "Anacreon Fr.5 Diehl [358]," *TAPA* 90 (1959) 40–47 = Idem, *From Archilochus to Pindar* (London, Macmillan 1968) 247–55; M. Wigodsky, "Anacreon and the Girl from Lesbos," *CP* 57 (1962) 109; G. Wirth, "Anacreon 5 D," in *Miscellanea Critica* I [on the occasion of the 150 years of B. G. Teubner] (Leipzig 1964) 295–306; Benedetto Marzullo, *Frammenti della Lirica Greca* (Firenze, Sansoni 1965) 157 f.; David A. Campbell, *Greek Lyric Poetry. A Selection* (London, Macmillan 1967) 320 f.; Giuseppe Giangrande, "Sympotic Literature and Epigram," in *Entretiens Hardt* XIV (1967) 111 f.; Idem, "Anacreon and the Lesbian Girl," *QUCC* 16 (1973) 129–33, and "On Anacreon's Poetry," *QUCC* 21 (1976) 43–46; Idem, "Zwei hellenistische Epigramme," *RhM* 117 (1974) 66–71; Jules Labarbe, in *Entretiens Hardt* XIV (1967) 176 f.; M. L. West, "Melica," *CQ* 64, N.S. 20 (1970) 209; Douglas E. Gerber, *Euterpe. An Anthology of Early Greek Lyric, Elegiac, and Iambic Poetry* (Amsterdam, Hakkert 1970) 229 f.; Malcolm Campbell, "Anacr. fr. 358 P.," *Museum Criticum* 8–9 (1973–1974) 168 f.; G. M. Kirkwood, *Early Greek Monody. The History of a Poetic Type* (Cornell Studies in Class. Philol., Vol. 37, Cornell U.P. 1974) 166 f., 275 f.; Anna M. Komornicka, "A la suite de la lecture 'La ragazza di Lesbo,'" *QUCC* 21 (1976) 37–41; Zoltan Franyó, in Bruno Snell, *Frühgriechische Lyriker*, 3 (Schriften u. Quellen der Alten Welt, Band 24.3, Berlin, Akademie Verlag 1976) 103; Pat Easterling, "Literary tradition and transformation of Cupid," *Didaskalos* 5.3 (1977) 329–31; Gabriele Burzacchini, in Enzo Degani e Gabriele Burzacchini, *Lirici Greci. Antologia* (Firenze, La Nuova Italia Editrice 1977) 247–50; K. J. Dover, *Greek Homosexuality* (Harvard U.P. 1978) 182 f.; Leonard Woodbury, "Gold Hair and Grey, or the Game of Love: Anacreon Fr.13:358 *PMG*, 13 Gentili," *TAPA* 109 (1979) 277–87.

(ii) I feel, however, that the advantages of the interpretation ἄλλην (sc. κόρην) prevail: "But she, for she comes from finely built (or well-settled) Lesbos, finds fault with my hair, for it is white, and is all agape after another—a girl."

(*a*) The alternate interpretation, "But she . . . despises my white hair, and goes gaping after another (younger) man," seems to me pointless, even trivial. For such a course of action is what one would expect from any pretty young girl who has the choice between an old and a young man, no matter whether she comes from Lesbos or, say, from Teos. So what is the point of the poem?[2] On the contrary, the interpretation, "and she goes gaping after another—a girl," gives the poem a new twist in its closing line and provides an unexpected point, carefully prepared by the apparently innocent bit of information that the young lady is from Lesbos. This point of the poet's "malicious jest" has been well expressed by Page (p. 143, n. 3): "The listener is ready to hear that she will turn from him [Anacreon] to a younger man. But Anacreon, having prepared the way by the apparently casual mention of her native island, turns his rebuff to her discomfiture by the unexpected jest at the end—the real reason for her scorn is not that he is *old,* but that he is a *man.*"

(*b*) With this interpretation, the information that the girl comes from Lesbos gains its full force: she prefers a girl to a man because she is a Lesbian. The representatives of the alternate interpretation have rightly objected that there is just no evidence for the assumption that "coming from Lesbos" would imply "being a Lesbian." I feel, however, that such an assumption is utterly possible in the times of Anacreon in view of the unmistakable homosexual inclinations of Sappho from Lesbos, as expressed in her poetry: 1.23 f. ταχέως φιλήσει / κωὐκ ἐθέλοισα, and 31 L-P.[3] Scholars who are not happy with the homosexual

[2] The same argument is valid against Barnes' emendation ἄλλον for ἄλλην. Wilamowitz called it (p. 116, n. 1), "die monströse Änderung," and D. A. Campbell (p. 321) says, "to alter ἄλλην to ἄλλον is irresponsible." Fränkel (p. 333, n. 3) and Davison (p. 252 f.) were more tolerant with Barnes. As a matter of fact, Wilamowitz (who understood ἄλλην sc. κόμην) translated the stanza so: "Aber die, sie ist ja aus dem stolzen Lesbos, und mein Haar, das ist ja grau; das mag sie nicht und äugelt nach einem anderen." And ἄλλον for ἄλλην is an easy change in such a corrupt manuscript as is Marcianus 447 (A), displaying four scribal errors in the first five lines of the poem. My reason for dismissing Barnes' ἄλλον is the same as adduced against the understanding, ἄλλην (sc. κόμην): it makes the poem pointless and unworthy of an Anacreon.

[3] Cf. M. Marcovich, "Sappho Fr. 31: Anxiety Attack or Love Declaration?" *CQ* 65, N.S. 22 (1972) 19–32, esp. 27; Page (note 1 above) 144; Dover (note 1 above) 176–79.

interpretation of the poem usually see in the information, "for she comes from Lesbos," a reference to the renown of Lesbian women for their beauty, culture, and elegance. So does Woodbury (p. 282), while West (p. 209) wrote: "The implication is that Lesbian girls can afford to be choosy, they have young admirers enough to pick from." Indeed, one need only refer to *Iliad* 9.129 f. and 271 f. (Λεσβίδας . . . / . . . αἳ τότε κάλλει ἐνίκων φῦλα γυναικῶν) or to the well established beauty contests for women on Lesbos.[4] I trust, however, that such an interpretation of the phrase, "for she comes from Lesbos," will be shown as less likely by argument (iii) below.

(*c*) One difficulty with Lavagnini's interpretation, "and she goes gaping after another—a girl," however, remains. If the girl's choice is not between an old and a young man, but between a man and a woman, then what is the relevance of the information that the poet's hair is white (λευκὴ γάρ)? As Gomme well put it, "And why should Anakreon say that he was scorned for his white hair, if he was only scorned because he was a man?" My answer is that the girl's scorn of the poet's white hair was expressed in words—the verb καταμέμφεται seems to imply this, as does the Homeric ἐπιμέμφεσθαι—and that λευκὴ γάρ is actually the reason adduced by the girl. She is pretending, "You are too old for me," while concealing the real reason for rejecting the poet: "You are a man."

(iii) The question is now: While the arguments for ἄλλην (sc. κόρην) adduced under (ii) are based on the literary analysis of the text, can the case for the homosexual interpretation of the poem be strengthened by an argument coming from the usage of Greek language? I think it can. The verb χάσκειν, in its metaphorical senses, usually denotes either *keen interest* ("to be all agape after") or *lack of interest* ("yawning from boredom"). Evidently, the former is the case in our poem, as Joshua Barnes (in 1705) had already pointed out: "*Desiderantum more inhiare.*"[5]

Now, my point is that the construction, χάσκειν πρός, as a rule refers to an animate object. If this is true, then the preference should be given to the interpretation, "she is all agape after another girl," over the interpretation, "she is all agape after another hair." Consider Aristophanes *Equites* 651: οἱ δ' ἀνεκρότησαν καὶ πρὸς ἔμ' ἐκεχήνεσαν;

[4] Cf. Alcaeus Fr.130.32 f. L–P; Theophrastus ap. Athen. XIII.610 A; Schol. A to *Iliad* 9.129.

[5] *Anacreon Teius . . . emendatus . . . operā* Josuae Barnes (Cantabrigiae 1705) No. 101, 272–75.

804: (ἀλλ' ἵνα . . . ὁ δῆμος . . .) ὑπ' ἀνάγκης ἅμα καὶ χρείας καὶ μισθοῦ *πρός σε κεχήνῃ*; 1118: *πρὸς τόν* τε λέγοντ' ἀεὶ / *κέχηνας* (cf. 1263 τῇ Κεχηναίων πόλει and *Acharn.* 635 μήτ' εἶναι χαυνοπολίτας, implying the well known Aristophanic undue attention and foolish gullibility on the part of the *vulgus*). *Nubes* 996 f. seems to be no exception to the rule:

> μήδ' εἰς ὀρχηστρίδος εἰσᾴττειν, ἵνα μὴ *πρὸς ταῦτα κεχηνώς*
> μήλῳ βληθεὶς ὑπὸ ορνιδίου τῆς εὐκλείας ἀποθραυσθῇς

since here πρὸς ταῦτα seems to imply, "both the performance and the charms of the dancing-girl." Porphyry *Ad Marcellam* 9 *κεχηνέναι πρὸς τὴν* τοῦ ὑφηγητοῦ σκιάν.[6]

(iv) As for the early iambic and elegiac poetry, the evidence about the employment of χάσκειν, in metaphorical sense, is scarce, but it seems to confirm a general meaning of "eager expectation and keen interest." As at Hipponax 9.1 West, πάλαι γὰρ αὐτοὺς προσδέκονται χάσκοντες, and at Solon 13.35 f. W.:

> . . . πρίν τι παθεῖν· τότε δ' αὖτις ὀδύρεται· ἄχρι δὲ τούτου
> χάσκοντες κούφαις ἐλπίσι τερπόμεθα.

At Semonides 7.110 W., the sense of χάσκειν is not clear. Nevertheless, I am inclined to take it to imply, "while the husband is all agape after his wife, she proves him wrong by being unfaithful to him," first, because of the rather synonymic αἰνέσει μεμνημένος (112); second, because of ὡς ἁμαρτάνει (111) contrasting κεχηνότος (110).[7]

> ὅκου γυνὴ πάρεστιν[8] οὐδ' ἐς οἰκίην 106
> ξεῖνον μολόντα προφρόνως δεκοίατο.

[6] Examples of χάσκειν πρός τι seem to be late: Epictet. 2.2.25; Luc. *Pisc.* 34; *Icar.* 3. At *Od.* 12.350 (πρός κῦμα χανών), the verb has its concrete (not metaphorical) sense.

[7] I accept Bergk's *aposiopesis* in line 110. Different interpretations of κεχηνότος here are possible, but are less likely to me. Hugh Lloyd-Jones, *Females of the Species: Semonides on Women* (Noyes Press, Park Ridge, N.J. 1975) 54, translates: "because while her husband is not looking. . . ." For χάσκειν denoting inattention, he refers (p. 90) to Aristophanes *Equites* 1032 ὅταν σύ ποι ἄλλοσε χάσκῃς. But there is no ἄλλοσε in our text, and at *Equites* 1032 the implication is not merely "inattention," but rather "paying one's attention to the wrong cause, or in the wrong direction" ("giving one's whole attention to one thing when other more important issues are at hand," West 209). On the use of χάσκειν in comedy, compare J. Taillardat, *Les images d'Aristophane* (Paris 1965²) 264 f. D. A. Campbell (p. 191) understands Sem. 7.110 as "probably denoting incredulity," while Gerber (p. 63) comments, "Possibly, 'while her husband stands dumbfounded (at the outrage his seemingly virtuous wife has committed), the neighbours rejoice when they see how he too is deceived.' "

[8] πάρεστιν coniecit West: γάρ ἐστιν Stobaei codd. S M A.

ἥτις δέ τοι μάλιστα σωφρονεῖν δοκεῖ,
αὕτη μέγιστα τυγχάνει λωβωμένη·
κεχηνότος γὰρ ἀνδρός—οἱ δὲ γείτονες 110
χαίρουσ' ὁρῶντες καὶ τόν, ὡς ἁμαρτάνει.
τὴν ἣν δ' ἕκαστος αἰνέσει μεμνημένος
γυναῖκα, τὴν δὲ τοὐτέρου μωμήσεται·
ἴσην δ' ἔχοντες μοῖραν οὐ γινώσκομεν.

(v) Two extreme interpretations of Anacreon's χάσκει (8) may be easily dismissed. West's suggestion that χάσκειν here "need not mean more than 'foolishly preoccupied,'" and that "The girl is deep in trivial conversation with her friend, and only belatedly becomes aware that Anacreon is amusing the party with a song about her" is gratuitous and is easily refuted by the force of the contrast (notice μὲν . . . δέ) between καταμέμφεται and χάσκει, implying, "but she rejects the poet, and goes gaping after another—a girl—instead." Doubtless, the clause πρὸς δ' ἄλλην τινὰ χάσκει expresses the girl's preference as far as a love affair is concerned (συμπαίζειν [4]).[9]

The other extreme interpretation is that χάσκει here may have "an obscene implication" (Kirkwood, p. 275, n. 35) and is best represented by Giangrande: "Given the fact that Lesbian girls were notorious in antiquity for their being addicted to *fellatio,* and given the fact that χάσκω, applied to girls in amatory contexts, is the *terminus technicus* denoting eagerness to *fellare,* Anacreon's poem becomes perfectly clear and its witty point obvious."[10]

Giangrande offers no example of such a *terminus technicus* but only refers to Davison and Wigodsky. All Davison does (p. 251 f.) is repeat Barnes' old reference to Athenaeus IX.389E as an example for the sense of χάσκειν, *desiderantum more inhiare.* Athenaeus describes the behavior of partridges (known to be highly sexed) at the season of mating: "They fly about with beak open and tongue projecting, both the females and the males" (πέτονταί τε περὶ τὸν τῆς ὀχείας καιρὸν χάσκοντες καὶ τὴν γλῶσσαν ἔξω ἔχοντες οἵ τε θήλεις καὶ οἱ ἄρρενες). Far from denoting "eagerness to *fellare,*" χάσκοντες here may at best reflect "sexual interest" of partridges, both male and female, and that is what both Barnes and Davison seem to have implied.

Gentili, Giangrande, and Kirkwood all refer to a note by Michael Wigodsky (*CP* 57 [1962] 109), believing that it provides us with a clear

[9] Against West's interpretation compare also Dover (note 1 above) 183, n. 38.
[10] *QUCC* 16 (1973) 132.

example of χάσκειν implying λεσβι(ά)ζειν (Aristophanes *Wasps* 1349). But I think the reference is a blunder, since ἐγχάσκειν here clearly means, "to scoff or laugh at," as it does at *Wasps* 721:

ὁρᾷς ἐγώ σ' ὡς δεξιῶς ὑφειλόμην 1345
μέλλουσαν ἤδη λεσβιεῖν τοὺς ξυμπότας·
ὧν εἵνεκ' ἀπόδος τῷ πέει τῳδὶ χάριν.
ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀποδώσεις οὐδ' ἐφιαλεῖς, οἶδ' ὅτι,
ἀλλ' ἐξαπατήσεις κἀγχανεῖ τούτῳ μέγα·
πολλοῖς γὰρ ἤδη χἀτέροις αὔτ' ἠργάσω. 1350

Consequently, there is no evidence of χάσκειν being "the *terminus technicus* denoting eagerness to *fellare*,"[11] nor is there any likelihood that the verb may have this connotation in our poem. Against Giangrande's bizarre interpretation of the girl as a *fellatrix*, interested only in the poet's black pubic hair, it suffices to say the following. (*a*) To see a deliberate hint at the poet's penis in ἄλλη τις (8) is a shot in the dark. (*b*) The information that the girl comes from Lesbos may hint at her being a homosexual (in view of the evidence of Sappho's homosexual poetry), but may not hint at her being a *fellatrix*, for which the evidence does not seem to be older than the comedy. (*c*) The force of ἐμήν (6) precludes Giangrande's interpretation. Both M. Campbell and Dover (p. 183, n. 37) have correctly stressed this point, the former by stating, "The claim that by ἄλλην τινά Anacreon meant 'the poet's hair' is contradicted both by grammar and by common sense," the latter by summing up, "Giangrande [132] wishes the antithesis to be between 'my *head*-hair' and 'my *other* hair,' but the antithesis offered by the Greek, using the emphatic possessive adjective *emos*, is between '*my* hair' and '*other*.'"

Gentili (p. 127) tries to remedy this by interpreting that the girl is sexually interested in "another man's pubic hair" ("un'altra, una diversa . . . chioma (pubica), evidentemente nera, di un altro convitato"). This is even worse. The antithesis just cannot be stretched that far, and the way from the poet's white head-hair to the black pubic hair of another man is a fiction. Dover's (apparently preferred) interpretation of the poem (p. 183) will convince no one. It reads: "Since 'hair' (*komē*) is a feminine noun, this may be understood with 'another,' whether it means '[*sc.* someone's black hair] other [*sc.* than mine]' or, with a

[11] Dover (note 1 above) too (182, n. 36) calls Giangrande's interpretation of χάσκειν "misleading." Burzacchini (250) tells us, it is "del tutto ipotetica." Compare also Woodbury (note 1 above) 283 f.

reference to the Lesbians' reputation for fellation, '[*sc.* someone else's black pubic hair] other [*sc.* than the white hair on my head].' "

(vi) Woodbury's recent interpretation of the poem (1979) is based on three assumptions, none of which is convincing to me: (*a*) ἄλλην (8) (sc. κόμην). (*b*) "The κόμη signifies both the person . . . and the object of love." (*c*) The contrast between "the gold-haired Eros" (line 2) and "the white-haired poet" is devised to achieve a "tone of rueful but detached" "self-regarding irony." Let us examine the validity of each one of these arguments.

(*a*) Woodbury writes (p. 283): "The careful symmetry of the construction [τὴν μὲν ἐμὴν κόμην vs. πρὸς δ' ἄλλην τινά] requires that κόμην be supplied in the last phrase. In conceptual terms the only possible opposite to '*my* head of hair' is '*some other* head of hair.' To introduce 'some other *girl*' at this late point in the poem is syntactically possible but structurally ruinous." However, such a "conceptual" view is too narrow and pedantic. The interpretation of ἄλλην τινά as "somebody else—a girl," far from being "structurally ruinous," is only welcome, since it provides the poem with an unexpected twist (τὸ ἀπροσδόκητον) and thus makes it pointed. This unexpected jest has been deliberately kept for the poem's closing line (ii, *a*). The supplement "another girl" also demonstrates the full force and relevance of the information, "for she comes from finely built Lesbos" (ii, *b*). Finally, the construction, χάσκειν πρός, "being all agape after," makes it highly likely that the object of the verb is an animate (not inanimate) one, like κόρη and unlike κόμη (iii).

(*b*) I have no difficulties with the κόμη as "a sign of the man's vitality, including sexual energies" (p. 284 f.); the point is that its connotation "person," "self," postulated by Woodbury, is to be found nowhere. "Hair" is not "head": κόμη is not κάρα, κάρηνον, κεφαλή, *caput*. The only example Woodbury adduces cannot stand criticism. Pindar's "analytical expression," ὅντιν' ἀθρόοι στέφανοι / χερσὶ νικάσαντ' ἀνέδησαν ἔθειραν / ἢ ταχυτᾶτι ποδῶν (*Isthm.* 5.8–10), proves nothing, since it is a common Homeric σχῆμα καθ' ὅλον καὶ μέρος, where the pronoun ὅντινα plays the part of "self" and "whole," and the partitive apposition ἔθειραν, that of "the affected part."

(*c*) I utterly agree with Woodbury that there is a deliberate contrast in the poem between "the gold-haired Eros" (of stanza I) and the poet's own white hair (of stanza II). But there is more to that. All three epithets of stanza I express bright colors, brilliance, and radiance and are in sharp contrast to the poet's white hair: "the crimson (or rather)

bright-colored ball," "gold-haired Eros," and "a motley-slippered maiden" (Bowra), or "the girl with the jazzy sandals" (West). This contrast in polychromy has been well pointed out by Lidia Massa Positano (1946) and, more recently, by Kirkwood, D. A. Campbell, Gerber, and Burzacchini.

Now, my point is that Woodbury draws the wrong conclusion from this contrast, that it is to the poet's disadvantage, that it reveals the poet's "debility," "self-regarding irony," and gives the poem "its bittersweet flavor." In other words, the poet admits to his own inadequacy as a love-player. "The Lesbian girl," concludes Woodbury, "is thus removed from the center of focus to a point nearer its periphery." "The ball, he [Anacreon] notices, has bounced into another court, as it were, and towards the hands of another player [i.e. πρὸς ἄλλην τινὰ κόμην, implying another, younger male lover]" (p. 286 f.).

This interpretation too has been anticipated by Massa Positano, who spoke of the poet's "amarezza" and his admission that "le gioie d'amore . . . non son piú per lui" (p. 371 f.). In my view, however, there is no *Lusimus satis* motif in the poem. Stanza I clearly implies the poet's willingness to engage in a *jeu d'amour* with the young lady (συμπαίζειν): It is the girl who is not willing to play her part. For love is a godsent gift (Σφαίρῃ . . . με . . . βάλλων . . . Ἔρως), and the poet feels it his duty to follow the god's summons (Ἔρως . . . με . . . προκαλεῖται). Evidently, he feels confident enough as an adequate playmate (συμπαιστής), and the responsibility remains with the girl, who thus remains in the center of the focus of the poem. In brief, "Eros" and "me" of stanza I are in sharp contrast to "she" of stanza II: Ἔρως . . . με . . . συμπαίζειν προκαλεῖται (I) : ἡ δ' . . . ἐμὲ μὲν καταμέμφεται, πρὸς δ' ἄλλην τινὰ χάσκει (II).

The poet is well aware of the fact that he is aging and that his hair is white or gray. He mentions it elsewhere (Πολιοὶ μὲν ἡμὶν ἤδη / κρόταφοι κάρη τε λευκόν . . . [395 *PMG*]; εὖτέ μοι λευκαὶ μελαίνησ' ἀναμεμείξονται τρίχες [420]), as does Sappho of her own hair (ἐγένο]ντο τρίχες ἐκ μελαίναν [58.14 L–P]). But that does not prevent him from feeling like an experienced lover and an adequate playmate in our poem. What then is the role of the contrast between the polychromy of stanza I and the white hair of stanza II?

I think there are two explanations, which do not seem to exclude each other. First, the words λευκὴ γάρ are "a quotation"—this is the reason the girl adduces for her rejection of the poet (καταμέμφεται, see ii, *c*). Second, the contrast between the brilliance expressed in stanza I

and the white hair of stanza II reflects the difference in age between the young girl (νῆνις) and the aging poet. Notice that a similar color contrast is employed by the poet elsewhere, as D. A. Campbell and others have pointed out: ὑποπόλιον γένειον χρυσοφαέννων . . . 379 [*a*] *PMG* (the gold-winged Eros flies past the graying poet). Again, this difference in age, however, by no means denotes the poet's inadequacy as a lover, his debility or "self-regarding," "rueful but detached irony." The experienced lover is ready for the game, the girl is not. The real reason is not that he is old, but that he is male, since the girl from Lesbos has a different sexual preference, or "shares the propensities of her island" (Bowra).

In brief, far from admitting to his own debility as far as a love affair is concerned (*Lusimus satis*), our poet seems to express the same self-confidence as Horace (*Odes* 3.26) does. Even when retiring as a "soldier of Love" (*Vixi puellis nuper idoneus / et militavi non sine gloria*), the aging poet is still ready to engage in a last love affair: *tange Chloen semel arrogantem,* of the surprising closing line.

(vii) One final remark: What is the part (if any) of the epithet of Lesbos, εὔκτιτος? Bowra (p. 285) first stated, "There is some mystery about εὐκτίτου. In a poem where everything else is pointed, it too should have a point. . . ." To chance then this interpretation: "Perhaps it is intended to convey a sense of security and established position, to show that the girl is not a slave who must do what Anacreon wants, but comes from a free home and can pick and choose. Or perhaps it is a sly dig at Lesbos, which is as well established in certain habits as it is in other ways." In his turn, A. E. Harvey (1957) suggested that Anacreon "wished to introduce a note of mock-solemnity": by using a more elevated phrase—"she *hails* from Lesbos"—the poet first "raises the girl for a moment out of her contemporary setting into a more dignified world" and "heroic times," then he destroys her in the closing line ("the girl is a Lesbian"). D. A. Campbell and Gerber quote Harvey's suggestion, the former with approval, the latter with noncommitment. Burzacchini too sees in this Homeric echo "un tono di arguta e scherzosa parodia" (p. 249).

I feel, however, that these scholars are going too far. The epic echo εὔκτιτος Lesbos[12] is here for the same reason for which the rest of

[12] As a matter of fact, εὔκτιτος Λέσβος is a blend, adapted to glyconics, of the Homeric ἐύκτιτον Αἰπύ (*Il.* 2.592; *Hymn. Apoll.* 423) and Λέσβον ἐυκτιμένην (*Il.* 9.129, 271), ἐυκτιμένηι ἐνὶ Λέσβωι (*Od.* 4.342, 17.133).

the epic, traditional echoes are in the poem: σφαίρῃ . . . πορφυρέῃ (*Odyssey* 8.372 f. σφαῖραν . . . / πορφυρέην) and χρυσοκόμης Dionysus (Hesiod *Theog.* 947 and West *ad loc.*), Apollo (Tyrtaeus 4 *test.* West; Pindar *Ol.* 6.41, 7.32), Eros (Euripid. *I.A.* 548 *lyr.*). In addition to being colorful, they are all part of the epic elevated diction, which is a cherished heritage for the early lyric poetry, beginning with Archilochus, "the apprentice of Homer."[13]

Consequently, if there is any point deriving from the epithet "finely built" or "well-established" Lesbos, it is likely to hint at the young lady's "elegance and refinement in matters of taste" (cf. ποικιλοσάμβαλος) and "sophistication and selectivity in matters of *love,*" since it is love our poem is talking about (Ἔρως συμπαίζειν προκαλεῖται). Anyway, it is Lesbos, not εὔκτιτος, which is crucial to the understanding of the closing line, πρὸς δ' ἄλλην τινὰ (sc. κόρην) χάσκει.[14]

(viii) To sum up, first, I have tried to demonstrate that the old interpretation propounded by Bruno Lavagnini (in 1932), and shared by Bowra, Page, D. A. Campbell, Gerber, and others, is the most likely one: κόρην, not κόμην, should be understood with ἄλλην τινά, and the implication that the young lady from Lesbos is, after all, a Lesbian cannot be avoided (ii, *a, b, c*). I think this interpretation is strengthened by my argument (iii) that the verb χάσκειν, when employed with πρός τινά, usually refers to an animate object (such as κόρην), and not an inanimate one (such as κόμην). Second, I have taken issue with some recent interpretations of the poem—notably with those of Giangrande and Gentili (1973) and Woodbury (1979)—and tried to show their unlikelihood (v–vi).

In conclusion, if we now ask about the possible reason for the poet's cruel jest with the girl, my guess would be that the poet's indiscretion and revenge are a consequence of his frustration. He has been courting the young lady for quite a time. The present tense of line 2 βάλλων (for the expected aorist βαλών) is best explained as iterative. The love god keeps hitting the poet with his love-ball; as a consequence, the poet is being love stricken every day, each time he meets the elegant

[13] Cf. M. Marcovich, *Eraclito: Frammenti* (Bibl. di Studi Superiori, Vol. 64, Florence 1978) 105 ad Fr.30 = Fr.42 Diels.

[14] Hermann Fränkel says about Anacreon's epithets: "So inhaltreich und gutgewählt die Attribute auch immer sind, hat doch die Regelmässigkeit ihres Auftretens in der immer gleichen Anzahl schon etwas von der allzu gekonnten Zierlichkeit der gleichzeitigen inselionischen Marmorkunst." *Wege und Formen frühgriechischen Denkens,* herausgegeben von Franz Tietze (2nd ed., München 1960) 60.

young girl from Lesbos. On her part, the girl persists in rejecting the poet while pretending, "You are too old for me!" Finally, the poet discovers the real reason for his rejection: "My rival is not a younger man, it is a girl." Hence his disappointment and frustration and a quick poetic revenge, "It figures. What else could one expect from a girl from Lesbos but to go gaping after another girl!"

It is equally possible that the poet had taken it for granted that a love affair between him and the girl had been prearranged and ordered by the god of love (Ἔρως με νήνι συμπαίζειν προκαλεῖται, cf. Theocritus 11.77). Now, by refusing to obey a mighty god, the poet may have felt, the girl deserves to be ridiculed. Whatever the reason for its existence, this short poem of Anacreon is a masterpiece of the epigrammatic elegance and pointedness.

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INTERPRETATIONS

ΟΦΡΑ, ΤΟΦΡΑ

Jeffers and Pepicello have discussed (*IF* 84 [1979] 1–16, esp. 4–6) the equivalence in rôle of ὅφρα and Lat. *ut* as conjunctions for the expression of purpose. It is noted (4 §2.3) that -φρα is an unexplained particle.

In a series of studies[1] I have analyzed Lat. *ut* and *ita* as (cor)relative and anaphoric collocations with an enclitic or affix of manner, **ku-tH* and **i-tH*. Now we know that the Greek equivalents, in a functional sense, of these two bases are ὁ- and το-, i.e. **io-* and **to-*. Therefore -φρα must represent a renewal of the manner clitic **-tH*.

It is easy now to see the semantics of φέρω φορά in the senses "conduct, motion, tendency, influence, occasion" in this enclitic. We suggest then that **-tH*, functionally akin to -ως, has been replaced by **bhṛ(-t)* > -φρα.[2]

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THE ASTRONOMICAL CRUX AT *GEORGICS* 4.234

In memoriam
Robert John Getty

Of the passages in which Virgil's competence in observational astronomy has been questioned, perhaps none has been more severely impugned than *Georgics* 4.231–35:

[1] Parasession on Diachronic Syntax (CLS 1976) 350 ff., *Festschrift for Oswald Szemerényi* (1979) I 349–50, Studii clasice 17 (1977) 147 ff., *Glotta* 60 (1982) 115–20.

[2] On the roots **bher-* see now *Zeitschrift für celtische Philologie* 39 (1982) 205–18.

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bis grauidos cogunt fetus, duo tempora messis:
Taygete simul os terris ostendit honestum
Pleas et Oceani spretos pede reppulit amnis,
aut eadem sidus fugiens ubi Piscis aquosi
tristior hibernas caelo descendit in undas.

With this note I hope to vindicate the astronomical accuracy of the Roman poet who devoted more verses to astronomy than did any other Latin writers except those taking it as their central theme.[1]

In the troublesome *Georgics* passage, Virgil notes first a springtime culling of honey "as soon as the Pleiad Taygete" has her morning rising, then adds, "or again when the same Pleiad, fleeing from the constellation of the watery Fish, descends from the sky with gloomier aspect into the wintry waves." What troubles commentators is the absence of any fishlike constellation set over against the Pleiades in such a way that it might fairly be said to pursue the renowned star-sisters as they by their morning setting signal the start of winter. All attempts to explain how Virgil could have so drastically misplaced Pisces or any stellar candidate yet proposed[2] for the pursuer's role have left me unpersuaded. Given the poet's firm control elsewhere in dealing with the risings and settings of stars, I have always believed that Virgil did not master and convey the more complex points of observational astronomy only to mistake altogether the position of Pisces at the Pleiades' setting.

At the same time, *Piscis* modified by *aquosi,* supposedly an ornamental epithet, has about it a certain un-Virgilian banality, since all fish—even "Empedocles' fiery fish"[3]—must by dint of their native

[1] Were it merely that, in keeping with the casual usage then current, Virgil scattered astral allusions like so much stardust among his verses, the effort to restore his credit here might seem misplaced. But in *Numeri Vergiliani: Studies in Eclogues and Georgics* (Coll. Latomus 63, 1963) 23–40, I have sought to demonstrate that the poet's usual care extended to his verses touching on astronomy, even those that have been thought inaccurate.

[2] The best account is that by Robert Getty in "Some Astronomical Cruces in the *Georgics,*" *TAPA* 79 (1948) 24–45, esp. 35–40. Though I now think unavailing my own previous effort, in *Numeri Vergiliani,* the brief there presented (note 1 above, 28) for regarding the text as suspect still holds.

[3] H. H. Huxley (*Virgil: Georgics I & IV* [1963] 164 *ad* 234) and others convey the epithetical quality of *aquosi* here by translating it "The Watery Fish," which of course points to the sense listed in the *OLD* s.v. *aquosus* 3: "Associated with water or the sea." "Empedocles' fiery fish" is J. Longrigg's coinage, in *JWI* 28 (1965) 314–15.

element be *aquosi*. Further, the meteorologically true[4] and prosaically natural expression would have attached the adjective to *sidus* (*ubi eadem sidus aquosum Piscis fugiens*). In his extended review of the risings and settings that demarcate the farmer's year, Pliny illustrates this normal Latin phrasing whenever in naming a given constellation by means of the periphrasis *sidus* + genitive (e.g., *Orionis*) he indicates the weather associated with it: *N.H.* 18.49.223 ". . . *sidus vehemens Orionis* . . ."; 18.69.287 ". . . *frigidum sidus Arcturi*. . . ."

It could, of course, be maintained that *aquosi* figures simply as a transferred epithet in our passage, and that has undoubtedly been its usual acceptation. But while the displaced adjective is elsewhere in Virgil often both semantically effective and structurally elegant (e.g., *Aen.* 5.139 *clara dedit sonitum tuba,* or 6.57 *Dardana qui Paridis derexti tela* . . .), *aquosi* here neither vivifies *Piscis* nor matches normal Virgilian word order as the metrically equivalent *Piscis fugiens ubi sidus aquosi,* though objectionable on other grounds, would have done. Still, *sidus fugiens ubi Piscis aquosum,* despite the good sense of *sidus* coupled with *aquosum* as well as their characteristic positioning,[5] leaves *Piscis* as unacceptable as ever, astronomically.

The origin of *Piscis* as a corruption, however, is so far easier to explain if an errant scribe, knowing the standard names of a number of constellations—the zodiacal signs reasonably included—substituted for a term inexplicable to himself one that at least conformed in gender to *aquosi*.[6] That Virgil must have designated *some* member of the zodiac

[4] W. Gundel in his article s.v. "Skorpios" (*RE* 5 [2nd ser., 1927] 598, 38–45) summarizes: "Die Witterungsprognosen der Kalendar kennzeichnen den S. als ein stürmisches, regenbringendes und kaltes Gestirn. Unter den typischen Attributen, mit denen die Astrologen den Charakter des S. zeichnen, werden die Epitheta χαλαζήεις ὑδατώδης βροντώδης den Kalendernotaten gerecht: Teukr.-Rhetor Catal. cod. astr. VII 205. Valens p. 10, 26 Kr. Nonn. Dion. IV 132 u. ö." More on the zodiacal sign as χαλαζήεις may be found in I. Gualandri, "Lo Scorpione ΧΑΛΑΖΗΕΙΣ di Nicandro," *RFIC* 106 (1978) 276–80; and as ὑδατώδης, in L. Aurigemma, *Le Signe Zodiacal du Scorpion* (1976) 38, n. 100.

[5] See T. E. V. Pearce, "The Enclosing Word Order in the Latin Hexameter. I," *CQ* N.S. 16 (1966) 152: "Virgil regularly separates a noun from its adjective, whether or not a syntactical unit is enclosed." Pearce documents the frequency with which an adjective before the penthemimeral caesura agrees with a noun at the end of the line (pp. 149–50); but a noun before this caesura agreeing with an adjective at verse end, as here proposed, often occurs: *Geo.* 4.232 *Taygete simul os terris ostendit honestum;* and cf. 4.230 *ora fove, fumosque manu praetende sequacis,* where *fumos* and *sequacis* in the verse are metrically placed exactly as *sidus* and *aquosum* would be in theirs.

[6] *Aquosum* would have been prone to suffer corruption first, because of its verse-final position and its possibly ligatured form there. As for the conscious "emendation" of

would seem to follow from the fact that he elsewhere employs *sidus* with the name of a constellation or with that of a zodiacal sign's tutelary deity only when alluding to the Sun as present in that asterism: *Ecl.* 10.68 *sub sidere Cancri; Aen.* 11.259–60 *triste Minervae / sidus.*[7] As Getty, of course, recognized,[8] Dryden understood the requirements, astronomically, at verse 234 and simply adjusted his translation accordingly:

> Again when their affrighted choir surveys
> The wat'ry Scorpion mend his pace behind. . . .

Though it is Orion who from Hesiod's time on (*Erga* 619–20)

> εὖτ' ἂν Πληιάδες σθένος ὄβριμον Ὠρίωνος
> φεύγουσαι πίπτωσιν ἐς ἠεροειδέα πόντον

was usually depicted as the immediate menace to the Pleiades, the giant hunter himself began to set even before the daughters of Atlas, for all that his brandished club or sword had still to sink when they had disappeared. Since Orion was said to set at the rising of his stellified vanquisher, the Scorpion, the Pleiades could well be thought to seek escape from the same mighty scourge of Earth and Heaven. The elements of observational astronomy here in question are similarly combined in Columella:

> Solis et adversos metuant Atlantides ortus.
> Atque ubi iam tuto necdum confisus Olympo

---

the preceding noun that *aquosi* in turn provoked, the scribe responsible is as likely to have been inspired by Ovid's *quotiensque repellit / ver hiemem, Piscique Aries succedit aquoso*" (*Met.* 10.164–65) as an astronomically erroneous *Piscis aquosi* in Virgil is *unlikely* to have been converted to an astronomically valid use by a poet notoriously weak on the stars (Sir James Frazer, *Ovid: Fasti* [Loeb Libr. 1931] xx–xxi). Yet Ovid is regularly credited with a re-use of Virgil's flawed original, and a correct one at that, since Aries opening the Spring does follow "watery Piscis."

The misreading of both *Pestis* and *aquosum*, however, may be traceable to "physical damage in a prearchetypal source," which E. Courtney, "The Formation of the Text of Vergil," *BICS* 28 (1981) 13–29, esp. 16–17, has posited in precisely our section of *Georgics* IV, where no palaeographical motive accounts for the displacement (as Bentley saw) of verses 203–5 from their original position following line 197, and (as Bentley and Schrader alike recognized) of verses 236–38, originally after line 230.

[7] This allusion to Minerva's constellation reflects the system—known from Diodorus (2.30), Manilius (2.434–52), the Gabii altar (H. Stern, in *Encyclopedia of World Art* 2 [1960] col. 51, Pl. 22), and two rustic menologies (*CIL* I², part 1, 280)—whereby each sign of the zodiac was ruled by one of the Twelve Gods.

[8] Note 2 above, 36–37.

Sed trepidus profugit chelas et spicula Phoebus
Dira Nepae. . . . (*De re rust.* 10.54–57)

But granted that Virgil could not accommodate the cretic in *Scorpionis* to his hexameters, it is metrically impossible that (where we read *Piscis*) he wrote the synonymous *Nepae* like Columella, though the MSS of the latter's agricultural treatise suggest how easily this word of perhaps African origin suffered corruption.[9] I propose, therefore, that our poet preferred to signal the great Scourge in the skies by a suitably characterizing *Pestis*.[10] This is the word that Manilius sets in chiastic apposition to Scorpio at *Astr.* 2.228–29:

pestisque duorum
praedatorque Leo *et* dumosis Scorpius aruis—

as Housman's note *ad* 229 makes clear.[11]

Although Ovid (*Her.* 9.61) could term the lion of Heracles' first labor *pestis Nemeaea*, Housman is undoubtedly correct in associating *pestis* with *Scorpius* here. In the same note he cites the prosaic Pliny (*N.H.* 11.30.86), who equally describes Scorpio's earthly prototypes as an oppressive plague, *pestis importuna*. Certainly the scorpion is the

[9] Two of the major MSS, S and A, read *negat*. It is out of the question, of course, that *Piscis* might have replaced *Scorpii*, if only because "il n'y a point chez Virgile de longues authentiques élidées entre les brèves d'un dactyle": J. Soubiran, *L'élision dans la poésie latine* (1966) 310.

[10] To designate the *sign*, that is; the full constellation figure looms still larger, stretching some 54° from the most westerly star of Ptolemy's Claws to the most easterly in the tail of his Scorpion, as E. J. Webb notes in *The Names of the Stars* (1953) 167, n. 1; cf. Gundel (note 4 above) col. 591, 3–18.

I made room for the possibility that Virgil's still uncorrupted text had *signified* Scorpio by MARTIS, even when in *Studies* (note 1 above) 29–31 I ultimately preferred the reading *Fustis* (the cudgel in Orion's right hand and actual instrument of the threat he posed the Pleiades). But if my appreciation of Virgilian usage in the phrase *sidus* + genitive, and of the need for some word connoting Scorpio directly, has grown in the interim, my adherence to what is palaeographically credible in considering emendations in the text of Virgil is also closer now, if possible. I could at present imagine PISCIS supplanting MARTIS (in token of Scorpio's *tutela*) only when it had first lost its T: once MARIS arose, its metrical anomaly might conceivably have induced a scribe to adopt PISCIS (available from a marginal gloss on *sidus . . . maris aquosi?*).

[11] A. E. Housman, *M. Manilii Astronomicon* II² (1937) 23; see also the *app. crit. ad* 228: "*pestis* Gronouius obs. III c.15, *positi GL, posid* M, *positis* cod. Cusanus, *hostis* Scaliger," but a consensus in favor of *pestis* has been reached.

most dangerous pest in the Western hemisphere, where in a short period 25,000 deaths have been traced to its sting.[12] While the more lethal species of Old World scorpions are found south of Europe, the sting of *Buthus occitanus* in Italy and Greece has, according to Keller, "nur ganz ausnahmsweise den Tod eines Menschen zur Folge . . . , aber immerhin ist das Tier zu fürchten."[13]

Thus, a Virgilian audience, accustomed by local menace as well as by the very myth of Orion's death to regard the scorpion as formidable, would readily have understood the reference on encountering *sidus . . . Pestis aquosum.* Similarly, Avienius expected *his* readers to appreciate that *venenatum monstrum* (*Aratea Phaen.* 1152) signified "Scorpio." Our poet could count on being comprehended the more because Romans were accustomed not only to associating the Pleiades' morning rising and setting with the start of summer and winter, respectively, but also to linking seasonal turnings with the Sun's presence in the appropriate sign, here Scorpio.[14] If in addition it is true that by his choice of *Pestis* Virgil has made it possible for his hearer to take the phrase as meaning "when the Sun is in the rainy sign of [or portending] pestilence," that is the affair of those who subscribe to astrology.[15] It would even be open to the traditionalist who sought the Pleiades' pursuer in Orion to construe *Pestis* as allusion to that mythic scourge of all wild beasts and, in one version (Apollod. *Bibl.* 1.27; Arat. *Phaen.* 637–44), pesterer of

[12] Fatalities from scorpion sting numbered about 2000 in Mexico alone as recently as 1946: L. Mazzotti and M. A. Bravo-Becherelle, in *Venomous and Poisonous Animals and Noxious Plants of the Pacific Region* (eds. H. Keegan and W. V. MacFarlane, 1963) 120–21, 129.

[13] Otto Keller, *Die Antike Tierwelt* 2 (1913) 471–72. Altogether graver is the toxicity of Androctonus australis' sting, "almost equal to that of a cobra": J. L. Cloudsley-Thompson, *Spiders, Scorpions, Centipedes and Mites* (1968) 98.

[14] As witness, e.g., Varro, *De r. r.* 1.28.1: *Dies primus est veris in aquario, . . . hiemis in scorpione.*

[15] Gundel in his *RE* article (note 4 above) col. 589, 57–61, rightly held it to be very questionable whether the true origin of the constellation name lies in the "üblichen Erklärung, dass hier ein Symbol der im Herbst herrschenden Krankheiten gegeben sei." But even without tracing the recognition of a stellar Scorpion—which the hyper-skeptical Fotheringham (Webb [note 10 above] 136) granted to resemble its namesake—to the ills prevalent in Autumn, one may recognize the naturalness, among believers in the harmony between things celestial and things terrestrial, of making Scorpio the presiding asterism of pestilences of every sort.



Artemis herself.[16] At all events, a phrase that in its emended form lends itself to multiply valid interpretations merits consideration as being the more characteristically Virgilian.[17]

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NOTES ON THE BOBBIO SCHOLIA*

Portions of a fourth or fifth century commentary on Cicero's speeches were published by Angelo Mai in 1814 from a palimpsest in the monastery of Bobbio. The standard edition is that of Thomas Stangl in *Ciceronis orationum scholiastae* (Vienna 1912), following that of Paul Hildebrandt in the Teubner series (1907). Lemmata are cited from it by page and line.

77.4 'In Autronium testimonium dixisti' inquit, 'Sullam defendis' et relicum. (*Sull.* 10)

Acutissimum torquet δίλημμα prope ad vim dialecticorum, ut *adversarii propositio* utrimque conclusa teneatur.

The tralatician change of *propositione* in C (the palimpsest) to *propositio* is a mistake. Cicero puts a dilemma into his opponent's mouth so that he himself is caught either way. The note goes on to show how cleverly he gets out of his own trap: *Huic ita factae propositioni opponitur, ut animadvertis, acuta responsio.* No textual change is necessary. However, I rather suspect that the scholiast wrote *adversarius* (*-ri'*). *ut . . . teneatur* would then be general, following *ad vim dialecticorum,* not specific to this particular case.

[16] For Virgil's use of *pestis* for scourges in human form, see *Aen.* 11.792–93, where Arruns invokes Apollo's aid against Camilla: ". . . *haec dira meo dum vulnere pestis / pulsa cadat, patrias remeabo inglorius urbes*"; cf. *Aen.* 3.620.

[17] I wish to thank my colleague and friend Agnes K. Michels for reading and commenting on a draft of this paper.

* I have to thank my colleague, Professor Badian, for valuable criticisms.

79.17 Quod tandem, Torquate, 'regnum'? Consulatus, credo, mei: in quo ego imperavi nihil. (*Sull.* 21)

Cumulaturus invidiam Torquatus in personam M. Tullii et hoc dixerat, quodam illum spiritu velut regiae potestatis exposcere ut Sylla innocens iudicetur. Itaque . . . statim . . . consulatum suum talia edidisse moderationis et continentiae et virtutis exempla, ut non ipse rex, sed aliis regnum adfectantibus esset inimicus. Qua exsecutione simul et invidia liberat auctoritatem suam et *impenetrabilius* facit quod ad *Syllae victoriam* locuturus est.

The obvious correction *impetrabilius* (= *efficacius*) merely restores C's reading to the text, from which Hildebrandt had unwisely removed it. *Syllae victoriam* is another old "correction" of *Syllam victoriae* in C, embraced by editors who thought no further than the grammar. True, in s. 72 Cicero does refer briefly to L. Sulla's victory (*in illa gravi L. Sullae turbulentaque victoria*) and to the admirable behavior of his nephew. But how could Cicero's rebuttal of Torquatus' taunt about his own *regnum* lend weight to what he was going to say on that particular subject? The corruption must lie deeper. Try *ad Syll<ae innocenti>am oratorie.* That will refer to the highly rhetorical peroration (83 ff.). *oratorie* is a favorite word with the scholiast (see Hildebrandt's index verborum).

94.1 . . . Vehementer congeminavit, ut attentiores animos iudicum faceret, quo magis universae rei p. providerent, ne bene meritis civibus virtus sua non *gratiam praemii* sed materiam periculi compararet.

praemiis C. *gratiam praemii* should mean "gratitude for a reward," which is nonsense; compare the passages with which this one is associated in *Thes.* (VI.2216.30). *gratiae praemia,* "rewards in the form of gratitude," will have been assimilated by the copyist to *materiam periculi.* So far as sense goes, *gratiam et praemia* would do equally well.

97.23 . . . offensas privatae indignationis ulcisci, qui moleste ferant se Flacco iudicante perpessos.

Perpessos requires an object, perhaps *damna* (cf. Aug. *Epist.* 157 [correct *Thes.* V.1.30.74].35 *pecuniaria damna perpetienda sunt*). But as pointed out by Professor Badian, the simplest change would be *qui* to *quas.*

101.17 *Absenti* inquit *Flacco* decreta laudatio est: ergo nihil invitis extorsit vel gratia vel potestate, cum absens esset. At ceterae

civitates *praesenti Laelio,* cogenti opibus magnis et *obstinata* necessitate suadenti magis est ut succubuerint ad obsequium mendacii.

What is *obstinata necessitas?* Read *ostentata.*

106.28 Verum fuit haec Valeria de libertis Flacci, ac propterea in legitima tutela quasi aput patronum habebatur, nec videri poterat iure in manum convenisse, cum hic ei tutor legitimus auctor non fuerit, et ideo hereditas ad hunc Flaccum legitimo iure *pervenerit.*

cum . . . fuerit is causal, giving the reason why Valeria could not be *in manu.* But *et ideo* sqq. is a statement of fact, deduced from the previous statement *nec . . . convenisse,* and requires an indicative, *pervenerat* or *pervenit.*

119.29 Consideremus itaque ad coniecturam duplicem sic praemunitam . . . , ut et personam P. Clodi ad locandas inimico insidias idoneam faciat et causas faciendi validissime instruat et alia semina futurarum quaestionum ad defensionem Milonis pertinentium ἐκ τοῦ . . . praemuniat sollertissime, utque, ita *moratus,* nec ullo *emolumento* provocatus existimetur illud facinus cogitasse.

C has *ita moderatus nec ullo molumento prouocatus,* on which Stangl's efforts to improve were altogether misdirected. Hildebrandt's addition of *non* before *cogitasse* is equally useless. In ss. 24 f. of *Pro Milone,* Cicero sets out Clodius' motives for attempting to kill Milo; he is not arguing at this point that Milo had not planned to kill Clodius. The subject of *existimetur* is Clodius, not Milo, and the only textual change required is *meditatus* for *moderatus:* "and that so he may be thought to have planned the crime, deliberately and unprovoked by any attempt [on Milo's part]." Cf. *Thes.* sv. *molimentum:* "i.q. actus moliendi, conatus, nisus, labor, machinatio." *Ille* for or before *ita,* suggested by Professor Badian, would make the meaning clearer.

132.15 Legum cum earum quae latae, tum vero quae promulgatae fuerunt. (*Sest.* 55)

Saepe hanc ostendi promulgatae legis et latae differentiam. Nam trinundino proponebantur, ut in notitiam populi pervenirent: quo exacto tempore *ferebant iuris* validi firmitatem.

So Ziegler. C has *ferebant uris,* obviously for *ferebantur in iuris.* That

Mai (1828) and Orelli so read will not be learned from Hildebrandt or Stangl.

142.14 . . . idem tamen ostracismo [damnatus], quod erat aput Athenienses <poenae genus>, proditionis absens damnatus Corcyram demigravit.

A verb is needed to replace *damnatus*. Ostracism is regarded as a form of exile, but Themistocles' *damnatio* came later. My guess: *ostracismo [damnatus], quod erat aput Athenienses <exilii genus, multatus, postea>*[1] *proditionis* sqq., based on Nep. *Arist.* 1.2 *a Themistocle collabefactus testula illa exilio decem annorum multatus est, Cim.* 3.1 *testarum suffragis, quod illi* ὀστρακισμὸν *vocant, decem annorum exilio multatus est.* Cf. 143.3 *in exilium decennii actus est* (sc. *Aristides*).

142.25 Quoniam curiosius de Themistocle diximus eorum gratia qui litteris etiam secretioribus delectantur, breviter consideremus et *Miltiadi stemma.*

The scholiast's note gives no information about Miltiades' ancestry other than his father's name, and the foregoing note on Themistocles does not give even that. Read *Miltiadis lemma.* For *lemma* = "theme" (*argumentum*) cf. 169.1 *lacrimosis lemmatibus iam perorat* and LSJ λῆμμα III, *Thes.* s.v. Here perhaps "story," as in Auson. *Epist.* 12.90 *nutricis inter lemmata.* According to grammarians the genitive in *-is* was normal in the scholiast's time (Charis. *G.L.K.* I.67.21–68.2, 132.17–24, Prisc. *G.L.K.* II.246.16–247.2). He has *Themistocli* three times (142.2, 12; 143.3), but *Mithridatis* (95.32), *Asclepiadis* (100.34), and *Tigranis* (119.1). *Aristidi* (143.1) is quoted from Cicero (*Sest.* 141), whose manuscripts have *Aristidis.*

153.2 Nam cum P. Clodii, tribuni plebi, inimici sui, lege aqua et igni interdictus urbe cessisset et Macedoniam petisset nullis opem ferentibus *qui* Clodianam potentiam graviter extimescebant, prolixa benignitate et fide non minore quaestoris Cn. Plancii sustentatus est.

Read *quia.*

155.20 Aliquid praeterea—timide dicam, sed tamen dicendum est: aliquid adtulimus etiam nos. (*Planc.* 24)

. . . Necessario *temperavit* gratiam suam non mediocriter

[1] I had written *mox,* but Professor Badian pointed out that this word does not occur in the scholia.

Plancio profuisse, quando vir consularis testimonium beneficiorum in se conlatorum perhibens candidato multum potuerat promovere.

What is *temperavit* supposed to mean? The lacuna of twelve or thirteen letters before *necessario* may represent a Greek word, ἐπιδιόρθωσις or ἐπιθεράπευσις (Stangl). But perhaps *dicere* has fallen out: *dicere necessario temptavit;* cf. 101.7 *eam temptaverat accusator falsam dicere,* 92.18 *temptaverat Crassus adseverare,* 160.14 *negare itaque temptavit accusari posse lege Licinia Plancium.*

157.21 . . . valde inpiam Laterensis propositionem, qui candidato plus inpedimenti ex persona patris esse debuisse dixerit quam favoris, pro *regio* naturae.

"Pro regia *vel* imperiosa eius [*scil.* patris] natura *intellege*" Stangl. This, like *privilegio naturae* (Mai, Orelli) and *pro religione naturae* (Ziegler, Hildebrandt), being manifestly unacceptable, I fancy the original held nothing more out of the way than *pro lege naturae. Regio* may possibly have resulted from a stray glance at *ratio* in 1.26.

164.17 . . . nec non etiam iuxta praecepta sapientium, qui animos ingratorum non parum cuidam crimini obnoxios arbitrantur, quando et parentibus et amicis et protectoribus salutis nostrae hoc testimonium debeamus, nos, in quantum potest, gratos adprobare *proximis.*

Proximis (Stangl) for *possimus* (which should simply be deleted) is nugatory. Gratitude is conventionally due to some of our nearest and dearest, but not, for example, from father to son or from brother to sister. The former vulgate *velimus* is rhythmically offensive, as Stangl pointed out.

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THE ECHO OF A CHASTE OBSCENITY: VERG. *E.*VI.26 AND SYMM. *EP.*VI.22.1

I

No name is more closely connected with the support and cultivation of Latin letters in the fourth century than that of Symmachus. Drawing on the learning evident in the correspondence and *Relationes,* Symmachus' defense of the altar of Victory, his (idealized) presence in Macrobius' *Saturnalia,* and the hints given by the famous subscriptions to Livy, students of late antique culture have portrayed Symmachus (and his "circle") as the last bulwark of the pagan literary tradition.[1] There is reason to think, however, that such portraits may be rather overdrawn;[2] and in all of them Symmachus certainly wears a face too unrelievedly grim. I would like, in this note, to draw attention to a different, more casual use that Symmachus makes of his learning, involving a reminiscence of Vergil which has gone unremarked.

In *Ep.*VI.22.1 f., Symmachus writes to his (daughter and) son-in-law, Nicomachus Flavianus, concerning a lawsuit which has been stirred up against the latter:

> dura commotio est, quam gignit iniuria, sed mollire debet dolorem medicina patientiae. nec deest vobis usus adversa tolerandi, nam crebro ictum fortunae ferre didicistis. quod si in secundis rebus ageretis, iure insolitis malis felicitas laederetur. haec eo scribo, ut miratum me scias, quod constantiam tuam lis privata mutaverit, quam sub adfinium nomine . . . Baiani litoris persultator animavit. sed illi aliud mercedis erit, causae autem vestrae propugnaculum iudiciale non defuit. . . .

[1] On the literary reminiscences in Symmachus' works, W. Kroll, *De Q. Aurelii Symmachi studiis Graecis et Latinis* (Diss. Breslau 1891). For estimates of Symmachus' place in the literary and religious culture of the late fourth century, see (among more recent studies) H. Bloch, "The Pagan Revival in the West at the End of the Fourth Century," in A. Momigliano (ed.), *The Conflict between Paganism and Christianity in the Fourth Century* (Oxford 1963) 207 ff.; F. Klingner, *Römische Geisteswelt*[4] (Munich 1961) 528 ff.; F. Paschoud, *Roma Aeterna* (1967) 100 ff.; R. Klein, *Symmachus: Eine tragische Gestalt des ausgehenden Heidentums* (Darmstadt 1971) 67 ff.; R. W. Markus, "Paganism, Christianity and the Latin Classics in the Fourth Century," in J. W. Binns (ed.), *Latin Literature of the Fourth Century* (London 1974) 1 ff.

[2] See esp., on the "pagan revival," Alan Cameron, "Paganism and Literature in Late Fourth Century Rome," in M. Fuhrmann (ed.), *Christianisme et formes littéraires de l'antiquité tardive en occident,* Entretiens sur l'antiquité classique 23 (Geneva 1977) 1 ff.; on the subscriptions, J. E. G. Zetzel, "The Subscriptions in the Manuscripts of Livy and Fronto and the Meaning of *Emendatio,*" *CP* 75 (1980) 38 ff.

Writing in 395,[3] Symmachus alludes (*usus adversa tolerandi / ictum fortunae ferre didicistis*) to the disasters that had befallen the family of Flavianus in the preceding year and urges his son-in-law to show the same *constantia* in dealing with this private matter that he had previously displayed in facing his family's public misfortunes. Symmachus then dismisses the troublemaker with a flick (note the striking and contemptuous phrase, *Baiani litoris persultator:* "that fellow who prances about on the shore at Baiae") and goes on to give encouraging news of the suit.

The point of interest is the clause that Symmachus uses—*sed illi aliud mercedis erit*—when he touches on Flavianus' tormentor. The last three words should really be set in quotation marks (*sed illi "aliud mercedis erit"*), for the clause is an unmistakable borrowing from Vergil (*E.* VI.25–26), Silenus' promise to the meddling nymph Aegle:

> "carmina quae vultis cognoscite: carmina vobis,
> *huic aliud mercedis erit.*" simul incipit ipse. . . .

As well-bred schoolboys were regularly told when they came to those lines, that clause was Vergil's modest way of having Silenus threaten with *stuprum* the nymph who had instigated his binding.[4] Plainly Symmachus had not forgotten the lesson,[5] and he evidently turned it to his advantage when he came to think of the meddling instigator of Flavianus' suit. What better way for a gentleman to threaten an enemy ("But he'll get *his*") while maintaining the proper tone of voice?[6]

[3] O. Seeck, *Aurelii Symmachi quae supersunt, MGH, Auctorum Antiquissimorum* VI.1 (Berlin 1883) clxii.

[4] See Servius ad *E.* VI.26, HVIC ALIVD MERCEDIS ERIT nymphae minatur stuprum latenter: quod verecunde dixit Vergilius. For Vergil's restraint, contrasted with the greater frankness of Theocritus, see also Servius ad *E.* II.51, III.8 (similarly ad *G.* III.135 [contrasted with Lucretius], ad *A.* IX.801 [contrasted with Homer]).

[5] As he of course remembered other bits of scholastic lore: with *Ep.* III.44.2 (a critique of "archaism": an si nobis scribenda sit forensis oratio, Iovem deosque ceteros Catonis lege praefabimur, ne nobis vitio detur vel neglegentia antiquitatis vel inscitia? atqui praestat Tullium sequi, qui ignorata maioribus usurpat exordia), compare Servius ad *A.* VII.259 (DI NOSTRA INCEPTA SECVNDENT antiquo more locuturus de publicis rebus . . . facit ante deorum commemorationem, sicut etiam in omnibus Catonis orationibus legimus) and XI.301 (PRAEFATVS DIVOS more antiquo: nam maiores nullam orationem nisi invocatis numinibus inchoabant, sicut sunt omnes orationes Catonis et Gracchi . . . unde Cicero per inrisionem ait [*div. Caec.* 43] "si quid ex vetere aliqua oratione 'Iovem ego optimum maximum . . .' ").

[6] The reminiscence is clinched by *aliud,* opposed to *carmina* in *E.* VI.26 but without a corresponding antithesis in Symmachus' passage, where it is motivated solely

No doubt the equally well-bred Flavianus caught his father-in-law's risqué allusion and derived an extra frisson of satisfaction from the recollection of the Vergilian context. We see here another use to which a classical education might be put, as Vergil's *verecundia* provides a way of expressing refined abuse; and it is probably worth bearing the turn of phrase in mind when our image of Symmachus becomes a shade too solemn.

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by the Vergilian antecedent. My thanks to Robert Renehan and the referee of *AJP* for pointing this out and for other helpful remarks.

REVIEW ARTICLE

LOUIS GERNET. The Anthropology of Ancient Greece. Translated by John D. B. Hamilton, SJ, and Blaise Nagy. Baltimore and London, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981. Pp. xiii + 378. $24.50.

There are certain authors who are not only worth knowing, but who confer a certain credit on those who know them. Those who have independently discovered them feel a mutual bond. Georg Simmel, for instance, is a writer of this kind; no one "discovers" Max Weber, but Simmel comes to many as a discovery. Louis Gernet also falls into this category. Some of us discovered him through his editions of Antiphon, Lysias, and Demosthenes, which, taken off the shelf merely because they were conveniently available in the Budé edition, turned out to include unusually illuminating introductory materials and notes. We then began to look about for what else he had written and found a slim monograph on the Athenian grain trade, which is a minor classic in economic history, some collected essays on Greek law, and, most notably, a collection of essays entitled *Anthropologie de la grèce antique*. This last collection was published after Gernet's death, edited by Gernet's most influential discoverer, Jean-Pierre Vernant, with the assistance of Vernant's younger colleague, Marcel Detienne. The publication of this collection in English provides an occasion for reflection on Gernet's contribution to the study of ancient society—a topic which has, however, already been elegantly treated by Sally Humphreys ("The Work of Louis Gernet," *History and Theory* 10 [1971] 172–96). There is no point in doing over again what Humphreys has already done so well; here it may be appropriate to offer a more informal and personal assessment of the qualities of Gernet's mind and the possible rewards he offers readers who for the first time find his work available in English.

The essays in this volume are arranged by topic, but one forms a much clearer impression of the author if they are read in chronological order of publication. Gernet's development was slow, and it is interesting to follow it. If he has a special place in French intellectual life, it is partly because he did something French intellectuals rarely do: he left Paris for a prolonged period. Gernet's career in fact falls into three marked phases. In his first 35 years he completed, with great distinction, the normal process of a French higher education and established himself as one of the promising younger members of the school of *L'Année sociologique*, whose intellectual master was Emile Durkheim. Then, in 1917, he went to Algiers, where he spent the 30 years of the *entre-deux-guerres* and World War II. Only at the age of 66 did he begin to teach in Paris; here the young Vernant discovered him in person, in his seminars, in which, as Vernant once said, Gernet uttered "pas d'un mot banal." Gernet is, as Humphreys says, the link between the *Année sociologique* school, which was the most influential school of French social theory in its time, and the school of J-P. Vernant, which is probably the most influential school of classical studies now at work. (These estimates of influence are mine, not Humphreys'.) But he

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is a link whose personal synthesis was established in a period of isolation and withdrawal.

The essays in this volume fall into two chronological groups, divided by a gap roughly corresponding to the war. A reader prepared to be entranced is likely to find the first group somewhat disappointing. The learning is impressive; in a field in which it sometimes seems that all the evidence has been cited and discussed too many times, Gernet constantly finds unfamiliar items in out of the way places and uses them to establish fresh connections. Unquestionably also we are in the presence of a resourceful and original mind. But the whole is somehow out of focus; when we finish an essay we are left wondering just what point it is trying to make.

We may take as typical the essay "Dolon the Wolf," the only one of these early essays that Gernet himself intended to republish. The starting point here is the description in the *Rhesus* of Dolon disguising himself as a wolf. Gernet then brings before us other moments in Greek myth and ritual in which men dressed as wolves or became wolves. Some of these involve initiation, particularly of warriors; others seem to involve the identification of the wolf with an evil spirit, perhaps even a grotesque representation of death, who must be driven out. So perhaps the *Rhesus* preserves relics of one or both of these more primitive beliefs.

This is the sort of thesis we call "suggestive," by which we generally mean that it makes us think, but we don't know what to make of it. It is not a statement about the *Rhesus* as a meaningful work of art. On the other hand, we are not offered any plausible or coherent reconstruction of this more primitive stage, much less any notion of where to place it in time or space. What is the connection between initiation and the exclusion of demonic forces? It is not that this question has no answers but that Gernet does not answer it. He seems at times to assume that to call something a "survival" is to explain it.

This whole rhetoric of "survivals," "relics," and "reminiscences" was of course not invented by Gernet; it goes back at least to the generation of Durkheim's teacher, N. M. Fustel de Coulanges. Fustel at least worked out a coherent, if largely fanciful, picture of the original condition of mankind, the condition from which these survivals survive. His successors were more responsible and thus became vaguer; the "primitive" became for them a kind of historical *au-delà*, a time about which (since it was by definition earlier than any evidence we have for it) nothing could be really known, but which was at the same time somehow explanatory of, and more interesting than, the periods for which we do have evidence. Culture-history has perhaps still not absorbed the lesson taught the linguists by Saussure: that diachronic change takes place between synchronically coherent systems, so that synchronic analysis must precede research into origins. In culture-history this is made complicated by the fact that much of culture consists of a picture of the past and a language for relating it to the present; this does not mean that a culture "preserves" in some mechanical way its previous forms.

The last period of Gernet's work was inaugurated by three essays published in this volume: "The Origins of Greek Philosophy" (1945), "The Mythical Idea of Value" (1948), and "Law and Prelaw in Ancient Greece" (1948–49). Here we are suddenly in the presence of a mature mind, one sure of itself, of its

methods, and of an overall vision of history which provides a firm context for particular analyses. These three essays, in fact, form the core of Gernet's work; in themselves they would be enough to make him an important figure, and since they are interrelated they convey, taken together, the overall vision.

All three essays are concerned with transformations. The first deals with the invention of philosophy, seen as the shift from a world in which wisdom is something sacred, revealed to the inspired and shared with the initiate, to a world of demythologized discourse which presumes the existence of an "intelligible reality. By such a standard knowledge could go beyond the pragmatism of technical skill and the subjectivity of dreams and illusions" (p. 352). Philosophy is thus seen as the foundation of science.

The second essay deals with the invention of money, seen broadly as the shift from use value, which is qualitative, to exchange value, which is quantitative—providing that "use value" be understood not only as practical utility, but also the mystification of objects as the carrier of sacred powers. It is this latter aspect of pre-monetary value which most interests Gernet; it involves a whole range of sentiments—for example, what is valuable is also dangerous. Here we can see clearly the connection with Durkheim, for whom the sacred was primarily that which cannot be touched. The shift to money value, in turn, is seen as an aspect of a general demystification of social relationships.

The third essay deals with the invention of law—seen as the gradual process whereby public space comes into existence and the public begins to take charge of a notion of legality previously "satisfied in traditional legal fulfillments—that is, in activity that is totally private and, in a way, a priori legitimate" (p. 173). This shift, however, is not merely the transfer of old powers to new agencies; it involves a reconception of legitimacy, which is now demythologized and relativized: "human representations and human expressions of will . . . appear as the true conditions of power or obligation" (p. 200). The development of law is equivalent to the development of the city-state, and the city-state, for Gernet, is not only a new social form, but also a new intellectual atmosphere. It generates, in effect, a new metaphysic. "Law . . . had to organize a new system . . . in which causality and time take on new meanings" (p. 201).

These three transformations, therefore, are really the same transformation seen in three different levels: intellectual, economic, and juridical. The general shift is from the sacred to the secular, from myth to reason. This shift has been, of course, the central concern of modern social theory; it has been talked about in a myriad of ways, each of which catches different aspects of it and establishes different connections: as the shift from status to contract, or from *Gemeinschaft* to *Gesellschaft,* or from folk society to urban society. Applying somewhat crudely Weber's familiar triad, we may say for Gernet the shift is from the traditional to the rational, with the transitional phase characterized, on each level, by the charismatic. Between traditional religiosity and rational science stands the charismatic or prophetic philosophy of Parmenides, Pythagoras, and Empedocles; between use value and money value stands the charismatic value associated with gifts and prizes; between traditional norms and positive law stands the charismatic status represented by Agamemnon's scepter, by a kind of oath which creates the fact it declares, and in general by a situation in which the public is compelled to recognize claims which the public cannot even so control, since they retain their original magical force.

Gernet was able to make a particular contribution to our understanding of these issues partly because he approached them, not as a general theorist, but as a historian and a Hellenist. He was interested, not so much in the general transformation, as in the transitional stage. He asks not only when did we moderns begin to be modern, how did the West become Western? but also, at the crisis of the transformation what were the conditions of life? He describes the nascent city-state not merely as a stage to something else, but as a society habitable in its own right. Gernet thus places these issues firmly in history—not the vague history of the difference between "now" and an indefinite "then," but a history which can, at least in principle, mention names and dates. His analysis as he left it is sketchy, and the choronology is extremely tentative. For him the crucial shift between prelaw and law occurs when the group begins to assert its sovereign power to determine, not merely witness, social relations; Gernet associates this shift with the establishment of the polis, which he would put as early as 800 B.C. Philosophy, obviously, he placed much later, and the origins of science not before the late fifth or early fourth centuries B.C. The monetization of value sometimes seems to be connected with the revival of Greek commerce, therefore as early as 750 B.C., sometimes with the introduction of currency some two hundred years later, sometimes with the alienability of land, which Gernet would not admit before the very end of the fifth century (a point discussed in his essay on "Mortgage *Horoi*"). It is not that Gernet produced a detailed social history of early Greece, but that, by his way of approaching the problem, he opens before us the possibility of producing one. He leaves us the challenge of developing a concrete understanding of these changes in terms of particular people, times, and places.

Gernet has a (very French) taste for abstract formulation, but he approaches his material with the temperament of a social historian. He understands that history does not happen all at once, but gradually, in phases, unevenly in different districts, and incompletely. Rational values never fully replace traditional (life would probably be unlivable if they did), and, especially in the sphere of the law, Gernet is well aware that the charismatic origins of rational procedures retain, even in our own day, a residual power. General formulations of the difference between "now" and "then" therefore have only heuristic worth: They induce us to ask new questions of the evidence, to look for differences, and to think more deeply about the difference the differences make.

In this connection it is interesting to compare Gernet with Karl Polanyi, who in America at least has been far more influential. The two men were roughly contemporary, and Gernet's inquiries into the history of value in many respects parallel Polanyi's work, even though, as far as I can tell, neither man influenced the other. Both take as their starting point Marcel Mauss' epoch-making "Essai sur le don," and both contrast market-exchange with gift-exchange. Both are forms of social relation, but in market-exchange the relationship is entered into for the sake of the commodity, while in gift-exchange the commodity is exchanged for the sake of the relationship. Market-exchange is normally immediate and relatively unproductive of other types of relation between the parties, whereas gift-exchange, which normally involves a delay between gift and counter-gift, is productive of a broad range of associated relations. Gifts may be offered unilaterally, and it is difficult to refuse them;

they impose on the recipient, further, the obligation of a counter-gift even if unwanted in the first place. All this would be more or less common ground between Polanyi and Gernet. For Polanyi, however, gift-exchange is the elementary form of exchange; he found it in the ethnographers, particularly Malinowski, and supposed it to be primitive. Gernet remarked that in gift-exchange a commodity is already valued against a commodity, and that this is halfway to market-exchange.The commodity becomes a symbol, and this is halfway to money, where it becomes a sign. Of course certain objects, the *sacra,* had always had symbolic meaning, but in gift-exchange, as we find it in Greek myth, "the relationship with religious objects is reversible. It is not only because an object has a religious use that it has value; it is because it is precious that it can be consecrated" (p. 103). Thus, Gernet thought of gift-exchange as characteristic of a specific social stage, in which traditional relationships are becoming less certain, and therefore need to be symbolized and in this way asserted, reinforced. "Such conditions favored a certain diffusion of the 'external signs of wealth.' Because these signs are no longer the privileged possession of a class in which the heritage of mythical kingship and the power of these symbols survive, economic value begins to impose itself. . . . Thus the way is made clear for the revolution created in the life and thought of society by the advent of money" (p. 106).

Gernet's interpretation of gift-exchange has consequences for our understanding of the relation between the tradition and its historical context. In Homer, for instance, particularly in the *Odyssey,* gift-exchange is important. M. I. Finley, who was much influenced by Polanyi, sees this as an archaic element in the poems; by Gernet's reading of the institution we may rather see the insistence of gift-exchange as characteristic of the period of the monumental composition of the poems, which was also the period of the revival of Greek commerce and the first beginnings of the city-state. From the point of view of Homer, therefore, gift-exchange is not an "archaic" but a "contemporary" feature. And while Gernet does not say this, it would be consistent with his analysis to further generalize this point and see the assertion in the Homeric poems of heroic values as characteristic of a period of social change, of a transitional "charismatic" phase.

Polanyi tends to treat exchange relations as primary and generative of everything else; the "disembedding" of the economy, the emergence of the price-setting market whereby anything, in principle, could be evaluated in money terms, was the "great transformation" which explains everything else. For Gernet cultural forms, including exchange relations, are reflective of social structure, and not only in a passive sense. They are the instruments of those who have an interest in the preservation or reform of social structure, the rhetoric, as it were, with which specific groups make specific claims to power and legitimacy. The law, for instance, came into existence as a mode in which the public asserted its power—the public being, of course, not an indefinite "everybody" but rather in each community those free adult males who recognized each other's claims to a common status of citizenship. Thus we can understand (although Gernet does not say this either) why the development of legality went along with a loss of status for women, and an increasingly sharp contrast between the free man and the slave. Similarly Gernet suggests that philosophy,

in its earliest phase, was used to legitimate claims to power by a self-defined elite. Here again (as so often in Gernet) the suggestion remains undeveloped, but if pursued might significantly alter our sense of much of early Greek history, particularly in the West. We might see that Parmenides' involvement in the administration of Velia, the political pretensions and achievements of the Pythagorean school, and Empedocles' ideological connections with the Sicilian tyrants (attested by Pindar) were not peripheral to their philosophical projects, but integral to the enterprise, and crucial to the way in which their philosophy was understood by their contemporaries.

I have focused in this account on the three major essays which stand chronologically at the center of this collection. There is of course much more, and all of it provokes thought. Gernet did not attempt a definitive study of any problem; he aimed always to reshape the question and to open new paths to further inquiry. Often he makes his point by analyzing a myth, and in this sense he may seem to proceed on the level of ideas and ideals rather than actualities. But for him myths are always "collective representations"; they code and conveniently summarize cultural understandings which conditioned actual behavior. In this sense Gernet is a materialist; he asks always the hard-nosed question: *cui bono?* At the same time Gernet sees that interests are not fixed, as if history were the working out of competition for inherently valuable resources, measurable against an unchanging standard of natural utility; interests are conditioned by values, by culturally conditioned aspirations. In this sense the inner content of history is religious, in the sense that action in history is shaped by a constantly transformed collective understanding of the higher and better, of the standard against which mankind properly measures itself. His own formulation of this question is very Greek: "What is of particular interest in an anthropological study is the question of the barrier between human and divine reality: what separates the human from the divine, and, conversely, what brings them together?" (p. 3).

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REVIEWS

MICHAEL GAGARIN. Drakon and Early Athenian Homicide Law. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1981. Pp. xvii + 175. $20.00.

Drakon received a commission to publish the laws, and probably not just those for homicide (*Ath.P.* 4.1). These alone, however, survived into the Classical age. Solon's laws superseded whichever others had been in effect since ca. 620 B.C. (*Ath.P.* 7.1). The laws on homicide must have been thorough and equitable, sufficiently explicit for later ages. Drakon introduced the concept of intent and state intervention (statutory juries, injunctions for the protection of the killer), revolutionary changes in a traditional society. He defined lawful homicide and distinguished killings that incurred pollution (Dem. 20.157–58). Murder is a fundamental category of homicide, not to be left to conjecture in a law-code. The most important text for Drakon is a broken stele containing a late fifth-century copy of part of his legislation. I do not think one can yet adequately construe his law, but Michael Gagarin, the author of stimulating articles on Athenian law, has tried.

G provides a transcription of Stroud's improved text of *IG* I² 115 (409/8) and an English translation. The monograph requires constant reference to Stroud, *Drakon's Law on Homicide* (Berkeley 1968). For a photograph of the stone, see Stroud; or Sealey, *History of the Greek City States* (Berkeley 1976) 100, who devotes eight compact pages to the vexing web of legal and historical problems.

G's eight chapters interpret the preserved inscription and ascertain its significance for Athenian attitudes toward homicide. One of the author's strengths is his ability to set out logically and demolish the perceived alternatives for an issue. G, despite nods to the gaps in the inscription and our knowledge of the law-giver, does not offer a convincing historical context for the society that produced a law on manslaughter as peculiar as the one he proposes. He addresses three problems (p. 2): (a) why does this *re*inscription claiming to offer τὸν Δράκοντος νόμον τὸν περὶ τοῦ φόνου begin with a law on *un*intentional homicide, μὴ ἐκ προνοίας? (b) where did the law on intentional homicide appear? and (c) what was Drakon's contribution to Athenian law?

Chapter One compares Athenian and current American categories for the taking of human life. Modern ideas require more distinctions as to intent and premeditation and consequently finer gradations of penalty, because what was in primitive times a tort, a matter carrying little moral stigma in the community, has become a crime. "Homicide was not considered by the Greeks nearly as serious a wrong as many crimes which today are viewed as far less heinous" (Bonner and Smith, *The Administration of Justice* [Chicago 1930, 1938] II, 207, 224).

Chapter Two, "Homicide Law Before and After Drakon," surveys the surviving evidence. G tidily collects 31 references in epic and discovers that "there was no fundamental difference in the treatment of intentional and unintentional homicide" (p. 11). The manslayer is responsible for his act and

therefore liable to prescribed penalties. In "Homeric" Greece, penalties were prescribed by tradition, *nomos*, but the redress was to be exacted by relatives of the victim through self-help, and not by the community. Killers flee to escape vengeance, if compensation is not arranged, and remain fugitives until their suppliance is honored elsewhere. The utility of this Homeric evidence is open to doubt, however, since, for example, the Homeric Shield's *poinē*, blood-money, has not been demonstrated for historical Athens.

MacDowell, *Athenian Homicide Law* (Manchester 1963) 7, promptly conceded that "I have nothing to say about Drakon." His prudence resulted from a situation about which G confesses: "If the evidence for the treatment of homicide in pre-Drakontian Athens is meager, it is no more plentiful for the history of homicide law during the two centuries separating Drakon from the Attic orators" (p. 21). Except for the stele, all evidence for Athenian homicide law is certainly no earlier than Antiphon, and most of it is no more concerned with historical veracity than suits a litigant's interest. Drakon's homicide law survived Solon's recodification, but in the next two centuries modifications and additions were probably introduced, despite Antiphon's casuistical statement to the contrary (Ant. 6.2, p. 23; *contra*, Lys. 1.30, 6.15; Dem. 23.22, 28, 37, 44, 51, 53, etc.; Stroud, pp. 54–56). Revisions, even illegal ones, are to be expected (Boegehold, *CP* 68 [1973] 153). G's agreement here with Stroud's fundamentalism (pp. 62–63) should have been precluded by Ruschenbusch's objections (*Gnomon* 46 [1974] 815–17). Evidence exists for changes: (a) Drakon only mentions Ephetai for homicide, but the Areopagus dealt with murder in the Classical period (Plut. *Sol.* 19); (b) state administration of the death penalty was unknown to Drakon's and Solon's age, but practiced later; (c) the varying terms of art referring to the "fifty-one" and the Ephetai suggest different dates for different clauses of the inscription.

Chapter Three examines provisions of the preserved part of the stele. G argues well that premeditation does not matter in Athenian homicide law, only intention. Furthermore, again following Loomis (*JHS* 92 [1972] 86–95), unintentional homicide was restricted for the Athenians to modern "accidental" homicide (pp. 34–35).

Chapter Four explores the main problem. The law on intentional homicide was either: (a) not part of Drakon's task or achievement; or (b) part of the legislation originally appearing at the beginning of *axon* #1 but revised beyond recognition or lost in transmission before this stele was inscribed; or (c) part of Drakon's work but appearing later, in *axon* #2, for instance, on the lost bottom half of the stele (p. 65); or (d) for which see Chapter Six below.[1] Solution (a) contradicts all evidence, positive and negative, on the authorship of the homicide laws (esp. Dem. 20.157–58, [47].52–73, particularly 71); (b) requires one to believe in an unattested revision of the law on intentional homicide that no longer deserved Drakon's name, and one must still explain the *axon* headings and the inexplicable initial word καί; (c), Stroud's contribution (pp. 38–40), neither explains this καί satisfactorily nor justifies an order in which uninten-

[1] G once seems to agree that indeed a separate stele with the laws on intentional homicide existed at the Areopagus (pp. 27–29), but he denies that this constituted Drakon's *nomos* as described in *IG* I² 115.

tional precedes intentional homicide, going from less to more serious crimes (p. 73). "A context of intentional homicide" (p. 76) seems desirable.

The next fifth of the monograph is devoted to καὶ εἰ; the disproportion indicates the difficulties. Chapter Five considers sentence-initial καὶ εἰ as it appears in Greek laws and concludes that in legal texts καί only connects, whereas δέ is used for contrast (p. 84). Unfortunately, καὶ εἰ appears at the *beginning* of only one other legal text (Dem. 24.39), where its probable meaning emphasizes the retroactive nature of the law in question. In this quotation, καὶ εἰ does not assume a previous law or subsume a current one. Our text's καὶ εἰ μή is unparalleled.

Chapter Six attacks the specific καὶ ἐάμ in *IG* I² 115. G suggests "that we should understand the first sentence of Drakon's law, which treats unintentional homicide explicitly and intentional homicide by implication, to be the basic statement of the law on all homicide, intentional and unintentional. In other words, Drakon wrote no separate law on intentional homicide . . ." (p. 101). This awkward interpretation "may strike some as improbable."

That the particle καί alone must be understood to include Drakon's *thesmoi* on intentional homicide exceeds even the limits of the "terse, elliptical style . . . common in early laws" (p. 108). No explanation of such an extreme and unparalleled (p. 110) ellipsis and such obscurity concerning a serious and more common crime in a basic codification of the law can be offered. The author believes, nonetheless, that his explanation is the most economical. Although objections exist to every proposed solution to the problem of the initial clause, there must be an alternative crime and punishment implied, even if καὶ ἐάμ is to be translated "even if," not "and if." Harrison (*CQ* 11 [1961] 3–5) suggested that the heading *protos axon* summarily referred to a separate inscription about murder that did not need republication. This explanation, although it may violate idiomatic usage of καί, seems less violent.

The author regards as unsurprising the consequence that no penalty for murder greater than exile is normally envisioned. Indeed, he considers it to be severity itself that unintentional killers have that identical penalty (p. 104). The *opinio communis* is that by distinguishing two kinds of homicide, Drakon mitigated the lot of unintentional killers (cf. Exodus 20:13 to Numbers 35:11, 26, 31; Joshua 20). G, to the contrary, holds that Drakonian conservatism may be descried "resisting a trend to greater leniency" (p. 104) for those who killed unintentionally. He posits "a growing movement" in seventh century Athens to reduce penalties for unintentional homicide. I find this explanation based on despair uncongenial, and the absence of the Areopagites fatal to the claim that here are all the provisions of 621 B.C. on matters homicidal. Perhaps Drakon left murder in the domain of custom or even previous law and confronted unintentional homicide only (Busolt-Swoboda, *Griech. Staatskunde* [Munich 1926] II, 811). He would thus have regulated vendetta in certain complex cases. Perhaps the later stele contained not all homicide law, or not even all of Drakon's law (as Stroud, p. 63, argues), but only all Drakon's still valid provisions. The *anagrapheis* inscribe Drakon's law concerning homicide (11.5–6), but superseded sections might long since have been effaced. *IG* I² 115 innovates (p. 54) the law on unintentional homicide, an area where Drakon perceived the rights of both parties in a new way.

Chapter Seven explores Drakon's penalty for intentional homicide. G rejects two common assumptions: that the chief penalty for murder was always death and that the court was that of the Areopagus (p. 111). These are attested facts in the fourth century, but were things different in 620 B.C.? Ant. 2.2.9 and 5.10, Lys. 1.50 and 6.14, and Dem. 21.43 state that death is the Areopagus' penalty for a convicted murderer, as MacDowell proved (pp. 114–15; cf. G, pp. 113–15; also Plato *Laws* 9.867b on grading punishments). Death was the most important, but not the sole penalty for "Murder One" convictions in Athens (see also Lys. 13.56; Dem. 21.105, 23.80, 24.7).

Evidence at Athens for *Wergeld* is inadequate (Bonner-Smith, II, 198; MacDowell, p. 30; Stroud, p. 81, n. 64; cf. Sealey, p. 102). Pursuit and punishment of a killer was an Athenian obligation, which perturbs the alleged Homeric parallels (*pace* G, p. 147). The ἀδικία required the family, in the absence of a state prosecutor, to pursue the malefactor. "The Athenians considered *all* unnatural deaths to be matters of extreme gravity" (Loomis, p. 95). The *genos* demanded purgation and *timōria*, a pleasure as well as a duty. Deterrence, purification, and vengeance are three different but complementary Greek concerns (MacDowell, pp. 4–5; cf. Bonner-Smith, II, 199; Dover, *Greek Popular Morality* [Berkeley 1974] 244–45).

The author struggles with the evidence: "none of these passages is inconsistent with the possibility . . . ," and "the clear implication" of Dem. 23.53, he proposes, is that exile is the normal penalty for homicide, when, to others, the implication is that unintentional homicide in athletic contests (ἄκων), killing a highwayman, and catching an adulterer *in flagranti* are not criminal offenses at all, but "lawful homicide" (cf. *Ath.P.* 57.3). An effort to equate the severity of the penalties of exile and death, based on pathos in an orator (p. 123, Ant. 2.2.9), surprised a reader who had been encouraged to be cautious before the bias of pleaders. Compare pages 94 and 103, an example of the "progressive fallacy," in which an argument is first presented cautiously and later referred to as established fact.

G revives the view (p. 132) that the Ephetai once comprised the sole court for homicide, a theory which Hignett disposed of (*History of the Athenian Constitution* [Oxford 1952] 308–11). Since the Ephetai judged less important varieties of homicide, and the Areopagite procedures for murder were more archaic and its legendary history rich in murder lore, it seems likely that Drakon created or redirected the Ephetai in order to relieve the elder body's press of business which then included much besides unnatural death.

G recognizes three subsequent changes in Drakon's law: (a) execution became the common penalty for murder; (b) jurisdiction over intentional homicide was transferred from the Ephetai to the Areopagus; and (c) the pardon that *IG* I² 115 permitted for intentional homicide was later prohibited (p. 140). In fact, *IG* I² 115 says nothing of intentional homicide (c); change (b) just recalls us from G's hypothesis to the known evidence; and change (a) is necessary only if one accepts G's hypothesis that we have all that Drakon proposed concerning murder.

Central to G's argument is the treatment of intent (pp. 140–44). To MacDowell (p. 147), this was "One of the most fundamental distinctions in the whole system. . . ." Despite the words μὴ ἐκ προνοίας, G denies much signifi-

cance to the distinction, although he had underlined earlier (p. 95) that the decree's reference to "unintentional" emphasizes "exceptional situations" (cf. Dem. 23.49–51).

The last chapter analyzes "organization, style, and general principles." G divides the topics into penalty, procedure, and an incongruously lengthy description of pardon, the law's most innovative aspect (p. 149). He deems the provisions "a clear, well ordered sequence of regulations" (pp. 64, 167). G estimates highly the style of "the earliest surviving example of Attic prose," "Drakon's actual words" (p. 153). One may admire the parallelism and the use of chiasmus (pp. 154–58), although we demur at the conclusion that the style itself suggests Drakon as the author (p. 161). The republication of a law in uniquely continuous use for two hundred years seems a treacherous subject for literary criticism.

G concludes with comments on this law in the context of Athenian law. He sees it as "entirely secular," historically unlikely, and devoid of any concern with pollution (pp. 165–67). Dem. 23,72 shows that, later at least, a concept of *miasma* was recognized at law, and therefore, even by G's logic, that the law had changed in underlying concepts as well as procedures and statutory penalties. Purification of the community and the slain man's kin (cf. Dem. [47.]68) may well be older and separate procedures (as in Aesch. *Eum.*) that, once the power of religion had waned, required specification in the written *nomoi*. Casting beyond the borders objects "convicted" of homicide, religious qualifications and activities of the basileus who also presided over all homicide trials (cf. Stroud, p. 62), ritual exclusion of the killer from certain places, and expressions that imply the killer's uncleanliness (e.g., καθαρός in Ant. 5.11, 82; And. 1.95; Dem. 24.60; μίασμα in Ant. 5.82) suggest religious concerns, as well as vengeance and deterrence. Stroud (ibid.; cf. Busolt-Swoboda, II, 813; Bonner-Smith, II, 208) terms Drakon's law "one of the religious foundations of the city" (see Ant. 5.14 = 6.2; Plato *Euthyphron* 4b–d).[2] Comparative materials, occasionally cited here, offer little assistance in determining Athenian habits. Bantu, Bergdama, Hottentot, and Roman parallels and tangents suggest nothing about Athenian history, in the absence of positive evidence.[3]

Gagarin's prose is lucid, his argument logically presented. He is always conscientious about offering the ancient evidence and modern reconstructions. G has examined an important nexus of problems in Athenian law with a fresh, certainly daring approach. The book is frankly speculative; I find Stroud's monograph more trustworthy in method and more comprehensive in its histor-

[2] G's reversal of developments requires more explanation, if we are to dismiss concepts of pollution and purgation so well known from non-Attic sources prior and subsequent to Drakon, from Attic tragedy, the orators, and Plato *Laws* IX.

[3] See, e.g., I. Schapera, *Government and Politics in Tribal Societies* (London 1956) 29, 79, 84–87; for the Romans, on magistrates and intent: Festus, s.v., *parricidi;* Plut. *Rom.* 22; Pomponius in Justin. *Dig.* 1.2.2.23 (*tabula* IX); on execution, Cic. *de inv.* 2.50, *pro Rosc.* 25.70, Modestinus in *Dig.* 48.9.9. The only known trace of blood-money in Roman law is found in Servius' quotation (*ad* Verg. *Ecl.* 4.43) of one of Numa's laws. English law has concurrent private and public procedures: appeal of murder and indictment for murder.

ical grasp. Logic and linguistic parallels cannot force a broken stone to reveal statutory details and its author's intent. We may have false expectations of Drakon's task in publication or of the ordering of penalties for murder, but it seems poor method to revise history on the basis of an awkward conjunction.

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JACK CARGILL. The Second Athenian League: Empire or Free Alliance? University of California Press, 1981. $24.50. Pp. 233.

This book provides a much-needed corrective to the prevailing view of the Athenians' fourth century confederacy as an enterprise conceived in idealism but destined to a sleazy slide into a treacherous tyranny. The view of the second Athenian confederacy as a Grade B remake of the Delian league is based on a number of contentions. These boil down in essence, I think, to seven cardinal points which can be extracted from Cargill's study in this order:

1. The Athenians' maltreatment of members of the league such as Corcyra is typical.
2. The Athenians behaved badly in forcing their island allies to allow various Peloponnesian states to enter the league in 371.
3. The Athenians levied tribute on the members of the league contrary to the promises of the decree of Aristoteles.
4. Nor did the Athenians keep their promise of freedom and autonomy for league members, infringing the autonomy of such states as Eretria, for example, and Ceos.
5. The Athenians also violated the decree of Aristoteles by owning land in allied territory and by establishing cleruchies there.
6. The Athenians further violated the decree by the installation of governors and garrisons, from which the decree had promised league members would be free.
7. Athenian abuses of league members caused the Social War.

(It might be pointed out at this juncture that much time could have been saved in grasping the outlines of Cargill's argument had it been Cargill and not I who collected these seven points and listed them together in one place.)

It is Cargill's goal in this book to examine the evidence for each one of these contentions and to demonstrate that alternative interpretations of the evidence are not only possible but indeed preferable. The success of his argument varies to some extent, but by and large the thesis he has presented is cogent and convincing.

To begin with, Cargill demonstrates that scholars have shown less thoroughness than they might have in discriminating between Athens' treatment of other Greek states and her treatment of league members. The problem lies in part with honest disagreement about the membership of the confederacy and in part in simple carelessness in conflating Athens' treatment of members and nonmembers. On the first point, the maltreatment of Corcyra, Cargill argues that Corcyra was never a member of the confederacy—that an undated inscrip-

tion which has often been viewed as a league membership alliance of 375 is actually a non-league alliance of a later date. And in fact none of the descriptions of Timotheus' exploits of 375—not that of Xenophon or Isocrates or Nepos or Diodorus—suggests that Corcyra joined the league at that time. On the contrary, the implication of these texts is rather that Corcyra was simply reduced by force: as Cargill points out, Xenophon's observation that Timotheus won points by his failure to enslave the people of Corcyra or send people into exile or make changes in the laws is hardly in keeping with the notion of Corcyra as a state joining up with the league. The sole evidence in fact for Corcyra's membership in the league is a single remark in Polyaenus which may well be a careless mistake. If Cargill is correct—and his marshalling of both epigraphic and literary evidence is forceful here—then we are forced to reevaluate the traditional view of Chares' alleged maltreatment of "league member" Corcyra.

Cargill is also persuasive on his second point. It has been argued (by Marshall, for example) that the Athenians unjustly compelled their island allies to permit Peloponnesian states to enter the league in 371 and were justly repaid for this cavalier conduct when these Peloponnesian allies failed to render assistance after the Thebans' seizure of Oropus. Cargill counters with the assertion that the evidence for league membership for the Peloponnesian states in 371 is weak. In fact, the decree of 362/1 proclaiming the Athenian alliance with Arcadia, Elis, and Phleius—which is in any event a bilateral alliance, not a league alliance—would seem to argue against any league membership for these states in 371. On his third point, Cargill has little trouble in making a case for the participation of the allied synedrion in levying the famous *syntaxeis*. Lines 11 f. of *IG* II² 123, dated to 356, which discuss the disbursement of funds ἐκ τῶν συντάξεων κ[α]τ̣[ὰ τ]ὰ δόγ[μα/τ]α τ[ῶ]ν συμμάχων, seem to me clear-cut evidence that the synedrion participated in the assessment of *syntaxeis* at least as late as this date; they say nothing, of course, about the participation of the Athenian demos, but they do seem to rule out the possibility that the *syntaxeis* were imposed *unilaterally* by the demos. On the question of autonomy, Cargill's case is not, I think, as strong as it might be. D. M. Lewis has maintained that the Athenian inscription specifying that the people of Ceos are to govern themselves κατὰ πόλεις constitutes an Athenian encroachment on their autonomy, and I believe he is right to do so. The arguments that Cargill presents to counter Lewis' interpretation are convoluted and unpersuasive; in this instance the Athenians do seem to have abridged the autonomy of an ally, and Cargill might have done better not to try to explain this decree away.

Cargill's arguments on his fifth point are fairly solid. On the whole, the evidence for property-owning and cleruchies in allied territory is decidedly weak. Accame has argued that during the period of the league a cleruchy was sent to Methone, which, he claims, was a league member. As Meritt has pointed out, however, the inscription Accame cites in putting forward this argument (a fragment joining *IG* II² 55) must surely be a fifth century document, for despite its fourth century lettering style it makes reference to existing Hellenotamiai. And the other sites of Athenian cleruchies were not in fact within league territory.

On his sixth point, Cargill acknowledges that garrisons were stationed in league territory not only on Andros and Amorgos during the Social War but also on Abdera as early as 375. This policy, as Cargill is aware, contravenes one

of the central promises of the decree of Aristoteles, spelled out in 11.21–23: that states entering the league would not receive garrisons nor governors nor pay tribute. At first, Cargill's attempt to resolve this awkward contradiction seems to smack of desperation: what happened, he concludes, was that both the Athenians and the allies "realized at a very early date that adherence to the letter of this particular guarantee would prove disastrous—not only to Athens, but to the League members as well," and "somehow—and it would be idle to speculate exactly how, given the total absence of evidence—the understanding must have arisen that garrisons and governors might be sent out, *with the approval of the allied synedrion*" (p. 154; italics are Cargill's). In fact, though, the evidence, such as it is, bears Cargill out: as early as 377, the league membership alliance treaty with Chalcis stipulated that the Chalcidians were to be free and autonomous, neither accepting a garrison or governor from the Athenians nor paying tribute παρὰ τὰ δόγματ[α τῶ/ν συμμάχων]. This inscription indeed suggests what the later inscriptions concerning Amorgos and Andros imply as well—that such garrisons and governors as were dispatched to allied territory during the duration of the league were sent by decree of the allies; it suggests too that the Athenians instantly after the decree of Aristoteles realized the untenability of their position there as regarded the protection of the allies. None of this, however, alters the fact that the Athenians, for the sake of inducing states to join their alliance, appear to have made promises which they could not and did not keep, or the fact that garrisons may in truth have been forced on individual states unwilling to receive them if such unwillingness was at odds with a majority vote of the synedrion.

Much of our assessment of Cargill's thesis must hang on our estimate of his attempts to counter the argument that the Social War was sparked by Athenian maltreatment of league members. Cargill's arguments on this point are on the whole forceful and convincing, and in Chapter 10, "Defections from the League," he has scored an important victory in the struggle against a simplistic and sentimental view of fourth century Greece.

The first successful withdrawal from the league of which we know is that of Thebes, and the lack of enthusiasm which the Thebans felt about the alliance from the start is well-documented; they had joined, after all, out of dire need for Athenian backing against the Spartans. The Athenians did not maltreat the aloof and ambivalent Thebans either before or after their attempts to withdraw their support from the confederacy; on the contrary, they tolerated (perforce) a great deal of high-handedness on the part of their ambitious ally. And in fact, as Cargill observes, the fine hand of the Thebans can be seen in many of the troubles the Athenians had with their league throughout the 360s. When one takes into consideration, moreover, the machinations of Alexander of Pherae, it becomes quite possible to view the Athenians' problems with the league down to the outbreak of the Social War more as the product of enemy agitation than as the nemesis for Athenian abuse. And similar lines of argument can be taken as regards the war itself, which Cargill argues "can reasonably be seen as less a struggle of Athens against its discontented allies" than "the struggle of Athens and the loyal League members against Thebes, the Persians, Philip of Macedon, and a small number of rebellious allies and former allies following their lead or pursuing ambitions of their own" (p. 179).

This chapter is not without its weaknesses. On pages 176–82 Cargill

makes various references to wartime abuses without much explanation of what he means; once he has set aside the lawless behavior of Chares on Corcyra as belonging, so he believes, to a different time period and, in any event, not concerning a league ally, there is very little left of these abuses in his narrative. This omission makes all the more mysterious his concession (on p. 176) that Isocrates' speech *On the Peace* "is almost universally characterized as a just and answerable indictment of what the Second Athenian League had become" and that "I share this viewpoint, within limits." There is nothing in his narrative to explain why on earth, after all he has said, he would share such a view. One piece of dramatic evidence, moreover, is approached by Cargill from only one side: the extremely bad reputation of Chares in antiquity. Cargill is absolutely right to call attention to the strange way in which the generalizations of modern scholarship have tended to smooth over the sharp, indeed acrimonious distinctions which contemporary and later ancient historians made between Iphicrates, Chabrias, and Timotheus on the one hand and Chares on the other. He does not, however, confront the problem of the Athenians' persistent refusal to repudiate Chares and all for which he seems to have stood. Indeed, Chares led a remarkably charmed life at Athens. In view of the fact that Chares not only was a lawless and aggressive imperialist but also—as Cargill points out—"led Athenian forces from disaster to disaster" (p. 181), it is curious that he so consistently escaped the wrath of a demos which did not suffer fools gladly and which took care to keep a very close watch on its στρατηγοί. This phenomenon and its implications Cargill largely ignores.

The chapter ends, however, on a sound note, stressing the amicable relations between Athens and both league and nonleague allies, and Cargill's arguments here bear out his insistence on "a notable countermovement toward renewed friendly relations with Athens on the part of states that had renounced their Athenian alliances" (p. 183)—Acarnania, for example, and Byzantium—and his thesis that "Athens remained, to the end, the rallying point for the Greeks who wished to preserve their own liberty" (p. 185). In the last pages of the chapter, Cargill indulges in speculation which some readers may find off-putting. Had the Athenian alliance not been debilitated and had Philip been stopped at Chaeronea (or before), then Athens "might have been able to preside over a Greece of independent states, bound by treaties of nonaggression and defensive alliance, for decades—perhaps even until the development of a genuine Greek federal state," and historians today "might study not the Roman Empire but the Greek Federation—which would have been more democratic, intellectual, and creative, we might wager, and perhaps consequently more enduring" (p. 187). Though the ultimate character of this putative Greek Federation lies squarely in the realm of science fiction, Cargill is quite right to suggest that the implications of his view of the Second Athenian Confederacy are very far-reaching indeed, for what we believe about the significance of Philip's victory at Chaeronea is of course narrowly entwined with our view of the causes of the weakening of the Athenian system of alliances.

The book as a whole is well written in straightforward prose that is clear and forceful. Epigraphers will welcome the detailed discussion of the stele of Aristoteles that covers pages 14–47, though each will find something there with which to take issue. Footnotes appear throughout at the bottom of the page;

documentation is for the most part thorough without being oppressive; and a lengthy index of passages cited precedes the index of names and toponyms. A general bibliography would have been useful, and to it Cargill would now have to add the recent article of F. Mitchel, "The Nellos (*IG* II² 43 B 35–38)," *Chiron* 11 (1981) 73–77. I find the possessive form "Athens's" most jarring and am puzzled too as to why the publisher did not show consistency in also employing, for example, such forms as "Diodorus's" and "Chares's." (Other California Press books do show this consistency.) For all its minor shortcomings, however, this volume makes an important contribution to the understanding of fourth century Greece and carries serious implications for the way in which Philip's victory has traditionally been regarded.

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D. R. SHACKLETON BAILEY. Profile of Horace. Cambridge, Mass., 1982. Pp. x + 142; Appendices I & II.

The reader of this chronologically ordered, descriptive analysis of Horace through the medium of his poems will do well to begin with the second of its two substantial appendices. In a lecture commemorating the tercentenary of Bentley, delivered before the Leeds Classical Association and here republished, Shackleton Bailey defends the perspicacity of one of his most idiosyncratic and controversial predecessors with all the witty turns of phrase, the oracular pronouncement, and even the polemical abuse of a tradition of writing that has gone pale in recent scholarship. Although Bentley on Horace provided a focus to suit the occasion of the essay, its real subject is the art of text criticism itself. Text critics, Shackleton Bailey argues, have not been satisfactorily replaced by paleographers; text criticism is not a technological science proceeding by rules, but rather "it is in divinatory conjecture that the critical faculty shows at its cleanest" (p. 108). One may observe in passing that "the general decline of literary scholarship, both active and receptive," leaves the contemporary critic "even less assured than his predecessors of an instructed and sympathetic public" (p. 109). Space forbids citation from the abundance of mottos and gnomes with which this revelatory essay coruscates (the modern text editor will set them above his desk at his peril), but the essence of its doctrine may be conveyed in an excerpt from Shackleton Bailey's description of the mind with which the genuine hierophant approaches his subject (p. 108):

> the critic . . . generally gets his clue from the context. He is faced with a pattern of thought, part of which has been broken up. He has to adjust his mind to that pattern, run it into the mould of the author's as represented in this particular passage. Once that is done, and the correct pattern, so far as it emerges from the context, is established, then, with the help of such indications as the corrupt piece itself provides, and subject to the control of touchstones which knowledge and experience automatically apply, the missing link may suggest itself, often with little conscious effort. The power to run the mind onto a literary context, reacting to and retaining compositely and in due proportion each successive impression—that is as near as I can get to the secret of *divinatio*.

Turning from this *de facto* preface to the remaining two sections of the book, the reader should find each appropriately illustrative of the text critic's philosophy. The point is obvious in the case of Appendix I: some 30 pages of Horatiana ranging from emendation through repunctuation, lexicography, and syntactical reinterpretation. As Shackleton Bailey says of Bentley, not everyone will agree with everything. An emendation in *Odes* 3.9.20 imposes symmetry upon a dialogic exchange of whose asymmetry creative sense has elsewhere been made. The publication of this collection should not, however, be overlooked by any person setting to work on Horace's poetry, and the proposed emendations on *Epod.* 5.55–70 and *Odes* 3.1.33–40 (to mention token samples) deserve entry into any Horatian reader's marginalia.

The *Profile* itself may be construed as Shackleton Bailey's larger critical context: that "adaptation of his mind to the author's" (p. 109), that he has established for reading Horace. Straightforward biographical criticism it is not. Indeed, the prefatory abstract from the *Vita* which appears, at first glance, to place the foundation for a biographical approach, serves finally to remind the reader how little we genuinely know of this "most elusive of poets." Shackleton Bailey's chronological framework serves for discussion of what has struck his attention. In commenting on *Epode* 3, for instance, he accepts Markland's *iocosa puella* to make Maecenas a sharer with Horace in the consequences of eating garlic. Horace's relationship with Maecenas is a recurrent topic of discussion, as is also the reality of his love objects and of the literary detractors he mentions. These are important issues for the bearing that they have on the interplay of reality and fiction in poetic discourse; and the first of them especially has commanded much recent attention within the broader context of the nature of literary patronage. Horace, Shackleton Bailey observes, prided himself on his associations with persons of consequence and on having become such a person himself. He was quite a match for Augustus, the master in the generation of personal propaganda.

The hexameter poems receive far more attention in the *Profile* than do the lyric, since these are where Shackleton Bailey sees the game of self-presentation most fully in play. The "real Horace of the lyric," by contrast, is said to be the "ever-controlling and self-controlled artist" who is represented for *Odes* I–III by only three examples. Chronology of composition plays some part in the discussion of the *Satires* with occasional observations on the logic by which poems are juxtaposed. After the remarks on Horace's garlic joke, it is odd to see Satire 2, for its questionable subject matter, dated before the poet's acquaintance with Maecenas. Satire 4, Shackleton Bailey conjectures, was a literary manifesto written during the interval between his introduction to Maecenas and acceptance into friendship, but under such circumstances one may wonder why Horace claims the discriminating taste of his select audience as his standard of art, since the taste of his friends would scarcely be a criterion to conjure by unless Maecenas could be numbered among them.

In writing on the *Epistles,* Shackleton Bailey sees through the too often repeated notion that Horace abandoned lyric in consequence of an unfavorable reception of his *Odes.* Epistle 19 of Book I does not say this. Furthermore, the poet had completed his collection of *Odes* even to his claim for their immortality, but "writing verse was his metier. . . . Moreover it was expected of him" (p.

51). The author of the biography of Cicero shows through here in perceptive reflections on the self-evaluation of the mature public figure: in a close reading of *Epistle* 1.7 as an affadavit of autonomy that challenged the grounds of the poet's friendship with Maecenas or in remarks on Horace's growing sense of distance from his correspondents and "the cooling of his emotional climate with age." Especially the biographer's facility for isolating the touching and revealing moment appears at the end of the chapter in a citation of *Epistles* 11.7–10: three verses whose inclination toward solitude and even obscurity show a new angle of Shackleton Bailey's publicly oriented Horace.

After this it is disappointing to find the chapter that is truthfully enough entitled "Ligurinus" almost solely concerned with a refutation of Gordon Williams' suggestion that the enticing boy is a fiction. Again the issue is one of art and reality, but Shackleton Bailey seems to be accusing the literary interpreter of unnecessary delicacy in his approach to the Roman world, and he bears down on the question with extensive evidence concerning Cicero's attitude toward homosexuality. Be this as it may, and Shackleton Bailey has earlier implied his willingness to credit the little story about the mirrors, still the real question posed by the introductory poem of the magnificent, retrospective Fourth Book of *Odes* is surely the choice of love (where Odes I–III might seem to have predicated art) as the focus for a return to the lyric mode. Does not a lost younger self prompt the embarrassing tear and lead the lyric speaker into renewed wanderings through scenes suitable to youth? This arrogant self will finally not be recaptured but turned aside with wise resignation in poem 10. The motif of poetic immortality is virtually absent from Horace's last lyric book.

The Epilogue which begins with a glance at the literary *Epistles* again turns aside from its expected subject to offer an emendation on verses 50–52 of the "Epistle to Augustus." This is, to my mind, the prize piece in the collection, for the words "Ennius . . . leviter curare videtur / quo promissa cadunt" present within the context of their sentence just that kind of problematic inconsistency that can convince the graduate student, and even his elders, of the impossibility of understanding Latin. By reading "viget et Curare"—a substitution that stands the test of scrambled letters—Shackleton Bailey assigns the judgment in "curare videtur" to Ennius' contemporary admirers and produces lucid sense. Certainly this is *divinatio* in its highest form, and enough to persuade us that we might be in the presence of what Horace actually wrote.

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ELAINE FANTHAM. Seneca's *Troades:* A Literary Introduction with Text, Translation, and Commentary. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1982. Pp. xii + 412.

We have critical texts, index, concordance, translations, biographies, and endless criticism. In contrast to Greek, Senecan tragedy urgently requires modern scholarly commentaries. These should (1) collect and assess detailed work scattered in journals and books; (2) adduce parallels of language, especially from

Vergil and Ovid, in lyrics from Horace and Catullus too, and discover what Seneca does with them; (3) adduce parallels of sentiment from Stoic, especially Senecan, prose; (4) set Seneca into the context of his Greek sources, classical for the matter and Hellenistic for the form; (5) discover what Seneca said to Nero, that is, the political content of his dramas; and (6) assume without argument a play intended for performance and discuss staging in terms of the Roman theater (Wilamowitz' *actio*). The exegetical challenge is more demanding than for *Oedipus Rex*. One must be Hellenist and Latinist and there is no Jebb to lead the way. The model for a post-classical tragic commentary is Howard Jacobson, *The Exagoge of Ezechiel* (Cambridge 1983), a book no Senecan will ignore.

Fantham's introduction (1–124) is a book on its own and would have benefited from rigorous compression. Do we need an essay on "Tragedy at Rome," especially one ignorant of Ribbeck? She does not control the foreign bibliography and is not gifted with a historical sense. I can only be selective. Her discussion of dating ought to have considered alleged parodies in *Apocolocyntosis* (see Franco Caviglia, *L. Anneo Seneca Le Troiane* [Rome 1981] 13–15). Although citing work from 1982, she does not know the only other modern commentary on her play. Her question (11), "When would such a man have time for tragedy?" is not apt. I doubt that Seneca needed more than a long weekend for *Troades*. Q. Cicero wrote four tragedies in sixteen days (*QFr* 3.5.7.). Archias composed numerous excellent verses *ex tempore* (Cic. *Arch.* 8.18). I doubt (12) that the *carmina* of Tac. *Ann.* 14.52 "could well be Seneca's epigrams," for they were neither sung nor accompanied by music. An essay on why Seneca wrote *Troades* asks (15): "Can we determine whether his purpose was primarily moral or aesthetic?" Answer (19): "a literary motivation." This is in the tradition of Marti, Motto, and Griffin. These three have no idea what a public statement under autocracy risks nor how literature is a tool toward a complex political end (see Peter Hacks, "Senecas Tod/Seneca-Essai," *Neue Deutsche Literatur* 26.6 [1978] 18–80; Wolfgang Schindler, "Peter Hacks' Seneca-Essay: Anfragen, Bemerkungen," *Rezeption des Altertums in modernen literarischen Werken*, ed. H. Gericke [Halle 1980] 69–84; my critique of Griffin at *CJ* 72 [1976/77] 367–68). We have progressed beyond Montaigne. In purely literary matters she is at home. I recommend the valuable discussion of Ovid, *M.* 13.399–575 as a source of *Troades;* but the Latinist never speculates on Ovid's sources.

Fantham has read too much Zwierlein and her treatment (34–49) of the matter of staging shows it. She opts expectedly for *recitatio*. Her arguments against performance derive from mistranslations and nineteenth century theatrical realism. ". . . at *Phaedra* 1154, Phaedra is reported as on the palace roof, but two lines later she is apparently at stage level" (35). But *ab altis . . . tectis* at 1154 has nothing to do with a roof. It is either *pars pro toto*, the palace (Grimal ad *Phd.* 1154), or "from the high-ceilinged halls." Her cry from within is heard and she enters at 1159. *Medea* cannot be performed because (36): "it is unreasonable" that an actor throw down small boys "from the roof." This is a variety of the "Indians are really shot" approach. But *recipe* (*Med.* 1024) means "come get them." Nothing is thrown. She does not understand (37) that Seneca's Hellenistic chorus would be three (cf. Ezechiel) who withdraw into the *scaenae*

frons after each stasimon. Because Seneca was his own director and his slaves the actors, he had no need (39) "to protect his work from misinterpretation by the director." The suggestion (40) "to use disembodied voices for the second choral ode" because it is (38) "outside dramatic time and space" I find bizarre. It is an *embolimon*, little more than an act-divider, of the sort invented by Agathon and preserved in late Euripides. Ezechiel may have used psalms for the same purpose. Arguments from the existence of asides (41) and of the type (42) "what is the actor playing Ulixes to do while she debates?" might with equal cogency prove that *cosi fan tutte* is an oratorio. Much to her credit F sees the difficulties of *recitatio* (46–49). Zwierlein's Seneca mimics eleven characters (three of them women) and a chorus of women, handles rapid-fire stichomythy, says a three-actor scene without identifying vocatives, and with a sweep of the hand indicates a change of scene. This forces F to the lame conclusion that only (48) "readers would experience the plays as complete works." That is, they were not understood before St. Ambrose. Later, on no evidence at all but because of ambiguities in recitation, she invokes (240–41) "a subsidiary figure" (whom I shall call the Fantham of the opera) to "preface each scene with a statement of the speakers and perhaps the context." This prophetic figure reads the names of characters that did not appear in the manuscripts until the middle ages (see F. Leo, *Observationes* 87, and J. Andrieu, *Le Dialogue antique* [Paris 1954] 227–29).

Her control of Greek material is inadequate for a Senecan commentator. Her discussion of the *tabulae Iliacae* is antiquated because she does not know Horsfall's case against Stesichorus (see *JHS* 99 [1979] 26–48) nor is the reader aided by her unfortunate confusion of *CIL* with *IG* at 54, n. 11. I do not understand her contention (68 with n. 48) that Seneca never read Herodotus. At *de Ira* 3.15.1–2 he cites for a moral Hdt. 1.119. Accius (69) did not adapt Sophocles' *Philoctetes*. He adapted Aeschylus' (see *GRBS* 11 [1970] 173–74). This is clear from the opening parodos.

F's treatment of sources is inadequate (68–75). She has no idea of *contaminatio* hallowed for tragedy by the *exemplaria graeca*. Euripides, *Hecuba* uses Euripides, *Troades*, Sophocles, *OT* and *Polyxena*. She proves again that one cannot evaluate Seneca's Hellenism apart from Neronian classicism. That requires attention to art. It is a pity that she did not know Jean-Michel Croisille, *Poésie et Art figuré de Néron aux Flaviens* (3 vols. [Lille 1978]). Her concluding argument against Seneca's use of sources (after Herington) is a *confessio fidei* beyond argument (71): "We may well feel that 'the greatest literary egotist in the history of Rome' . . . is scarcely the man to sit down with a single 'source.'" Are Vergil's variations on the *Iliad* proof of his humility? Seneca did not draw his Polyxena episode from *Hecuba* (72). Seneca and Euripides used Sophocles' *Polyxena*. There are scattered remarks on Senecan syntax and diction (92–103) and on his meters, based fortunately on Strzelecki. Her text benefits from the work of Carlsson, Zwierlein, MacGregor, and the Columbia dissertation of R. L. Wertis (correct 121). Wertis' *veneri* at 304 deserves attention. Her *apparatus* (121) is "entirely derivative."

The best that may be said of F's translation is that it will remind readers of W. S. Barrett's versions of *Hippolytus* passages. "Our garments drop from our uncovered shoulders, and piled up cover our lower flanks" (104–5). "In

conquering I learned that great organisms are overthrown in an instant" (263–64). "Come from your hiding place, pitiable secret of your poor mother" (705–6). I pass over "old queen" for *anus* (1059).

The commentary (201–385) has much on the order of "Line 365 shocks" but nothing on the plural *umbras* (256) after *manes* (see Austin on *Aen.* 4.571) nor the Grecism *ut . . . factura* (1158–59) (see *GRBS* 7 [1966] 53, n. 121). On details she must be read with caution. Friedrich says not a word on the elision of *Atrei:* correct p. 258. The advanced age of Astyanax (p. 275) allows a slaveboy to play the role: *cf.* Tantalus Jr. in *Thyestes.* Schetter's German original is published by Lefévre, not a translation: correct p. 392. Finally at p. 49, n. 25 she forgets (see p. 129) that *Hecuba* was the alternative title for *Troades.*

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Società Romana e Produzione Schiavistica. I. *L'Italia: Insediamenti e forme economiche.* II. *Merci, mercati e scambio nel mediterraneo.* III. *Modelli etici, diritto e trasformazioni sociali.* Edited by Andrea Giardina and Aldo Schiavone. Bari, Laterza, 1981. Pp. 574, 301, 437.

This is an important publication for all historians and archaeologists who are concerned with ancient Italy. However, since it is large and fragmented (1,312 pages by 59 authors), it will only be possible in a review of moderate length to indicate the contents and to evaluate very briefly the most significant conclusions the authors put forward.

The original papers were given at a 1979 conference at Pisa organized by the Istituto Gramsci, and the preface cites the collective volume *Analisi marxista e società antiche* (Rome 1978) as a basis. Most of the contributors to that collection reappear in the new one, but this time there is very little that is doctrinal, and some of the contributors are far from being Marxists. In any case we should not allow prejudice or cold-warriorism to keep these works from receiving proper critical attention (as far as I know, *Analisi marxista e società antiche* has not been reviewed in any English-language periodical; contrast the attention given by Marxist ancient historians in Italy to the work which they appear to regard as the greatest threat to their interpretations, Finley's *Ancient Economy*).

The agricultural systems of Roman Italy are the starting point. The first of these volumes contains a series of surveys of various regions: F. Coarelli, M. Mazza, and A. Fraschetti in separate articles about republican Sicily; E. Lepore and A. Giardina on southern Italy in general; P. G. Guzzo on the Bruttii; M. L. Gualandi and others on Lucania; F. Grelle on Canosa; J.-P. Vallat and the late Martin Frederiksen on Campania; W. Johannowsky on Campania and Samnium; L. Mercando and others on the Marche; M. Andreussi on Lazio; D. Manconi and others on Umbria; and finally a few pages on limited areas of Etruria by P. A. Gianfrotta and O. Luchi. (There is nothing on Cisalpina.) Mario Torelli offers a short but useful and provocative set of conclusions from some of these surveys. We are also given a paper on republican Campania and the supply of slaves from the east by D. Musti, and two papers

on large estates, from an economic and a juristic point of view, respectively, by M. Corbier and L. Capogrossi Colognesi.

The second volume is organized by products, first some "merci destinate al commercio trasmarino," namely wine (D. Manacorda, C. Panella), fine tableware (J.-P. Morel, G. Pucci, A. Ricci), and terracotta lamps (C. Pavolini). Then "merci meno diffuse," which turn out to be architectural terracottas (M. J. Strazzulla, L. Anselmino, and S. Tortorella) and the stamped bricks, *mortaria* and *dolia* (M. Steinby). A. Carandini attempts to bring it all together with a short essay "Sviluppo e crisi delle manifatture rurali e urbane."

The last volume concerns the moral outlook and the law of the Romans, "superstructure" in Marxist terms, in relation to the changes in the social and economic system; or rather it concerns selected fragments of this huge problem. G. Clemente discusses the sumptuary laws of the third and second centuries; M. Talamanca, the development of Roman private law in the century or so down to the early 80s (with 50 pages of notes); A. Schiavone, the outlook of the jurist Servius Sulpicius Rufus; G. Lotito, the economic aspects of Cicero's moral philosophy; M. Labate and E. Narducci, the moral values of Atticus; A. La Penna, the writings of Nepos and Valerius Maximus and the *Laus Pisonis,* from the point of view of the moral values they express; and lastly, L. Canfora, proscriptions and social disorganization in the late Republic (thus we seem to be moving still further away from the stated theme). There follow 74 pages of *interventi,* with substantive remarks by among others Coarelli, La Penna, and M. H. Crawford. At the end of all this we sigh for an index of subjects; instead we receive an unhelpful index of sources.

Some of these papers are very useful to have simply as erudite collections of information and should be welcomed as such even by those most unsympathetic to the more historical and more theoretical parts of the collection. Outstanding instances of this are Giardina's paper "Allevamento ed economia della selva in Italia meridionale . . ." (also important in other respects); the topographical surveys of Guzzo, Gualandi, Andreussi, Manconi, and their respective collaborators; Manacorda's paper "Produzione agricola, produzione ceramica e proprietari nell'ager cosanus nel I a.C." (though he has published much of this information elsewhere); and Pavolini on the terracotta lamps.

A work constructed as this one is could not, of course, possibly provide one single clear account of how slave-based production developed in Roman Italy or of how it affected Roman society at large. Yet a number of papers do demonstrate very well how, when the great influx of slaves occurred in the middle and late Republic, their labor was exploited. Coarelli, for instance, analyzes with his usual acuteness the historically difficult evidence on slave-based agriculture in Sicily in the period of the slave rebellions, concluding that it was indeed a period of growing latifundism and that Roman-citizen proprietors had an important hand in this. Giardina's article explores the forms of Roman exploitation of southern Italy in the period after the Hannibalic War, with especially useful comments on the trade in timber. Frederiksen describes "the evolution of speculative agriculture" in Campania between Hannibal and the end of the Republic (the last paragraph has unfortunately become rather gnomic as the result of a translator's error or a misprint). Somewhat more tangentially, Clemente shows with learning and elegance how the sumptuary laws of the

second century B.C. arose from the aristocracy's natural desire to prevent the new flood of wealth from upsetting the existing relationships of political dependence; Talamanca attempts with precision and only a moderate amount of conjecture to trace the relationship between the opinions of the second century B.C. jurists and the social class they belonged to. Labate contributes a very sensible section on the "Epicureanism" of Atticus and its effects (iii.141–56).

Between "base" and "superstructure" comes the second volume, on trade. This should be read in conjunction with *MAAR* 36 (1980) (*The Seaborne Commerce of Ancient Rome. Studies in Archaeology and History*), where, for example, A. Tchernia comments on Panella's Pisa paper on the wine trade. It must be said, however, that even after these publications some large questions about Italian trade remain incompletely answered. For some time now a dispute has been smouldering between a "minimizing" and a "maximizing" estimate of the importance of Italian trade in general, a largely futile dispute so far since it has been conducted in vague terms (and it may be that the "minimizers" are little more than a mirage). Most of the contributors to this volume, certainly Carandini, are "maximizers." But it would be useful to ask how much impact exporting had on the Italian (or central Italian) economy (how typical in fact was the Sestius enterprise, analyzed by Manacorda?). And to what extent did the growth of Italian exports in the late Republic result from the availability of slave labor? The Istituto Gramsci view is evidently that Italian goods became more competitive because of the systematic and ruthless way in which slave labor was exploited in Italy (cf. Mario Torelli in P. Zanker, ed., *Hellenismus in Mittelitalien* [Göttingen 1976] 497), which is reasonable enough, but perhaps not a sufficient explanation of the whole phenomenon (and for an alternative theory, worthy of further consideration, see Crawford's remarks in iii.275–83).

However, the most disappointing aspect of this collection is that it has quite little to say about the actual rise and fall of the slave system of production. Many, though not all, of the contributors assume that the period under discussion extends roughly from 200 B.C. to 200 A.D. But when, how, and why did the system come into being? Carandini, who heavily emphasizes discontinuity (ii.250–52; these pages should be read with the comments of La Penna, iii.288–90), claims that the important break occurred around the end of the Second Punic War, but this dubious assertion is scarcely defended. If we are searching for the time when slave labor became a truly major factor in the Roman economy, we ought to do so systematically, and the preferred period probably should be earlier than 202. For when did there emerge a Roman elite which drew a large surplus from slave labor? It is hard to see how this event can be dated later than the massive enslavements of the 290s, and it could easily be argued that the date should be earlier than the decline of *nexum* and even before the conquest of Veii. The most useful recent discussion, though it is only brief, is in Finley's *Ancient Society and Modern Ideology* ([New York 1980] 82–86), which appeared too late to be considered properly here (but see some comments by Clemente in the new periodical *Opus. Rivista internazionale per la storia economica e sociale dell' antichità* 1 [1982] 187–88). The decline of the slave system receives even less attention in the Giardina-Schiavone collection, which is all the more regrettable since Carandini holds that it began "già con gli inizi del principato" (ii.252)—not an obvious truth. What a Marxist historian

can offer on this latter problem can now be seen in G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, *The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World* ([London 1981] esp. 233–43). The question of the slave supply in the first and second centuries A.D. is clearly critical and is not confronted here.

Such complaints should not, however, distract attention from the extraordinarily high quality of almost all the work published in these proceedings. Both technical competence and breadth of vision are present in abundance. The chasm between archaeologists and historians is successfully bridged, an achievement which we ought to emulate more often in the United States.

Finally, these volumes are dedicated to the memory of Martin Frederiksen, whose death in July 1980 was such a disaster for the fields of archaeology and ancient history. They lead one who knew him to imagine what he might have thought of their contents, how he would have cogitated the subtle and original points in the best papers, and also how he would have picked out the redeeming features of the weaker ones. As ever, he would have been the most open-minded of commentators. As ever, he would effortlessly have crossed and recrossed the cultural barriers between England and Italy. The work under review, imperfect though it naturally is, exemplifies many of the intellectual attractions which always made the journey to Italy worthwhile.

WILLIAM V. HARRIS

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

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